The Kashmir conflict has been one of the most important unresolved issues in relations between India and Pakistan since August 1947. It emerged almost simultaneously with the emergence of two independent dominions on the territory of the former British India and directly affects the development of relations between the two neighboring countries. Despite the fact that New Delhi and Islamabad are currently experiencing a period of normalization of relations and are following the path of an "integrated dialogue"1, including discussion of the Kashmir issue, the parties are still far from a final solution to this urgent problem. However, the current conditions make the situation in this region unstable, and under certain circumstances the pendulum of relations may swing in the opposite direction from the political dialogue. Against the background of the general warming of relations and the establishment of constructive cooperation in recent years, Delhi and Islamabad may have found it more acceptable to freeze the Kashmir issue for a while, so that it does not become an obstacle to bilateral dialogue in other areas of relations. However, this does not mean that the Kashmir card cannot be played again. This is especially true in Pakistan, where support for the Kashmir Brothers is one of the main ways to consolidate society, and for the country's leadership it is a cornerstone of foreign policy. It is not without reason that in recent years, the President of Pakistan, General Pervez Musharraf, has repeatedly made proposals for concrete measures and steps to resolve the conflict.

Today, the former principality of Jammu and Kashmir is located at the junction of five states-India, Pakistan, China, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. The territory of Jammu and Kashmir is 222,236 square kilometers. It is generally considered that Jammu and Kashmir is "divided" between three states. Under the actual control of India is 99 thousand square kilometers, about 84 thousand square kilometers are controlled by Pakistan, a little less than 40 thousand square kilometers-by China [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, p. 157]. The main rivals here are India and Pakistan, which are separated by the Line of Control established after the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971.Meanwhile, the "Chinese" sector has no direct relation to the Kashmir conflict itself and is a legacy of a long-standing cartographic dispute between India and China over their border.

The western section of the India-China border passes through the remote mountainous regions of the Himalayas and Tibet, which are characterized by a diverse ethnic and religious composition. Due to the geographical conditions and low population of this peculiar "buffer" zone between the two states, it is extremely difficult to demarcate this area.-

1 The negotiation process between the two countries, which is being conducted in the format of an integrated dialogue, was initiated by the meeting of the Prime Minister of India and the President of Pakistan on January 5, 2004 in Islamabad within the framework of the 12th summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

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register an interstate border. The history of this dispute is connected with the relations between British India and China in the mid - late XIX century.The reason for the disagreement is that when defining the borders of British possessions in India with China, two cartographic traditions developed. According to the first, the border ran along the so-called McCartney-MacDonald line, and part of the principality of Jammu and Kashmir - Aksai Chin-remained on the Chinese side. However, Great Britain, concerned at that time about the growing Russian threat in Central Asia, considered it necessary to move the border of its possessions deeper into China, and the Governor-General of British India, Lord Curzon, accepted the proposal to draw the border along the so-called Ardag-Johnson line along the Kuenlun Ridge. Thus, the Indians, having inherited the British cartographic traditions, on maps issued after their country gained independence, included the entire territory of Aksai Chin in the Indian Union.2
China's position on the Indo-Pakistani conflict in Kashmir is rather restrained. Beijing hopes for a peaceful solution to this problem through negotiations between Delhi and Islamabad. The India-China border dispute is not directly linked to the Kashmir issue, but is only related to the 1963 agreement between Pakistan and China on the demarcation of the border between China's Xinjiang and the Pakistan-controlled Northern Hunza Region.

The territory of the former principality of Jammu and Kashmir can be roughly divided into four historical, geographical and cultural areas. A single entity was the province of Kashmir, which is now part of the Indian state, and Azad Kashmir, which is under the jurisdiction of Pakistan. The other part is Jammu with a majority Hindu population. Another area is Ladakh, where more than half of the population is Buddhist. The Northern Territories are singled out separately. However, in geopolitical terms, Jammu and Kashmir consists of two parts - Indian and Pakistani.

The northernmost and strategically important Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir includes three administrative regions: Jammu - a narrow strip of the Punjab Valley, the foothills and Pir Panjal range (the state's winter capital is located in Jammu); Kashmir - the Kashmir Valley (the state's summer capital, Srinagar, is located here) and the Great Himalayan Range Ladakh is a high-altitude plateau on the border with Tibet (Baranov, 2003, p. 4).

Before partition, according to the 1941 census, the population of the principality of Jammu and Kashmir was 4.02 million people, 77% of whom were Muslims, 20% were Hindus, 3% were Sikhs and adherents of other faiths [South Asia, 1999, p. 104] According to the 1981 census, the population of "Indian" Kashmir was about 6 million people, of which 64.2% were Muslims, 32.25% were Hindus, 2.23% were Sikhs, the rest were Buddhists, Christians, etc. [Belokrenitsky, 2003, p. 157]. 3.1 million people (95% Sunni Muslims) lived in the Kashmir Valley; 2.7 million in Jammu (66% Hindus) and 134.4 thousand in Ladakh (50% of the population profess Lamaist Buddhism and 44% Islam) [Stobdan, 1996, p. 130; Jammu and Kashmir...In the late 1970s, Ladakh was divided into two districts: Leh, where 80% of the population is Buddhist and the remainder is Sunni Muslim, and Kargil, where 80% of the population is Shia Muslim. All regions of Jammu and Kashmir differ from each other in their natural conditions, historical past, national, ethnic and religious composition.

Under the jurisdiction of Pakistan are the so-called Azad Kashmir ("Free Kashmir")formed in 1947 with its capital in Muzaffarabad and adjacent-

2 For more information on the history of the India-China border, see, for example: [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, and Shaumyan, 2003, p. 49, 68; Shaumyan, 2002, p. 63-71; Lamb, 1991, p. 17-53; Calvin, 1984; Maxwell, 1962].

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the Northern Territories that belong to it. According to the 1981 census, Azad Kashmir had a population of about 1.98 million, while the Northern Territories had a population of 0.575 million. [Belokrenitsky, 2003, p. 157]. Most of the residents of Azad Kashmir speak Punjabi, Kashmiri and Pashto, and the religion is Sunni Muslims, who make up about 99% of the population here. A special place is occupied by the Northern Territories, which include the districts of Gilgit and Baltistan, whose population is 90% Muslim, and the rest-mainly Buddhists. Moreover, in Baltistan-mainly Shiite Muslims, and in Gilgit-Ismailis. Azad Kashmir's Muslims practice Sunni Islam.

According to 2001 estimates, the population of "Indian" Kashmir was about 10 million, and that of "Pakistani" Kashmir was about 4.14 million. [Kashmir Study Group..., 2005] Thus, the population of the entire former principality compared to the beginning of the 1940s. increased by about 3.5 times. Since the 1980s, the population of each of the parts - the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir and "Pakistani" Kashmir-has grown by about 1.5 times.

After the formation of two sovereign states in August 1947 - India and Pakistan - both of them began to seek the annexation of Kashmir to their territories. Repeated attempts to reach an agreement on the ownership of Kashmir, its status, relations between Delhi and Islamabad with the parts of the former principality under their control, as well as on other newly emerging problems, were not crowned with real success either at the bilateral or international level.

Despite the existence of several international and bilateral agreements and resolutions on Kashmir, the solution to this problem is not even a matter of the near future. One of the reasons for disagreements is the complex and multi-level nature of the conflict: over the decades, not only the composition, but also the characteristics of the participants in the Kashmir confrontation have changed. Under the influence of internal and external factors, the "Kashmir tangle" has become even more complicated, moving from the local level of bilateral relations to the macro-regional and, in a certain aspect, to the global level. Internal factors in both countries began to play a major role in the conflict. Such a complex problem does not have a simple and unambiguous solution, especially given the new factors such as Islamist terrorism and separatism.

The key reasons hindering the final settlement process are the opposite and unchanging initial positions of Delhi and Islamabad on this issue.

The fundamental points of the two countries ' positions are as follows::

* Pakistan considers the Kashmir issue unresolved in principle and insists on the right of the Kashmiri people to self-determination through a plebiscite based on UN Security Council Resolution 1948. In turn, India, referring to the Act of Accession of the Principality of Jammu and Kashmir to the Indian Union in 1947, considers the issue as a whole resolved, and the problem, from its point of view, is only the illegal occupation of a part of Indian territory by Pakistan.

* New Delhi insists that the conflict is bilateral in nature and can be resolved through negotiations based on the Simla Agreements of 1972 and in the spirit of the Lahore Declaration of 1999, without the participation of any intermediaries. Islamabad has repeatedly tried to give the conflict an international status.

* Until recently, Pakistan assumed that without resolving the Kashmir issue, it is impossible to successfully and constructively develop relations with India, which, in turn, considers this issue only one of many other points of bilateral relations.

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THE KASHMIR ISSUE AND THE UN SECURITY COUNCIL

The first international documents on Kashmir are the UN Security Council resolutions. In October 1947, after the formal annexation of Jammu and Kashmir to India, one-third of which was already held by Pakistan, Indian troops were sent there, stopping the offensive of the invading military detachments from Pakistan on the approaches to the capital of the principality, Srinagar [Shaumyan, 1999, p.28]. Thus began the first armed conflict between India and Pakistan, which lasted more than a year. January 1, 1948 India has appealed to the UN Security Council accusing Pakistan of meddling in Kashmir's internal affairs. On January 15, 1948, Pakistan filed a response complaint against India to the UN Security Council, claiming that India was suppressing "a popular uprising against the despotic regime of the ruler of the principality, Maharaja Hari Singh" [Lamb, 1994, p. 164-167; Shaumyan, 1999, p. 29].

On January 17, 1948, the Security Council adopted resolution No. 38, which legally established the involvement of the UN in this conflict, but did not contain any specific proposals, except for an appeal to both sides to resolve their differences peacefully [Krysin and Skorokhodova, 2004, p. 215], and on January 20, in accordance with Security Council resolution No. 39, a mediation commission was established. UN Commission consisting of representatives of three UN member States (later the Commission was expanded to five members in accordance with Resolution No. 47 of April 2, 1948)3. The main task of the Commission was to prepare the plebiscite.

The Commission's work resulted in the adoption of a resolution on August 13, 1948, recommending that India and Pakistan resolve the issue by plebiscite after the ceasefire and withdrawal of troops. The withdrawal of all Pakistani troops from the state was stipulated in detail, along with the fact that India would withdraw most of its troops, leaving only forces to maintain peace and order. After that, the UN can establish the post of administrator by plebiscite [UN Resolution..., 1948]. Meanwhile, what was fixed on paper turned out to be difficult to implement in practice. When adopting resolutions, the Security Council relied on existing documents, recognizing as legitimate the Act of Accession of Jammu and Kashmir to India, signed by the ruler of the principality Hari Singh on October 26, 1947.However, Pakistan at one time did not recognize the annexation of all of Jammu and Kashmir to India, so this position was unacceptable for it. From his point of view, it was a mistake not to take into account that on October 24, 1947, i.e. a few days before the signing of the Act of Accession, the establishment of the Azad Kashmir Government was announced with the assistance of Pakistan. At the same time, Pakistan announced the annexation of the Baltistan and Gilgit political agencies located in the north of Kashmir, as well as the Hunza, Nagar and other principalities controlled by the latter. Of course, based on this, Pakistan could not recognize the legality of the Act of Accession on October 26, and, from its point of view, the Security Council's demand for the withdrawal of all Pakistani troops and only part of Indian ones was unacceptable. Thus, the UN Security Council resolution (including the one on holding a plebiscite) turned out to be unenforceable, since it did not take into account the fact that the competing parties had different ideas about the initial fundamental question of belonging to the territory.

Moreover, over time, the difference in understanding of territorial affiliation was legally fixed by India and Pakistan.

3 Among the members of the UN Commission for India and Pakistan were: Czechoslovakia (proposed by India), Belgium and Colombia (appointed by the Security Council as additional members of the Commission on April 23, 1948), Argentina (proposed by Pakistan), the United States (appointed Chairman of the Security Council on May 7, 1948).

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One of the most important provisions of the Constitution of Jammu and Kashmir, 4 which came into force on 26 January 1957, is that the State of Jammu and Kashmir is declared "an integral part of the Indian Union". The borders of the state include all territories that were under the suzerainty of the ruler of the principality on August 15, 1947 [Constitution of the State of Jammu and Kashmir], including the part of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir occupied by Pakistan and territories that actually belong to China. This provision was recorded in the 1956 State Reorganization Act, as well as in the 1954 and 1955 Constitutional amendments.

According to Indian legal experts, there is no doubt that the Act of Accession of the principality legally and irrevocably made it part of the territory of India, and the Indian Government was given the right to exercise its jurisdiction over the principality in matters covered by the accession agreement. At the same time, it is emphasized that if, despite this, the Indian Government has given assurances regarding the need to confirm the accession or the constitutional relationship between India and the population of the principality, this does not mean the right of any third party to declare the incompleteness of the legal act itself.

Pakistan, in turn, put forward the following provisions::

- the annexation of the principality was legally invalid;

- The Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir was no longer competent to sign any accession agreement by October 26-27, 1947, as by that time he had lost control of the Gilgit district, and in Poonch his authority was effectively abolished on October 24, 1947 by proclaiming and creating Azad Kashmir. From the Pakistani point of view, at the time of signing the annexation agreement, the Maharaja ruled only in the districts of Jammu and Ladakh (Lamb, 1994, p. 150).;

- Based on the fact that the Act of Accession was "conditional", the ruler of Jammu and Kashmir had to find out the opinion of his people regarding the future affiliation of the principality.

The Constitution of Pakistan (Article 257) preserves continuity on Kashmir issues and contains a separate article on Kashmir, which states that when the people of Jammu and Kashmir decide to join Pakistan, relations between Pakistan and the said state will be determined in accordance with the will of the people of that state [Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan]. On the one hand, this provides a legal basis for the separation of this territory from India and its inclusion in its own composition. On the other hand, this article of the Constitution obliges Pakistan to give up its claim to Kashmir if the population votes to join India.

Military operations in Kashmir were terminated on January 1, 1949. In accordance with the recommendation of the UN Commission, July 18, 1949 India and Pakistan have started negotiations on a truce and demarcation of the ceasefire line that divides Kashmir into two zones. However, the decision to hold a plebiscite, taken in December 1948, was not implemented either at that time or subsequently, as the parties were not ready to withdraw their troops from the areas of Kashmir under their control.

In its last report of December 9, 1949, the Commission stated that it had exhausted all possibilities of mediation and failed to reach an agreement on the demilitarization of Jammu and Kashmir, which was a necessary condition for holding a plebiscite [Krysin and Skorokhodova, 2004, p.256].

4 Jammu and Kashmir is the only Indian state with its own Constitution. Its special status is also enshrined in Article 370 of the Constitution of India.

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PLEBISCITE: PROS AND CONS

The provision of the UN Security Council resolution on holding a plebiscite is constantly referred to by representatives of the Pakistani side, recalling the fact that at one time Indian leaders also recognized the right of Kashmiris to a plebiscite or referendum.

According to Islamabad, both sides (India and Pakistan) have recognized these Security Council resolutions, respectively, and their provisions, including on holding a plebiscite, remain in force. According to the UN Charter, the Security Council can make a legally binding decision, which is final and can only be reviewed by the Council itself due to newly discovered circumstances. This provision of the Charter has been invoked for many decades by opponents of the annexation of Jammu and Kashmir to India, while at the same time demanding that the Indian side unconditionally and fully implement these resolutions. It should be noted that the resolutions of the Security Council and its Commission mentioned above provided for holding a plebiscite throughout the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, subject to normalization of the situation, non-recognition of the Government of Azad Kashmir, disarmament of the armed forces of Azad Kashmir, refusal to grant special status to the territory occupied by Pakistan to the detriment of the interests of Jammu and Kashmir. Thus, without fulfilling the demand for demilitarization and withdrawal of Pakistani troops, the Indian side does not intend to discuss the issue of holding a plebiscite.

However, even if we hypothetically imagine that both sides agreed to a referendum, many questions immediately arise about the terms of its holding. The first and most important question is whether the vote should be held in the entire territory of the former Principality of Jammu and Kashmir (hence, in the territory of Azad Kashmir), or separately in the main districts, or only in the Kashmir Valley. The second issue, no less important, concerns the proposals that will be put to the vote, i.e., which option will be put forward: joining either India or Pakistan, or allowing the Territory to vote for independence. At the same time, the question immediately arises: the independence of which "Kashmir"?

According to some Indian experts, even at the initial stage of the Kashmir conflict, the plebiscite, as an "ideal" and, in fact, democratic solution, was extremely difficult to implement [Sisir, 1967, p. 470]. It is difficult to disagree with this opinion, given the multi-ethnic and multi-confessional composition of the population of the former principality.

If the plebiscite is held across the entire territory of the former principality, the result will largely be determined by voting in the most populous part - in the Kashmir Valley, where Muslims live. In this case, it is unlikely that the results of the referendum will reflect the wishes of the entire population of Jammu and Kashmir, and therefore they can be questioned and appealed. Holding the referendum separately in each administrative part of Jammu and Kashmir may lead to the division of the territory into smaller entities, splitting primarily "Indian" Kashmir, since the results of voting in Jammu and Ladakh are likely to differ from the results in the Valley. In addition, there may be a situation when some "Muslim areas" vote, for example, for joining Pakistan, and others for independence. This is unlikely to satisfy both Islamabad and Delhi. We should not forget that terrorist organizations are still operating in Jammu and Kashmir, which are unlikely to remain "on the sidelines" both during the preparation of the referendum and at the time of its holding. It is unlikely that voting "at gunpoint" will be objective. It also remains an open question about what to do if

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The majority of Kashmiris will vote for independence from both India and Pakistan, and this option is largely unacceptable for either Delhi or Islamabad. In addition, if the relative political independence of Jammu and Kashmir is still real, will it be able to become economically independent, and, therefore, how will this "state" exist? Tourism could be a possible source of income for an "independent" Kashmir. However, creating the necessary tourist infrastructure will require a lot of financial costs and time. But the main problem still remains the need to ensure security, in particular, it is necessary to destroy terrorist gangs and eradicate hotbeds of Islamist radicalism in Kashmir.

Holding a referendum in modern conditions, and especially implementing its results, is difficult and quite dangerous. Over the past 60 years, both parts of Kashmir have become politically and economically integrated into India and Pakistan, respectively. For several generations, Kashmiris have actually grown up in different countries. Even if a plebiscite can be held, it is difficult to assume that some territory of one country will be painlessly incorporated into another. The situation is particularly complicated by the growing reluctance among Kashmiris to enter either India or Pakistan and the growing desire for independence. It is absolutely clear that the actual forcible annexation of part of the territory of one State to another under such conditions will lead to an even greater crisis.

IS KASHMIR'S INDEPENDENCE POSSIBLE?

One of the proposed solutions to the Kashmir problem is to grant it independence, the so-called third option (after a hypothetical accession to India or Pakistan). According to this option, the status of Jammu and Kashmir, which was before the partition, should be restored and an independent state created. This proposal has quite a lot of supporters in Kashmir, for example, the influential political movement "Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front" [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2003, p.186]. In particular, the head of the Front, Amanullah Khan, wrote in one of his articles in the mid-1990s: "A future independent Kashmir, like Switzerland, should be neutral, having friendly relations and trade relations with all neighboring countries "(Ashraf, 2003, p. 30). However, the same leader advocates armed struggle to create a" neutral " Kashmir. According to Amanullah Khan, an independent Kashmir will include five federal entities (Kashmir Valley, Jammu, Ladakh, Azad Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan), each with internal autonomy and elected governments. According to this plan, the state will be headed by a bicameral parliament. Such a state and administrative structure, according to the leader of the Front, will only strengthen the already existing socio-economic, political and administrative ties between "Indian" Kashmir, Azad Kashmir, Gilgit and Baltistan (Khan, 1995).

However, even without independence, Kashmir appears to face national, religious and ethnic contradictions that are ignored by proponents of this path of development. To create a single independent state, it is necessary, if not the unity of the people, then at least the absence of interethnic and inter-religious contradictions. The struggle of Kashmiri nationalists is being waged under the flag of self-determination for Kashmiris, which is based on the ideology of "Kashmiri identity "(kashmiriyat). It is understood that Hindus and Muslims living in Jammu and Kashmir represent a certain national community-the Kashmiri people - and associate themselves not so much with India or Pakistan as with India.

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with Kashmir. The question of the unity of the Kashmiri people, the Kashmiri identity, and whether the Kashmiri population is ready for unification and independence is still open. The creation of an independent Kashmir is most likely possible under Islamic slogans, which, in turn, may contribute to the development of a struggle under the slogan of self-determination on religious grounds.

An independent Kashmir is obviously completely unacceptable for the Indian side, as well as the option of independence of any part of Jammu and Kashmir. Independent Kashmir is a direct threat to the territorial integrity and security of India. Any variants of such a development could create a dangerous precedent for the emergence of a sovereign state as a result of the "armed struggle for independence" on the basis of ethnic and confessional separatism. The "Balkanization" of Jammu and Kashmir will cause a sharp escalation of the situation on the subcontinent and throughout the region, given that two de facto nuclear powers will be drawn into a potential conflict. We should not forget that the events will unfold in one of the most unstable and explosive regions of the world, in the immediate vicinity of Afghanistan, from where the flames of Islamic extremism have repeatedly spread to Kashmir. Instability in Kashmir will affect the interests of the four States at the junction of which it is located, and whose territorial integrity may be seriously damaged.

An independent Kashmir will not only set a dangerous "separatist" precedent in India, but will also lead to increased nationalist and separatist sentiment almost everywhere in South Asia, primarily in Pakistan (where there are nationalist movements among Pashtuns, in Balochistan and Sindh). In addition, if the issue of independence becomes a practical issue, the Northern Territories, including the part of the Pakistan-China Agreement of 1963.5, will be the subject of serious disagreements.

It is unlikely that the future of independent Kashmir will be as bright as the supporters of this idea imagine it to be. In a multi - ethnic and multi - confessional society-mostly clan-based-the struggle for power, up to armed clashes among various groups and organizations of Kashmiris themselves, is fraught with further destabilization of the situation.

It is likely that Delhi and Islamabad will try to prevent the Kashmir issue from being resolved by granting it independence. By and large, this does not suit either the Indian or Pakistani sides. Although Pakistan does not forget to remind that the solution of the Kashmir problem should take into account the interests and aspirations of Kashmiris first of all, and Islamabad's position on the issue of "independent Kashmir" is less harsh than that of Delhi, it is unlikely that the leadership of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan seriously considers this option as final in resolving the conflict.

5 At the turn of the 1950s and 1960s, Pakistan began negotiations with China to resolve the issue of the border separating Chinese Xinjiang and Hunza Principality in the Northern Territories controlled by Pakistan. In March 1963, a temporary border demarcation agreement was signed, under which China ceded about 2 thousand square kilometers of the border strip to Pakistan in exchange for agreeing not to take into account the claims of the Hunza principality in the territory north of the Karakorum Range. The agreement states that when the fate of Kashmir is resolved, the Chinese leadership will enter into negotiations with the government of the country that will belong to Jammu and Kashmir.

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OTHER WAYS TO RESOLVE THE CONFLICT

There are several options for addressing the Kashmir issue, with the United Nations playing a major role. One of the proposals is that the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir should be placed under UN trusteeship for a period of 20-25 years, and then the Kashmiri population could be granted the right to self-determination. In other words, it would have opted for joining India or Pakistan, or for independence. During the period of UN trusteeship, the entire territory of Jammu and Kashmir is fully demilitarized, including in Azad Kashmir, Gilgit, Baltistan, Jammu and Ladakh, and military control is carried out by international peace forces under the auspices of the UN Trusteeship Council. It is expected that during these 20-25 years, relations between India and Pakistan will reach such a constructive and friendly level that the Kashmir issue can be easily resolved. Proponents of this plan believe that after the trusteeship period expires, Kashmiris will choose independence, and Delhi and Islamabad will become guarantors of Jammu and Kashmir's security and sovereignty.

It is unlikely that all ties between Jammu and Kashmir with India and Pakistan, respectively, will be severed in 25 years, so it is not at all obvious that when the question of a referendum is raised, the people of Kashmir will speak out in favor of creating their own independent state. Consequently, the question of ownership of this territory will again arise, old problems will arise again, only "postponed" for a quarter of a century.

Even if we assume that India will abandon its rigid position regarding the participation of a third party in the settlement of the Kashmir issue and at least in some capacity the international community will "get involved" in this process, then the question of the effectiveness of UN control will arise due to the huge costs and armed clashes that are likely to continue in this region. Of course, we can assume that India-Pakistan relations will improve qualitatively, but they are unlikely to become so cloudless that the Kashmir issue will be put to rest. It is also unlikely that during the period of establishment of UN trusteeship, the unification of such different "Indian" and "Pakistani" parts of Kashmir, which have existed separately for about 60 years, will be successful and peaceful.

In fact, for all the past decades, the Kashmir dispute was fought between two powers, but this conflict between the two countries also had an important domestic component, especially for India. Since the late 80s of the XX century. For India, the internal political aspect of the Kashmir problem has come to the fore, and the danger of separatism in the state of Jammu and Kashmir has become a real threat both to the territorial integrity of the country and to one of the fundamental principles of Indian statehood - secularism [Baranov, 2003, p.22]. Mass discontent of the Kashmiri population and accusations against the Indian authorities of rigging the results of voting in the 1987 Legislative Assembly elections, as well as a number of other internal and external reasons, led to the beginning of the" uprising " in the Kashmir Valley in December 1989. It was during this period that Kashmiri separatism acquired the characteristics of radical Islamism, and Kashmir became one of the centers of international Islamic extremism.

For six decades, the Central Indian authorities have been trying to resolve their" internal " Kashmir conflict. The uncertainty of the political situation in the Indian state largely complicates the settlement of the conflict at the interstate level. In addition to facing purely internal difficulties along the Delhi-Srinagar line, Indians are forced to confront those political and extremist forces that are supported by Pakistan. A certain difficulty for the federal government is that in the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir in the

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Several groups are actively involved in political life, which can be roughly divided into: a) legal parties participating in legislative elections (National Conference, INC, People's Democratic Party, Patriotic Popular Front of Jammu and Kashmir, etc.); b) semi-legally active parties, as a rule, in support of the independence process Kashmir, or its accession to Pakistan (Freedom All-Party Conference, Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front); c) illegal parties engaged in armed struggle and members of the Joint Jihad Council.

Some Indian and Kashmiri politicians support the idea of granting Kashmir autonomy, which should be expressed in the transfer of the widest possible administrative, financial and legislative powers to Srinagar. Among Kashmiri politicians, there are also many supporters of "maximum" autonomy, in which Delhi retains only defense and foreign policy issues, and all other powers are transferred to Kashmiris [Kashmir: The View From New Delhi, 2003, с 21]. Moreover, these powers are distributed among the regions formed according to the religious principle: "Muslim" Kashmir," Hindu "Jammu and" Buddhist " Ladakh. The option of autonomy for each of these regions is also considered [Yousaf, 2004, p. 27]. Traditionally, these proposals are rejected by the Indian authorities, who fear the intensification of centrifugal processes in the state and the potential disintegration of the country in the future.

Most experts believe that the most acceptable solution to the problem is to consolidate the status quo in Kashmir and recognize the line of control as the state border. Such a proposal has been repeatedly made by representatives of both the Indian and Pakistani sides.6
For Islamabad, the establishment of a state border along the line of control is even more unacceptable than for Delhi. Pakistan, which does not recognize the current situation in Kashmir and describes it as an "unresolved territorial problem", cannot accept the consolidation of the" disputed " status quo. [Kashmir: The View From Islamabad, 2003, с. 26]. At the same time, some Pakistani analysts support such a solution, in which the line of control would become a "transparent" state border (soft international border) with maximum autonomy for both parts of Kashmir and free movement of Kashmiris across this border. However, this option is ruled out by some of the Pakistani military, for whom the line of control is something that Pakistan has already fought three wars over [Kashmir: The View From Islamabad, 2003, p. 26]. Islamabad believes that an open border in Kashmir is possible only if relations between the two countries as a whole normalize.

In fact, the recognition of the line of control as the state Indo-Pakistani border will mean the division of Kashmir. Realist politicians in both Delhi and Islamabad are leaning towards such a decision, but so far this position remains unacceptable for the official circles of both countries. Although Delhi has periodically indicated that it would be satisfied with maintaining the status quo in Kashmir, Indian leaders have repeatedly said that Kashmir is an integral part of the country and demanded that Pakistan return the occupied part. However, the Pakistani leadership is well aware that numerous separatist and extremist groups in the region are actively involved in the fight against terrorism.-

6 Thus, as early as 1963, at the talks between the Foreign Ministers of India and Pakistan, Swaran Singh and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the Indian side proposed to formalize the ceasefire line established on July 27, 1949. This proposal was not supported by the Pakistani leadership. At a meeting of the leaders of India and Pakistan in 1972 in Simla, an agreement was signed under which both sides pledged to resolve existing issues between them by peaceful means - through bilateral negotiations. The parties also pledged to respect the line of de facto control established by December 17, 1971, as a result of the Indo-Pakistani war.

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However, the influential Kashmiri diaspora abroad is unlikely to agree with such a solution to the problem in the near future. In addition, official recognition and consolidation of the border will force the Pakistani authorities to abandon the traditional requirement to hold a plebiscite to determine the fate of Kashmir and actually betray the Kashmiri brothers, whose interests Islamabad has so zealously defended for decades [Yousaf, 2004, p. 15].

We should not forget that not all political forces in Kashmir itself agree to consolidate the status quo. Supporters of turning the line of control into a state border are usually representatives of pro-Indian political parties and movements (for example, the National Conference). The same forces that stand on the positions of independent Kashmir cannot accept the option of its actual division.

KASHMIR ISSUE IN BILATERAL RELATIONS: NEW STAGE

The Kashmir issue is still on the agenda of the Indo-Pakistani talks. Launched in 2004, the "comprehensive" political dialogue between the two countries also includes discussions on the Kashmir issue. However, even amid the warming of relations, Delhi does not stop accusing Islamabad of supporting terrorists. The Indian authorities are convinced that the situation in the state will return to normal if Kashmiri separatists do not receive support from Pakistan.

At the same time, the Indian leadership does not give up trying to solve the "internal" Kashmir problem. Thus, since the beginning of 2004, the Indian Government has engaged in a political dialogue with Kashmiri separatists. Several rounds of talks with the moderate wing of the All-Party Freedom Conference focused on the status of Jammu and Kashmir and respect for human rights in the state.

In November 2004, the Indian Government developed a broad solution program based on an integrated approach. It provided for the development of economic infrastructure in the state, solving social problems of the population, developing dialogue with Kashmiri groups, etc.The key provision of the program was the promise to gradually withdraw Indian military formations from Jammu and Kashmir. Indian authorities have called on the Kashmiri population and political parties to join forces with the federal government to build a" new Kashmir " [Finally India's...].

These proposals of Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh were a kind of response to the proposals for a Kashmir settlement made public earlier, in October 2004, by Pakistani President P. Musharraf. At a meeting in New York with the Indian Prime Minister, he announced the demilitarization of the entire territory of the former principality of Jammu and Kashmir and the further division of its constituent areas in accordance with the ethnic and religious characteristics of the majority of the population living there, as well as on the basis of linguistic and geographical differences [Musharraf's New...].

As a follow-up to these proposals, on December 5, 2006, speaking on the Indian channel NDTV, P. Musharraf stated that his country is ready to give up its claims to Kashmir if India agrees to the Pakistani formula for solving this problem. His "road map" consisted of four points: 1) the free movement of residents of both parts of Kashmir is ensured, while existing borders remain unchanged; 2) the region receives self-government or autonomy, but not independence; 3) a phased withdrawal of troops is carried out; 4) "a joint supervision mechanism" is established, including representatives of Pakistan, India and Kashmir [Musharraf's Terms...; No Formal...].

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The reaction of the Indian side to this initiative of the Pakistani president was rather restrained. Official Delhi only stated that India is against changing borders, but for establishing peace in the region. Real progress in the Kashmir settlement, as well as the possibility of mutual demilitarization of the region, is possible, from the Indian point of view, only if Pakistan stops supporting cross-border terrorism. As long as Delhi does not receive firm guarantees, and most importantly real confirmation that Islamabad is not involved in terrorist activities in India, the question of "transparency" of the border in Kashmir and freedom of movement across it will remain.

In Pakistan, the President's initiative also provoked a mixed reaction. The opposition accused him of abandoning his long-standing support for the 1948 UN Security Council resolution. In Kashmir itself, representatives of various political forces also expressed doubt and disagreement with the proposals of P. Musharraf (Topychkanov, 2006).

Meanwhile, the Pakistani "formula" was widely supported abroad - in the United States and Europe. It can be assumed that official Islamabad puts forward various options for resolving the Kashmir issue, which are impossible to implement in advance by the Indian side and cause disputes within Kashmir, in order to demonstrate Pakistan's "flexible and constructive" approaches to solving the problem and thereby create a favorable foreign policy environment.

Since India is forced to reject these proposals because they are unacceptable to itself, it is presented in an unfavorable light. Delhi is trying to solve the "Kashmir problem" on two levels: as a domestic and bilateral problem. Moreover, both of these levels are closely interrelated, primarily due to Pakistan's support for some extremist political forces operating in "Indian" Kashmir. To date, the main task for Delhi is not so much the settlement of the Kashmir conflict, but rather the implementation of steps towards strengthening confidence-building measures between the two countries and curbing cross-border terrorism from the territory of Pakistan. Islamabad traditionally focuses on the final settlement of the dispute as the basis for further normalization of relations with Delhi. If there is a difference in the approaches of the two countries, the settlement process may take many more years.

* * *

It seems that the positions of the opposing sides are so static because of the "powerful force of inertia". For 60 years, both countries seem to have come to terms with the conflict situation in Kashmir, which has become an invariable element of their domestic and foreign policies, and the leaders of India and Pakistan have become hostages to the ingrained views of the Kashmir problem in both countries. This problem is increasingly turning into a" bargaining chip " in the games of political forces in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy of both countries. Many experts believe that the solution to this conflict is a matter of the political will of the leadership in Delhi and Islamabad. Even in the late 90's of the XX century. there was an opinion that the de facto conflict has already been resolved and only legal registration of the existing status quo is required. Perhaps the absence of any final documented decisions indicates that both warring parties are interested in the existence of this conflict.

At present, the Kashmir issue has taken a back seat in India-Pakistan relations. However, the desire of India and Pakistan from time to time to "flex their muscles" in Kashmir, to demonstrate resolute intentions towards each other, given their possession of de facto atomic weapons, causes concern.-

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There is serious concern that the conflict between them (including over the issue of Kashmir) could hypothetically escalate into a nuclear one. This not only creates additional challenges for both countries, but also threatens security and stability throughout South Asia.

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