The" godfather "of the creation of the ASEAN organization in 1967, whose name became synonymous with an entire geographical area, was Washington, which sought to create an obstacle to "communist expansion" Since then, Washington has remained its main partner, pursuing a policy of expanding relations both with the regional organization as a whole and on a bilateral basis.

However, due to the end of the Cold War, the rapid economic growth of the newly industrialized countries of Southeast Asia, and the promotion of the task of strengthening the US economic position in the world as the main foreign policy priority of the Clinton administration since the early 1990s, the trade and economic component has become dominant in relations between ASEAN and the United States.

Today, the ASEAN-US nexus faces new challenges and challenges, both generated by the era of globalization and the contradictions caused by decades of rapid development.

These contradictions sometimes become explosive against the backdrop of yet another redistribution of power and influence across the entire Asia-Pacific region, of which Southeast Asia is an integral part. But the very concept of "challenge" includes more than just a threat. It opens up new opportunities and horizons for progress.

THE UNITED STATES IS A MAJOR TRADE AND ECONOMIC PARTNER

The impressive economic success of the ASEAN countries has been achieved primarily due to the export model of "catch - up" development previously tested in Japan and South Korea, their active participation in international economic relations, and now in the globalized economy.

At the same time, trade and economic ties with the United States played a primary, albeit ambiguous, role.

Foreign direct investment in the ASEAN area totaled $ 19.6 billion in 1998 and $ 16.9 billion in 1999, due to the effects of the 1997-1998 financial turmoil over time. At the same time, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce, their direct capital investment increased from $ 1.1 billion in 1998 to $ 9.4 billion in 1999. This sharp increase is attributed to reinvestment of profits and cross-border mergers and acquisitions. In other words, American corporations, taking advantage of the difficult situation of many companies in the ASEAN countries, bought up property that fell in price after the crisis, that is, they acquired existing businesses, and did not create a new one.

ASEAN countries ' exports to the United States in 1999 ($70 billion) exceeded this figure in trade with the European Union ($55.7 billion) and Japan ($37.6 billion). It was almost equal to their intra-Asean exports (74.4 billion), despite the fact that a significant part of the actual trade between the Association countries is accounted for by intra-corporate supplies, that is, trade exchange between branches of multinational corporations located in different countries of the sub-region. More importantly, the ASEAN countries ' trade with the United States is characterized by a permanent and largest surplus, which, for example, in the first half of 1999 was estimated at $ 12.2 billion. This balance covered the negative balance in ASEAN's trade with Japan (five billion dollars in the first five months of 1999).

The growth in ASEAN's overseas exports was driven by the booming US economy, which was experiencing a growing demand for goods from Southeast Asian countries, as well as the sharp devaluation of the currencies of a number of ASEAN countries as a result of the previous crisis. Another positive factor was that in this case, the process of globalization has played more to the benefit of the region's economies than to their detriment. As the London-based Economist noted, the crisis of 1997-1998 was mostly localized within the Southeast Asian region, which made it possible to avoid a simultaneous decline in world markets and preserve export outlets for producers in the region.

Cooperation between ASEAN as an organization and the United States is developing in many directions, covering all new areas. The parties communicate on a bilateral basis, within the framework of regional forums of the ASEAN countries (extended meetings of the leaders of the group's member states, their foreign ministers with colleagues representing countries with the status of dialogue partners), through the US - ASEAN Business Council. The latter deserves special mention as a private non-profit organization that is trusted to hold meetings between the Ministers of economy of the Association's member countries and the American business community, organize various missions and forums (one of the most high-profile actions of the Council was the preparation of a trip to the United States in May 2000).-

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United States delegations from ASEAN countries to boost American investment activities in Southeast Asia).

The traditional set of topics discussed by the United States and ASEAN includes economic and social issues, environmental protection, and regional and international security issues.

Recently, priority has been given to technological cooperation, especially in the field of e-commerce. The President of the Business Council, Ernest Bauer, recently said that the use of Internet technologies is an essential component of the ASEAN reform package, " opening up new opportunities for small and medium-sized businesses in the Association's member countries and leveling the playing field." Given the role of a viable small business as a social stabilizer, this is a far-sighted statement of the question. E-commerce really allows you to make purchases and deliveries, bypassing expensive traditional supply and sales channels, which is especially important for small and medium-sized companies.

Another growing aspect of cooperation is the development and improvement of the institutional environment and regulatory mechanisms. In recent years, ASEAN and the United States have signed a number of documents on cooperation in the field of compliance with trade standards and the application of conformity assessment procedures (testing of products and consumer goods, their certification and quality control). The implementation of this plan will be of considerable practical importance, since it will avoid double verification and certification of goods exchanged by partners. The task of coordinating all work to implement this agreement is assigned to the ASEAN Advisory Council on Standards and Quality, the United States Institute of Standards and Technology, and the United States Office of International Trade. It is expected that the introduction of common standards will significantly reduce the costs of processing trade transactions and increase the volume of mutual trade, primarily with products of the electronic and electrical industries.

First of all, the ASEAN countries that are most advanced in terms of information technology dissemination, and whose exports are dominated by high-value-added industrial products, will benefit. The "digital divide" ^* within ASEAN is more sharply defined, which overlaps with other differences between the members of the grouping.

Another new initiative was the establishment of a Center to evaluate and promote environmentally friendly technologies in line with the implementation of the Hanoi ASEAN Action Plan adopted in 1998. The most urgent task of the dialogue partners is considered to be the fight against cross-border fires in South-East Asia. The US interest is obvious - it is taking care of its own lungs.

WASHINGTON AND ASEAN-BASED INTEGRATION

From the very beginning, the program of the Association was to ensure economic rapprochement of the member countries, create a free trade zone, and implement joint industrial and other multilateral projects. At the same time, in addition to accelerating development and improving the level of well-being, the goal was to reduce dependence on extra-regional powers and markets. But sub-regional integration plans did not and could not serve as a counterbalance to the broader East Asian and Pan-Pacific schemes, because there was a lack of sufficient economic complementarity among the ASEAN "six" of the organization's old, i.e. original, members.

In fact, the true integrators of the ASEAN area are multinational corporations in the United States, Western Europe, and Japan, which are much more interested in removing intraregional barriers than national industrial circles. Both the US government and the private sector support the creation of a unified or enlarged ASEAN market. Within such a market, there will be a freer flow of goods produced by regional branches of American TNCs, as well as capital and advanced technologies. Hence the willingness of the United States to allocate resources for the modernization of customs in the Association countries. The formation of such a market - and ASEAN is moving towards this goal by eliminating duties on intraregional trade or reducing them to a minimum level - should be accompanied by other steps, including the development of communications, the liberalization of air traffic, and so on. It is easy to imagine the resistance of local, protectionist entrepreneurs to such measures.

Due to the similar export structure and international specialization of the ASEAN member countries, intra-regional economic ties do not play such an important role in the total volume of foreign trade operations. This fact alone precludes the possibility of creating a closed trading block within the region. The expansion of the ASEAN countries to include Indochina and Myanmar makes this prospect even less likely. For a number of years, ASEAN has actually pursued a policy of two - speed integration, in which the old members of the organization (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, Singapore, Brunei) follow one schedule, and the newly joined ones follow another. Moreover, due to the particularly severe consequences of the financial crisis and the sharp increase in terrorist activity, Indonesia is now caught between these two charts.

For the ASEAN countries, the American market is incomparably more important than the intra-regional one. For Vietnam, for example, today the task of fully normalizing trade and economic ties with the United States is much more urgent than participating in pan-Asean integration activities.

From time to time, the issue of introducing a duty-free service is discussed-

^* Reducing the gap in computerization and informatization.

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There is no direct trade between the ASEAN countries and the United States, but in reality only Singapore is ripe for this step. In addition, bilateral and sub-regional negotiations on a free trade agreement are also underway within the APEC framework, where, in particular, a group of trade liberalization advocates such as the United States, Australia, New Zealand, Chile and Singapore has formed.

One way or another, all regional discrepancies on this issue will have to be brought to a single denominator, and these will be the conditions and requirements that are imposed on members of the World Trade Organization.

ANOTHER PERESTROIKA

The ASEAN countries have done much to create a favorable business environment and investment climate, attract investment, and are among the first countries in the developing world to learn the lessons of interdependence and the use of comparative advantages in the interregional division of labor.

They have gone so far in this direction that when the crisis of 1997-1998 revealed the scale of unresolved problems, institutional immaturity and insufficient modernization of economic mechanisms, it was a big surprise for many.

The analysis of the underlying causes of the shock events of 1997-1998, carried out by a number of Western and domestic experts, drew attention to some specific features of the economic environment and business behavior in the ASEAN and Asia-Pacific countries, overcoming which should reduce the probability or reduce the damage caused by such disasters.

Among them::

* dominance of financial and industrial groups;

* closed economic systems, where success is ensured not by competitive advantages, but by proximity to those in power;

* excessive investment inflows, negative impact of the "easy" money effect;

* lack of a developed legal framework, failure to comply with court decisions;

* concealment or lack of reliable information, non-transparency of business, non-compliance with international reporting and auditing standards.

The analysis of the disproportions and shortcomings of the economic development of the ASEAN countries leads to the conclusion that the influence that the United States and other Western countries had on the Eastern countries, the evolution and improvement of their institutional environment and legal framework, culture and ethics of doing business, is superficial. However, the countries of the region had a rather limited historical period at their disposal, during which they did not manage to break far from the not very good traditions of Eastern society and the state.

The ASEAN countries will have to rely on the United States and the European Union in the coming restructuring of the severely under-reformed economy and social sphere, if they do not prefer autarky or xenophobic populist policies, which in the context of globalization would again lead to a repeat of the financial crisis of 1997-1998. Based on this, we should predict the future development of the entire complex of relations between the ASEAN countries and the United States.

Apparently, there has not been and will not be a single pan-Asean approach to overcoming the consequences of the crisis and entering the path of self-sustaining growth. The countries of the region have different approaches to economic reform. It is difficult to expect that all tasks will be completed completely. Those countries that demonstrate the greatest commitment to reform and the highest financial and economic discipline will be better off.

If the ASEAN countries do not re-adjust their political and economic mechanisms, they will simply turn away from them, turning to other regions - for example, to Central and Eastern Europe or the CIS, because, unlike during the Cold War, for the sake of strategic considerations alone, the regimes in crisis, including in Southeast Asia, the United States will be helped they won't. At the same time, a sharp increase in Islamic extremists and their terrorist activities in the region contributes to the cooling of Western investors towards Southeast Asia.

In the post-crisis period of economic recovery, the Asean area attractiveness index fluctuates depending on the situation in individual countries. In some of them, especially in Indonesia, the interests of Western corporations, including American multinational giants with huge levers of influence, were under attack, paradoxically. For example, in January 1998, the Indonesian Government and a state-owned local electricity grid company proposed to conduct a survey of the country's electricity market.

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repayment of outstanding dollar-denominated loans to corporations such as Unocal, Atlantic Richfield, and Edison Global Energy of California in Indonesian rupees at the exchange rate used in the drafting of the state budget for the 1997/1998 fiscal year. Taking into account the subsequent collapse of the rupee exchange rate after the budget was drawn up, it turned out that the Indonesian side was going to pay back only a quarter of its debt. A similar notification was received by Arco Indonesia, which supplied gas to privately owned power plants in East Java.

American corporations have tried to challenge the proposed terms of the deal in local courts, but without much success.

The disintegration of power in Indonesia creates huge difficulties for American corporations, when provincial leaders issue ultimatums to renegotiate mining contracts that provide for additional deductions in favor of provincial authorities. In northern Sumatra, Exxon Mobil was forced to stop gas production for several months (from March to June 2001) due to the actions of local separatists. Rebels damaged a gas pipeline and gas production equipment at the Arun field, causing a fire that raged for 10 days. Total losses from the cessation of production and disruption of export supplies amounted to at least $ 300 million.

In the ASEAN area, foreign investors and employees of companies are not always provided with not only effective judicial protection of their interests, but even physical security. Whatever safeguards cross-border corporations may have, there is little they can do in the event of civil unrest. In Sulawesi (Indonesia), Australian owners were forced to open access to gold mines for local residents over the weekend under pressure from the crowd and with the inaction of law enforcement forces. No one was able to guarantee the safety of the equipment. In Myanmar, the Atlantic Richfield Oil Corporation was also hit by anti-Government insurgency and was forced to shut down its operations first and then evacuate its staff altogether for security reasons. It was replaced by the Malaysian Petronas .

Multinational corporations thus face political risks that cannot be fully insured against even with guarantees from the Export-Import Bank of the United States.

The following fact is interesting in terms of illustrating the complexity of the world picture and the functioning of global institutions: when the IMF demanded that Indonesia freeze the implementation of the 15 most expensive infrastructure projects in order to reduce budget expenditures, it was projects with the participation of American corporations that were hit.

REDUCING PRESENCE, BUT NOT LEAVING

Disagreements between the ASEAN countries and the United States are rarely openly expressed. There are no radical anti-American regimes among the countries of the region. The United States ' relations with Vietnam, once Washington's main opponent, have been normalized, and the ruling regime in Myanmar can rather be described as isolationist.

However, there is not and has not been complete unanimity. At every step, there are nuances and differences in approaches. None of the ASEAN capitals share Washington's view of Myanmar as a "source of regional instability" and do not support the position of the Americans, who put the problem of human rights violations at the forefront of relations with this country.

Members of the Association are also not particularly concerned about North Korea's efforts to develop missile and nuclear weapons. They have been wary of the Bush administration's tougher approach to Pyongyang, aligning themselves with Seoul's approach to inter-Korean dialogue and working closely with it in the framework of the ASEAN Plus 3 Forum.

ASEAN countries often shift responsibility to the United States, while retaining the ability to criticize Washington's actions, especially in other regions of the world. "Other countries would like the United States to bear the burden of confrontation with China, preferring to remain silent when China conducts missile tests or strengthens its presence in the Spratly Islands, "Orbis magazine wrote ^.1

Serious concern to the State-

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It is not so much the threat of American interventionism that is causing problems in Southeast Asia, but rather a possible decline in US interest in their region, a decline in its strategic value in the eyes of Washington.

However, even after the defeat in Vietnam, Washington was not going to do what is most feared in ASEAN - to withdraw from the region. Decades after the Nixon Doctrine was proclaimed, which provided for sharing the military burden, the United States still faces the urgent task of increasing the responsibility of the countries of the region for their security and involving them in improving the regional defense infrastructure. American analysts in this regard draw attention to the fact that the operation "Desert Storm" was so successful from their point of view, because Saudi Arabia upgraded the military facilities used by the Americans, bringing them in line with NATO standards. We can also talk about such a measure as the early placement of weapons and ammunition stocks in the Asia-Pacific region. At the same time, since the United States is unlikely to participate in large-scale ground operations, the scale of such storage will be limited.

In Southeast Asia itself, Washington will most likely no longer need permanent military bases, but rather call points that allow the US armed forces to be on the move, indicate a presence, and be "somewhere nearby". This approach meets both the political and commercial interests of the countries of the region, and Washington's desire to save money in the absence of a clear and immediate threat. However, it is extremely important to have well-equipped docks and provide high-quality repair and maintenance services.

The forced withdrawal of the US military from the Philippines in the first half of the 90s did not undermine the American position in Pacific Asia. In May 1999, after enduring a long anti-American pause, the Philippine Senate voted 18 to 5 in favor of the agreement, which for the first time since 1996 authorized the conduct of large-scale military exercises, including joint exercises, in the Philippines, as well as visits by US warships. But there was no return to a permanent American presence.

Although the bilateral agreements of the United States with Thailand and the Philippines remain valid as legal documents, with the evacuation of American bases, the system of military-political alliances and agreements in Southeast Asia has become largely virtual, especially due to the absence of serious external threats of a classical nature. Most of the military-political and geostrategic layouts and forecasts applied to this sub-region are purely hypothetical and very conditional.

Nevertheless, the development of interaction in the event of an armed conflict continues. So, in the summer of 2000, the Flying Fish naval exercises were held in Southeast Asia with the participation of the United States, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, Taiwan, Thailand, Malaysia, and Singapore.

BETWEEN WASHINGTON AND BEIJING

A new issue of concern for the ASEAN countries is the tension in relations between China and the United States, which has manifested itself with the coming to power of the Republican administration. For example, in March 2001, Philippine President Gloria Arroyo made no secret of her concern about the emergence of signs of a resurgence of the cold war in relations between Washington and Beijing.

The States of the sub-region are afraid to find themselves in an uncomfortable position if they are forced to choose who to support in the dispute between Washington and Beijing. Playing on the contradictions between major powers fades into the background when there is a threat of a serious deterioration in the political and business climate in the entire Pacific region. Such a development would certainly undermine all sorts of ratings - country and corporate, jeopardize the implementation of many projects, and perhaps even lead to a new polarization within Southeast Asia, intensifying China's efforts to find allies and mobilize all available anti-American forces.

The following point is noteworthy. The Bush administration's new, tougher approach to China in the first half of 2001 was accompanied by a slowdown in the process of normalizing relations with Vietnam, which was initiated by the previous Washington administration. So, Washington at one time cooled down to the ratification of the trade agreement with Vietnam in Congress, abstained from voting on the issue of granting Vietnam loans from the IMF and the World ^Bank2 . The confrontational component in Washington's politics was, to a certain extent, a continuation of the pre-election debates, during which Republicans accused the Democrats of being too "soft". And before the September 11, 2001 attacks, three communist countries - China, North Korea, and Vietnam-were the most suitable targets for demonstrating the strong-willed attitude of the new US administration, in addition to Iraq, Iran, and Cuba.

Following the demonstration of toughness towards Beijing, the Washington administration, after the first hundred days in power, considered it good to soften its tone somewhat, as evidenced by the official visit of George Bush to China in February 2002.

However, the US divergences with China are long-term. At the same time, some problems in Southeast Asia also cast a long shadow over American - Chinese relations. Chief among them is the ownership of the Spratly Islands, which (and their potentially oil-rich shallows) are claimed and partly occupied by China, Vietnam, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Brunei ^. The official position of Washington states that this

^** For more information, see Stepanov E. Zhemchuzhina razdora [The Pearl of Discord]. "Asia and Africa Today", 2002, N 6.

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The area is a "potential conflict zone" and that the United States welcomes efforts to peacefully resolve existing differences and stabilize the situation in the area. The ASEAN countries, for their part, have made it a priority to develop a code of conduct in the South China Sea together with China and implement confidence-building measures through a series of working conferences. At the Phnom Penh summit in November 2002, which was also attended by China, Japan and South Korea, the Association States succeeded in signing a Declaration on Good Neighborly Behavior in the South China Sea.

Experts believe that the United States will not interfere in the conflict as long as there is no armed conflict and nothing threatens the freedom of navigation in the disputed waters.

It is unlikely that the parties to the dispute will purposefully escalate the situation. So far, it is known about cases when Beijing, during the development of uninhabited and unoccupied islands, informed some ASEAN countries in advance about its actions ^.3

An anti-American policy does not meet the interests of the states of the sub-region, since the United States is their main trade and economic partner, the guarantor of strategic stability. At stake are huge commodity flows and capital investments, as well as the position of investors who are sensitive to any signals.

However, the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region is changing, and the overall vector of movement is such that China is gradually becoming a more important and attractive partner with a booming consumer economy and a growing private sector capable of digesting more and more ASEAN goods. In addition, Beijing is not without the ability to pursue a flexible political line, especially on the issue of Huaqiao communities (foreign Chinese). It can, by methodically strengthening its own positions, postpone indefinitely the resolution of territorial issues, at least in relations with individual countries. Over time, China-centric economic and other interests may outweigh the strategic distrust of Southeast Asian countries.

Another scenario of possible development of the situation is that the progressive strengthening of China will occur in such a way that it will force the ASEAN countries to strengthen the alliance with the United States, accelerate the development of contacts with other non-regional powers and centers of power.

Today, China is already moving to openly play an anti-American game in the region, realizing what some believe is its "burning desire" for leadership in East Asia. The whole question is how this leadership will be expressed and by what methods it will be achieved. China is already the leader in terms of development and economic growth.

In the era of the Soviet-Chinese confrontation, Beijing rather favourably assessed American policy in the Asia-Pacific region and Southeast Asia. At the present stage, the PRC disapproves of providing Singapore's port facilities for the calls of the American fleet, and Singapore's airfield for the landing of American aircraft. Chinese leaders talk about the inadmissibility of" gunboat diplomacy"," economic colonialism", and ask"why the United States is poking its nose into the affairs of Asia." In defiance of Washington, Beijing supports the idea of a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia.

In 2001, Beijing pledged to buy rice from Thailand, which the PRC does not really need ^.4 This was seen in Southeast Asia as a demonstrative gesture of support for a country that was left to its fate by the US administration at the height of the 1997 crisis. China also provided loans and grants to Cambodian leader Hun Sen for 190 million yuan ^*** during his visit to Beijing in February 1999.

China's rivalry with the United States does not preclude China's constructive involvement in solving global and regional problems, Beijing's compliance with collectively developed rules of political and economic behavior prescribed, for example, by WTO membership, and the rejection of old-fashioned claims in favor of sharing in the benefits of globalism. China is changing, and the motivation for its actions will also change. The global fight against terrorism launched by Washington after September 11, 2001, has received some support from Beijing, which has to contend with its own homegrown separatists resorting to terror.

AFTER SEPTEMBER 11

The terrorist attack of September 11, 2001 provoked a strong but far from unequivocal reaction in Southeast Asia.

On the one hand, a powerful blow was dealt to the focus of business interests of the leading partner of the ASEAN countries - the American business elite, with which the political and business establishment of the sub-region is connected by many partnership and other threads. ASEAN members have always had a lot of different complaints about Washington, but one thing remained unchanged: the desire to remain a privileged partner and client of the United States, to retain the benefits granted at the height of the cold war to "non - communist" countries in the region, and later to "development leaders" on the former colonial periphery.

On the other hand, influential political circles in the Association countries blamed the tragedy on the United States itself, criticizing it for allocating insufficient resources to fight poverty and deprivation, which creates a breeding ground for terrorist activities. Criticism was directed to the outside world, although it is well known that a very significant part of the aid sent to Southeast Asia through multilateral and bilateral channels did not reach its intended destination, as in other regions.

^{* * *} 1 US dollar - 8.3 yuan.

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Deep-rooted corruption and other social and economic ills of the ASEAN countries are causing resentment among the population of the region, including those expressed in extremist forms. Their eradication should be handled by these countries themselves. More fertile ground for the growth of anti-American sentiment and religious fanaticism was created by the still-unresolved consequences of the currency and financial crisis of 1997, for which not only Western financial speculators, but also local businessmen and politicians are responsible. The political turmoil that has unsettled some countries in the subregion is also playing a negative role.

Local ruling elites quickly seized the opportunity to demand concessions in exchange for verbal "solidarity" in the fight against global terrorism in a number of areas that ranged from monetary and financial issues to human rights issues. It has become convenient to put the fight against internal opposition in the context of the global campaign against terrorism.

Washington was required to take steps to prevent the deterioration of the situation in the ASEAN area, the growth of anti-American sentiment among the public and the population. American politicians have begun to listen more carefully to local leaders, show a greater understanding of their situation, and make some concessions.

While Indonesia and some other Southeast Asian countries generally supported the fight against global terrorism, they considered it undesirable for US military specialists to participate directly in ground-based counterinsurgency operations. The Prime Minister of Malaysia spoke in this regard about the danger of turning the country into a "second Afghanistan". Indonesian President Megawati Sukarnoputri called on the United States to turn the campaign against terrorism into a war on poverty. The democratically minded leader of Indonesia, who managed to prevent the country from sliding into the abyss of civil war and disintegration, is forced to reckon with the huge influence of the part of the Muslim community that perceived the military operations of the international coalition in Afghanistan as nothing more than a "war with fellow Muslims." These anti-American forces represented those segments of the population that had gained little or nothing from the economic development process.

Washington had to decide whether to unfreeze military-technical cooperation programs with the Indonesian army, suspended because of its role in the bloody incidents in East Timor. It is necessary to strengthen the ability of the Indonesian army to perform the functions of monitoring and suppressing the activities of extremist elements. Here it is appropriate to recall that the Indonesian army has traditionally served as a bulwark against Islamic fundamentalism in their country.

Philippine President Arroyo initially stated that ASEAN itself should localize hotbeds of tension and conduct counterinsurgency operations in border areas, preventing the presence of US ground forces in Southeast Asia. However, the low combat readiness of the Philippine army, which has been waging an independent struggle against separatists on the island of Mindanao for decades without visible results, and the extensive international ties of their extremist Muslim group Abu Sayyaf, including cooperation with Al-Qaeda, are indisputable facts.

As a result, American advisers and instructors were still allowed to enter the areas of the fight against extremists. The task of a special American anti-terrorist group consisting of 1,200 troops was to train Filipino soldiers in more effective counterinsurgency tactics and provide logistical assistance. It was specifically stipulated that they would not be directly involved in combat operations. In the summer of 2002, most of the American advisers and instructors left the Philippines, and 400 American troops took part in the second phase of the anti-terrorist operation.

The US side made several demarches, allegedly due to Jakarta's unwillingness to deal more specifically with identifying and blocking financial sources and channels that fuel the activities of international extremism. Thus, the leader of the extremist organization Jemaah Islamiyah, Hembali, not only "praises Bin Laden, but also cooperates for many years with his militants." ⁵ Under the guise of advertising, the Indonesian press published ads of the Islamic Youth Movement, which called for "heroes to fight in Afghanistan" and also offered "all sympathizers" to transfer money to an account in the Muamakat Bank indicated in the newspaper. Washington stated that none of the Indonesian authorities to which it applied (the Bank of Indonesia, the Ministry of Defense and Security, the Prosecutor's Office) reacted with due energy to such facts, as well as to the transfer to Indonesia of lists of organizations and individuals suspected of aiding or directly preparing terrorist acts. ⁶ Although belatedly, the Indonesian authorities sent out instructions to a number of banks to report all "suspicious transactions". However, experts doubted the possibility of implementing this installation in practice. In this case, of course, we are talking not so much about hidden sympathies for Osama bin Laden, but about the inaction of the bureaucratic apparatus, which did not function in the best way even in more prosperous years for Indonesia.

The identification and neutralization of terrorist International cells in Indonesia is hindered by its long and poorly guarded borders. But even in compact and disciplined Singapore, it was only by a stroke of luck that the local police were able to thwart a plan by local al-Qaeda operatives to bomb a number of Western embassies.

As shown by large terak-

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You were in Bali and the Philippines last fall, and there will be a long and difficult fight against religious extremism and terrorism. Combustible material has been accumulating in the region for a long period of time. Some areas of Indonesia and the Philippines, for example, have long been the scene of an international community of extremists hiding behind the flag of Islam. "While the world was celebrating the new millennium, Indonesia and the Philippines were rocked by a series of explosions. Their organizers sowed discord between Muslims and Christians, escalated tension. These explosions put an end to the old image of Southeast Asia as a model not only of economic progress and political stability, but also of religious and ethnic tolerance. After the crisis of 1997-1998, the underlying conflicts came to the surface. The miracle was replaced by a serious illness." ⁷ The tone of the article suggests that alarmism is replacing the euphoria of the past. However, even the weakest ASEAN countries are far from being comparable to Afghanistan, and others have already gone through a considerable path of modernization and are deeply embedded in the global economic system, which provides new impetus for their development, despite periodically recurring crises.

As extremist groups have become more active in South-East Asia, especially after the major terrorist attacks in Bali and the Philippines in the fall of 2002, the leaders of the countries of the sub-region are striving for a stronger response to terrorism. This was discussed at the ASEAN Heads of State and Government meeting in Phnom Penh in November 2002.

Earlier, in August 2002, at the ASEAN Foreign Ministers ' Forum in Brunei, an agreement was signed with the United States on cooperation in the fight against terrorism, which provides for the exchange of intelligence on the activities of terrorist groups, blocking their financial assets and strengthening border controls.

ASEAN, THE UNITED STATES AND RUSSIA

According to a number of American researchers, Washington "ignores Russia as a factor in Asian politics", which "... undermines the hopes of some Russian analysts to overcome Russia's isolation in the Asia-Pacific region with the help of the United States ... " ⁸ .

There is really no need to talk about "isolation" in the literal sense of the word. The root of the problem is not in anyone's favor, but in our own objective weakness.

In the international arena, the countries of the sub-region have always shown a greater degree of independence, and Russia's success will depend crucially on the state of its economic potential and creditworthiness in the broad sense of this term, and not on the position of third countries.

It seems important to avoid a gap between Russia's available resources and its current policy, and to show more realism in assessing the actual balance of power in Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific region. Enthusiasm for the idea of fighting the hegemony of a single superpower has led some Russian politicians to declare Southeast Asia an independent center of power, objectively opposing the unipolar world. This concept was especially actively voiced by them at a time when the leaders of the countries of the region plunged into crisis least thought about geopolitics, and were completely absorbed in earthly economic concerns and "knocking out" stabilization loans from the IMF and the World Bank.

In fact, Southeast Asia is not a full-fledged power center and will not become one in the near or medium term. Previously, ASEAN rallied on the platform of countering "Vietnamese expansionism", but now this is no longer the case. Anti-Americanism as a common denominator obviously does not work, and the formation of a unified approach to China is also not on the agenda. There is also a lack of cohesion in the ASEAN ranks on intraregional issues, as evidenced by the pitfalls in bilateral relations, unresolved territorial disputes, the lack of a unified Asean platform on monetary and financial issues, a coordinated approach to US actions in Iraq and Yugoslavia, etc.

Preoccupied with pressing domestic problems, Moscow has not yet managed to build a system of developed and extensive ties with most of the Southeast Asian countries. But there are no special problems in this relationship.

The situation in the United States is radically different. The implementation of reforms and the state of the economic situation in the ASEAN countries seriously affects the economic interests of the United States.

At the moment, Washington's position in the ASEAN area does not look impregnable.

The growing challenge from China should encourage not only Washington, but also Tokyo to find new partners to maintain or prevent a sharp change in the balance of power in such a key and promising area as Southeast Asia. And the countries of the Association, for all the importance of their multi-channel and multi-level dialogue with the United States, have also always preferred a multilateral balance of power, which implies strengthening its links.

And so are relations with Russia.

There is little doubt that the ASEAN partnership with the United States will survive the current challenges, especially if the dialogue between them fits seamlessly into the context of broad and constructive regionalism and globalism, within which Russia, another Pacific power, has every chance of taking its rightful place.

¹ "Orbis", Spring 1999, p.240.

² "The Far Eastern Economic Review", 7.06.2001.

³ "The Far Eastern Economic Review", 10.06.1999.

⁴ "The Financial Times", 21.05.2001.

⁵ International Herald Tribune, 23.03.2002.

⁶ Business Week, 26.11.2001, p.68.

⁷ "Orbis", Summer 1999.

⁸ "The Journal of East Asian Affairs", Spring/ Summer 1999, p. 89.

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