The magazine "Oriens" has already addressed the topic of ethnic separatism in the activities of the United Front for the Liberation of Assam* - the most powerful and active underground group in this state of India. At the same time, the authorities in Assam have to confront another rebel movement led by the Bodo tribes for the separation of the new state of Bodoland from its composition. Like Assamese separatism, the Bodo movement grew out of the 1979 - 1985 campaign for the rights of the" sons of the earth "(i.e., the local population) and the expulsion of so - called" foreigners " (migrants-mostly Bengalis) from Assam. In other words, this movement is based on interethnic contradictions, which has recently become increasingly relevant for Russia, taking into account changes in the national composition of the population in the south of our country.

The Bodo armed movement is somewhat smaller in scope and strength than the Assamese separatism, but it poses a serious threat to internal security and stability in the Lower Assam areas, through which the main transport links between the state and the rest of the country pass. The Bodo movement has been going on for more than 15 years, during which various attempts at settlement, both peaceful and forceful, have been made. Unfortunately, they did not give the desired result, and now an active search for a political solution to the Bodoland problem is underway again.

Bodo, or Boro - an ethnic group of Sino-Tibetan origin-is the largest "plain" tribal association in the state of Assam. In addition to the actual Bodo (boro), the Bodo group also includes the related tribes of Achik (garo), Borok, Deuri, Dimasa, Hajong, Kamatapuri (Koch - Rajbongshi), Chhutia, Rabha, Sonowal, Tiwa, sword and some others living in different parts of Assam, in Meghalaya, Tripura, in the north West Bengal, Nepal and Bangladesh ¹ .

Data on the Bodo population in various sources vary greatly. The official Census of India in 1991 recorded 1 million 184 thousand 569 native speakers of Bodo (Boro), which accounted for 5.3% of the population of Assam2 . Representatives of the rebels claim that the Bodo number at least 9.5 million people, however, taking into account all the tribes of this group.

According to some sources, the Bodo settled the plains of Assam around 5000 BC. e. In the Middle Ages, the Bodo dynasty even ruled in several principalities in the Brahmaputra Valley. Over time, however, the Bodo lost their dominant position, and now almost 99% of the Bodo live in villages and are mainly engaged in rural ho-

* See: Baranov S. A. Problems of separatism and terrorism in the state of Assam (India) // East (Oriens). 2001. N 3. pp. 81-93.

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zyaistvom. Some tribes of the Bodo group have undergone strong Hindu acculturation. For example, Koch Rajbongshi and Chhutia are now considered as the lower Hindu castes of Assamese.

The origins of today's Bodo movement for autonomy date back to 1967, when the All-Bodo Students ' Union (VSSU) and the Assam Plains Tribal Council (PSA) political party emerged. Initially, the PSA demanded the protection of the rights of linguistic minorities, then the creation of a university for representatives of the" lowland "tribes of Assam, and in October 1972 demanded the allocation of a new Udayachal state (Land of Dawn) from Assam3 for" lowland " tribes. From time to time, the PSA movement was joined by the UBCC, but due to internal contradictions and rivalries between leaders, it soon broke up, never achieving its goal.

In the late 1970s, the Bodo joined the campaign against "foreigners", which culminated in the signing of the 1985 Assam Agreement, which provided certain guarantees for Assamese people (article ^6.4), but did not mention other ethnic groups. During the campaign against "foreigners", Bodo leaders were not allowed to participate in the negotiation process, and later, when the Assamese nationalist party Asom Gana Parishad (People's Council of Assam) formed the state government, it did not share power with them. Frustration with the outcome of the campaign, as well as concerns about rampant Assamese chauvinism, were the main reasons Bodo launched his own campaign for the creation of a separate state of Bodoland, which was led by the charismatic leader of the VBSS, Upendra Brahma.

At the first stage, the Bodo movement, which officially began in March 1987, was peaceful and democratic. However, the Chief Minister of Assam, Prafulla Kumar Mahanta, refused to negotiate with Bodo and ordered the police to suppress their protests. In response, the Bodo movement began to gain momentum and increasingly resort to violent methods. Soon, two extremist groups were formed: the Bodo Security Forces (advocating the creation of an independent state of Bodoland from India) and the Bodo Volunteer Forces (the armed wing of the VBSS, advocating the creation of a separate state of Bodoland).

The Bodo movement saw a surge in activity in 1989. In particular, in February, the Bodo organized a 5-day strike, accompanied by arson, looting, attacks on police and explosions, which killed 24 people. In the first two weeks of March, there was a new outbreak of violence unleashed by young armed Bodo extremists under the leadership of the EBSF in areas around the cities of Kokrajhar and Udalghuri, in which 32 people were killed and 40 people were injured. The non-Bodo population fled to neighboring towns. To restore order, the Assam government was forced to turn to the army and the Central Reserve Police Force. In April, 62 people were killed in Bodo terrorist attacks, and in August 1989, 150 people were killed ^.5 In the following year, 1990, Bodo groups carried out several bombings that killed 50 people in Tinsukia (27 May); 12 policemen near Bongaigaon (19 June); and 25 bus passengers in Barpeta (4 September) ^.6

With the death of WBSC President Upendra Brahma at the age of 30 from cancer in 1990, the Bodo movement somewhat declined in activity. In addition, the large - scale actions of the army and security forces against the United Front for the Liberation of Assam (OFLA) in 1990-1991 also affected. (operations Bajrang and Rhino). However, on October 13, 1992, the Bodo Security Forces made their presence felt again by blowing up a train near the town of Barpeta, killing 21 people. ⁷

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The Kongressist Assam Government led by Hiteswar Saikia, which came to power in 1991, has begun to seek a political solution to the problem. As a result of trilateral negotiations between representatives of the Ministry of Home Affairs of India, the Government of Assam and two Bodo organizations-the WBSC and the Bodo People's Action Committee (NCAC), a memorandum of settlement (also known as the "Bodo Agreement") was signed on February 20, 1993. This document provided for the establishment of an "administrative authority within the state of Assam", called the Bodoland Autonomous Council (ASB), with the aim of granting Bodo "maximum autonomy within the framework of the Indian Constitution for social, economic, educational, ethnic and cultural progress" ^.8 In accordance with Article 3 (a) of the Bodo Agreement, the ACB's jurisdiction was extended to villages where "50% or more of the population belongs to tribes", based on the verification of the list provided by the WBSC and the NCDB. However, the agreement did not provide for the protection of the rights of minorities in Bodo9 .

The creation of the ASB was officially announced on December 10, 1993. The territory falling under the jurisdiction of the ASB was 5,186 square kilometers. There were 2,750 villages with a total population of 2,137,445 people, of which only 813,303 people belonged to the tribes (including the Bodo) ^.10

After the signing of the Bodo Agreement, the armed wing of the VSSF was disbanded, and a short period of relative calm ensued. However, although the memorandum of settlement stipulated that the ASB's jurisdiction would extend from the Pasnoy River in the east to the Sankosh River in the west, the exact demarcation of the territory's boundaries was not carried out. This issue was submitted for approval by the management of the state and bodo organizations. However, Hiteshwar Saikia did not agree to the transfer of an additional 515 villages to the ASB and the inclusion of a 10-kilometer belt along the border with Bhutan in the territory it controlled. The signatory of the Bodo Agreement, Sansuma Khunggur Bwisvmuthiari, who was appointed as the first chairman of the ACB, resigned in protest, threatening to return to the demand for the creation of a separate state of Bodoland. At the same time, non-Bodo minorities expressed dissatisfaction, because of the 2,570 villages included in the ASB area of responsibility, only 1,100 Bodo villages were the majority, and the total Bodo population in the ASB area did not exceed 28% of the population. This ethnic situation has developed as a result of the influx of migrants to the northern bank of the Brahmaputra over the past century, with the Bodo feud targeting all the incoming settlers, whose numbers were growing dangerously-Muslim immigrants, Hindu Bengalis and ethnic Assamese. Another reason for Bodo's dissatisfaction lies in socio-economic problems. Almost 70% of the Bodo are landless, while 300,000 acres of land remain illegally occupied by non-tribal settlers ^.11

It was inter-ethnic contradictions, aggravated by the authorities ' failure to comply with the terms of the 1993 agreement, that led to the widespread use of "ethnic cleansing" tactics by Bodo. As early as May 1994, the Bodo Security Forces (SBF) carried out a massacre in the Kokrajhar district, killing at least 22 Bengali Muslims and destroying hundreds of homes. This was followed by attacks on Muslim settlements in the Barpeta district in July 1994, in which SBB militants killed about 100 Muslims. In four days, more than 50,000 Muslims lost their homes and were forced to live in refugee camps. These events showed a significant increase in the influence of the Bodo Security Forces (which changed its name in November 1994 to the National Democratic Front of Boroland). Since its founding in Darrang District in 1986, the group has grown from 50 to 500 members, and its influence has spread to the Nalbari districts.,

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Barpeta, Bongaigaon and Kokrajhar. After the Barpeta massacre, the army conducted Operation Kranti against the SBB ^.12 The troops managed to reduce the level of violence, but they were unable to arrest any significant Bodo leaders who were hiding in the Manas Nature Reserve near Kokrajhar or retreating to Bhutan.

The fact that only 39 members of the NDFB were arrested in 1995 is also indicative of the authorities ' limited success (for comparison, in the same year, the police arrested 234 members of the OFLA) ^.13 In November 1995, in retaliation for the arrest of several Bodo activists in the neighboring state of Arunachal Pradesh, the NDFB shot at a bus and threw a grenade at it. As a result of the explosion, 10 people were killed and about 20 were injured.

In parallel with the Bodoland State movement, clashes between various Bodo factions broke out from time to time. The National Democratic Front of Boroland blamed the "Bodo Volunteer Forces" that killed the first SBB field commander, Bangbur Gwra Basumatari, on September 14, 1988. In any case, in the last quarter of 1995 alone, more than ³⁰ people were killed as a result of hostility between the NDFB and the VSSS14.

The next outbreak of inter-ethnic violence occurred in May 1996, when representatives of the Santal tribe became the next victims of Bodo militants. The attacks were triggered by the discovery of the bodies of three Bodo women near a Santal village. In response, the Santals started setting fire to Bodo villages. During the week, ethnic clashes in Kokrajhar and Bongaigaon districts killed about 100 people and destroyed 200 villages. About 150 thousand people (mostly Santals) became internally displaced, 10,000 fled to West Bengal ¹⁵ . The situation became so complicated that, in order to restore order, the authorities had to increase the number of troops operating in the Bodo areas to three army brigades between May and August 1996. Later, troops were relocated to other areas of the state to fight the OFO.

After inter-ethnic clashes, on June 18, 1996, a group of "Bodo Liberation Tiger Forces" (STOB) emerged, which actually continued the work of the"Bodo Volunteer Forces". The appearance of the STOB only added fuel to the fire of internecine war among the Bodo. Thus, on 4 December 1996, the office of the Bodo weekly newspaper Thulunga in Guwahati was attacked by armed Bodo members of the EBSF. As a result of the attack, a relative of the newspaper's editor was killed and several people were injured. It was suggested in the press that this was revenge for the attacks of NDFB militants on November 19, 1996 on the WBSU representative office in Bonorgaon and on the premises of the WBSU Radab press office in Kokrajhar. Alarmed by the course of events, various Bodo organizations appealed to the NDFB and STOB to put an end to the conflict ^.16

On December 30, 1996, a passenger train explosion killed 33 people. The next day, a bridge on a highway connecting Assam with the rest of the country was blown up. Both explosions were carried out by STOB militants. (Keep in mind that all trains, buses, and cars bound for northeastern India pass through Kokrajhar, and a single strike on the district's communications network could paralyze much of the region.) On August 19, 1997, the same group blew up a bridge, interrupting rail traffic between Assam and the rest of India for three days.

While the STOB carried out sabotage on transport communications, the NDFB continued to carry out "ethnic cleansing". In response, Bengalis and Santals living in the territories under the responsibility of the ASB began to create their own groups for the purpose of self-defense. In particular, in 1996, the Bengal Tiger Forces emerged, and the Santals created the Birsa Commando Force and the Adivasi Cobra Force. However, according to Brigadier General Sukhdev Singh, these

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the new groups were few in number and poorly armed ^.17 However, when 13 people (most of them Hindu Bengalis) were shot dead by the NDFB in two villages in the Nalbari district on August 15, 1997, after refusing to pay the "tax" to the militants, the Bengal Tiger Forces hacked 12 Bodo's to death in retaliation on August ¹⁸, 1997.18

On May 3, 1998, NDFB fighters stopped a bus in the Kokrajhar district, escorted the passengers out, and separated the Santals, opening fire on them. As a result, 14 people were killed (including 6 women and a child). According to officials, the attack was revenge for the Santals 'killing of three Bodos in April 1998. On May 9, 1998, the NDFB burned down the Santals' village in the Kokrajhar district and shot dead 15 residents. In July 1998, 5,000 Santals fled their villages due to Bodo attacks.

In September 1998, a new round of inter-ethnic clashes was provoked by the murder of Santhal Sathyan Soren, General Secretary of the Adivasi Seva Samiti (Adivasi Service Committee), and his four-year-old son by the NDFB on 9 September. In retaliation, the next day, Santali militants burned down 144 houses in three Bodo villages, while the NDFB fighters were armed with small arms, the Santali fighters were armed with machetes, bows and arrows. On 15 September, 48 people (4 Bodos, 7 Santals and 37 Oraons) were killed in various clashes and over 500 houses were burned in Kokrajhar district. Some 70,000 people have fled their homes and found refuge in 28 refugee camps ^.19

By this time, having become disillusioned with the "Bodo Agreement", the WBSS again began to insist on the creation of a separate state of Bodoland. At a joint meeting on November 7, 1998, the SBSS and the NKDB threatened to organize strikes if their three main demands were not met: 1) the creation of a separate state of Bodoland on the north bank of the Brahmaputra River, 2) the establishment of the Bodo District Autonomous Councils on the south bank of the Brahmaputra, 3) the inclusion of the Bodo-Kachari living in the Karbi Anglong District in the list of registered tribes, and thus extending to them the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India ²⁰, which contains provisions for management of tribal areas in the states of Assam, Meghalaya, Tripura and Mizoram. According to the Sixth Schedule, nine such territories have been created in these states (in Assam, these are the districts of Mount North Kachar and Karbi Anglong), which have the status of autonomous districts ²¹ .

This meant that if an autonomous district was inhabited by different registered tribes, the state governor could divide the territories inhabited by these tribes into autonomous regions. A district council is formed in each autonomous district, and a district council is formed in the autonomous region. These councils have mainly representative functions. At the same time, they may make local laws concerning the allocation, occupation or allotment of land; regulation of shifting farming practices; management of non-protected forests; inheritance of property; marriage; social customs; matters relating to the administration of villages or towns, including the formation of village or town committees or councils and their powers, as well as issues related to village and city police, health, sanitation, etc. In addition, district and autonomous councils exercise some judicial powers. They have the right to determine and collect land revenue, and to impose and collect certain local taxes ^.22

The inclusion of the Bodo-Kachari in the list of registered tribes means that they will be subject to reservation of seats in the lower House of the Parliament of India, as well as in the State Legislative Assembly, in accordance with Articles 330, 332 and 334 of the Constitution of India.

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In addition, the New Delhi Bharatiya Janata Party's decision in 1998 to create the states of Jharkhand, Chhattisgarh and Uttaranchal and the absence of Bodoland from the list also contributed to the revival of the Bodo movement.

In April 1999, the State Government issued an official notice to review the ACB's area of responsibility and include an additional number of villages (bringing the total number to 2,941). As a result, the total area under ASB control increased from 5,371 sq km to 8,300 sq km, which is about 10.5% of Assam's territory ^.23 However, this did not satisfy Bodo's organization.

At the same time, attempts were made to reconcile the two armed factions of the Bodo - the NDFB and the STB. Representatives of the Bodo intelligentsia, led by the President of the Bodo Sahitya Sabha (Bodo Literature Society), Bineshwar Brahma, appealed to the STOB, after which the group announced a unilateral ceasefire on November 21, 1998 against the NDFB, which, on November 29, 1998, welcomed steps aimed at ending fratricidal clashes. As a result of negotiations between the leaders of the STB and the NDFB in Shillong on 30 May 1999, an agreement was signed in the spirit of "forgive and forget" in order to further stop attacks on each other ^.24

When considering the Bodo armed movement, it is necessary to take into account such an aspect as its gradual transformation into a profitable business. Just like the OFO, Bodo groups began using kidnappings for ransom, extortion from tea plantation managers, and collecting "taxes"to finance their activities. Every year, the income of the groups grew, which allowed the militants to buy modern weapons. For example, personal income tax revenues from collected "taxes" in 1994-1995 amounted to 13561500 rupees, in 1995-96 -18230450, in 1996-97-4432199525, and in 1998-99-104546279 rupees 26 . NDFB fighters forced residents of lower Assam districts (even farmers and teachers) to pay the "Boroland tax", which varied according to their wealth. STOB also collected monthly "taxes" from ordinary people, which ranged from 30 to 400 rupees depending on their occupation, and from 25,000 to 100,000 rupees from the markets ^.27

During the Kargil incident in Kashmir, the STOB unilaterally declared a cease-fire against Government security forces effective July 14, 1999. In turn, the central Government agreed to negotiate with the group, after which, on 15 March 2000, Indian Home Minister Lal Krishna Advani issued a statement in both Houses of Parliament suspending operations against STOB28 .

The six-month cease-fire agreement was formally signed at a trilateral meeting on 29 March 2000 between representatives of the central Government, the Assam Government and the SRTB (it was subsequently extended several times). The document also recorded the refusal of the SRT from violence and all illegal activities (murder, property damage, kidnapping, extortion, intimidation), along with agreeing to comply with the Constitution of India and the laws of the country.

This was followed by several rounds of trilateral political negotiations. As a group affiliated with the WBSS, the STOB initially supported the students ' demands for the creation of a separate Bodoland state on the north bank of the Brahmaputra River, the formation of autonomous Bodo district councils on the south bank of the Brahmaputra, the inclusion of Bodo-Kachari living in Karbi Anglong District in the list of registered tribes, the establishment of a central university, engineering and medical colleges in Bodoland, as well as the inclusion of the Bodo language in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India.

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The inclusion of any language in the Eighth Appendix, in addition to raising the prestige, significantly expands the scope of its functioning and increases the opportunities for its development. So, only in the languages listed in the Eighth Appendix, it is allowed to take competitive exams for admission to the civil service. In addition, annual budgets and five-year plans allocate funds for the development of these languages ^.29 And Khunggur Bwisvmuthiari, an independent member of the People's Chamber of Sansum elected from Kokrajhar, was not allowed to take the oath of office in Bodo on March 23, 1998, as this language is not mentioned in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution of India.

In the course of negotiations, the STOB (and then the WBSS) refused to demand the creation of a separate state of Bodoland. Instead, consideration was given to abolishing the existing ASB and replacing it with the Bodoland Territorial Council (TSB) with expanded powers, greater area of responsibility and constitutional guarantees under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India. The central government's financial package for infrastructure development in TSB districts for 10 years was also discussed. The remaining requirements were the inclusion of the Bodo language in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution, the Bodo-Kachari of Karbi Anglong District in the list of registered tribes ,and the establishment of a central university with medical, engineering and agricultural colleges. ³⁰

The STOB's negotiations with the central government caused dissatisfaction with the NDFB, which considered the rival group to be an Indian "puppet". (It is true that even before this, there were rumors that the STOB were initially trained and equipped by Indian intelligence to split the Bodo movement.) It is very likely that the negotiation process between the authorities and the STB provoked the activation of the NDFB's activities. For example, on 31 July 2000, a passenger train traveling from Guwahati to Tezpur was blown up by front fighters, killing 12 people and injuring several others. In addition, the war between the STB and the NDFB broke out again, which was triggered by the murder of Bodo Sahitya Sabha President Bineshwar Brahma at his home in Guwahati on August 19, 2000, because of his adherence to the Devanagari script. The fact is that in the early 1960s, Latin script was chosen for the Bodo language (among which Christians make up only 30%), then it was replaced by Assamese script, and then Devanagari. The NDFB (consisting mainly of Christians) has been demanding a return to the Latin script for a long time. However, the WBSC first expressed its support for the Devanagari script, and then the 39th Annual Bodo Sahitya Sabha Conference, at its session of 25-27 February 2000, put an end to the discussion by deciding to continue using the Devanagari script for Bodo. This decision displeased the NDFB, which declared Bineshwar Brahma a traitor to the entire " boro nation "(which the group claims seeks to use the Latin script for its language), and took responsibility for its liquidation ^.31

Following the assassination of the President of the Bodo Sahitya Sabha, Mohini Basumatari, a member of the Assam Legislative Assembly, was shot dead by four unknown assailants in their village home in Bongaigaon District on 21 August 2000. Rumors immediately surfaced that the crime was committed by STOB activists in retaliation for the death of Bineshwar Brahma. This assumption was based on the fact that the deceased MP belonged to the People's Democratic Front (NDF), a political party that was established in 1996 and was said to be the legal wing of the NDFB, with the NDF and NDFB having strained relations with the VBSS ^and STOB32 .

Although the Public Relations Secretary of the SRT, Mainao Daimari, condemned the murders of Bineshwar Brahma and Mohini Basumatari on August 24, 2000, and strongly denied the involvement of the SRT in both incidents, the NDFB launched a manhunt for the victims.-

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new STOP. In particular, on December 11, 2000, 11 activists of the STB political wing were shot dead by the NDFB in the Barpeta district, and on December 14, 2000, an attack by the NDFB on the VBS premises in a village in Bongaigaon District killed one person and injured another. On the same day, two STOB members were shot dead in the Nalbari district. On December 21, 2000, again in Nalbari district, NDFB militants killed 5 STB activists in their organization's office.

Relations between the two Bodo groups were further strained by attacks on six Bhutanese vehicles (including two passenger buses) on 20 and 21 December 2000 in various locations in lower Assam, in which 14 Bhutanese were killed, 19 injured and two were missing. A press release issued by the Bhutanese Embassy in New Delhi on 23 December 2000 claimed that the Bhutanese police believed that the SRTs were behind the incidents, although they denied any involvement in the attacks on Bhutanese citizens ^.33

The NDFB, which the Assamese and STOB authorities were quick to blame for the Bhutanese deaths, also denied any involvement in the attacks. At the same time, it was not in the interests of the NDFB to quarrel with Bhutan (where most of the group's camps are located). Taking this circumstance into account, the threat contained in the NDFB statement issued on January 16, 2001 about the possibility of using "selective killings" and an order to open fire without warning against 5 bodo organizations (if they do not stop their activities against the NDFB) becomes clear. The threat was directed at the WBSS, the NDSB, the STOB, the Bodo Sahitya Sabha and the All-Bodo Women's Charity Federation, which (according to the NDFB) had joined forces to "disrupt the NDFB revolution aimed at creating a sovereign Bodo State" ^.34 In response to their threat, on January 19, 2001, in Bongaigaon and Dhubri districts, NDFB terrorists shot dead 5 people, three of whom belonged to the STB.

Due to the presence of a common enemy (represented by India), there was a rapprochement between the OFO and the NDFB. Back in 1999, these groups formed a coordination committee to conduct a joint struggle. In addition to carrying out attacks on Indian security forces, the OFLA and the NDFB called for a boycott of the Indian Independence Day (15 August 2000) and Republic of India Day (26 January 2001) celebrations. Both groups threatened to disrupt the Assam Legislative Assembly elections held on 10 May 2001. During the election campaign, NDFB gunmen shot dead 10 Asom Gana Parishad party officials in Nalbari district and intimidated people to vote for NDFB candidates ^.35

Below is a table compiled by the non-governmental Institute for Conflict Resolution in Delhi, which provides some insight into the scope of the movement, as well as the activities of both Bodo armed groups over the past decade.

Along with political assassinations, the NDFB continued to sabotage transport links. For example, the explosion of the Northeast Express in Bongaigaon District on September 25, 2001, injured more than 120 people.

On 19 October 2001, the group made an unprecedented attempt to declare an area adjacent to a police post near the Indo-Bhutanese border in the Barpeta district a" liberated zone". On that day, 150 NDFB fighters tried to seize the post, which was defended by 30 policemen, and raise the group's flag over it. However, after an hour-and-a-half battle that left three policemen dead and seven others wounded, the attackers were forced to retreat to their bases in Bhutan ^.36

The openness of the border with Bhutan is probably one of the main factors complicating the authorities ' fight against the armed Bodo rebels. Back in the beginning

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Death toll from Bodo activities in Assam

In the 1990s, after the Indian Army's operations in Assam, Bodo fighters began to take refuge in the jungles of southern Bhutan, and in 1997 the NDFB and STB had 33 camps in Bhutan ^.37 India has repeatedly tried to get permission from Bhutan to conduct a military operation on its territory against the OFO and NDFB militants, or to conduct such an operation jointly. However, after such permission was granted in 1993, Bhutan no longer consents to the operation, fearing possible material damage and human casualties from the fighting.

Although the 78th Session of the Bhutanese Parliament passed a resolution in 2000 authorizing the Bhutanese Government to use the army against the militants if they do not agree to leave the country peacefully, the authorities are trying to resolve the problem through negotiations. The Minister of the Interior of Bhutan held three rounds of negotiations with the OFA (in 1998, 1999 and June 2001) and two with the NDFB (in October 2000 and May 2001). During the last round of negotiations, the OFA leaders and the Government of Bhutan signed a three - point protocol. In accordance with this document, OFOA committed to dismantle 4 of its 9 camps in Bhutan by December 2001, reduce the number of personnel in the remaining 5 camps, and, after fulfilling the first paragraph, find a solution to close the remaining 5 camps through further negotiations ^.38 The NDFB also stated that they intended to leave Bhutan, but could not commit themselves to setting a deadline.

Meanwhile, reports have emerged that while the militants have disbanded some of their bases, they have also set up new ones in other areas of Bhutan. According to Indian intelligence, by the summer of 2002, there were 16 OFO camps and 6 NDFB camps in Bhutan. There were about 4,000 OFO fighters and 1,000 NDFB fighters on the territory of the Kingdom ^.39 In total, the number of NDFB was estimated at 1,500 people. Moreover, the entire Royal Bhutanese Army consisted of 6,000 men armed with rifles, machine guns, and 81-mm mortars. In addition to the army, Bhutan has five thousand people's militia, police and a small forest guard ⁴⁰ .

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If we take into account that by August 2001, 122 officers and 3,623 soldiers of the Bhutanese army were stationed in southern Bhutan , ⁴¹ then the balance of power was clearly not in favor of the Bhutanese troops.

After a relatively short lull, the NDFB again began to conduct "ethnic cleansing". In particular, on 15 January 2002, 13 people were killed and 5 injured in Bongaigaon district in a Bengali village. Bodo fighters were reportedly searching for members of the Bengal Tiger Forces, and opened fire on civilians when they failed to locate the latter. On 21 January 2002, 17 Hindu - speaking Biharis (including 9 women and 2 children) were shot dead by 15-20 NDFB gunmen in a village 16 km from Udalguri in Darrang District. The NDFB ordered non-Bodo ethnic groups to leave the area.

These attacks were followed on 22 January 2002 by a statement by the Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, on the need to build barriers on the border with Bhutan to prevent the movement of militants, as well as his call for the central Government to deploy Border Security personnel on the Assamese section of the Indo - Bhutan border to better protect it ^.42

Militant attacks on police officers and government soldiers have recently become more frequent in Assam, as well as attempts by various underground groups to join forces in the fight against the authorities. For example, six members of the Central Reserve Police Force were injured in an ambush between West Bengal and Bhutan on 26 May 2002, jointly organized by three groups: the OFLA, the NDFB and the Kamatapur Liberation Organization (KLA) ^.43 The latter was formed by the Koch Rajbongshi tribes in 1995 to fight for the creation of a separate Kamatapur State from the northern districts of West Bengal and the Goalpara district of Assam. There are no exact data on the number of OCS. However, it seems that the number of its activists may be 100-150 people. On July 30, 2002, an army patrol was ambushed by the NDFB in the Kokrajhar district near the Assamese-Bhutanese border. During the battle, 5 soldiers of the Indian Army and 2 members of the SRT were killed.

Against this background, the negotiation process with the STOB leaders continued. After 14 rounds of trilateral negotiations, the Assam Government approved the establishment of the Bodoland Territorial Council in accordance with the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India, and submitted its proposals to the Ministry of Home Affairs of India on ¹⁵ May 2002.44 In July 2002, the Assam Government's proposals to establish a Bodoland Territorial Council and protect the rights of non-Bodo ethnic groups living in the territories under its control were submitted for approval to the relevant central departments of the country, for example: the Ministry of Justice to prepare a draft amendment to the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of India, the Ministry of Human Resources - to start the procedure for including the Bodo language in the Eighth Schedule of the Constitution. The Government of India has agreed in principle to allocate funds for the development of areas within the TSB's area of responsibility, and has submitted the necessary documents to the Planning Commission and the Ministry of Finance. After completing all the formalities, which is expected to take several months, a draft agreement (memorandum of settlement) ⁴⁵ will be developed .

* * *

The settlement of the Bodoland problem is constantly faced with various obstacles. In addition to the resistance of the irreconcilable separatist group NDFB, 19 different groups opposed the creation of the Bodoland Territorial Council.

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organizations that have formed the Sanmilita Janagosthiya Sangram Samiti (Joint Committee of Public Struggle). A statement from their leaders accused the state government of trying to" break up " lower Assam ^.46 A group of Santals ,the Adivasi Cobra Forces, also took a negative position towards the creation of the TSB, and since 2000 they even began to entertain the idea of setting up a separate Adivasiland state within the Bodoland Autonomous Council area. Of course, now this idea is unlikely to have any chances of mass support and serious perception by the authorities, but it can aggravate the difficult relations between Bodo and the Santals, as well as become a new source of tension. In particular, the rise of other tribes in Assam, such as the Lalung, Tiwa, Rabha and Mishing, which are also beginning to demand the establishment of their own tribal councils, is a serious problem.

Another obstacle to reaching an agreement was the clarification of the boundaries of the TSB's area of responsibility. STBs require that the total area of the council be 9,000 square kilometers. The Assam Government, however, insists that the boundaries of the area under the control of the ASB, under the 1999 notification, should be the boundaries of the TSB's area of responsibility ^.47 At a press conference in New Delhi on July 4, 2002, the Chief Minister of Assam, Tarun Gogoi, announced that his Government had agreed to include 126 of the 353 disputed villages under TSB jurisdiction. The rest will be subject to further negotiations ⁴⁸ .

Thus, the Bodo regionalist movement, having failed to achieve its goal of creating a separate state of Bodoland, was split into two factions: the STOB-VBSS and the NDFB. The former agreed to give up armed struggle with the authorities and demand the formation of a state in exchange for granting Bodo greater autonomy within Assam, while the latter has consistently sought the separation of Bodoland from India. Just as the Bodoland state movement grew out of the campaign to expel "foreigners" from Assam, so the NDFB separatism grew out of the latter.

The prospects for concluding a new agreement (memorandum of settlement) between the authorities and the STB are currently very vague. Even if it is signed, it is unlikely that this will lead to a final settlement of the Bodoland problem. Since the Bodo do not constitute the majority of the population in the areas falling under the TSB's jurisdiction, further inter-ethnic clashes are not excluded in the future. In addition, as long as the border with Bhutan and Bangladesh is not tightly closed (if at all possible), the NDFB will still be able to continue the armed struggle, causing a lot of trouble to the authorities.

In the future, there are two possible scenarios, depending on the fate of the new agreement with Bodo. According to the first option (in case of failure of this agreement), a complete transformation of the Bodo movement into a separatist one under the leadership of the NDFB, following the example of the OFO, or the Naga tribal movement is not excluded. According to the second one (if the future agreement is successful), we can expect a complete separation of moderate Bodo organizations from the NDFB and its transformation into a marginal terrorist organization that is gradually losing its social base.

notes

¹ Introduction // The NDFB - http://www.geocities.com/ndfb2001/introduction.htm; Manifesto (Chapter I) // The NDFB - http://www.geocities.com/ndfb2001/manifesto.htm#chapter1

² Table 26: Three Main Languages in Every State, 1991 // Census Data Online. Source of Data: Statement 3, Census of India 1991. Paper 1 of 1997. Language - http://www.censusindia.net/cendat/datatable26.html

^{Klyuev B. I.} 3 Natsional'no-yazykovye problemy nezavisimoy Indii [National language problems of independent India]. Moscow, 1978, p. 116.

⁴ Assam Accord 15 august 1985: Memorandum of Settlement // Bhambhri C. P. Indian Politics Since Independence (Vol. II). Delhi, 1999. P. 266.

page 61

^{Lee Shin-wha, Malik Aamena, Khosla Deepa.} 5 Assamese and Bodos in Assam, India (Chronology). Updates 15.09.1999 - http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/mar/indbodo.htm

⁶ Blow-by-Blow Account. Some Recent Strikes by Bodo Outfits // Sunday, 12 - 18.01.1997. P. 21.

^{Lee Shin-wha, Malik Aamena, Khosla Deepa.} 7 Assamese and Bodos...

^{Prabhakara M. S.} 8 The Bodo Question...

^{Samaddar Ranabir, Maulana Abut Kalam Azad.} 9 Governing through Peace Accords// A Democratic Inquiry - http://www.bgu.ac.il/humphrey/seminar/article%20samaddar.htm

^{Mendiratta D. R.} 10 Insurgent Assam // Indian Defence Review, July-Sept. 1995. Vol. 10. N 3. P. 65.

^{Banerjee Ruben.} 11 Assam. Stoking Ethnic Terror // India Today. 31.08.1994. P. 69 - 70.

¹² Ibid. P. 71.

^{Ravi Nair.} 13 The Application of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law in Internal Armed Conflict Situations in South Asia: Problems and Prospects // South Asia Human Rights Documentation Centre, 12 July 2000 - http://www.redcross.org.au/ihl/waconf_2000/papers/ravi_nair_south_asia_human_rig hts_document.htm

^{Biswas Ashis K.} 14 The Discord Resurfaces // Outlook. 27.03.1996 - http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fname=assam&fodname=19960327&sid=1

^{Biswas Ashis K.} 15 Reign Of Woes // Outlook. 05.06.1996 - http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp7fodname= 19960605&fname=assam&sid=1

^{Chandan Dileep.} 16 Bloodline. Rival Bodo Factions Fight it Out, Even as the Struggle for a Separate State Intensifies // Sunday, 22 - 28.12.1996.

^{Choudhury R. Dutta} 17 Kokrajhar People Coming out of Shadow of Militancy // The Assam Tribune. 09.10.2000.

^{Suparna Sharma.} 18 All Quiet and Angry on the Eastern Front // The Indian Express. 14.02.1998.

^{Chaudhuri Kalyan.} 19 Bloodshed in Assam // Frontline, 26.09. - 09.10.1998. Vol. 15. N 20 - http://www.flonnet.com/fl 1520/15201370.htm

²⁰ ABSU, BPAC not to Participate in Tripartite Talks // Daily Excelsior, 09.11.1998 - http://www.dailyexcelsior.com/98nov09/national.htm#5

^{Basu Durga Das.} 21 Introduction to the Constitution of India. New Delhi, 1997. P. 280.

²² Constitution of India, Moscow, 1956, pp. 291-298.

²³ Bodo Union Calls for 8-hr Asam Bandh // The Indian Express. 05.05.1999.

^{Choudhury R. Dutta.} 24 Congenial Atmosphere Must for Solution of Bodo Problem: BLT // The Assam Tribune. 26.08.2000.

²⁵ ULFA Has Accumulated Around Rs 15 Billion So Far // Rediff On The Net. 1997 (The Rediff Special) - http://www.rediff.com/news/oct/10assam 1.htm

^{Manoj Anand.} 26 Tea Firm Paid Bodo Leader $91,250 in '99 // The Asian Age. 04.08.2000.

²⁷ Saying 'No' to Extortion // Oriental Times, 22.06. -06.07.1999. Vol. 2. Issue 7 - 8 - http://www.nenews.com/OT%20June22-%20July6%20799/oh7.htm

²⁸ Dialogue with Bodo Liberation Tiger (BLT) / Press release, 30.03.01 // Ministry of Home Affairs, Government of India - http://mha.nic.in/pr032001.htm

^{Klyuev B. I.} 29 Edict. soch. p. 78-79.

³⁰ Dialogue with Bodo Liberation Tiger...

³¹ Platform (Interviews: The Northeast Times 19.09.2001) // The NDFB - http://www.geocities.com/ndfb2001/ platform.htm

^{Nitin A.} 32 Gokhale. Twist In The Script...

³³ Action Against Guilty Urged: Bhutan Govt Express Concern // The Assam Tribune. 24.12.2000.

^{Kashyap Samudra Gupta.} 34 Bodo Rebel Group Warns Other Groups of Elimination // The Indian Express. 17.01.2001; NDFB insane: Bodo groups //The Telegraph. 18.01.2001.

³⁵ 'NDFB-ULFA Combine on Killing Spree' //The Hindu. 02.05.2001.

³⁶ 'Liberated Zone' Bid by NDFB Foiled // The Assam Tribune. 21.10.2001.

^{Biswas Soutik.} 37 Arc Of Instability // Outlook. 06.10.1997 - http://www.outlookindia.com/full.asp?fname=BHUTAN&fodname=19971006&sid=1

^{Dhar U.K.} 38 Will ULFA Honour Pact with Bhutan? // The Pioneer. 03.08.2001.

^{Chaudhuri Kalyan.} 39 Unhindered Terror // Frontline. 22.06 - 05.07.2002. Vol. 19. Issue 13 - http://www.frontli-neonnet.com/fl 1913/19130460.htm

⁴⁰ Bhutan's Military Profile // Strategic Affairs. 01.03.2001. N 0016 - http://www.stratmag.com/issueMar-1/#a03

⁴¹ Bhutan's Strategy to Tackle...

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⁴² Fence Assam-Bhutan Boundary: CM // The Assam Tribune. 23.01.2002.

^{Chaudhuri Kalyan.} 43 Unhindered Terror...

⁴⁴ Govt Submits Draft Deal on BTC to Centre // The Assam Tribune. 17.05.2002.

⁴⁵ Creation of BTC. Steps on to Amend 6th Schedule // The Assam Tribune. 01.08.2002.

⁴⁶ Govt Approval to BTC Creation Flayed // The Assam Tribune. 06.07.2002.

^{Choudhury R. Dutta.} 47 Failure of Bodo Talks to Boost Anti- National Forces: BLT // The Assam Tribune. 25.06.2002.

⁴⁸ Creation of 4 New Dists. ST Status for Koch Rajbongshis, Adivasis Demanded. Sixth Schedule Amendments to Pave Way for BTC // The Assam Tribune. 05.07.2002.

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