Libmonster ID: IN-1465

Rajeev Bhargava

Indian Model of Secularism: Contextualism and Principled Distance

Rajeev Bhargava-Senior Research Fellow and Director at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi. rajeevbhargava@csds.in

Secularism is often reduced to its western forms - be it French or American model. Rajeev Bhargava in his interview invites us to revise this perspective. He proposes to look more closely at non-western forms of secularism, f e. at its Indian model that might give clues to the solution of many problems of contemporary secular societies, which are, as it is often claimed, in crisis. Two basic features of Indian model are outlined: contextualism and principled distance.

Keywords: secularism, crisis of secularism, religion in India, religious pluralism.

In recent years, the "crisis of secularism" has been increasingly spoken of, and there are more and more people who are trying to question the very principle of separation of the state from religion and religious organizations. And this applies equally to Russia and many other countries. Is secularism really in crisis? Or do you disagree with this diagnosis?

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Rajiv Bhargava: In my opinion, it is hardly justified to talk about the crisis of secularism as such. Rather, today we are dealing with a crisis of the models of secularism that developed in a number of Western societies, and then were transferred to other cultural and historical contexts. Accordingly, for me, the mentioned crisis of secularism is a reason to move away from the doctrines derived from the experience of secular states in the West, and concentrate on analyzing the normative practices of other states, in particular, to turn to the experience of India. By doing this, we can look at secularism in a different way: we will see it as a special moral and ethical position, directed not against religion, but against religious homogenization and institutionalized (inter - and intra-confessional) dominance. My position is that of all the options available to us, secularism remains the best tool for dealing with the growing religious diversity and the problems that this diversity creates.

Could you explain what is meant by intra-confessional dominance?

In the most general sense, intra-confessional dominance is the inequality of rights of people within confessions, due, for example, to a person's caste or gender characteristics. There is no simple solution, as interference in these issues will be clearly regarded as a violation of religious freedom, which is unacceptable. Ideally, however, a secular State should seek to mitigate such dominance.

You are talking about the crisis of Western models of secularism. Researchers distinguish two main models - French and American. What, in your opinion, are the disadvantages of each of them?

I will begin my answer by pointing out that, according to the dominant self-awareness of Western secularism, secularism is a universal doctrine that requires a strict separation of church/religion from the state in the name of individualistically understood moral and ethical values.

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values. As you correctly point out, this hegemonic self - awareness takes two forms: one derived from the idealized American model, the other from the equally idealized French model.

Let's start with an idealized French model. According to this model, the State should be separated from religion, but at the same time it reserves the right to interfere in the affairs of religion. Religion, on the other hand, has no right to interfere in the affairs of the State. In short, separation is a one-way exception. The state can interfere in the affairs of religion - interfere with it or, conversely, help it - but the main thing in such interference is to demonstrate its power over religion. This model was developed in response to the excessive dominance of the Church, it encourages open disrespect for religion, and its sole purpose is to prevent religions from taking control of the secular order.

This model is quite suitable for solving the problem of intra-religious dominance, since it equalizes all citizens before the law and does not allow any exceptions, implying an attempt on secular order. However, it is powerless in the fight against inter-religious domination, when members of one religious community discriminate and oppress members of another religious community.

But why? This thesis is not entirely clear...

The fact is that in European society the issues of radical personal freedom and civil equality were raised after the establishment of religious homogeneity. Prior to this, the state, in alliance with the church, engaged in mass persecution of people whose faith differed from that of the ruler. Yes, a policy of tolerance was implemented, but, as is well known, it was accompanied by inequality, with the humiliating and almost invisible existence of minorities on the very outskirts of public life. Liberal democratization and its accompanying secularization have helped many citizens in European countries who practice religions other than Christianity achieve a number of civil rights, but this set of rights still does not include interfaith equality and does not prevent discrimination and inequality on religious grounds.

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On the contrary, this model is quite compatible with ethno-religious prejudices among the majority.

These prejudices are particularly evident in the difficulties faced by Muslims. In Britain, for example, religious communities control a third of primary schools, but requests for public funding for Muslim communities are often rejected. At one point, there were only 2 Muslim schools in the country, 2,800 schools under the auspices of the Roman Catholic Church, and 4,700 under the auspices of the Church of England. Similar problems exist in other European countries. In addition, these prejudices are manifested in the inability of many Western European states to solve the problem of hijabs (France), to deal with the demand of Muslims to build mosques and conduct rituals corresponding to their faith (Germany, Italy), to get normal cemeteries (Denmark). Islamophobia has captured the public imagination in several Western countries (think of the cartoon controversy in Denmark), and it is highly unlikely that Muslim citizens will continue to suffer inconvenience just because they belong to their religious community.

Some groups within European societies-both on the right and on the left-are leaning towards the French model, because they believe that "Islam is a problem" and that the only way to solve this problem is to involve the use of force by the state. But this is a dead end, since such measures do not affect the official and unofficial Christian institutions of these societies in any way. In addition, any attempt to further interfere in the affairs of religions is likely to meet with opposition not only from Muslims,but also from non-Muslims. So using the French model is fraught with problems.

And what about the American model?

The idealized American sense of secularism sees secession as mutual exclusion. Neither the State nor religion is allowed to interfere in each other's affairs. It is assumed that mutual exclusion is necessary to resolve conflicts between different branches of Christianity, to maintain some kind of equality between them,

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but the most important thing is to provide citizens with the freedom to form and maintain their own religious associations. It is considered that without mutual exclusion, freedom of religion and other more general civil liberties are impossible. This rigid or "perfect separation," as James Madison called it, must occur on three separate levels: 1) goals, 2) institutions and personnel, h) law and public policy. The first and second levels guarantee the non-theocratic status of the state and the absence of a state religion. The third level provides a situation in which the state has neither good relations with any religion (for example, the state cannot provide any special assistance to religious associations), nor bad ones. The scope of the State's powers does not include interference in religious matters, even in situations where certain values (such as equality) proclaimed by the State are grossly ignored by a particular religion. Congress does not have the power to legislate on matters related to religion.

Such non-interference is justified by the fact that religion is a special, private (non-state) matter. And if something is wrong in the sphere of religion, then only those who have special powers should deal with it. This, according to this view, is what freedom of religion is all about.

In my opinion, such a model of secularism promotes passive respect for religion on the part of the state. This model has some resources for combating interfaith dominance (for example, it inevitably leads to the separation of any once dominant religion from the state), but it is completely powerless in terms of combating intra-confessional dominance. Because the State is unable to maintain freedom and equality within faiths, it forces people to break with their religions instead of seeking intra-confessional equality from within.

But if we ignore what you call the "idealized self-consciousness of Western secularism", then the Western states have quite concrete positive results

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using the models you describe. Why do you focus your criticism on this "idealized self-awareness" and not on concrete practical results?

The fact is that the prevailing understanding of Western secularism stems precisely from the idealized self-consciousness embodied in the two models described above, and not from an analysis of the best achievements of Western states, be it the United States or France. I believe that this prevailing understanding (a) makes it difficult to recognize the existence of alternative models developed in other local contexts; (b) while influencing both politicians and citizens, it distorts our perception of the actual actions of Western and non-Western States. Moreover, c) it conceals various manifestations of inter - and intra-confessional dominance, which are easily recorded in the real life of most Western states. But most importantly, it is precisely this understanding of secularism that has spread around the world and caused a misunderstanding of the value of secular states. Accordingly, my goal is to displace this understanding, these models, or at least return them to their specific historical context.

You are trying to contrast Western models of secularism with the Indian model. But there is a common understanding that secularism and secularism are purely Western phenomena, resulting from the peculiarities of Christian culture with its division into the secular and spiritual. Therefore, if we think in this logic, no secularism is possible, particularly in India. Do you agree with this logic?

No, in my opinion, it is wrong. If we consider secularism as atheism, as the dependence of the world on human activity, then one of the oldest examples of atheism in the world can be found in Indian culture. After all, Buddhism, if you look at it from this angle, does not believe in any "Theos", that is, God. Jainism also lacks the concept of God. That is

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In the sense of rituals, Buddhism can hardly be called atheism, since atheism has a certain well-established meaning. However, even the ritual component in Indian culture is quite specific: if you look at the Vedic culture, there is an idea of sacrifice - a ritual sacrifice. This sacrifice does not involve any involvement of the deity. And even if it does, it is still - its main purpose is to get God to give you what you want and need in this world here. So the whole ethic of Indian culture as an ethic of self-realization in this world, based on quite common understandings of the secular, is quite secular. So there are hardly any prerequisites for secularism in Indian culture.

Can the Indian model of secularism be radically different?

There is the most general abstract conceptual structure of secularism, which implies the separation of the state from religious associations. This is a completely universal framework that is understandable and works in any cultural context. Today it is becoming an integral part of democracy. However, the context is always important: this conceptual structure, being embodied in specific historical circumstances, will necessarily acquire its own characteristics. Accordingly, there will be many types of secularism, and secularism cannot be unified everywhere. It is time to abandon the thesis that modernity is one, the process of modernization is one, and sooner or later we will all be drawn into it. Yes, we do use airplanes, these planes are the same for the Americans, the French, and the Indians. But this is a technique, in other areas of life everything is different. Even McDonald's is different everywhere. In India, beefburgers (beef burgers) are not allowed, instead they sell bean burgers (bean burgers).

What are the distinctive features of the Indian model of secularism?

The Indian model can be derived from the best aspects of inter-communal practices, as well as from the Indian Constitution, if interpreted correctly. The fact is that

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India originally had a huge number of religious communities, movements, etc. This led to the development of a conceptual response not only to the problem of intra-religious, but also inter-religious conflicts. At the same time, I am not saying that other countries should blindly copy this model, but rather that they should study it as closely as possible.

The Indian model has a number of striking distinctive features that are becoming particularly relevant today. First of all, religious pluralism in India is not a sudden factor, it exists initially. Actually, starting from it, this model is formed. Indian secularism has always been closely intertwined with religious diversity.

Secondly, it focuses on multiple values: freedom and equality are understood not in a narrow individualistic sense, but in the broadest sense, implying the relative autonomy of religious communities, equality of status in society, as well as other basic values, for example, peace and tolerance of different communities in relation to each other. It contains space not only for the individual's right to profess any religion, but also for the right of a religious community to establish and maintain the educational institutions necessary for its survival and the maintenance of appropriate religious traditions.

Third, because Indian secularism originated in a multi-confessional society, it is aimed at solving problems not only within, but also inter-confessional dominance.

Fourth, this model does not create a wall between the State and religion. Of course, there are certain boundaries, but they are quite permeable. This allows the State to interfere in the affairs of religions, deter or encourage them, without controlling or destroying them. The role of the state can vary: it can help educational institutions of religious communities on an impartial basis, or it can interfere in the affairs of religious organizations that refuse to recognize equal dignity and status for some of the representatives of their own or someone else's religion (for example, the abolition of the untouchable caste or allowing everyone, regardless of caste, to attend Hindu temples,

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and in the long run, correcting gender inequality), based on a more nuanced understanding of the principle of equal care and respect for all individuals and groups. In short, this model treats separation not as strict exclusion or strict neutrality, but rather as what I call "principled distance", which should be distinguished from unilateral exclusion, mutual exclusion, or strict neutrality or mutual non-interference.

Fifth, this model does not imply any hostility towards the presence of religion in the public space. Although the State is not associated with a particular religion or with religion as such, there is official, and therefore public, recognition of religious communities.

Sixth, this model shows that we don't have to choose between active hostility and passive indifference, or between disrespectful hostility and respectful indifference. You can find something in between: to experience the necessary dislike, if it does not exclude active respect. The State may intervene to ban certain practices, but only as long as it demonstrates respect for other forms of religious practice in communities and openly supports them.

Seventh, without focusing on individual or group values from the very beginning, without setting rigid boundaries between the public and the private, Indian constitutional secularism allows decisions on these issues to be made either through an open process of democratic politics, or through contextual polemics in court.

Eighth, focusing on multiple values and adhering to the principle of principled distance means that the state tries to maintain a balance between different, sometimes contradictory, but equally important values. As a result, Indian secularism in its idealized form is more contextual, more sensitive to the specifics of the situation, and more prone to political compromises. In this sense, it differs from the Western model, which is rather an abstract scientific doctrine, invented by ideologues and imposed by political figures.

The rough and sketchy definition of Indian secularism is this: the state must adhere to a principled policy.

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distance yourself from any public or private, individual-or group-oriented religious institutions in the name of equally significant (sometimes conflicting) values: peace, worldly good, dignity, freedom, and equality (in all their complex individualistic and non-individualistic versions). Therefore, Indian secularism is an ethically sensitive, compromise agreement between different groups and different values.

Above, we were talking about a secular state, but what about society? How relevant is the Habermas-Rawls problem of "post-secular society" and "public use of reason"in India? Is there a question about the permissibility of religious argumentation in public discussions?

Yes, this is a very acute problem. But here again, there is no unambiguity, no definitive answers. Context is always important - sometimes we tried to ignore religious justifications and rely only on secular ones, but there were situations when it became difficult to do this and we had to turn to religious justifications. I believe that all citizens should be able to get the justification that is most convenient for them. If you need something religious, let them get something religious. Believers will get a religious justification, and those who do not profess any of the religions will get a secular one. Don't forget that in India, the main conflict is not religious justification versus non - religious justification, but rather a struggle of different religious justifications. However, there is no final solution - everything depends on the context, secularism must always be contextual. You can't force decisions on people if they don't agree to obey them. If only one type of justification is not suitable for consent, then why not try to find many such justifications.

Suppose someone in India says: our state is secular because of the original Hindu tolerance. Well, as long as he believes in the need for a secular state, though not for secular reasons at all, then I don't mind. However

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if such a justification turns out to be written into the Constitution, then I will object, because in this case the Hindu justification will be the only possible one.

You speak of "principled distance" and "contextual secularism" as distinguishing features of the Indian model of secularism. Can you explain more about what this means?

My general idea is that you can't blindly follow rules and general abstract principles. Life is complicated. Therefore, " contextual secularism "and the thesis of" principled distance " emphasize the true complexity of life, which is not reduced to any set of rules and principles that seem absolute to us. You always have to adjust.

As I said above, in the prevailing Western understanding of secularism, the separation of the State from the Church means either mutual or unilateral exclusion. The idea of "principled distance" reveals the metaphor of separation in a different way. It recognizes the gap between the State and religion at the level of goals and institutions, but does not turn it into a fetish at the level of State policy and law. Let us recall that political secularism is an ethic whose attitude to religion is similar to that of theories that oppose unfair restrictions on freedom, morally unjustifiable inequality, and intercommunal domination and exploitation. However, secularism based on the idea of principled distance does not support an enlightened understanding of religion. It takes into account people's interest in building relationships with something or someone higher in relation to them, such as God, and is aware that this interest is expressed in personal beliefs and feelings, as well as in social practices that spill out into the public space. In addition, he recognizes that religion is a living tradition, and not just a way of identifying people. But at the same time, secularism emphasizes that even if it turns out that one religion is true and the others are false, this does not give the "true" doctrine or religion the right to impose itself on people who do not profess it. It is not

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this truth is also grounds for discrimination on the issue of equal distribution of freedoms and other valuable resources.

Now, what exactly is meant by principal distance? This policy assumes a flexible approach to the inclusion/exclusion of religion and State intervention/non-interference, depending at the level of law and policy on the specific context, nature or current state of the religion concerned. The intervention must be consistent with the principles of a secular State, that is, principles that stem from a commitment to the values of freedom, equality, peace, and tolerance. This means that religion can interfere in the affairs of the State if such interference contributes to strengthening the values inherent in secularism. For example, citizens may well support a generally binding state law based solely on religious grounds, but only if this law is compatible with the values of freedom and equality. Similarly, the State may or may not interfere in religious affairs, depending on whether these values are promoted or not. A State whose interference or non-interference follows the logic described above will be a State that maintains a principled distance. This is one of the fundamental features of the principal distance.

Such a policy should be distinguished from strict neutrality, that is, the idea that the state can only help or hinder religions to the same extent; and if it interferes in the affairs of one religion, it should also interfere in the affairs of others. Here it is appropriate to introduce a distinction beautifully formulated by the American philosopher Ronald Dworkin: the distinction between equal treatment and treating everyone as equal.

The principle of equal treatment in the appropriate political sense requires that the State treat all its citizens equally, for example, in the allocation of resources or the provision of opportunities. The principle of treating people as equals, in turn, implies that all people or groups are treated with the same care and respect. And here it is already possible to have both the same attitude and a selective one. Such differentiation does not in any way contradict the requirement to treat everyone as equal.

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This is another distinctive feature of what I call "principal distance."

What is meant by a differential, selective approach and why does it not contradict the principle of treating everyone as equal?

Many religious groups want to be exempt from certain practices imposed by the State. The requirement of non-interference on the part of the state is justified by the fact that these practices force believers to do what is forbidden by their religion or prevent them from doing what their religion considers mandatory. For example, Sikh police officers demand that they be exempted from the mandatory helmet law and the police dress code in order to wear religious turbans. Jews do not want to obey the instructions of the Air Force, which do not allow them to wear kippahs. Muslim women demand that the state does not prevent them from wearing the veil prescribed by religion. Jews and Muslims demand that shops should not be closed on Sundays, as this is not customary in their religions. The selective approach assumes that something that is forbidden or restricted for everyone can be allowed for minorities because of the special status or significance that it has for them.

For many Republican or liberal theories, such selectivity becomes a problem because of their simple and somewhat absolutist morality, which places excessive importance on a single value, such as equal treatment or equal freedom. However, in the logic of principled distance, religious groups may well demand that the state does not interfere in their affairs, or that it, on the contrary, intervenes in order to help them obtain what other groups already receive due to their high social status in the political community. The state can grant church officials the right to conduct legally recognized marriages, introduce its own rules for obtaining a divorce, rules governing the relationship of divorced spouses, making wills, inheriting property after the death of the owner, resolving civil disputes, and even establishing property rights.

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However, I would like to emphasize once again that fundamental distance is not a policy of non - interference, when the state simply provides religions with the opportunity to do what they want. It may imply more extensive State intervention in the affairs of one religion than another, given the specific context of the existence of the religions in question. For example, promoting some value inherent in secularism may require more intervention in the affairs of one religion than another. Suppose we want to promote the value of social equality. This value is undermined by the caste hierarchy. This means that the state should interfere in the affairs of caste-based Hinduism much more than in the affairs of, say, Islam or Christianity. But if the state decides to protect religious freedom, to protect the idea of diversity of religions, then it will have to interfere in the affairs of Christianity and Islam much more than in the affairs of Hinduism.

As you can see, no abstract normative principles work here, it is impossible to decide in advance whether the state refrains from interfering in the affairs of religion or whether it is going to interfere in the affairs of religions equally. It all depends on the context. The only constant is the requirement that relations between the State and religions should be regulated by motives that are not tied to a particular religion and correspond to secular values and principles. Varying degrees of State interference in the affairs of different religions do not necessarily entail a departure from secularism. Indian secularism does not want to cut everyone's hair in the same way.

Moreover, the requirement for a differentiated approach is also due to the fact that the values of secularism do not always fit together well. On the contrary, conflicts often arise between them. It is for this reason that constant consideration of the context, constant compromise, is necessary. For example, contextual secularism recognizes the tension between individual and group rights, between the values of equality and freedom, etc. This tension can hardly be resolved on the basis of a general abstract principle. Rather, the problem should be solved in turn on a case-by-case basis, which will always require finding a compromise between conflicting requirements. It may turn out that the result does not fully satisfy either party, but it will still be considered acceptable by the parties.

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When you talk about "principled distance" and "contextual secularism", you are talking more about the ideal type of Indian secularism, but if we talk about reality, is everything really so smooth in India?

Democracy is not without its problems. All sorts of things happen - and you constantly have to negotiate, correct mistakes, and make compromises. So it's not all smooth sailing. For example, in the 70s - 80s there was a famous case of Sha Bano (Shah Band). Sha Bano, a Muslim woman, filed a lawsuit against her husband, who decided to divorce her. According to Islamic law - or rather, according to some understanding of these laws - a husband is required to pay alimony to his ex-wife for a very short period of time. After that, he is completely free and no longer has any obligations to her. The woman filed an application to the court, saying that such a procedure for paying alimony would mean inevitable poverty for her. The court sided with her and ruled that the former spouse must pay alimony for life. Then-in 1985-the Supreme Court approved this decision. This is a positive example of state actions aimed at leveling intra-religious dominance: that is, in this case, the dominance of Muslim men over women. However, orthodox Muslims did not agree with this decision, considering it a violation of their rights. Active political campaigning has begun around this issue. And here the parliament sided with the Orthodox: in 1986, a law was passed ("The Law on Islamic Women: Protection of the Rights to Divorce"), according to which Muslim women were removed from the general Indian laws and were deprived of the right to claim lifelong alimony-they had to live according to Islamic laws1. And this is an example of the direct opposite of the thesis of "principled distance". The state intervened, but not to reduce, but on the contrary - to increase intra-religious dominance.

1. The Supreme Court subsequently adopted an understanding that was sufficiently favorable for divorced women, following a review of the constitutionality of the law. - Ed. note.

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Another problem was that the Supreme Court itself made a mistake in its decision. Instead of basing his argument on secular logic, he allowed Islam to be condemned for its mistreatment of women, thereby provoking such a painful reaction. It turns out that the state interfered in internal religious affairs and created a threat to religious freedom.

And what would be the correct decision of the court, if we think in the logic of "principled distance"?

He should have said that we have the law and the claim was filed on the basis of Indian law. The Indian court is a secular institution, and secular logic is above all else, so any woman can apply to it, regardless of her religion. Accordingly, Sha Bano's application must be granted and she must receive the money due to her.

So the "principal distance" requirement was violated?

Yes, the principle was violated because it resulted in a violation of religious freedom. In addition, one should always strive to reduce intra-religious dominance. Women's equality is extremely important. So, on the one hand, freedom of religion is important, and on the other - equality of women. And if there is a situation in which a Muslim woman says that she wants to be free from the law written by the Muslim Orthodox, the government should say: OK, we are on your side, we will not support the Orthodox. There is nothing anti-Islamic about this position, because it is a choice between two Muslims. And to make the right decision, you just need to look at the constitution, if the constitution corresponds to the aspirations of orthodox Muslims, then there is no problem. But why make a law that contradicts the constitution and frees the hands of the Orthodox?

Interviewed by Dmitry Uzlaner

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