Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan have influenced and continue to influence security in Central and South Asia and the Indian subcontinent. They began to play a special role in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries in connection with the situation in the "free Pashtun tribes" of Pakistan, where at present not the laws of this state apply, but, in fact, the voluntarism of the leaders of these tribes. Terrorist No. 1, Osama bin Laden and his associates, took refuge there. In fact, this territory was turned into a base of forces that are dangerous not only for the states of Central and South Asia and the Hindustan subcontinent, but also for the entire world community. Due to the actions of terrorists, the problems went beyond the specified region. The success of the fight against international terrorism, the most dangerous phenomenon of our time, largely depends on the development of Pakistan-Afghanistan relations.

HISTORY OF THE PASHTUN QUESTION IN THE COLONIAL ERA

In 1747, the first unified Afghan state, the Durrani Empire, emerged in the territories where the main population was the Pashtun people, led by Ahmad Shah, a military commander from the Sadozai clan of the Abdali tribe, which has since become known as Durrani (pearl). However, already in the 60s of the XVIII century. in Punjab, which was part of this state, the Sikh population rebelled, and in 1765 Punjab became independent. A Sikh state was established there, with Lahore as its capital. In 1799, a young but influential Sikh Sardar, Ranjit Singh, became its ruler. Having subdued most of the Afghan possessions in India, he created a strong state, the core of which was Punjab (Gankovsky, 1988, p. 129). Thus began the collapse of the Durrani Empire. At the beginning of the 19th century, the disintegration continued and several independent principalities emerged in place of the empire. In Kabul, Peshawar and Kandahar, Barakzai rulers seized power. Only in Herat did the former ruler of the empire, Shah Mahmud, survive, who lost the throne in 1818. The Unified Afghan state ceased to exist.

At the turn of the 17th and 18th centuries, the British first attempted to interfere in the internal affairs of Afghanistan in order to prevent an alliance between the ruler of the Durrani Empire, Shah Zaman, and the ruler of the southern Indian state of Mysore, Tipu Sultan. The authorities of the British East India Company, using their influence in Persia, obtained the assistance of the Persian authorities in overthrowing Shah Zaman. In 1808, a diplomatic mission was sent to Afghanistan, headed by the official M. Elphinstone, who on June 17, 1809, concluded an agreement with the then ruler of the Durrani Empire, Shah Shuja, which imposed on him the obligation not to let the French pass in the event of Napoleon's march on India and not to join the Franco-Russian alliance. However, this agreement remained on paper, since after its signing, Shah Shud-

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He was overthrown [Gankovsky, 1988, pp. 137-138]. He was succeeded by Shah Mahmud [Ali and Romodin, 1964, p. 164].

Meanwhile, the Maharaja of Punjab, Ranjit Singh, subdued Multan. In the same year, his troops entered Peshawar for the first time, but at that time Ranjit Singh did not capture it. In 1819, he conquered Kashmir, in 1819 - Deragazikhan, and in 1821 - Deraismayilhan. The ruler of Kabul, Muhammad Azim, considered Peshawar his domain and did not want to give it to the Sikhs, but was defeated by the Sikhs at Naushera. Soon after this disgrace, he died, and after a while the ruler of Ghazni, Dost Muhammad Khan, became the ruler of Kabul.

Later, Sayyid Ahmad Shah, a native of Barelvi, a city in Northern India, led the fight against the Sikhs. However, in 1831, he was killed in a battle with Sikhs in the Khazar region near Balakot. On May 6, 1834, the Sikhs took Peshawar without a fight, and the rule of the Afghan Sardars in this area came to an end [Spain, 1963, p.123]. All attempts by the next ruler of Kabul, Dost Muhammad Khan, to reclaim these lands ended in failure. Thus, the lands of the eastern Pashtuns were torn away from the Afghan rulers and became part of the Sikh state of Punjab.

In 1838, the combined army of the East India Company and the pretender to the Afghan throne, Shah Shuja, entered Afghanistan. However, this adventure, known as the First Anglo-Afghan War of 1838-1842, ended in complete failure and the interventionist troops were forced to leave Afghanistan.

In 1839, the founder of the Punjabi Sikh state, Ranjit Singh, died. Immediately, feuds broke out between various factions of the ruling elite, which the British took advantage of. As a result of the two Anglo-Sikh wars of 1845-1846 and 1848-1849, the territory of the Sikh state, together with the lands of the eastern Pashtuns, was included in the British possessions in India in March 1849. In August 1858, after the defeat of the Great Indian Insurrection1, India came under the control of the British Crown (before that, power was exercised by the British East India Trading Company), and after the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878 - 1880, British control over the territories of the eastern Pashtuns was consolidated and extended to the adjacent strip of mountain Pashtun tribes. Under the Gandamak Treaty of 1879, signed by the Afghan Emir Yaqub Khan and the representative of the British colonial authorities N. Kavanyari, Afghanistan was deprived of the right to pursue an independent foreign policy.

In 1893, something happened that determined the position of the eastern Pashtun lands - the border between British India and Afghanistan was established. It passed through the "Durand Line", so named after Colonel Sir Mortimer Durand, who carried out its demarcation as Secretary for Foreign Affairs in the government of the Viceroy of India. In the autumn of 1893, he signed an indefinite agreement in Kabul with Emir Abdurrahman Khan (1880-1901), which secured the capture by Great Britain of those areas in the Suleiman Mountains and in the Quetta-Pishin Highlands, where there were more Pashtuns than in Afghanistan itself [Gankovsky, 1964, p.216]. The Emir was forced, under the threat of a new war, to sign this agreement. However, the British authorities were not able to fully establish themselves in the severed areas. As a result, most of the "independent Pashtun tribes" remained only under British suzerainty. The mountain belt adjacent to these lands was seething with uprisings, and in the bowels of the Anglo-Indian General Staff, unknown terms arose.: "permanent border war" and "band of independent tribes", or "band of free Pashtun tribes".

1 Sepoy uprisings.

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In 1901, the administrative districts of the eastern Pashtun territories that were previously part of the Punjab province were separated into a separate North-Western Border Province (NWFP) with the center in Peshawar (Spain, 1963, p. 149). In the band of "free Pashtun tribes", the power of the leaders of these tribes remained, and the Viceroy of India was represented by so-called political agents.

In 1919, as a result of the Third Anglo-Afghan War, in which the Northwestern Pashtuns supported Afghanistan, the country fully regained its independence. But the then Afghan Emir, Amanullah Khan, was forced to recognize the Durand Line as the state border between Afghanistan and British India. The Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 also left this border unchanged.

EDUCATION OF PAKISTAN AND PROBLEMS OF ITS RELATIONS WITH AFGHANISTAN

After the First World War, the national liberation movement began to grow in India. Political organizations have sprung up in the NWFP. In 1921, the first mass organization Anjuman-i islah-i afagina2 was established. Its founders were future prominent figures of the national Pashtun movement NWFP brothers Ab-dul Ghaffar Khan and Khan Sahib and their associates. In 1926-1927. They created a new organization, the Pakhtun Jirga3, and then began forming the Khudai Khidmatgar4, which the British authorities called "red shirts" because of the color of their uniforms [Gankovsky, 1964, p.216]. In 1928, the provincial branch of the All-India Indian National Congress (INC) Party was organized by Khan Sahib in the NWFP and Khudai Khidmatgar became a part of it. Since that time, this organization has led the struggle of the NWFP population against British colonialism. It was the only serious political organization in the province until the 1937 elections held under the Indian Government Act of 1935. A branch of the All India Muslim League (VML), a party established in India in 1906 and leading the struggle for the creation of Pakistan in the 1940s, was established only after these elections.

Prior to the 1937 elections, there were no antagonistic contradictions between the INC and the WML. However, since 1938, relations between these major political parties in India have become increasingly hostile. With the outbreak of World War II, the League, unlike the Congress, which opposed India's participation in the "imperialist war", supported the position of the British government. On March 23, 1940, the Lahore session of the All India Muslim League passed a resolution declaring its goal to create state entities in those parts of India where Muslims were the majority. Supporters of a united India called the resolution "Pakistani", although the word "Pakistan" was not included in it.

In the 1946 Provincial Legislative Assembly (Assembly) elections, the NWFP Congress organization won a landslide victory and formed the provincial Government. These elections, in essence, determined the affiliation of provinces in the event of the division of the colony upon India's independence. Supporters of the INC believed that the province should join India, which the Muslim League did not want. And it was after these elections that a fierce struggle between branches of both parties began in the NWFP.

According to the "Mountbatten Plan" 5, India, upon independence, was to be divided into two dominions: the Indian Union and Pakistan. The idea of a unified Information system-

2 Society for the Education of Afghans.

3 Pashtun Conference, or Pashtun League.

4 Servants of the Lord.

5 Is also known as the "June Third Plan".

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dii could no longer be implemented due to the irreconcilable position of supporters of its division. Due to the difficult situation in the NWFP, this plan called for holding a referendum on the province's affiliation. The central leadership of the INC agreed to the referendum, and this shocked the leaders of its branch in the NWFP. Under these circumstances, Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his supporters began to fight for the creation of an independent Pashtun state in the province and founded the Free Pashtunistan movement. It was this fact that gave rise to the Afghan Government's attempt to capitalize on the situation. One of the reasons for the Afghan Government's support for this movement was apparently an attempt to somehow gain access to the Arabian Sea through independent Pashtunistan.

The press and radio of Afghanistan launched a campaign to support the struggle for the creation of Pashtunistan. Afghanistan's Foreign Minister Ali Mohammad has made it clear that his Government opposes joining the NWFP to India or Pakistan against the will of its people. On June 21 and July 6, 1947, four influential Afghan sardars-Hafizullah, Inayatullah Khan, Habibullah Khan and Muhammad Yaqub-appealed to the British government to allow the people of the NWFP to establish their own state. On July 10, 1947, the Foreign Secretary of Afghanistan sent a letter to the British representative in Kabul repeating the demands of the Afghan Government regarding the NWFP.

In response, the British representative said that such actions by the Afghan authorities would cause dissatisfaction with his government. On July 6, 1947, the NWFP referendum began. Since the Viceroy did not include a "Free Pashtunistan" clause in his ballot, Abdul Ghaffar Khan called on his supporters to boycott the referendum. When it became clear that the results of the vote would be in favor of Pakistan, the British government advised Kabul to establish relations with the future governments of the two new states.

As a result of the referendum, the administrative districts of the NWFP became part of Pakistan. Soon after the head of the Muslim League, M. A. Jinnah, visited the band of "free Pashtun tribes", these tribes also became part of it. Thus, the "Durand Line" became the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan. This solution to the NWFP problem did not satisfy the Afghan Government at all. His attitude toward his new neighbor had deteriorated dramatically. In September 1947, the Afghan delegation to the UN was the only one to vote against Pakistan's admission to the organization. Although Kabul soon withdrew its objections and the two countries exchanged ambassadors in 1948, relations between them remained strained. They have especially worsened after the arrest of Pashtun nationalist leaders Abdul Ghaffar Khan, Khan Sahib and their associates in Pakistan. On the" Durand Line " there were military clashes that threatened to escalate into an interstate conflict.

In June 1949, an event occurred that damaged relations between the two countries for many years. At the first session of the Afghan Parliament, all Afghan-British agreements concluded before the formation of Pakistan were denounced and the "Durand Line" was not recognized as the state border between Afghanistan and Pakistan. On August 31, 1949, after the" declaration of independence of Pashtunistan", which took place in the city of Tirakh6, the Afghan government decided to celebrate the so - called Pashtunistan Day annually on August 31 [Afghanistan at the beginning of the XXI century, 2004, pp. 300-301]. It should be noted that this proclamation was already carried out not by the supporters of Abdul Ghaffar Khan and his Khudai Khidmatgar, but by the supporters of Mirza Ali Khan, better known as the Fakir of Ipi, who led with sereh-

6 North Waziristan region in the tribal belt.

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In the late 1930s, he had fought an armed struggle against British colonialism, and now he did not obey the Pakistani authorities either.

Relations between the two countries continued to deteriorate, and the issue of "Pashtunistan" became a stumbling block, and the normalization achieved by the early 1950s was under threat [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2003, p. 84]. In 1954, the Afghan government of Sardar Muhammad Daoud denounced the Anglo-Afghan Treaty of 1921 and supported the anti-Pakistan actions of the " free Pashtun tribes "in 1955, after the proclamation of the united province of"West Pakistan". This was due to the fact that the NWFP, like other provinces in the western part of the country, was disbanded. In Kabul and in some other cities of Afghanistan, most likely encouraged by the authorities, protest demonstrations took place - the buildings of the embassy and consulates of Pakistan were attacked and looted. Dozens of people were injured. Pakistan's national flags were torn down from the buildings of its diplomatic missions. Diplomatic relations between the two countries were suspended. Pakistan has closed the border and transit corridor for Afghan goods. Both countries were on the verge of war. An armed conflict, however, was avoided, since neither side was interested in it [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2003, p. 84].

In the same year, during his visit to Afghanistan, the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR N. A. Bulganin and the Chairman of the Presidium of the Central Committee of the CPSU N. S. Khrushchev expressed firm support for Afghanistan in the issue of Pashtunistan [Iqbal, 2004, p. 91].

Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan seemed to be settled in 1955, and Kabul had to accept the fact that a single province of West Pakistan was formed, but in 1956 the SEATO bloc, of which Pakistan became a member, at his insistence recognized the Durand Line as the border between these countries, and relations again deteriorated. In 1956-1957, there was an intensive exchange of visits between the leaders of both states, during which the parties agreed to expand the channels of transit trade of Afghanistan through Pakistani territory and signed an agreement on air traffic.

The trip of King Mohammad Zahir Shah in February 1958 was the last in a series of visits by the leaders of both countries to each other at that stage of interstate relations. At the same time, it was followed in May of the same year by the conclusion of the first intergovernmental agreement on transit trade, which replaced the previous agreements inherited from colonial times. In June of the same year, a more preferential procedure for cargo transportation was established between Peshawar and Kabul (via the northern transit route) and between Chaman and Kandahar (via the southern route) [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2003, pp. 84-85].

By the late 1950s, relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan had again deteriorated due to events in Pakistan. In October 1958, on the eve of the military coup, the dissolution of parliament and the abolition of the 1956 constitution, which brought General Muhammad Ayyub Khan (a Pashtun by birth) to power, the former khan of the principality of Kalat (the center of the historical and geographical region of Balochistan) raised an uprising, demanding independence for the principality [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, p. 136]. During the ensuing fighting, anti-government protests were suppressed, but it was not until the summer of 1959 that the movement was finally suppressed.

The uneasy situation also spread to the Pashtun regions of Balochistan, the "tribal belt", as well as to the Pashtun principalities that remained independent (and after the creation of a single province of West Pakistan). In September 1960, Pakistani troops entered the Bajaur region bordering Afghanistan and the principality of Dir. Their punitive expedition, carried out in February-March 1961.,

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It has led to an even greater aggravation of Pakistani-Afghan relations. Encouraged by the moral support of the USSR and India, the Afghan authorities made a number of diplomatic demarches to protect the interests of the Pashtuns [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2003, pp. 84-85]. There were border clashes between Pakistani and Afghan forces. These actions of Kabul provoked a harsh reaction from the leadership of Pakistan, now headed by President M. Ayub Khan. In August, it closed its consulates in Kandahar and Jalalabad and demanded the closure of Afghan consulates and trade missions on its territory. In response, the Afghan government closed the border with Pakistan. The Government of Pakistan has taken measures to stop the transit of Afghan goods through the territory of West Pakistan, and it has demanded that Afghan nomads who previously freely crossed the border, going to spend the winter on its territory, now have passports with a Pakistani visa. The Afghan government had to deploy them on its territory, and the nomads were dissatisfied with both.

Mediation efforts by the US and Iranian governments to improve relations between the two countries have failed. In the early 1960s. Pakistan has managed to resolve the situation in Balochistan and in the Pashtun areas. The closure of the border with Afghanistan did not harm its economy. Afghanistan, on the other hand, was experiencing considerable difficulties and was looking for ways to get goods through Iran and the USSR [Korgun, 2004, pp. 300-301]. Prime Minister M. Daoud's policy on this issue clearly reached a dead end, and in March 1963 he was forced to resign.

In May 1963, the Pakistan-Afghanistan talks, mediated by the Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, resumed. At the insistence of Pakistan, the "Pashtunistan problem" was circumvented, and so the parties easily reached an agreement. Diplomatic relations were restored, and Afghanistan was granted the right to transit its goods through Pakistan [Korgun 2004, p. 326]. In the future, Afghanistan tried to maintain normal relations with its neighbor. This was also facilitated by the fact that after the resignation of M. Ayyub Khan, the province of West Pakistan was abolished and, among others, the NWFP was restored.

On July 17, 1973, a coup d'etat took place in Afghanistan. Former Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud overthrew King Mohammad Zahir Shah. Afghanistan was declared a republic, and M. Daoud became its president. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan then became complicated. Immediately after M. came to power. Dawood stated, " Pakistan is the only country with which we have political differences on the issue of Pashtunistan. We will continue our efforts to address this issue." This was nervously regarded by Islamabad, which, although it recognized the new regime, nevertheless called it anti-Pakistan [Korgun, 2004, pp. 398-399]. This position of the Afghan president was facilitated by the situation in Pakistan itself. The situation in the NWFP and in Balochistan has again become extremely tense. By the end of 1972, the Government of Pakistan, which had been headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto since December 1971, had ceased to accept the activity of political forces operating in these provinces that were opposed to the ruling Party of the Pakistani People. Troops were deployed to Balochistan, and the governor and Government were removed in February 1973. In the NWFP, the governor was removed, and the government resigned in protest against his removal. A cache of weapons intended for anti-Government forces in the Northwestern Federal District and Balochistan was found on the territory of the Iraqi Embassy. Concerned about this, the Shah's Government of Iran assisted the Government of Pakistan in suppressing the armed opposition in Balochistan. Active, carefully hidden from the world community, military operations were conducted until the beginning of 1975, although resistance continued until 1977. [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2003, p. 105].

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After the murder of one of the leaders of the local organization of the Pakistan People's Party, Provincial Minister of Internal Affairs H. M. Sherpao, in the NWFP, the central authorities arrested a number of prominent figures of the opposition National People's Party (formerly Khudai Khidmatgar), led by A. Wali Khan, the son of A. Ghaffar Khan, and tried them in a military tribunal, which was held for a number of years in Hyderabad (Sindh) [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2003, pp. 104-105].

M. Daoud continued his policy towards Pashtunistan and stated in an interview that NWFP and Balochistan have always been an integral part of Afghanistan, from which they are now separated. Afghanistan raised the issue of the violation of the rights of the Pashtun and Baloch peoples in Pakistan at the conference of Non-Aligned countries in Algiers in September 1973 and during the visit of Mevlut Cavusoglu. Dauda arrived in Moscow in the summer of 1974 [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2003, p. 105]. Pakistan has accused the Afghan government of interfering in its internal affairs. In addition, in an interview, M. Daoud again stated that the NWFP has always been an integral part of Afghanistan and was annexed by the British, who imposed an unfair agreement on Afghanistan [Afghanistan at the beginning of the XXI century, 2004, p. 399]. The Government of Pakistan worked closely with the Government of Iran to resolve the conflicts that had arisen in the Northwestern Federal District and Balochistan. However, the international situation has changed, and during the second visit of M. Daoud arrived in Moscow as President of Afghanistan in October 1974, where he was advised to solve the problem of Pashtunistan in a peaceful way.

The Pakistani army's crackdown on the Baloch people caused a flood of refugees to flow into Afghanistan, where camps were set up to train Baloch militants, who then returned to Pakistan and waged an armed struggle against government forces. In total, up to 15 thousand people were trained there [Afghanistan at the beginning of the XXI century, 2004, p. 399]. The Government of Pakistan also retaliated to destabilize the situation in Afghanistan by allowing the actions of the Islamic opposition, led by G. Hekmatyar, B. Rabbani and other oppositionists, to operate on its territory. Socio-economic measures were also taken to stabilize the situation in the NWFZ and Balochistan.

Moscow's refusal to support M. Daoud's position on the issue of Pashtunistan, the mediation of the governments of Turkey and Iran, which offered $ 2 billion in aid to Afghanistan, as well as the release of A. Ghaffar Khan from prison, although the remaining leaders of Pashtun nationalists remained in prison, allowed for a softening of relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. In 1976, recent opponents Z. A. Bhutto and M. Daoud exchanged visits and promises to settle disputes and disagreements [Belokrenitsky and Moskalenko, 2008, p. 281]. However, on July 5, 1977, Z. A. Bhutto was removed from power in a military coup led by the Army Chief of Staff, General Muhammad Zia ul-Haq. But the desire to improve relations between the two countries continued, and in October 1978, the new leader of Pakistan paid an unofficial visit to Kabul.

Meanwhile, the situation in Balochistan and the NWFZ has eased. The leaders of the Pashtuns and Balochs were released from prison, which created a favorable environment for the visit of M. Dauda to Islamabad. During the visit, the talks focused on economic and cultural ties. Pakistan again tried to raise the issue of Afghanistan's recognition of the "Durand Line" as a border and Afghanistan's refusal to support the idea of Pashtunistan. But M. Daoud made it clear that the solution of these issues lies exclusively in the competence of the Loya Jirga7 as the authorized representative of the Afghan people. On his return, he stated that this visit was a good idea.

7 of the People's Assembly.

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an important step for improving relations between the two countries [Afghanistan at the beginning of the XXI century, 2004, p. 401].

CIVIL WAR IN AFGHANISTAN

On April 27, 1978, a new coup d'etat took place in Afghanistan, and the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) came to power, declaring its goal to build socialism in Afghanistan in the Marxist-Leninist manner. The country was proclaimed the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan( DRA), its head was the head of the PDPA and its Khalq 8 faction Muhammad Taraki, his deputy - the head of the Parcham 9 faction Babrak Karmal, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs - Hafizullah Amin.

On May 5, 1978, Pakistan recognized the new Afghan Government. It was stated that what happened in Afghanistan is an internal matter and Pakistan will develop relations with Afghanistan on the basis of its recognition by the new regime of the "Durand line" border and a positive solution to the problem of Pashtunistan for Pakistan. During the session of M. N. M. Taraki confirmed Afghanistan's desire to maintain friendly relations with Pakistan and expressed the hope that political differences will be resolved through peaceful good-neighborliness [Khan, 2005, p. 240]. At the International Conference of Ministers of Industry of Developing Countries held in Kabul in May 1979, Pakistan expressed its readiness to assist Afghanistan in training personnel and send its specialists to various branches of its industry [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2001, p.328]. In September 1979, during the Conference of Leaders of Non-Aligned Countries in Havana, M. Zia ul-Haq and N. M. Taraki met.

However, after returning from Havana, N. M. Taraki was killed. The mastermind of the murder is Prime Minister X. Amin took the place of the head of state. Terror began in the country. The prison in Puli Charkhi turned into an Afghan prison cell, and lawlessness took place in the center and on the ground. This caused a mass exodus of Afghans to Pakistan and Iran. Government X. Amin's decision on the Durand Line and Pashtunistan left Pakistan with no hope. However, Pakistan's policy towards Afghanistan changed radically only after the entry of Soviet troops there. Pakistan did not recognize the government of Babrak Karmal, which replaced the government of H. Amin, and cut off diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. In Peshawar, the headquarters of political organizations that fought against the PDPA regime and the Soviet troops were established. In early January 1980. Pakistan has demanded an urgent meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the so-called Afghan issue. In the international arena, Pakistan has become one of the main initiators of actions against the DRA.

In January 1980, at the initiative of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, an Emergency Session of the UN General Assembly was convened, which adopted an anti-Afghan resolution, essentially prepared by Pakistan. A session of Foreign Ministers of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) member countries was held in Islamabad in January and May 1980. Pakistan succeeded in excluding the DRA from it and joined the Committee on Afghanistan established by the OIC. At the conference of Foreign Ministers of non-Aligned countries in New Delhi in February 1981, the delegation of Pakistan sought to supplement the final document with an anti-Afghan amendment. Later, at the annual sessions of the UN General Assembly, Pakistan played an active role in the adoption of-

8 People.

9 Banner.

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anti-Afghan resolutions. Pakistan has taken the same position in other international organizations.

The Pakistani Government actively supported the armed Afghan opposition. The Islamic Party of Afghanistan, 10 headed by Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, enjoyed particular support, as its ideological platform was similar to the leading Islamist party in Pakistan, Jamaat-i Islami. G. Hekmatyar's group also had considerable military strength. However, Pakistan's position on the DRA had negative consequences for it. Despite the help of the West and Muslim countries as a "frontline state", the economy of Pashtunistan began to experience great difficulties. By 1983, Pakistan's external debt had reached $ 12 billion, and prices for consumer goods were rising rapidly. In the areas of refugee accommodation (more than 3 million people), there was discontent among the local population. Refugees plowed pastures for crops and cut down forests. Many came to Pakistan with large sums of money and competed with local entrepreneurs. Pakistan was flooded with weapons and drugs, which was not the case before [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2003, p. 283].

In 1982, negotiations between Islamabad and Kabul began with the mediation of the Special Representative of the UN Secretary-General in Geneva. Initially, Pakistan sought to achieve the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. But before the end of the negotiations in 1988, Pakistan also tried to get Kabul to solve the problem of the state border, putting this as a condition for signing ready-made documents. The Pakistani delegation at the talks was headed by Prime Minister (since 1985) M. H. Junejo. At the final stage of the negotiations, President M. Zia ul-Haq and his group tried to disrupt the signing of peace agreements. There were disagreements within the ruling bloc, which led to the resignation of the government of M. H. Junejo. But the Geneva agreements between Pakistan and Afghanistan, supported by the United States and the USSR, were still signed on April 14, 1988. The withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan began, which ended on February 15 of the following year.

In August 1988, Pakistani President M. Zia ul-Haq and General A. A. Razman, who was directly responsible for the Afghan military intelligence operations, were killed in a plane crash. The country has embarked on the path of restoring democratic principles of state governance. As a result of the parliamentary elections, a government led by Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of Zia ul-Haq Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, who was executed by the regime, came to power. In Afghanistan, Babrak Karmal was replaced as president by the head of security 11, Muhammad Najibullah. The state became known as the Republic of Afghanistan, the PDPA-the Fatherland Party12. Benazir Bhutto's Government and Nawaz Sherif's successor Government continued to support the armed Afghan opposition, in violation of the Geneva Agreements. One of the main goals of the overthrow of the "communist government" of Afghanistan for Pakistan was again to recognize the future Mujahideen government border along the "Durand Line".

The armed Afghan opposition did not recognize the Geneva Agreements, declaring the Kabul regime illegitimate, and continued to fight against it. On February 10, 1989, the Mujahideen formed the "Transitional Government of Afghanistan" in Rawalpindi, headed by President S. Mujaddidi (whose representative in the Council that appointed the government was the future President of Afghanistan Hamid Karzai) and pre-established the "Transitional Government of Afghanistan".-

10 Hezb-e islami.

11 HUD.

12 Vatan.

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Prime Minister A. R. Sayaf. The Government consists of leaders of the seven-party alliance formed in Peshawar in 1988. In May 1989, the opposition attacked the city of Jalalabad, but after suffering heavy losses, they were forced to retreat to the territory of Pakistan.

Only with the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 did the situation in Afghanistan change radically. The cessation of arms supplies and the defection of former Mujahideen associates forced Najibullah to hand over his resignation to the UN representative in Kabul on April 15, 1992. On April 28, 1992, detachments of his former associate A. R. Dostom, as well as mujahideen from the group of B. Rabbani and A. S. Masoud entered Kabul. Najibullah, who had previously sent his family to Delhi, tried to escape, but was detained and granted asylum in the UN mission in Kabul. Immediately after his departure from the political arena, the then head of the Government of Pakistan, Nawaz Sherif, went to Kabul in order to promote the formation of a coalition government in which G. Hekmatyar would take a leading position. However, this turned out to be unattainable, as irreconcilable contradictions immediately arose among the Mujahideen. B. Rabbani became the President of the Islamic State of Afghanistan (IGA), and soon fighting broke out between his troops and those of G. Hekmatyar.

Relying on G. Hekmatyar, Pakistan sought to develop relations with both B. Rabbani and A. R. Dostom. The latter attracted attention by the fact that the documents of the National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan (NIDA) created and led by him declared recognition of the borders established between states [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2003, p. 328]. As Hekmatyar's position weakened, Pakistan sought to establish contacts with other Afghan political leaders. However, reconciliation between the former allies failed, and the war in Afghanistan became an increasingly heavy burden for Pakistan. Since 1990, the West has stopped providing him with aid. The problem of refugees, the spread of drug addiction that was not typical for the country before, terrorist acts that had an Afghan trace, the impossibility of creating gas and oil highways from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan - all this inflamed the situation in the country. Under these circumstances, Pakistan virtually abandoned its support for the Mujahideen and relied on the Taliban, which it helped establish in 1994. The backbone of the movement was formed by the Taliban - students of religious schools established in Pakistan for Afghan refugees. Some of the Mujahideen and even the Pakistani military also joined in.

Relations between Islamabad and Kabul have sharply deteriorated. Rabbani's administration has accused Pakistan of interfering in its civil war. On September 6, 1995, the Pakistani Embassy in Kabul was destroyed. Following this, Pakistan closed its diplomatic mission in Kabul and withdrew its personnel. A large group of Afghan diplomats were expelled from Pakistan. Rejecting all the accusations, Islamabad declared support and assistance to the Kabul regime from Iran and India [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2003, p.331].

Since the Taliban's entry into the political arena, Pakistan has provided them with comprehensive assistance, persuading the leaders of other Afghan groups to support them, and contributing to the collapse of the emerging anti-Taliban coalition. The failure of the Mujahideen leaders to unite sealed the downfall of their regime. Having settled in Kandahar, the Taliban conducted successful military operations. They were helped by the fact that the people were tired of permanent war, and the Taliban leaders promised to restore order and peace in the country. On September 26, 1996, their troops entered Kabul. The leaders of the Taliban movement did not comply with international laws, customs and agreements. They broke into the UN Mission building, arrested Najibullah, and then brutally killed him. According to some reports, the arrest was made by employees of the special service of the Pakistan Army-the Joint Military Intelligence (IAD), with the aim of signing it retroactively before-

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a document on Afghanistan's recognition of the "Durand Line" border [Plastun and Andrianov, 1998, p. 193]. Following the Taliban takeover of Kabul, the center of resistance moved north to the Panchshir Valley, and Ahmad Shah Massoud became the only consistent leader of the anti-Taliban coalition.

Under these circumstances, Pakistan's leaders at international forums began to call for support for the new leadership of Afghanistan, led by the Taliban leader Mullah M. Omar. At the UN, representatives of Pakistan tried to remove representatives of the Rabbani government from their work. At a meeting of the OIC Foreign Ministers in Jakarta in December 1996, Pakistan ensured that the seat of Afghanistan remained vacant, contrary to the views of many delegations, as the Taliban representatives who were there wanted. Pakistan's leaders, including President F. A. H. Legkari, visited Central Asian countries in October 1996 to convince their leaders that the rise to power of the Taliban in Afghanistan poses no danger to the countries of the region. On May 27, 1997, Pakistan, like Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, officially recognized the Taliban regime. The embassy of the so - called Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan is located in the capital of Pakistan, and its consulate is located in Peshawar. Islamic radicals have become more active in the country. In Afghanistan, the Taliban established a regime of medieval fanaticism. They didn't raise the issue of the Durand Line or Pashtunism, but they were clearly getting out of hand with their Pakistani friends. Peace in Afghanistan was becoming increasingly necessary for Pakistan, but when, in August-September 1999, it was not until the end of the war. Pakistan tried to bring the Taliban and the Northern Alliance, i.e. the leaders of the anti-Taliban coalition, to the negotiating table, but nothing came of it. The latter rejected this initiative [Zuev, 2000, p. 26].

In October 1999, a new military coup took place in Pakistan. The head of state was General Pervez Musharraf, who soon became president. Taliban leader Mullah M. Omar sent him a message of congratulations, clearly looking forward to further strengthening relations. Initially, the new Pakistani authorities continued the policy of their predecessors towards the Taliban. Having pledged to implement the UN Security Council's decision of October 15, 1999 to impose sanctions against the Taliban regime, Pakistan then regarded this decision as unfair, only adding to the "humanitarian tragedy of the people of Afghanistan", as a result of"uncompromising behavior on the part of the UN". Military cooperation with the Taliban continued, weapons and fighters were transferred to Afghanistan, which together with the Arab adherents of Osama Bin Laden, who settled with the Taliban in Afghanistan, formed the striking force of their combat detachments.

The Taliban responded to the imposition of sanctions against them by rejecting any UN intervention in Afghanistan, even in humanitarian actions. They rejected all Islamabad's proposals to make their policies acceptable to the world. The Taliban leadership increasingly fell under the influence of Bin Laden and his organization. The Taliban's actions became increasingly defiant. In March 2001, the Taliban blew up the world's largest Buddha statues in Bamiyan, challenging the international community [Afghanistan at the beginning of the XXI century, 2004, p. 461].

Despite their Islamic radicalism, the Taliban proved to be Pashtun nationalists and did not recognize the Durand Line as the state border with Pakistan. In April 2001, the Taliban leadership complained to Pakistan about the poor treatment of refugees. However, Islamabad's relations with the Taliban remained quite close. It is believed that the Pakistani special services, and especially the IAD, actively helped the Taliban movement. With the help of fundamentalist organizations, the transfer of militants and weapons to Afghanistan continued. In January 2001, the main Pakistani Islamist parties formed a Council at the Hakkaniya Madrasah in the NWFP

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in defense of Afghanistan. In April 2001, the Government of Pakistan withdrew the administration of J. R. R. Tolkien. Bush's direct contacts with Taliban leaders. As you know, one of the requirements of the Americans to them was to expel U. However, the Taliban regime refused to allow the United States to do so [Afghanistan at the beginning of the XXI century, 2004, p. 459]. Relations between Pakistan and the Taliban regime began to deteriorate in 2001, and after the famous events of September 11 of the same year, Pakistan found itself in the ranks of the anti-Taliban coalition. Shortly after the terrorist attacks on the United States, Islamabad sent two delegations to Kabul, consisting of government officials and clerics. However, it was not possible to persuade the Taliban to expel the culprit of the terrorist attack, U. Bin Laden, from Afghanistan and thus prevent an act of retribution against them [Afghanistan at the beginning of the XXI century, 2004, p.459].

THE DURAND LINE AND THE CURRENT STATE OF PAKISTAN-AFGHANISTAN RELATIONS

In the fall of 2001, U.S. and other forces invaded Afghanistan and overthrew the Taliban. Pakistan has given them great support. By joining the anti-Taliban coalition, Pakistan has secured favorable conditions in the international arena. Pakistan's relations with Afghanistan have improved since the Hamid Karzai administration came to power in Kabul. Pakistan has announced the development of a railway project from the Pakistani border town of Chamana to Kandahar (a feasibility study for the project has already been completed), aiming to gain direct access to Central Asian markets. Pakistan's exports to Afghanistan increased from $ 26 million to $ 600 million in the first two years after the defeat of the Taliban. [Afghanistan at the transition stage..., 2002, pp. 132-133].

The issue of the "Durand Line" border was not raised by either side. If there were any complaints from the Afghan side, then the Government of X. Karzai dissociated himself from them. However, on April 19, 2006, Karim Barakhui, who was proposed by him as the new Minister for National Policy and Border, stated at a meeting of Parliament that he did not recognize the "Durand line" and supported resolving this issue through the Loya Jirga, as reported by Kabul Radio. The main irritant in relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan remains the unsettled situation in the "free tribal" zone, on the territory of which various terrorist structures, including the Taliban, continue to be based and operate. Afghanistan has blamed its neighbor, claiming that Pakistan is doing nothing to destroy Taliban bases. Pakistan, in turn, said it had done more than any other country to fight the Taliban and al-Qaeda, arresting several dozen known terrorists, some of whom were extradited to the United States, and deploying an 80,000-strong military contingent on the border with Afghanistan to fight the militants.

In connection with the operation conducted by Pakistani troops against militants in Waziristan in the spring of 2006, the Afghan Government stated that Pakistan should have informed Afghanistan about this. In May 2007, it was reported that Pakistan had completed the first section of the border in North Waziristan, about 20 km long, with a total of 35 km planned for the first stage. Islamabad believed that a system of fences and minefields on problematic sections of the border would help stop cross-border terrorism. In turn, the Afghan authorities said that fences and minefields "will divide fraternal peoples", but will not stop terrorists.

Since the resignation of Pervez Musharraf in Pakistan and the rise to power of President Asif Ali Zardari, relations between the two countries as a whole have not changed significantly. What will be the future relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan-

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Time will tell, and if the political realism and responsibility of the ruling circles prevail over nationalism and the desire to weaken the other side, then we can say that in the future there will be an opportunity to end the anarchy in Afghanistan and establish good neighborly relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan's failure to recognize the "Durand Line" border with Pakistan will spoil these relations for a long time to come.

Now we will touch directly on the opinions of some historians and publicists that the Agreement on the border between British India and Afghanistan of 1893 has a supposedly validity period of one hundred years and that after this period the Pashtun lands, which were first torn away by the Sikh state of Punjab, and then by Great Britain, should be returned to Afghanistan. I must say that this opinion is so ingrained that it is necessary to dwell on this in more detail.

The author of this article was able to study the points of the Agreement signed by M. Durand and Emir Abdurrahman Khan relating to the border between British India and Afghanistan, established in 1893.None of them says anything about the term of its validity. Nor is this mentioned in M. Durand's letter to Emir Abdurrahman Khan dated November 11, 1893, i.e., on the eve of the signing of the Agreement. There is no mention of the term of the Agreement in the text of the Treaty concluded on March 21, 1905 between Emir Habibullah Khan and the representative of the British Government, Sir Louis William Dan, and confirming the Agreement of 1893. According to paragraph 5 of the Preliminary Peace Treaty signed on August 8, 1919 in Rawalpindi, the Government of Afghanistan recognizes the border between British India and Afghanistan. The Treaty of Friendship and Trade between Great Britain and Afghanistan, signed in Kabul on November 22, 1921, does not mention the validity of this Agreement.

Moreover, the Agreement of November 12, 1893 does not say that it must be confirmed by each new Government of Great Britain or Afghanistan, nor does it say whether it can be denounced unilaterally by either or both parties (Khan Azmat Hayat, 1997).

Thus, all the claims about the alleged 100-year validity period of the Agreement of November 12, 1893 on the border between British India and Afghanistan are groundless. According to world practice, the borders of states do not change when their status changes. All these opinions may have been inspired by the return of Hong Kong to China, which was leased from it by Great Britain for 99 years. It is also reminiscent of the talk that was spread in the former Soviet Union about the alleged sale of Alaska to the United States for only 100 years by Russia.

There is another important point. Will the NWFP population agree to secede from Pakistan and rejoin Afghanistan? Doubtful. The standard of living of Pashtuns in Pakistan is higher than that of Pashtuns in Afghanistan, especially at the present stage. The situation of the "free Pashtun tribes" of Pakistan also cannot be compared to the situation in the tribal zone in Afghanistan. The subsidies received by the tribes from the Government of Pakistan are quite significant, and no one wants to lose them.

Thus, since the text of the Agreement of November 12, 1893 and other treaties concluded by British India with Afghanistan do not specify the validity of this Agreement, it is indefinite. It follows that the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan can only be changed by a new agreement or treaty, i.e. by mutual agreement of the parties and in no other way. However, Pakistan has not given such consent, does not give it, and most likely will not give it.

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