After India gained independence, Hindutva became actively involved in political life. Its political wing, the Bharatiya Janata Party, has repeatedly led governments in many states and three times formed a government in the center. But in the 14th and 15th parliamentary elections, the BJP was defeated. Some authors have regarded the present state of hindutva as "the beginning of its end ." However, the state of public consciousness of the population of India today does not allow us to recognize the mobilization capabilities and other resources of the Sangha Parivar as exhausted.

Keywords: Hindutva, Sangha Family, Bharatiya Janata Parties, Constitution of India.

THE ROAD TO POWER

After 1947, politics became the most important activity of the Rashtriya Swayaksevak Sangh (RSS), and the creation of a mass political party was one of its main tasks. The RCC first bet on the Bharatiya Jan Sangh (BDS), organized in October 1951. In the first general elections of 1951, the BDS won 3.1% of the vote and 3 seats in the Lok Sabha. The BDS achieved the greatest success in the 1967 elections (it received 9.3% of the vote and held 35 deputies in the Lok Sabha). Then his influence began to wane. During the state of emergency imposed by Indira Gandhi in 1975, BDS political activity froze.

In 1977, the state of emergency was lifted and parliamentary elections were called. On the eve of the election, the Bharatiya Jan Sangh, Bharatiya Lok Dal, Congress (O) and Socialist Party formed the Janata Party. It performed well in the elections and in 1977 even formed the first non-progressive government headed by Morarji Desai (1896-1995). The leaders of the former BDS were given ministerial posts: Atal Behari Vajpayee - Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Lal Krishna Advani-Minister of Information and Broadcasting. But relations within the ruling party were not going well. The leadership of the Janata Party, led by the Gandhian M. Desai, did not share Hindutva's communalist views.

In the 1980 elections The Janata Party failed. Members of the former BDS under the leadership of Vajpayee and Advani left the Janata Party in the same year and formed the Bharatiya Janata Party ( Indian People's Party) - BJP. Its leadership was made up of proven RCC cadres-Atal Behari Vajpayee, Lal Krishna Advani, Narendra Modi, Shivraj Singh Chauhan and others. For respectability, members of high-profile names, movie and television stars, athletes, etc. were invited to the party. The Bharatiya Mazdur Sangh, Bharatiya Kisan Sangh, Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarti Parishad (Vsein) became the largest non - governmental organizations of the Sangha Family under the leadership of the BJP.-

Ending. For the beginning, see: East (Oriens). 2010. N 2. pp. 79-94.

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Indian Student Council), as well as the newly established Bharatiya Janata Yuva Morcha (Indian People's Youth Front), Mahila Morcha BJP (BJP Women's Front) and others.

The BJP has not formally joined the Sangha Parivar. She also tried not to advertise her ideological closeness to the Sangha Family. The first articles of the BJP's Program state that the party is committed to "creating a democratic state that guarantees all residents, regardless of caste, faith or gender, political, social and economic justice; freedom of belief and expression." The Party undertakes to abide by the Constitution and its principles of socialism, secularism and democracy [Constitution..., pt. II]. However, subsequent articles in this document leave no doubt that the BJP is the political" wing "of the RCC, or, in the words of A. D. Noorani, its" trained monkey " (Noorani, 2005).

The BJP did not immediately decide on its" philosophy". At first, she claimed that her worldview was based on "Gandhian socialism." But since 1985, "integral humanism" has become the "foundation of the party's philosophy" [Constitution..., pt. III]. This term was coined in the late 1950s and early 1960s as the "philosophy" of the Jan Sangha. Its meaning was revealed in April 1965 by Pandit Dindayal Upadhyaya (1916-1968), General Secretary and later President of the Jan Sangha. "Integral humanism" is the same Hindutva, but adapted to the new socio-political realities, the antithesis of the popular trends of social thought in India at that time-bourgeois-democratic reformism and Marxism.

D. Upadhyaya, like his predecessors, rejects Western civilization in any form, be it capitalism or "Soviet communism", as "spiritless". D. Upadhyaya said that the development of India should be based on dharma and humanism. Dharma in his interpretation appears as divine predestination, as a goal-setting coming from above. It sets the direction for the development of society and the state. Humanism is interpreted as a blessing for all, as the content of the dharmic world order. But humanism is not in the Western sense, because it has a " materialistic and individualistic bias." Such humanism breeds greed, class antagonisms, exploitation, and social anarchy and cannot unite a nation. Humanism should harmoniously connect the individual and society, meet the needs of "body, mind and soul". In a word, humanism must be " integral."

D. Upadhyaya chose secular, democratic and federal principles of state organization as the object of his criticism. "Now, "he said," the term 'secular state' is used as the antithesis of a theocratic state. This is a Western way of thinking, it is unacceptable for India." For "a state without religion is a state without dharma," i.e., without truth, without morals and morals. "The state can only be dharma rajya and nothing else." The dharma of India is primarily to preserve the unity of the country. The federal structure of India does not correspond to its dharma. It is fraught with the danger of disintegration. The principles of Western democracy also do not meet the dharma of India. The truth cannot be revealed by voting. If tomorrow the people of Kashmir vote to secede from India, this decision will not be dharma. India should become a theocratic unitary state, and the Constitution should be changed. Pandit D. Upadhyaya did not ignore the Muslim question either. He, like the founding fathers of Hindutva, sees a fundamental difference between Hindus and Muslims. But he does not connect this difference with the attitude of both to the "holy places" of India, but considers it from the standpoint of human nature: it is positive for Hindus, which cannot be said about Muslims [Integral Humanism].

To hide the unconstitutional meaning of "integral humanism", the BJP uses a well-developed technique - a deliberate jumble of terms and concepts. Article IV of the Program states that party members, while embracing "integral humanism", simultaneously "remain loyal" to nationalism and national integration.-

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social democracy, "a Gandhian approach to socio-economic issues leading to the establishment of an egalitarian society free from exploitation"; as well as "positive secularism" and policies "based on moral values" [Constitution..., pt. IV]. At the same time, Article XXXIII of the Program grants members of the National Executive Committee of the BJP the right to interpret the program provisions of this document. These explanations are the only correct and binding ones for all party members and party organizations [Constitution..., pt. XXXIII]. An article has two addresses, as it were. It instills in ordinary party members: do not worry about all sorts of "socialism", "secularism", "egalitarianism", etc.; listen to the members of the National Executive Committee - what they say is the truth at the moment. To the BJP leaders, she says: don't cling to formulas, improvise, act according to circumstances. Therefore, authors often put different meanings into covering the same issue.

Take, for example, the same question about religious minorities. One party theorist, M. M. Joshi, states :" All Indian Muslims are Mohammedan Hindus (Mohammadiya Hindus), and all Indian Christians are Hindu Christians (kristi Hindus). They are Hindus who have adopted Islam and Christianity as their religion" [Thapar, 1987, p. 14-22]. It would seem that this idea is supported by another major BJP theorist, L. K. Advani, when he calls on Muslims to "put out of their minds the slightest hints of the 'two-nation theory'". There is only one nation in India. But to fully become part of this nation, Muslims must "understand cultural nationalism" and embrace "the symbols and inspirational sources of our national culture." They should "bury" the communal principle of voting in elections and thereby "contribute to the improvement of democracy" (Noorani, 2004). In other words, in order to become a full-fledged part of this nation, Muslims are encouraged to give up their identity and leave the arena of public and political life.

Apart from a cursory mention that the BJP stands for "decentralizing economic and political power," the party has no socio-economic agenda. Some elements of this program are contained in the documents of other Sangha Parivar organizations. It is perhaps best described in the charter of the Bharatiya Mazdur Sangha. Instead of Western capitalism and "Soviet communism", the charter proposes a "bharatiya social order", which includes: the rejection of property (both private and state), class struggle; "service to society" as an incentive for production (not profit); "laborization" of industry - transfer of enterprises to workers in ownership and management; limiting profits and introducing "equal distribution"; eliminating unemployment and poverty through the development of the "unorganized" sector; preferential use of local goods and technologies; restricting imports, "war for economic independence" against the "imperialism" of the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, the World Trade Organization, etc. Similar passages can be found in the charters of other Sangha Parivar organizations. But depending on the recipient, their accents and even their content can vary greatly. For example, in documents aimed at peasants, artisans, and the middle classes, there is not a single word about renouncing property, etc.

But the BJP Program pays a lot of attention to political issues. Among the political priorities of the party are the following tasks and goals: to repeal Article 370 of the Constitution, which defines the special status of the state of Jammu and Kashmir; to adopt a unified Civil Code for Hindus, Muslims and Christians; to abolish "privileges" for religious minorities; to prohibit the slaughter of cows and the use of beef for food; to prohibit the conversion of Hindus to another faith; to build Rama Temple in Ayodhya on the site of Babur Mosque; achieve reunification with India of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir controlled by Pakistan and China; strengthen bilateral relations

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Table 1

Lok Sabha election results

Elections

Parties

INC

BJP

voices, %

members of parliament

voices, %

members of parliament

8th of 1984

49.1

404

7.7

2

9th 1989

39.5

197

11.4

85

10th 1991

36.3

232

20.1

120

11th 1996

28.8

140

20.3

161

12th of 1998

25.8

141

25.6

182

13th 1999

28.3

114

23.4

182

14th of 2004

26.5

145

22.2

138

15th of 2009

28.6

207

18.8

116

Compiled from: Statistical Report on General Elections to the Lok Sabha. Volume I (National and State Abstracts & Detailed Results), Election Commission of India, New Delhi; http:// www.indian-elections.com/resultsupdate/

with the United States and other Western bloc countries; arm the country with all types of nuclear weapons; be ready to repel threats coming from Pakistan, China, as well as Bangladesh and other countries.

The BJP made its political debut in December 1984 in the 8th general election. Then the party won only 2 seats in parliament. However, subsequent elections brought the BJP more and more success. In 1989, the number of its deputies in Parliament increased to 88. By supporting the Janata Dal coalition government led by V. P. Singh, the BJP got its first taste of power and realized its significance. When in protest against the arrest of L. K. Advani in October 1990 it withdrew its support, and the government collapsed.

After the 1996 elections, the BJP became the largest party in Parliament. The number of its deputies exceeded the number of INC deputies for the first time. Indian President Shankar Dayal Sharma has appointed A. B. Vajpayee as Prime Minister. But opposition pressure forced Vajpayee to resign (his government lasted only 13 days). The United Front government led by Janata Dal, which succeeded A. B. Vajpayee, fell in March 1998. New elections were held in 1999.

Ahead of the 12th general election, the BJP formed the National Democratic Alliance (NDA) of 13 parties. With external support from the Telugu Desam Party, the NDA won a narrow majority in Parliament and formed a government headed by A. B. Vajpayee. But this coalition was also fragile. AIADMC's withdrawal from the coalition led to the resignation of the government. Before the 13th election, the BJP took a more thorough approach to forming a coalition. With its participants, she discussed in advance the number of seats in the future government. In the 1999 elections, the NDA won 303 seats in Parliament. A. B. Vajpayee became Prime Minister for the third time. L. K. Advani was appointed Deputy Prime Minister. This time the government stayed in power for a full term (13.10.1999-13.05.2004).

There are several reasons for the BJP's success. First, the deterioration of India-Pakistan relations, which resulted in the BJP's militant anti-Muslim rhetoric falling on favorable ground. The BJP's popularity was further boosted by a nuclear weapons test in 1998 during the brief tenure of A. B. Vajpayee's Government. And although it caused a negative reaction from the international community,

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The masses of ordinary people in India saw it as a fitting response to Pakistan's nuclear program.

Secondly, the so-called Shah Bano case also contributed to the aggravation of inter-communal contradictions within the country.1 The decision of the Supreme Court excited the public. Secularists (INC and other secular parties), the BJP, and organizations close to the Sangha Parivar hailed it as a step towards a unified civil code. But the Muslim community met the decision with hostility, as it meant interference in its internal affairs. Fearing further destabilization of the political situation, Rajiv Gandhi forced the Lok Sabha in 1986 to pass the law "On the Protection of Muslim Women's Rights to Divorce", which overturned the decision of the Supreme Court. This time, both secularists and communalists were outraged. Secularists (congressists, communists, etc.) perceived the law as a departure from the secular principles of the Constitution, and Hindutva supporters saw it as a generous and undeserved concession to Muslims, which caused a new wave of anti-Muslim sentiment.

Third, the BJP's noisy anti-Muslim campaign to restore the Rama Temple in Ayodhya. According to legend, Rama was born in this city, and the temple stood in the very place where Rama was born. In 1562, it was destroyed by the Babur, and a mosque - Babri Masjid-was built in its place. The names of Rama and Babur did not come together by chance. Rama occupies a special place in the Hindu pantheon. He is the 7th avatar of Vishnu, synonymous with Balarama, the elder brother of Krishna and Varuna [Gandhi Maneka, 1993, p. 331]. "Rama" means "beautiful", "kind", "invincible". For many Hindus, Rama is a historical figure. In the Rig Veda, he appears as the ruler of legendary states. There are experts who even call the year of his birth. According to M. S. Golvarkar, Rama is an ardent patriot. He freed the country from the evil spirit of Ravana. He "was the perfect son, the perfect brother, the perfect husband, the perfect friend, the perfect disciple, and the perfect enemy to his enemies-all represented in one perfect Hindu man (emphasis added). - A. K.)" [Golwalkar, 1966. p. 57]. Babur is the exact opposite of Rama. This is an aggressor who abused Hindu women, killed Hindus and forcibly converted them to Islam, looted and demolished Hindu temples and built Muslim mosques in their place. Rama and Babur represent Good and Evil. The Hindu God Rama is the embodiment of Good, and the Muslim Babur is the embodiment of Evil.

The issue of the temple and mosque has been discussed more than once by the society. But he was not the subject of Hindu-Muslim discord. The holy place was equally revered by both Hindus and Muslims. Since the late 1980s, the Sangha Parivar has been campaigning for the demolition of the Babur Mosque and the construction of a Rama Temple in its place. The Family chose yatra, a pilgrimage to holy places, as the main means of agitation. Yatra is a sacred act that cleanses the participant's karma from sins [Glushkova, 2008]. Therefore, the yatra is usually a crowded event. They are accompanied by processions, prayer services, rallies, and performances that are permanently stored in people's memories, attract media attention, and have a great propaganda effect.

The widely acclaimed Ram Rath Yatra for the restoration of the Rama Temple in Ayodhya in September-October 1990 was led by L. K. Advani. The yatra began in the sacred city of Somnath, a symbol of Hindu resilience, and ended in Ayodhya. In Ayodhya, the second stage of reconstruction was to begin . -

1 Shah Bano, a 62-year-old Muslim woman and mother of five children, found herself without means of support after divorcing her husband in 1978 and went to court with a claim against her former spouse to pay her alimony. But according to Muslim family law, after a divorce, a husband is only required to support his wife for three months, after which she goes to support her relatives. Shah Bano's relatives said they did not have the means to do so. The alimony case was considered by courts of various instances and eventually reached the Supreme Court. The court ruled in favor of Shah Bano in 1985.

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building of the temple. Yatra inflamed communal passions. Along its route, Hindu-Muslim skirmishes constantly broke out. To avoid mass riots, L. K. Advani, the yatra leader, was arrested on October 23, 1990. The arrest prevented the BJP from launching the second phase of the campaign. Nevertheless, the BJP regarded the yatra as a "resounding" success. L. K. Advani claimed that it was "the first attempt to present 'cultural nationalism' "in a concrete and intelligible form [Ram Rath...]. Opponents of communalism reacted differently to it:" For the first time in the half-century history of the Indian Republic, a mass movement was organized and brazenly used to undermine the law and violate the constitutional norm of equal and equal opportunity." fair protection of all groups of the population", - it was noted in the statement of the public organization "End communalism" [Rathyatra..., 2001].

In November 1992, L. K. Advani and M. M. Joshi held another yatra in favor of the restoration of the Rama Temple. It achieved its goal: on December 6, 1992, a mob of Hindu fanatics demolished the Babur Mosque. The destruction of Babri Masjid sparked a new wave of Hindu-Muslim clashes. It is believed that about 2 thousand people died in them. Commenting on the Babur Mosque incident, L. K. Advani said that he was sorry, but "it was God's will" [Indian express, 26.01.1993]. In the run-up to the 11th general election, the BJP realized that it was impossible to mobilize the electorate on an anti-Muslim platform alone. And the party changes its tactics. It refuses sharp attacks against " minorities "and positions itself as a" nationwide " patriotic force. Advani was forced to admit that the destruction of Babri Masjid was a mistake [Puri, 2004]. The Swarna Jayanti rath Yatra, which L. K. Advani conducted in May-June 1997, was secular and overtly political in nature.

Other reasons for the BJP's political success include the fact that the Indian public is tired of government leapfrogging-government crises, endless elections. The voter attributed these crises to the weakness of the Congress, its inability to control the situation in the country. The BJP, which pretended to be the party of order, could not fail to attract the sympathy of voters. And finally, its skillful policy is to build alliances with parties that are offended by the arrogance of the Congress, its unwillingness to share power with them.

HINDU RAJ REHEARSAL

The NDA government, formed by the BJP after the 13th parliamentary elections, has not done anything to build a "Bharatiya social order"in all its 5 years in power. It continued the Congress 'policy of liberalizing the economy, privatizing large state-owned corporations, making concessions to the "imperialists", etc. There was no noticeable improvement in the situation of the mass segments of the population - agricultural workers, artisans, small traders, "vulnerable" groups of the population-dolitoes, Adivasis, women. There is no less corruption. Even one of the BJP's vice-presidents, who was caught trying to take a bribe, was implicated in another corruption scandal.

If the NDA's economic and social policies were not new, then in the field of education and culture they were marked by a total attack on the secular foundations of society and the state. Referring to the fact that the state institutions responsible for education, science and culture were "packed to the brim with leftists and Marxists," the BJP government hastened to replace their leaders with its own cadres. These institutions include the Indian Council for School and Higher Education, the University Commission, the Indian Council for Historical Research, the Indian Council for Social Research, the Nehru Museum, the National Museum, and major universities [Hindu, 27.02.2000].

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After that, the Government launched an education reform. The Indian Council for School and Higher Education recommended that subjects such as Vedic Mathematics and Vedic Astrology be included in school curricula. The textbooks that children were taught in the Sangha Parivar Vidya Bharati schools were imposed by the Council on all schools in the country, including state schools. The Documents on South Asia Center in Delhi devoted a long article to the quality of these textbooks, "In the Name of History." It follows from textbooks that the creator of Indian culture and the "first Hindu nationalist" was God Krishna, Homer's Iliad is a version of Valmiki's Ramayana, Jesus Christ borrowed his teachings from Hindus, etc. In the spirit of Hindutva patriotism, the manner of presentation of educational material is also sustained: "When Peshwa Madhav Rao sat on the throne... The English, French, and Portuguese were all shaking with fear. They bowed their heads and carried gifts to his court. The Emperor of Delhi was a puppet in the hands of the Peshwa, " etc.

Textbooks persist in saying that Muslims have always been an alien element in India, that "there was a constant struggle between the two cultures "[Nalini]. Survivals and customs, such as the caste system, child marriage, and sati, which were fought by the country's leading people, are presented as good for society: intra-caste marriages "ensure purity of blood", child marriages "promote a happy family life", sati is "a tradition to be proud of" , etc. And if someone does not like them, then all the same Muslims are to blame for their appearance. "Muslim invaders began to marry Hindu women. To protect their religion and culture, Hindus were forced to tighten their marriage laws" [ibid.].

Textbooks for higher education institutions were also "edited" in the appropriate spirit. They present the complex and multi-layered culture of India as exclusively a product of Hinduism. Everything that would indicate the mutual influence of Hinduism, Islam and Christianity has been erased from them. Thinkers such as Rammohan Roy or Keshab Chandra Sen, statesmen such as Emperor Ashoka and Shah Akbar, and many anti-colonialism activists were excluded from the list of prominent historical figures for religious tolerance. The BJP leader in Madhya Pradesh, Gopinath Munde, even demanded that Jawaharlal Nehru's book "The Discovery of India" be banned, as he considered it to contain "offensive remarks" about Shivaji (Tripathi, 2004). "Under the pretext of educational reform, an attempt is being made to rewrite textbooks in the spirit of communalism,"the preface to the article" In the Name of History " says. "As a result, an entire generation of Indians will grow up with their collective memory destroyed, with ideas that have nothing to do with historical truth." "In combination with other forms of education," the authors conclude, "they will completely change our self - image and direct our political worldview in the direction of fascism, not democracy" [In the Name...].

A panel of three professors, Irfan Habib, Suvira Jaiswal, and Aditya Mukherjee, presented a 130-page report to the Indian Council for Historical Research in June 2003 listing misrepresentations of historical events and facts. The report noted that the distortions were caused by the desire to present India's history in a "chauvinistic" light and that it was not possible to eliminate them by editing. We need to change the basic concepts [Rajalakshmi, 2004].

Hindutva also paid attention to academic science. "Once in power for a while, the RCC and BJP are in a hurry to inject as much of their ideology as possible into the world of academic science," a group of prominent Indian historians said in a press Statement [Press Statement...]. However, the policy of the authorities met with strong resistance from the scientific community. Indian historians gave the general battle of Hindutva for the publication "Towards Freedom". This project provides for the preparation and publication of a 10-volume collection of archival documents on

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history of the liberation movement in India during the last ten years of British rule (1937-1947). The publication was intended as a response to the "Transfer of Power" series published in England. According to Indian historians, English publications portrayed the departure of the British from India almost as an act of goodwill and belittled the role of the liberation struggle. The preparation of the volumes was entrusted to a group of well-known historians headed by Professor S. Gopal.

On the recommendation of Human Resources Minister and prominent BJP leader M. M. Joshi, the Indian Historical Research Council withdrew two volumes (1940 and 1946) from the publishing house in 2000 for "review" and"correction". The reason for this, according to M. M. Joshi, was the dissatisfaction of the "majority of the population" with the fact that these volumes contain more documents "on the role of communists" than on the role of Mahatma Gandhi [Hindu, 04.03.2000]. A press statement signed by 39 well-known historical scholars states: "The seizure of these volumes is part of a plan to spread a distorted and false history of the national movement" [Press Statement...].

Scientists were supported by the democratic public of the country. On February 18, 2000, the Center for Indian Trade Unions, the National Federation of Indian Women, the Teachers ' Democratic Front, the Delhi Union of Journalists, the Delhi Forum of Scholars, the City Forum for Secularism and other organizations held a rally in front of the Indian Historical Research Council. The audience demanded that both volumes be returned to the publisher immediately. Protest rallies were held in Kolkata, Mumbai, Chennai, Baroda, Trivandrum [Intellectuals...]. Both houses of Parliament and the press participated in the discussion of the issue of the publication. Together, Hindutva's attack on academic science was repelled.

A characteristic feature of Hindu Raj was also the gross interference of Hindutva in the personal affairs of citizens, in the religious and cultural life of society. Sangha parivar tried to take on the role of "vice police". The militants of Hindu Vishwa Parishad, Bajrang Dal, Durga Vahini and other zealots of "Hindu nationalism" launched a hunt for people who have entered into mixed marriages or converted to a different faith on an unprecedented scale. They smashed art exhibitions that "inappropriately" depicted Hindu gods; theaters and movie theaters that played plays and films that "distort the Hindu cultural tradition" (Srinivasan, 2004). The Sangha family also tried to take over religious life in the country. It imposed its own symbols on Hindu temples, used them for propaganda, for holding its own public events. Under the pressure of the Sangha Parivar, State events were increasingly given a religious character. One of the BJP leaders, Uma Bharati, the Chief Minister of Uttar Pradesh, built gaushals (cow shelters) at the expense of taxpayers. In the holy cities of Ujjain, Amarkantak, Onkareshwar and Meheshwar, non-Vegetarian food was banned (Tripathi, 2004). Tamilnadu has passed a law banning" forced " conversions of Hindus. The Sangha Parivar organizations were allocated large sums from the budget for the renovation of temples, for the payment of pensions to temple pujari priests, and for annadhanam (distribution of food to the poor at Hindu temples) [Viswanathan, 2004].

In states where Hindutva felt particularly at ease, it launched an offensive against democratic freedoms. "With the rise to power of the Bharatiya Janata Party, Madhya Pradesh fell into the hands of the Lumpens of Bajrang Dal and Hindu Vishwa Parishad," wrote K. N. Panikkar. "Once in Madhya Pradesh, pay close attention to what you say or do. You can be terrorized, publicly humiliated, imprisoned, or even expelled from the state under any pretext. Law enforcement agencies will not pay any attention to this, and the ruling party will pretend that it knows nothing about it" (Panikkar, 2004).

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The" demons " of communalism were especially violent in Gujarat in February-March 2002. Taking advantage of the connivance of the central government, and often with the direct participation of activists of the BJP, the ruling party in the state, they unleashed an unprecedented anti-Muslim massacre of unprecedented scale and cruelty [Kutsenkov, 2002, pp. 37-43]. Emboldened by the "success" in Gujarat, the Sangha Parivar extremists promised to repeat Gujarat nationwide, purge all holy sites of Muslim presence, and send Indian Muslims "to Pakistani cemeteries." And not only Muslims: "Pehle kasai, phir Isai" ("First Muslims, then Christians") [Ramakrishnan, 2006].

Since, according to Hindutva, the BJP's victory in 1999 was brought about by a wave of "Hindu patriotism" raised in connection with Ayodhya, then with an eye to the 15th election in December 2007. she organized anti-Christian pogroms in Orissa. 40 churches and 700 homes were destroyed. In August 2008, the pogroms resumed and covered 14 districts. "Demons" raged for 6 weeks. During this time, the Sangha Parivar militants killed 60 people, burned 147 churches, destroyed 4 thousand homes, and left 50 thousand people homeless [Emmanuel, 2009]. Anti-Christian acts of intimidation were also held in Karnataka, Gujarat, Rajasthan and other states.

The Hindu Raj dress rehearsal revealed to many citizens the unsightly appearance of the"Hindu state". Its apotheosis was the village of Khambarisahi (Gajapati district, Orissa), inhabited by one tribe, brothers in blood, but divided by barbed wire into two halves - Hindu and Christian. Residents of these parts do not communicate with each other, as they may be subjected to physical violence at any time (Chattopadhyay, 2004).

IT'S TOO EARLY TO DOT THE I'S

Hindutva's opponents were quick to declare the 14th election "the beginning of her end" (Bidwai Praful, 2004). After the 15th election, people started talking about the "historic decline" of communalism and the triumph of secularism forces, as well as the beginning of a new era in the history of India. How well-founded are these conclusions? Let's look at it in order.

Hindutva is a superstructure over the "national", soil-based, everyday Hindu communalism. Numerous, but unfortunately imperfect, population surveys show that, despite everything, communalism retains a strong position in society. One such survey was conducted by Outluk magazine between May 31, 2002 and May 31, 2003, in the wake of the Gujarati pogroms and (note!) a year before the BJP's defeat in the 14th general election.

It follows from the responses that the proportion of respondents who are tolerant of Muslims and do not agree with India becoming a "Hindu state" is 20.7 - 20.9% of the sample. The share of those who are uncomfortable with communication with Muslims, who are aggressively opposed to them, and who advocate turning India into a theocratic "state of Hindus" is 77.3 - 79.2%. There are very few fluctuating factors - only 0.1 - 1.8%.

How accurately does this data reflect the real state of affairs? The survey organizers themselves warn that its results should not be considered "scientific", since they took into account only those respondents who agreed to answer the questions posed. And the sample is too small to be representative. But if not the numbers themselves, then their order allows us to draw some conclusions. Namely: a) that supporters of Hindu communalism make up the majority of the population, b) that the communalism-secularism rift has affected the entire society, leaving almost no people neutral, indifferent, and c) that communalism is not just an unaccountable feeling; it is a deeper and more conscious feeling, a conviction, one might say, a worldview. And the worldview, as you know, does not change suddenly.

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Table 2

Survey results

Question

Number of respondents

Answer

yes

no

don't know

Would you feel comfortable if your neighbor or tenant was a Muslim?

8568

20.9

78.6

0.4

Do you think that the Gujarati pogroms cannot be justified by anything?

8784

20.9

77.3

1.8

Should India change its name from "secular republic" to "Hindu republic"?

8655

79.2

20.7

0.1

Compiled by: http://www.outlookindia.com/resultsurvey.asp?surveyid='7

Nevertheless, in 2009, the difference between the number of votes received by the INC and the BJP reached the maximum value in the last 10 years - 9.8%, while even in the crucial years of 1999 and 2004 it did not exceed 4.3 - 4.9%. These facts need to be explained. It is important to understand the extent to which electoral statistics can reflect the balance of power between communalism and secularism, and reveal the dynamics and nature of changes in society.

To begin with, the election results are the result of the interaction of many factors. For the average person going to the polling station, the state of inter-communal relations becomes the number one issue if it threatens him directly, here and now. Under normal circumstances, he is more concerned with work, wages, prices for basic necessities, water, electricity, road conditions, etc.The set of these problems remains the same, but their hierarchy changes. Therefore, no election is similar to any other.

The 13th, 14th and 15th parliamentary elections were held under different conditions. 1999-2007 India experienced rapid economic growth. In the spring of 2008, the Indian economy faced difficulties caused first by a sharp increase in world energy prices, and then by the global financial crisis. In the 1999 and 2004 elections, voters were asked to choose between two main political blocs - the NDA and the OPA. On the eve of the 15th election, two new associations - the so-called Third and Fourth Fronts-joined the fight. During this time, both the BJP and the INC were in power, which gave the population an opportunity to compare the results of their rule; there were many other events that somehow affected the socio-political situation in the country, on the mood of voters. Therefore, the number of votes given to the BJP or Congress and the number of their representatives in Parliament could not serve as the only indicators of the balance of power between supporters and opponents of communalism.

The fact of winning/losing an election doesn't mean much either - it doesn't always depend directly on the number of votes received. The Central Election Commission of the Government of India indicates that the number of BJP and INC supporters remained almost unchanged in the 13th and 14th elections. It was 103.1 and 103.4 million votes for the INC, 86.6 and 86.4 million for the BJP, respectively. The geographical distribution of votes has not changed either. But at the same time, the elections, as you know, gave the opposite results. In the 1999 general election The INC nominated more candidates than the BJP and received more votes than the BJP. But the BJP held a parliamentary election on

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68 deputies more than Inc. In the 2004 elections, the number of INC candidates decreased, and the difference in votes in its favor even narrowed. But the INC won 31 more seats in Parliament and the BJP 44 fewer than in 1999 [Statistical Report...].

Indian analysts often attribute such paradoxes to the influence of changeable and hard-to-predict factors that are well known to every politician. One of them is the majority system of elections. With it, competing candidates can get as many (or as few) votes as they want, but the winner is the one who has at least one more. In this case, much depends not so much on the attitude of voters to parties, blocs, their programs, etc., but on the ability of party headquarters to correctly select and place their nominees in electoral districts. In the 1999 elections, the BJP's political strategists won over their colleagues from the INC. But in 2004 and 2009, the payoff was on the side of Inc. If in the 13th general elections, every percentage increase in votes in favor of the Congress gave him 4 additional seats in the Lok Sabha, then in the 14th-5.5, and in the 15th-7.2 [How India Voted, 2009].

They also call the notorious anti-incidence factor2. In 2004, the loss of the INC in the 13th and the BJP in the 14th elections is quite within the" norm " of anti-incumbency. According to the pendulum law in 2009, this factor should have swung again in favor of the BJP. But it didn't swing. And if it swung, it was not to the extent that it seriously affected the outcome of the elections.

We can try to explain the results of the 15th general election by the mental and psychological characteristics of the BJP and INC electorate. For example, the degree of his loyalty to "his" party. Analyzing the results of the 2004 elections, Japanese scientists found that representatives of all castes, religious communities, and social class groups vote for the BJP and the INC. Therefore, it is not possible to make a generalized portrait of the voter of each participant in the election.

But something can be learned from the structure of the BJP and INC electorates. It is logical to assume that the votes given directly to the party-leader of the alliance (this is the BJP and INC) are more stable than the votes of allies (if only because the allies change from election to election), and even more so the votes of random fellow travelers who are not associated with any party and decide for whom to vote on a whim. The BJP has a smaller share of "own" votes and more votes of its allies than the INC. But the BJP is mostly supported by upper-middle-class castes of high and middle ritual status. These are financially well-off people, more educated and politically literate. Their electoral behavior is more determined by their consciousness and beliefs. The INC has more" own " votes and fewer allies than the BJP. But INC is popular with religious minorities, groups of low and very low ritual status, and people who are poor and very poor. They are mostly illiterate or illiterate. Their electoral behavior is determined not so much by reason, but by emotions, minute moods. As we can see, neither the BJP nor the INC have any clear advantages in these parameters.

Practice shows that the factors listed and not accurately accounted for (majority system, anti-incumbency, behavior of marginals, etc.) can add or subtract a maximum of 4.5 - 4.9% of votes for one or the other party. This is a threshold value. As the 13th and 14th elections showed, it may not even affect the outcome of the fight. But in 2009, the gap between the votes of the INC and the BJP was almost twice the threshold. Therefore, it is impossible to explain the defeat of the BJP in the 14th and especially in the 15th elections as a game of chance. It is also difficult to explain the victory of INC by saying that its board

Anti-incumbency factor 2 can be translated as a factor of unfulfilled hopes or annoyance "overstayed in power". He always works against the ruling party. Having given her his vote and ensured her victory in the elections, the average person waits for the fulfillment of her promises. But they usually remain unfulfilled. Having become disillusioned with the previous favorite, the voter gives his vote to the competing party in the next election.

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it turned out to be more attractive for the population. The study "How India voted" showed that the problems that worried the voters in 2009, worried them in 2004 and 1999 [How India Voted, 2009].

Most likely, the BJP paid the price, willingly or unwittingly, mainly for the RCC's extremism, for its hard-line Hindutva course. There is ample evidence that after the Gujarati pogroms, in which the BJP took part along with other Sangha Parivar organizations, fear of mass sectarian clashes took hold of a large part of the Indian population. The authors of the study "How India voted" explain the results of the 15th elections by the fact that, unlike the BJP, "the approach (of Congress - AK) is very different. the approach to solving social conflicts does not divide society", does not push one part of it against another [How India Voted, 2009]. The BJP, in the eyes of public opinion, was and remains part of the Sangha Family, a tool in the hands of the RSS. After the Gujarat events, 8 parties left the National Democratic Alliance, and by the 15th election, the BJP was left without influential allies. According to V. Venkateswan, they "felt ashamed to speak to the voters at the same time as the BJP, which disgraced itself in 2002 with pogroms against minorities in Gujarat" (Venkatesan, 2005). Telugu Desam, Trinamool Congress and other BJP-allied parties refused to support it because they felt that if they joined it, they would lose more votes than they would gain [How India Voted, 2009].

Despite these worrying signals, on the eve of the 15th election, the BJP continued to persist in demonstrating its loyalty to Hindutva. Among the candidates for the post of prime minister of the future government (if she wins), she named Narendra Modi, a bright but odious figure. He is considered the main organizer and mastermind of the Gujarati pogroms. In March 2009, a scandal broke out with BJP candidate Varun Gandhi. In his election speeches, he made sharp attacks against Muslims, which caused a storm of indignation in society. The court opened a criminal case against V. Gandhi on charges of inciting inter-communal hatred and recommended that his candidacy be withdrawn from the elections. But the BJP did not heed this warning and came to the defense of its favorite [How India Voted, 2009].

Inciting inter-communal hatred, pogroms, violence, violation of civil rights, gross interference in the religious and cultural life of society, attempts on democracy, which were widely practiced by the RCC and other organizations of the Sangha Family, in which the BJP participated directly or indirectly, alienated not only religious minorities, but also the sane part of the Hindu community [Kutsenkov, 2009]. The BJP's organ, Kamal Sandesh magazine, acknowledged that the party's failure in the 2009 elections was largely due to the departure from the BJP of a part of the middle class that had lost "faith in the moral values" of Hindutva [Gupta, 2009, p. 15]. But it is the well-off strata of the middle class that are the cementing foundation of the party's electorate.

Recent electoral failures have exposed more than just voter dissatisfaction with the BJP's policies. They made public the discord in the ranks of Hindutva itself, which could not but affect the election results. First of all, we are talking about the contradictions between the BJP and the RSS. They didn't appear all of a sudden. The RCC had high hopes for the BJP's victory in the 1999 elections, achieved through the efforts of all members of the Sangha Family. He demanded that the BJP immediately start implementing the Hindutva political program-to amend Article 370 of the Constitution, adopt a unified civil code, legally prohibit the conversion of Hindus to another faith and the slaughter of cows, allocate a plot of land for the construction of the Rama Temple in Ayodhya, etc.

Instead, A. B. Vajpayee said that as the head of the government, he does not represent any particular community (read-Hindus. - AK), but all Indians; that the party that first came to power should not make any sudden movements, so as not to alienate the voters [Hindu, 12.04.2001]. The BJP essentially gave up on

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amendment of Article 370 of the Constitution. Instead of taking a tougher stance on the Muslim issue, Vajpayee began negotiations with Muslim separatists in Jammu and Kashmir and engaged in improving relations with Pakistan. He promised to provide two lakhs (200,000) of jobs for Urdu teachers and large cash grants to madrasas. Instead of building a unitary state, the BJP "established links with regional parties to strengthen federalism" (Puri, 2004).

According to the RSS, the BJP "blabbed" the Ayodhya issue. Solemn promises to fulfill the "dream of all Hindus" in the very near future were replaced by arguments that the demolition of the Babur Mosque in Ayodhya was a political mistake, that the problem of the Rama Temple in Ayodhya should be solved "through negotiations and within the framework of the law." On the eve of the 14th general election, L. Advani stated that the construction of the temple will only begin after the new cabinet formed (under the leadership of the BJP, of course) after the elections comes to power [Indian Express, 06.04.2004].

The populism of the BJP is extremely irritating in the RCC, where they believe that it is caused not by political considerations, but by the banal desire of the BJP leaders to stay at the helm of state power, and they are doing everything possible to return it to the true path [Venkatesan, 2005]. Ashok Singhal, a prominent member of the Sangha, outraged by the indecisiveness of the A. B. Vajpayee government, once even threatened that "if the party does not change its style of behavior, we will eat it up" [Asian Age, 23.04.2001].

After 14 elections, these threats began to come true. At a November 2004 session of the Akhil Bharatiya Karyakari Mandal (the central executive body of the RSS) in Hardwar, the majority of its members denounced the "style" of the BJP leaders during their time in power. The Executive committee session in Mangalore (Karnataka) in March 2005, Chitrakut (Uttar Pradesh) in October 2005 and Nagpur in February 2006 developed a BJP reform agenda. The party was told that from now on, when determining its political course, it should be guided only by the ideological principles of Hindutva [Ramakrishnan, 2006]. Recognizing that the BJP is not up to its task, the RCC leadership suggested first eliminating the "monopoly of one organization", i.e., the BJP, on political activities and including other Family members in politics - Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Mazdur sangh, Swadeshi jagran manch, etc. (Ramakrishnan, 2006).

But the BJP, what Noorani described as the "trained RSS monkey," suddenly showed its teeth. The BJP leaders rebelled against the RSS's interference in the party's day-to-day operations, against the hardline Hindutva in public activities. Young BJP leaders have lashed out at the older generation of RSS leaders, accusing them of being backward and retrograde. The BJP has become more open about its non-involvement in Hindutva extremist activities. Unlike the Gujarati events of 2002, the pogroms of Christians in the south of the country in 2007 and 2008 were usually carried out not by BJP activists, but by RSS militant groups - Vishwa Hindu Parishad, Bajrang Dal and other Sangha Parivar organizations. There were reports in the press that some prominent BJP functionaries went to the scene and tried to stop the militants.

The crisis has also penetrated the ranks of the BJP. He touched upon the relationship between the party leadership, which is increasingly slipping towards soft Hindutva positions, and the more conservative grassroots, which remains loyal to the" nationalist " Hindutva ideals. In addition, ordinary members of the party express dissatisfaction with the fact that the leaders of the BJP put themselves above the party, do not take its opinion into account. Demanding asceticism from others, they themselves lead an aristocratic lifestyle, "bathe in luxury" (Venkatesan, 2005). Internal party tensions escalated to such an extent that in the 15th general elections, BJP "saboteurs" often voted against candidates nominated by their party's leadership and favored INC candidates [Gupta, 2009].

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It seems that the crisis in the Hindutva ranks is still far from being resolved. The RSS does not want to listen to the BJP's arguments. The RSS puts all the blame for the election defeat on the BJP leaders, who lost their "mental and mental balance", turned the BJP into an "illegible typewritten copy of the Congress" and departed from the only correct and "time-tested" Hindutva ideology inherited from the Jan Sangh (Datta Chaudhary Sandeep, 2009). Get rid of these ailments, the RCC urges, and the party will have a bright future [Mishra, 2009].

But the BJP has so far shown no willingness to make concessions. She continues to insist on her version of hindutva, which does not even hint at religious cleansing, the forced return of Muslims and Christians to the bosom of Hinduism, etc. "Hinduism or Hindutva should not be understood narrowly, only as a religious practice or extreme forms of self-expression," reads the political resolution of the National Executive Committee of the BJP, dedicated to the results of the 15th parliamentary elections. - In fact, it is connected with the culture and character of the entire Indian people and reflects their way of life. Therefore, it includes the highest ideological achievements of our culture and civilization... Equal treatment regardless of the personal faith of each person is an integral part of this idea (emphasis added - A. K.)" [Political Resolution..., 2009].

The new BJP President Nitin Gadkari [Presidential Address 2010] and the new Lok Sabha opposition leader L. K. Advani [Concluding Remarks, 2010] are not inclined to dramatize the situation. They believe that the party's electoral failures are not systemic, but temporary. By expanding the social base by attracting the poorest and poorest segments of the population, making a more thorough selection of allies, and strengthening discipline in its ranks, the party will certainly take revenge in the next election.

* * *

The recent parliamentary elections have exposed and sharpened the contradictions between the hard-line Hindutva of the RSS and the "human-faced" Hindutva of the BJP. Hindutva was in a state of crisis. The only question is how deep this crisis is and whether it is truly fatal. You should not rush to conclusions.

The eclectic nature of the ideology, ideological and political pluralism have always been a feature of Hindutva. The internal struggle between different currents accompanies its entire history. Hindutva has repeatedly experienced and successfully emerged from such states. Nor is the current crisis exceptional.

Nor is it unusual for the BJP to lose to Congress in the 2004 and 2009 elections. With the exception of 1998, the INC has always been ahead of the BJP in terms of electoral votes. And the BJP's victory in 1999 was not due to a preponderance of votes, but mainly to the tense communal situation in the country and a favorable combination of uncontrollable random factors. Leaving aside the random circumstances, the main reason for the defeat is the easing of communal tensions and the rejection by some of the electorate of the extremes of the hardline Hindutva RCC, with which public opinion associates the BJP.

And one last thing. Hindutva's political organization, the Bharatiya Janata Party, lost the election. But the BJP is not the entire Sangha Family, nor is politics the only application of Hindutva power.

There is more than one scenario for overcoming the political crisis: provoking a new surge of religious and communal hostility, mimicry towards the liberal, soft Hindutva, and sacrificing the BJP by transferring its political role to other members of the Sangha Family, and many others. If we take into account the total resource of Hindutva-communal beliefs of the Hindu part of the population.-

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However, due to the high level of innovation, flexibility of ideology and politics, functional diversity and capabilities of the organizational infrastructure of the Sangha Parivar, we will have to admit that forecasts of the imminent decline of Hindutva are premature.

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