August 2002 marks the 60th anniversary of the Indian people's movement under the slogan " Leave India!", which went down in the history of this South Asian country as the "August Revolution" of 1942. At the height of the Second World War, all the provinces of India were more or less engulfed in mass anti-British protests, and only with the help of 57 battalions of the colonial army withdrawn from the front, the authorities managed to suppress the "revolution". These dramatic events deserve careful study, as they represent one of the most important and still insufficiently developed aspects of the history of India in 1939-1945 in Russian indology.

With the outbreak of World War II, the liberation movement of the Indian people entered a crucial phase. The goals of the leading political organizations in the field of constitutional reconstruction were not the same. The Indian National Congress (INC), declaring its solidarity with democratic countries, refused without preconditions to help Great Britain in the war with the bloc of Germany, Italy and Japan. The leaders of the INC, with the exception of the pacifist Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi (1869-1948), claimed that India could make a truly significant contribution to the anti-fascist struggle only after independence and the formation of a national government. Since 1940, the Muslim League has conditioned its support for the war effort of the mother country by demanding the partition of the country and the creation of a separate Islamic state of Pakistan from the north-western and north-eastern provinces inhabited mainly by Muslims. The leader of the League, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), promoted the idea of "two nations"," two Indies", appealing to the fact that Hindus and Muslims have different religions, philosophical systems, language, way of life, culture in general, in other words, Muslims are representatives of an original civilization that should be geographically isolated, in state and legal relations-completely independent of the "Hindu civilization".

From the beginning of the war until December 1941, the British authorities were quite content with the fact that India, which they declared a belligerent, actively participated in the fighting: the colonial army showed loyalty to the Crown and was constantly replenished by volunteers, 75% of the supply of technical raw materials for the supply of allied armies in the Middle East accounted for India 1 . However, after Pearl Harbor, the situation changed dramatically. The entry of Japan into the World War greatly complicated the situation of the British possessions in Asia and the Pacific. By mid-March 1942, the Japanese had captured Malaya, Singapore,and Rangoon. For the first time during the entire period of British rule in India, there was a real threat of invasion of its borders by the troops of another Asian country. It became obvious that to organize its effective defense, the forces of the army alone are not enough, but it is necessary to

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The Conservative Winston Churchill, who headed the war Cabinet, despite all his contempt for compromises with the colonies, was forced to send a mission to India from the Speaker of the House of Commons, Stafford Cripps (1889-1952), in order to attract the entire Indian people to prepare for a possible guerrilla war, to assist the military command in rear operations, to implement "scorched earth" tactics, etc. the draft declaration on constitutional reconstruction, which provided for the granting of dominion status to the country after the end of the war with fascism, and the right of self - determination to the provinces, which theoretically did not exclude the creation of Pakistan. There was no question of allowing the Indians to control the war department and immediately forming a national coalition government, as INC leaders Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel (1875-1950) wanted. No agreement was reached.

The failure of the Cripps mission had significant consequences for Anglo-Indian relations. Anti-British sentiment in society increased markedly, which was especially dangerous against the background of Japan's military successes. The INC leadership recognized with concern that " most people are convinced of the defeat of the British, moreover, they want their defeat, without thinking about the consequences of the conquest of the country by a new aggressor." 2 . Thus, the extraordinary circumstances in which India found itself in the spring of 1942 created an extremely unstable internal situation, which affected the entire society, especially political and other organizations.

There was an air of confusion at INC. In the complex twists and turns of internal party disputes about the role and place of India in World War II, the Congress felt an urgent need for the main consolidating principle - a detailed program for overcoming the political crisis that took into account the diversity of opinions and brought the potential for spiritual revival to society. The INC's strategic goal remained unchanged-achieving India's independence. The unsuccessful attempt of the Congressists in negotiations with S. Cripps to get the British consent to the creation of a national government showed the need to turn to new, more effective means. In addition, the threat of a Japanese invasion forced the INC to give an immediate answer to the question: how to save and protect the fatherland?

Nehru was inclined to think that at that moment it was still necessary to focus on solving the urgent task of defending India. He suggested that his compatriots overcome their passivity and start organizing forces and raising funds for a popular guerrilla war with the enemy. "According to my concept of defense," he said, "I would like to see hundreds of millions of Indians fighting the aggressor." 3

Subhas Chandra Bose, who was president of the Congress in 1938-1939, recalled himself after a long break due to his disappearance from India. While in Germany in the spring of 1942, he spoke to the Indians on the radio, urging them to use the critical situation of the British to immediately overthrow their regime. The Bos stated: "British imperialism is the eternal enemy of the Indians. No peace or compromise is possible with him!" 4 . The ideas of the popular leader found a certain response in Indian society, especially among the members of the "Forward Bloc" created by Bosh on the eve of the war. However, for all their anti-imperialist orientation, these ideas gave rise to dangerous illusions about the possibility of cooperation with fascism in the name of national liberation.

In these circumstances, the position of Gandhi, a recognized ideologue of the liberation movement, deserved special attention. After leaving the Cripps mission, on one of his "days of silence," Gandhi finally realized that the situation had reached an impasse. While admitting the victory of the Hitler coalition at that time, he realized that the people needed more than just anti-war appeals to gain the will to resist. As a pacifist, Gandhi rejected Nehru's idea of starting guerrillas-

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and the use of "scorched earth" tactics against the Japanese. With no intention of giving up his unwavering commitment to humanistic ideals, he worked hard to find the one true path that everyone would follow.

On April 19, 1942, in the weekly Harijan, Gandhi appealed to the British authorities to " Leave India!" Since then, it has been actively working to explain the new action plan. Gandhi's main argument was that the empire should "leave India" because the Indian people demanded it, and also because of military necessity. "Japan is not at war with India, but with its current masters," he said. "England is incapable of defending India... The best thing for it is to leave India to its own devices. " 5 If the British withdrawal takes place, then, first, the British rule will come to a bloodless end; secondly, the Japanese invasion may not follow at all, since there will be no grounds for it. What Gandhi did not know was that the Japanese and Germans were already planning to divide India, and a change in its status would not have deterred them .6 If the aggressor still violated the eastern borders of the country, then, according to Gandhi, he would have met with a rebuff in the form of widespread nonviolent Indian resistance. Gandhi believed with unfathomable certainty that in such a scenario, the Japanese would have had to retreat, otherwise they would have had no choice but to "destroy an entire nation." 7 So, the most influential national leader actually stated that there are no prospects for cooperation with the UK. From now on, he refused even moral support to the British.

In order to achieve unity of opinion in the ranks of the Congress and develop a new tactic for the liberation movement, a session of the All India Committee (VCC) was convened in Allahabad (United Provinces), which was held from April 29 to May 2, 1942. M. K. Gandhi did not attend the meeting, but sent his courier Mir Ben to Allahabad with the project resolutions on the military issue, where he outlined the idea of the British withdrawal from India and an original vision of the possibilities of achieving independence. The draft was submitted to the HCC for discussion and caused a heated discussion. Gandhi's first opponent was Jawaharlal Nehru, who realized that in the critical situation that had developed after the fall of Singapore and Burma, his homeland had to fight together with Great Britain and its allies against a common enemy. He tried to prevent the HCC from relegating the issue of the war against fascism to the background, even for the sake of freeing India from the humiliating colonial burden. In a certain sense, the internationalist prevailed over the nationalist. Nehru analyzed everything in detail, and above all, the real vulnerabilities in Gandhi's position.

He categorically rejected the hope of appeasing the Japanese militarists: "Japan is an imperialist power. The conquest of India is part of her plans. " 8 Nehru could not accept that demanding the withdrawal of the British (and their armies) at the time of the greatest military successes of the Hitlerite coalition countries could lead to Indian independence: "The withdrawal of troops and the entire civil administration apparatus will create a vacuum that cannot be immediately filled." 9 He expressed perfectly reasonable doubt that the methods recommended by Gandhi would be able to stop the Japanese army: "The Japanese will move inland. Nonviolent non-cooperation is not a barrier ...Their armies will go to Persia, Iraq, strangle China and significantly complicate the situation of Russia. " 10 As a result, Nehru came to the conclusion that by adopting the draft resolution on the military issue written by Gandhi, the Congress would present itself as a passive accomplice of the fascist aggressors.

During the discussion, Acut Patwardhan, a member of the HCC, expressed an interesting point of view. While he largely agreed with Nehru, he also supported a number of provisions of the Gandhi project. "Jawaharlal's position will lead us to unconditional cooperation with the British authorities.

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Patwardhan said, "that would be a reason for Japan to attack India." 11 Completely shared the views of Gandhi and defended his project at the session Vallabhbhai Patel. He stated that the committee faced two principled positions, of which it is the Gandhian one that seems to him "more correct". The situation at the Allahabad session, due to disagreements in the leadership of the INC, could have finally reached an impasse, but at the request of Congress President Abul Kalam Azad, Nehru prepared his own version of the draft resolution. It was a compromise document that incorporated the main provisions of the Gandhi project, but in a different interpretation, which was eventually adopted.

The resolution on the military question of May 1, 1942, proved that in the leadership of the Congress, along with a pronounced tendency towards an ideological clash between orthodox Gandists and non-Hindus, there was a desire for compromise, so necessary for the resumption of active political activity of the entire organization. Nehru's own draft, which took the form of this resolution, was essentially a modified version of Gandhi's new program, reflecting the widespread bitterness among the masses against the British. The fact that Gandhi had put forward such a program was self-evident and could not be ignored. In the name of compromise, Nehru did not include in the text he worked out the demand for an armed response to the aggressor, which he so ardently defended. At the same time, he was able to exclude Gandhi's clearly anti-British statement about the empire's inability to protect India, about the latter's lack of hostility to Japan, which could be used by the authorities against the Congress itself.

Gandhi, on the other hand, forced the WCC to conclude that the immediate end of British rule was the main issue of the day. All that was needed now was an answer: how did he, Gandhi, expect to influence the colonial administration so that his unprecedented demand to "leave India" would be met? The whole course of events, the very failure of Cripps ' mission, and Nehru's conformism contributed to the strengthening of Gandhi's influence in the Congress, and the model of further political behavior of the Congressists would largely depend not only on the participation or non-participation of the Indian people in the war, but also on the future of the entire liberation movement in India.

The British authorities were alarmed by the sudden intensification of Congress activities under the influence of Gandhi. Churchill noted: "Nehru-alone or almost alone is ready to seriously fight the enemy... Most of the congressional leaders have returned to the absolute pacifism of Gandhi. " 12 In India, the Department of the Interior began to take measures to discredit Gandhi's new plans, guided by the following guidelines: (a) criticize Gandhi's policies, but not him personally; (b) emphasize that if his plans were implemented, the Allied war effort would be harmed; (c) dispel suggestions that Congress might force His Majesty's government to commit suicide. new political concessions to the Indians 13 . The police raided the INC headquarters in Allahabad and seized all documentation available there, including several copies of the resolution of May 1, 1942. In a secret letter to the Viceroy, the Governor of the United Provinces, M. Hallett, drew the attention of Lord Linlithgow to the question of the authorship of this document, suggesting that it belonged to Gandhi. "If this resolution was written by a Mahatma," the governor emphasized, " then it becomes clear that he is a fifth column member... and we must closely monitor its activities... We also have information that 75% of Congress employees are pro-Japanese and 100% are anti-British. " 14 After carefully reviewing the materials received from Allahabad, the Viceroy asked the Minister of Indian and Burmese Affairs, L. S. Emery, to " bring the relevant information to the attention of the members of the war Cabinet and take urgent action." 15

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The events in India were closely followed in the countries-allies of Great Britain. U.S. public opinion reacted negatively to the INC's change in tactics because it saw elements of aiding and abetting the Japanese. This assessment of the kongressist course was suggested by the choice of nonviolent non-cooperation as the main means of combating the modern Japanese army. President F. D. Roosevelt was surprised and even outraged by what he himself described as a "Gandhian revival." 16 Deeply interested in India's greater contribution to the war, he believed that the London Government should do everything possible to ensure Indian support for the Allied war effort, despite Congress's "intransigence." 17

The Chinese leadership was very sympathetic to the liberation movement in India, and in February and March 1942 even made efforts to promote an Anglo-Indian agreement on the constitutional problem. President Chiang Kai-shek and his wife maintained warm personal relations with the Nehru family, and were quite familiar with Gandhi and Jinnah. Nevertheless, Chongqing refrained from actively supporting the new Congressional plans, believing that they would not only undermine India's defense capability, but also negatively affect China's strategic position .18

The Soviet Union avoided interfering in Anglo-Indian relations and made little reaction to the internal party life of the INC. It is well known that the Indian question has always occupied a significant place in the program documents of the CPSU (b) and the Comintern, but in 1942 there was little interest in events in distant India. Moscow was bound to London by the Agreement on Joint Actions in the War against Germany, signed on July 12, 1941 by V. M. Molotov and S. Cripps, and later agreements. Part of Britain's technical and raw material aid went to the USSR from India. At one time, there were even discussions about sending a Soviet representative to Delhi to better coordinate supplies. In other words, the policy of the USSR was completely focused on creating favorable conditions for waging war against fascism, and from this point of view, India was considered as a source of strategic resources. Almost no articles about the liberation movement in India appeared in the Soviet press. Thus, the central organ of the CPSU(b) "Pravda" regularly published the texts of speeches by W. Churchill and L. S. Emery, but ignored the most important documents of the INC. or put only those excerpts from them that spoke about the readiness of the Indian people to participate in the war .19 The crisis of Anglo-Indian relations in 1942 and Gandhi's "Leave India!" plan did not receive any timely and adequate coverage in the Soviet press .20 Thus, even at the design stage, the new congressional tactic of a "painless" end to British rule did not gain any impressive support either in the diverse environment of the Anglo-Indian colonial apparatus, much less in the countries that are allies of Great Britain.

Meanwhile, Gandhi began actively campaigning among the population in favor of the slogan "Leave India!". During May, the weekly Harijan regularly published articles in which he gave the key to solving his own problem-how to achieve an immediate withdrawal of the British from the country. On May 17, 1942, he published his famous letter "To all the British", in which he asked for their support in liberating "if not all the Asian and African colonies, then at least India" 21, and on May 24, he indicated a means of influencing the management structures: "All those who love India, England and the whole world will join my appeal to the authorities, and if it is rejected, will take non-violent measures to force them to comply with our request... Leave India to God! If it's too much, leave her to her fate! " 22 .

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The essence of the new Gandhian tactics was reduced to the following provisions:

1. British rule in India ceases. The British must leave India immediately and voluntarily;

2. If the colonial authorities do not agree to resign, then Gandhi will launch a massive civil disobedience movement under the slogan "Leave India!", which will force them to leave the country.

Thus, Gandhi decided to use his tried-and - tested weapon of satyagraha in the 1920s and 1930s, but this time he wanted to use it not to improve individual mechanisms in the system of foreign rule, but against the system as such. He was even willing to risk the temporary powerlessness that would probably ensue if the colonial administration withdrew from India. Gandhi was convinced that the leading political parties would be able to take power in the shortest possible time, form a national government and organize defense.

He called it a "nonviolent revolution" or "open rebellion," because he hoped that without resorting to weapons, the Indians would be able to achieve fundamental changes in the constitutional system .23 To prepare satyagraha locally, Gandhi sent emissaries to the provinces of the country. Moreover, he personally appealed to the heads of the allied powers - Chiang Kai-shek and Roosevelt-to support the liberation movement in India, 24 but found no understanding. "In view of the recent setbacks that have befallen the Allied forces in Libya," Chiang Kai - shek wrote in a reply telegram dated July 8, 1942, " Congress would do well to exercise maximum patience and refrain from decisive action. By doing so, he would show his sympathy for the cause of the United Nations. " 25 Roosevelt didn't answer Mahatma.

Discussion on the possibility of holding satyagraha under the slogan "Leave India!" It was held at a meeting of the INC Working Committee in Wardha (Central Provinces), where on July 14 it was decided to agree with Gandhi's opinion and, in the event of Great Britain's refusal to accept the Congress's condition for the immediate granting of full independence to India, to start a mass movement. Even Nehru and his associates recognized that such a program can be a kind of pleasant psychological shock for Indians, bring them out of a state of apathy and social passivity, and this energy can later be directed against Japanese aggressors. The final decision on this issue was to be made by the All India Congress Committee, which was to meet in Bombay on August 7, 1942.

The War Cabinet had no intention of resuming negotiations with the Congressists. Emery considered it his duty to "restrain Gandhi and Inc." and stated that he would undertake to " prepare the public opinion of the United States, China, and the USSR in connection with the possibility of holding anti-aggression events." 26 He informed the Viceroy that the Government gave him complete freedom of action and advised him to "put Gandhi on a plane and send him to Uganda." 27 However, Linlithgow reasoned otherwise. As he contemplated a plan for reprisals against the Inc, he feared, more than an international scandal, an explosion of discontent within the country. "Neither the cabinet nor I want a conflict with Congress," he wrote to London, " but if necessary... we will have to arrest Gandhi and all the other party members... The latter don't bother me much, whereas Gandhi is a special case. I came to the conclusion that it would be better to leave it in India, in some well-maintained place, with all possible amenities. I am convinced that in this case there will be less noise. " 28

In order to discredit the Indian liberation movement in the eyes of the world, the Linlithgow administration charged Gandhi with links to the Japanese military command. The propaganda hype was on-

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so beneficial to the authorities that it was not until September 14, 1942, that Churchill requested " reliable information about Gandhi's intrigues with Japan and documents that the Government of India has in this regard." On September 17, Emery reported to the Prime Minister. "On your instructions," he reported, " I have prepared information about Gandhi. There is no evidence that he had contacts with the Japanese, although he has repeatedly spoken publicly about the possibility of entering into negotiations with Japan in the future. " 29 The attempt to fabricate an accusation against Mahatma and the entire Congress that the "Leave India!" movement was inspired by Japanese intelligence failed.

Until the very opening of the Bombay session of the High Commission, Gandhi remained ready to meet the British authorities halfway, wanting to resolve the issue of their withdrawal at the negotiating table. Mira Ben went to the Viceroy's residence on his behalf, but was refused admission. The Private Secretary informed Mira that "Lord Linlithgow will not hold any negotiations with the representatives of Gandhi, who is preparing an open revolt." 30

On August 7, the session of the All India Congress Committee opened in Bombay. Delegates from all the provinces of the forum had to ratify the resolution on the" withdrawal "of the British from the country, with the light hand of Bombay journalists called in those days the resolution" Leave India!". In his speech at the session, Gandhi addressed the audience in English and Hindi. He stressed that " the resolution submitted for discussion is based on the principles of ahimsa. Its meaning is not a search for the INC's path to power, but a completely bloodless struggle for independence... If someone has lost faith in nonviolence, then do not vote for this document... We are beginning our struggle not against the British people, but against imperialism... Do or die! " 31 .

Azad, Nehru, and Patel came out in support of Gandhi. Ideological differences between the leading groups within the INC were muted for tactical reasons.

August 8, 1942 resolution"Leave India!" it was approved. The Congress confirmed its readiness to participate in the anti-fascist struggle of the United Nations as a free and equal partner. The document, in particular, read:: "The immediate collapse of British rule in India is necessary both for the Indians themselves and for the success of the Allied cause. After the declaration of independence, a provisional government will be formed, whose main function will be the defense of Hindustan and resistance to the aggressor with all non-violent and armed means at its disposal." The Congress claimed that the British authorities had refused to discuss its demand to "leave India", and therefore it was "launching a civil disobedience movement under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi" .32

Of the 240 people present at the session, 13 voted against the resolution. The Gandhian plan was approved, and the Congress actively opposed the government.

The colonial authorities met the opening of the Bombay session in "full alert". Official Delhi exchanged hourly telegrams with London. On August 8, the Viceroy informed the Minister of Indian and Burmese Affairs: "We are now waiting for the outcome of the Congress. It must be reached tonight. " 33 Emery reported to the Prime Minister: "The HQC is holding a session. It is expected that the resolution we are interested in will be ratified today. Rumor has it that Gandhi will then send a letter to the Viceroy asking him to make public the government's position on his demand that the British 'leave the country'." Late on the evening of August 8, Linlithgow urgently telegraphed to the War Cabinet: "The Committee approved the resolution... We are starting to implement our plan. " 34

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At dawn on August 9, Churchill's reply came marked "top secret": "Act, and without delay!" 35 Arrests of congressional leaders have begun in Bombay. Gandhi was interned at the Aga Khan Palace in Pune, and the committee members were interned at Fort Ahmadnagar. Activists of provincial and even district organizations were jailed according to pre-prepared and verified lists. The party's headquarters in Allahabad were raided and sealed. Inc. was outlawed. However, the British calculation that the preventive measures taken would help them prevent a new upsurge in the liberation struggle was not justified. The mass arrests of congressional leaders had the opposite effect - they served as an impetus for the beginning of INC's upcoming satyagraha. A powerful mass anti-British movement has developed in the country under the slogan " Leave India!".

Bombay, as the venue for the WCC session and all the events that followed, was the first to rise. On August 9, 1942, a 30,000-strong rally was held in Shivaji Park, demanding the immediate release of national leaders. Soon the movement spread to the entire province and, in particular, covered such districts of the Bombay Presidency as Kaira, Tana, Pune ,Ahmedabad, Surat, Satara, Belgaum. 36 Having managed to stay free for one reason or another, some members of the HCC gathered at the home of a major industrialist G. D. Birla, where Gandhi's personal secretary, Pyarelal, read them a letter written by the Mahatma before his arrest. It said: "Let every soldier of the nonviolent struggle affix the slogan' Do or die! 'to his clothing, so that he can be distinguished from those who are not adherents of Ahimsa." 37 The kongressists, who had taken refuge from the police crackdown, decided to take control of the movement and set up an underground "All India Congress Committee" .38 The name of the new committee was intended to symbolize the continuity of the functions of this body with the arrested VKK. Thus, the civil disobedience campaign has a new coordinating and guiding center.

On the basis of party affiliation, the underground VKK is characterized as a left-wing progressive body, consisting mainly of Congress-socialists. Leading figures of the committee were S. Kripalani, R. Lohiya, Aruna Asaf Ali, A. Patwardhan, Y. Meheralli. They immediately began to disagree on the tactics of further struggle. Thus, the " Gandhi group "(Kripalani, Meheralli, etc.) advocated the use of exclusively nonviolent methods, while the "group of supporters of violence" (Lohia, Patwardhan, etc.) believed that the movement should go beyond the usual satyagraha and become a "truly revolutionary struggle" against colonialists. The underground VKK created a monetary fund and established a certain connection with the provinces. The center operated in secret. At one time it was located at 69-87 Kafidral Street in Bombay, then it was moved to the second floor of the Govind Building on Kehtwadi Main Road. 4 people were constantly working in the secret apartment: a coordinator, an accountant, a typist secretary and a servant. There was a large amount of correspondence (up to 200 envelopes and packages per day). The center prepared daily news reports on the progress of traffic in the country39 .

Already on August 9, 1942, the underground Committee issued the first bulletin addressed to the people of Bombay. It read: "We congratulate the residents of the city on their remarkable performance in support of the sacred cause of the whole country. From now on, we are free citizens of a free India (so in the document-L. Ch.). Our struggle will not end until we win "40. On August 10, a second bulletin was published with the title" Do or die!", which contained excerpts from Gandhi's last letter calling on the people to make self-sacrifice guided by the principles of nonviolence. As the main means of fighting the Committee

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He suggested using a strike: "With strikes, we will bring the authorities to a state of crisis." 41

It is characteristic that the third bulletin of August 12, "Citizens of Bombay" already contained slightly different recommendations on the choice of methods of pressure on the British:"...Paralyze communications, violate the law of martial law " 42 . The left-wing progressive center called on the masses to switch to using elements of sabotage and undermining the empire's military efforts, thereby deviating from the original, Gandhian idea of "pure" satyagraha.

Drawing on the most active driving force of the campaign, the student body, the underground WCC established a secret Kongressist radio in Bombay, which broadcast to the city and province from August to November 1942. Radio sessions lasted 30 minutes a day. Their presenters had to elude the police by moving from place to place. In November, the radio station was discovered and the five main organizers were jailed. The underground C. C. not only tried to maintain communication between the provinces, but also organized meetings in Bombay, Delhi, Benares, and Calcutta of workers who managed the movement in various parts of the country in one way or another. The discussions revealed fundamental differences in the views of local leaders on tactics: from recognizing the need to keep the campaign within the framework of nonviolence to demands to abandon the "delicate" methods of Mahatma Gandhi, to switch to sabotage and even armed forms of confrontation with the regime.

The specific political views of the leaders of the movement, combined with local conditions, gave rise to a unique course in various parts of India. Thus, in the western, central, and southeastern provinces, the campaign generally did not go beyond nonviolence: along with the traditional Satyagraha mass marches, strikes, and picketing of government buildings, people in some cases disrupted communications, but they did not turn to open sabotage, sabotage, or armed struggle.

In the Bombay Presidency and the Central Provinces, students were the most active among all segments of the population. Strikes were organized at Bombay University, and attendance at colleges and schools dropped to 10-13%. In one of the districts of the Bombay Presidency-Belgaum-a large group of young people (about 700 people) raised a three-color congregational flag on the courthouse and tried to burn portraits of Churchill and Linlithgow, but were dispersed by the police.43 More than 1000 students helped the activities of the underground HCC. They held meetings, distributed bulletins and pamphlets, and kept in touch with the provinces whenever possible. On August 9-11, in Nagpur (Central Provinces), a demonstration of thousands of local youth called on Indian government officials to join the common struggle. In Sevagram, where Gandhi's abode was located, the population held a satyagraha under the slogan " Leave India!", during which even the police resigned in protest at the arrests of INC leaders. A peasant movement began in Chimur. At the end of August, the whole of India was shocked by the news of the barbaric treatment of the residents of Chimur by the military and police, where not only men, but also children and women were subjected to violence and reprisals. Professor Bhansali, from Bombay, traveled to Delhi to meet with lawmakers and protest the incident. He secured an appointment with a member of the Viceroy's executive council, Aeneas, and demanded the creation of a government commission to investigate the Chimura incident. As a result, under the influence of public opinion, the authorities were forced to recognize that they "must attach greater importance to maintaining discipline in the army and police involved in restoring order" .44

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A general strike broke out in Madras on August 9. Taking advantage of the fact that the province was intersected by strategically important railway lines in many places, road users destroyed the roadbed, dismantled rails, etc. As a result, the South Indian Road functioned with frequent interruptions, and communication between Madras and Calcutta was interrupted for a whole month. In the Coimbatore district, a military airfield was completely burned down. The authorities imposed collective fines on residents of surrounding villages ranging from Rs 5 to Rs 50,000 per person45 . The police were given permission to shoot anyone approaching military installations without warning. In one of the daily reports, the Viceroy told Emery: "Madras: the center is calm, but there are still cases of communication disruption in the districts. In Coimbatore, where non-cooperation has turned into sabotage, police are allowed to open fire. " 46

To suppress the movement in Madras, the Bombay Presidency, the Central Provinces, and a number of other regions with similar characteristics of participants and methods of struggle, the administration resorted to arrests, forced labor, corporal punishment, and collective fines. As a result, by the end of September 1942, mass protests in these provinces were mostly suppressed.

In Bihar, Bengal, and the United Provinces, nonviolent methods were combined with violent ones, including armed resistance to the British regime. They were organized by" revolutionary-minded " left-wing congressists.

The movement in Bihar, which covered all the districts of the province, was particularly intense. Back in July 1942, one of the leaders of the INC provincial Committee, Jaiprakash Narayan (1902-1979), advocated the transition to a "mass revolutionary struggle". According to Indian historian S. Niyoji, he wanted to "bring Marxism to the conservative liberation movement." 47 On August 9, Congress activists were arrested in Bihar. On August 10, strikes and khartals began in Patna, which were attended by a broad segment of the population. In one day alone, police opened fire 15 times, killing 8 and wounding 30 people .48 Most of the Eastern Railway was burned or damaged, causing the authorities to have significant difficulties with military transportation. The telephone and telegraph networks practically did not function.

After Narayan's escape from Khazaribagh prison, he created "guerrilla groups" that made improvised explosives, derailed trains with military cargo, and blew up bridges. The Times of London wrote:: "Bihar, where the unrest is most serious , is the birthplace of terrorism... The rebels use the experience of the Russian partisans. " 49 In his open letter to "All Freedom Fighters," Narayan wrote: "We have declared ourselves an independent people, and the British are the aggressors, and we are fighting against them with weapons in our hands." He interpreted Mahatma's slogan "Leave India!"in his own way. and he believed that if the actions of the Bihar people "diverge from the ideals of Ahimsa", then it is "not his fault" 50 . After the defeat of the "revolution", Narayan's troops went to Nepal and for a long time attacked border police posts.

In Bengal, events unfolded in approximately the same scenario as in Bihar. Participants of the movement disrupted communications, damaged telephone wires, and committed sabotage on transport. Linlithgow wrote sarcastically to Emery about the "good technical training of saboteurs." 51 After the Bengal Provincial Committee was outlawed, the escaped kongressists Mukherjee, Samantha and several others went underground. On August 19, the Bengal Action Council was formed in Midnapura to distribute guidelines for fighting. The Council, in particular, recommended that the population create a parallel-

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but the existing structures of local government have their own organs of popular power, which will later become the rudiments of the "free Indian state" 52.

This recommendation was not without consequences. A "national government" was established in Midnapur, which included "ministers" headed by a "dictator". This Government exercised judicial functions, maintained order and security, and created a volunteer army. With rivers overflowing after the summer monsoon rains and roads completely destroyed, Midnapur was out of reach of the British. The "national Government" lasted until August 8, 1944, and was dissolved on the instructions of Gandhi, who was released .53

The United provinces were also engulfed in anti-English demonstrations. Together with the students - the main driving force of the campaign - the workers, the middle strata of the city, and cadets of military schools showed considerable activity. On August 13, Allahabad, Meerut, Jaunpur, Gorakhpur and other cities were blocked by trees, pillars and stones. In Allahabad, members of the movement entered the airfield, set fire to several cars and office premises. The scale of the government's retaliatory crackdown was so great that even the New York Times did not ignore the events in faraway India, reporting that "as of September 1, 201 people were killed and many injured during a police shooting in Gorakhpur." 54

Just as in Bengal, the United Provinces established their own Indian "government" in the Ballia District. In Ballia, the sabotage became so widespread that by August 18, the district was out of touch with the center. The local judge released the congressists from prison in the hope that they would help him take control of the situation. Contrary to his expectations, 100 released activists led by Pandey called on the people to continue fighting. On August 20, a meeting of residents was held, declaring the district an "independent territory". Pandey formed his own administration, ordered the arrest of British officials, and took control of the Treasury and arsenal. But unlike in Midnapur, this administration lasted only a few days. On August 23, troops were brought into Ballia and mass terror began. Nehru wrote about the repression of local authorities: "The government of the United Provinces and Governor Hallett are avenging themselves. What lies behind their viciousness? Fear? " 55 .

The situation in Punjab and the North - West Frontier Province was different.

In Punjab, the provincial committee and its district branches were subjected to particularly harsh crackdowns. During the August 9-10 arrests, police officers publicly humiliated the members of the congregation, beat them, and then took them to prison in handcuffs. Prisoners also endured bullying and torture in prison premises .56 Nevertheless, in Amritsar, whose very name is identified in the minds of Indians not only with the location of the Golden Temple, but also with the mass shooting of civilians by the British military in Jal Lianwala Bagh Square in 1919, a march was held to protest the arrests of Gandhi, Nehru and other INC leaders. On August 10, all shops and bazaars in Multan closed for a one-day hartal. Without belittling the significance of all of the above, however, it should be noted that in general, in Punjab, the movement under the slogan "Leave India!" it was not widely used. A number of factors influenced the weak participation of the local population in this movement.

First, the authorities ' repressions and well-established anti-aggression propaganda played a role. Secondly, Punjab is a province with a predominantly Muslim population, among which the Muslim League enjoyed great authority-

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The adoption by the League's Working Committee of the resolution of August 20, 1942, on neutrality in relation to the movement, was in fact a directive for all Muslims. Third, a significant part of the province's Hindu population - the Sikhs - traditionally formed the backbone of the Anglo-Indian colonial army. Sikhs received fairly high salaries, privileges and pensions, and were personally loyal to the Crown. The immediate "withdrawal" of the British from India was not in their best interests.

As was the case in Punjab, an important factor influencing the situation in the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) was the policy of the provincial authorities to prevent a campaign of civil disobedience. The difference was in the way it was carried out: if the Punjab authorities resorted to extremely harsh repression, then the governor of the NWFP, G. Cunningham, preferred the other extreme. The NWFP has become a unique province without a preemptive strike on Congress. More far-sighted than the officials at the center, Cunningham understood that only the INC organization could keep the inevitable popular action within the framework of nonviolence. Further developments in the province confirmed the correctness of the governor's calculations. The local leader of the INC, Abdul Ghaffar Khan, with the help of his redshirt detachments, distributed the "declaration of independence" to the local population. Only on October 5, in Peshawar, detachments began picketing ships, which lasted for six days. By this time, the defeat of the "Leave India!" movement had already been determined. and Cunningham began to boldly resort to arrests of participants in the struggle. Police were sent to disperse the picketers in Peshawar. On October 27, Abdul Ghaffar Khan 57 was arrested .

However, in addition to the flexible policy of the governor, there were other equally important circumstances that allowed him to act mainly by cunning, and not by force. It was advantageous for the NWFP to support the British war effort. The local population-Pashtuns were engaged in intermediary trade and supplies to the army, entered military service. The war brought them an improvement in their financial situation, as prices for agricultural products increased many times. In addition, under the influence of official propaganda, the tribes were imbued with the belief that Great Britain stands in defense of Islam. Pro-English agitation was conducted by Muslim clergy.

Despite certain specifics of the movement under the slogan " Leave India!" In the NWFP and Punjab, even these provinces have made a certain contribution to the overall struggle. Thus, the movement covered almost the entire territory of India and became the apogee of the political crisis of 1942.

* * *

The Anglo-Indian authorities tried to prove to the world community the absolute adequacy of their measures to the extent of the danger that the movement created for the defense potential of Great Britain. On August 9, 1942, the Minister for India and Burma, Emery, spoke on the radio and described the government's measures as" sound policies "that helped him" nip the movement in the bud "and allowed him to maintain" control of the situation in the country. " 58

Since August 9, in the provinces of British India, a ban has been imposed on holding mass marches and gatherings, except for those that had written permission from the district courts and police commissioners. All social activities were suspended from 7.30 pm to 6 am. The British were particularly concerned about Mahatma Gandhi's detention. In the event that he went on a hunger strike in protest and his state of health deteriorated sharply, he would have preferred to-

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It was necessary to release Gandhi immediately, so as not to bear responsibility for the consequences. The authorities even provided for the possibility of a tragic outcome of the sudden death of the all-Indian leader. Under these circumstances, the security officer at the Aga Khan's palace was instructed to immediately notify the Government by encrypted telegram, which in turn would inform Gandhi's sons of what had happened .59

57 battalions of the Anglo-Indian Colonial Army were withdrawn from the front to suppress the movement. In those days, the Viceroy of India wrote: "We are facing here the most formidable riot since 1857. I am confident that a new Congressional attack will be repelled. " 60 The War Cabinet in London expressed satisfaction with the firmness with which the Indian leadership handled the situation in the country. During the suppression of the mass movement, the British authorities were in a state of euphoria, mainly because they managed to remove the INC from the political arena.

On September 10, 1942, Churchill addressed the House of Commons on the situation in India. In an attempt to justify his claim that "an INC-organized campaign cannot be nationwide," he stated: "The Congress is not an all-India party. It does not represent the majority of the country's population. It is a political organization that defends the narrow interests of industrialists and financiers. " 61 The Prime Minister assessed the situation in the colony in mid-September as "normal", which, in his opinion, was evidenced by the fact that during the period of unrest, the Anglo - Indian army was replenished with 140 thousand volunteers .62 In conclusion, Churchill stressed that the Government's policy towards India remained unchanged and its fate "will be decided at the end of the war." 63

The Prime Minister's speech sparked a heated debate in the House of Commons. The Labor faction expressed dissatisfaction with the extremely conservative approach of the head of the war Cabinet to solving the Indian question. W. Sorensen fundamentally disagreed with Churchill's statement that the INC does not represent the majority of Indians, and stated that "the only way to test the degree of influence of Congress is to hold elections" 64. The debate showed that the war Cabinet did not intend to deviate from its policy of using the material and human resources of India for the military needs of the empire and deciding on the future status of the colony after the defeat of fascism. At the same time, Labour members of Parliament and Government continued to support the Indian people's demand for independence and put some pressure on Churchill to end his illusions about so-called "restored stability" in the Indian Subcontinent.

Isolated INC leaders were not immediately aware of the mass movement unfolding in the country. At first, the arrested congressists were not allowed to read newspapers at all, then they began to receive stale issues, but information about popular demonstrations and government repression still reached them. Nehru's prison records state: "I read Churchill's speech in the papers... Common to him, insulting to Congress. But I'm satisfied. Let there be no compromises. " 65 Gandhi called the colonial administration responsible for the tragedy in the country. On September 21, he wrote to the Viceroy: "If you had waited for my letter about the start of negotiations, the country would not have suffered such a disaster. I believe that the government is responsible for what happened." 66 Gandhi suggested to Lord Linlithgow that the rational way to restore order in India was "to release all the kongressists and stop the repression that only increases the discontent of the people." 67

However, nothing could stop the flywheel of military-police terror launched in the face of a real threat from the outside. According to official figures, by the end of September 1942, 846 people had been killed and 2,024 wounded. Of these, the number of victims among

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There were 60 police and military personnel .68 At the end of September, the movement under the slogan "Leave India!" it was generally suppressed, although some demonstrations were observed until December 1942 and even in 1943.

Referred to by most Indian nationalist historians as the" August Revolution, "the" Glorious Revolution, " this movement was defeated for a variety of reasons. Objective conditions were not favorable for the Gandhian plan of a bloodless and immediate end to British rule in India to be realized. In the context of the United Nations waging war on fascism, any anti-government activity in the British Empire was automatically considered a riot and brutally suppressed. The British authorities considered the only acceptable basis for an agreement with the Indian political parties to be the idea of a post-war settlement of the question of the future status of India. In this regard, Gandhi's calculation on the possibility of negotiating with Great Britain on his own terms was initially unrealistic. The hopes of the Congressists that they would be supported by all social and religious groups of the population were also not fulfilled. The princes, the Comprador bourgeoisie, some of the workers, and the vast majority of Sikhs and Muslims were left out of the "revolution". Finally, the government's preemptive strike on INC on August 9, 1942. It led to the fact that the movement that was being prepared by the party began spontaneously, and the underground VKK that emerged later, due to the relative inexperience and ideological disunity of its members, could not completely replace the repressed real All-India Congress Committee and give the movement proper organization and scope. The overwhelming military superiority of the colonial administration, which used the army and military equipment against the Indians, predetermined the outcome of events.

The significance of such a multi-faceted and controversial phenomenon as the movement under the slogan "Leave India!" cannot be assessed unambiguously. It demonstrated the strength of the authority of Mahatma Gandhi and the Indian National Congress in society and the support of the majority of Indians for their program and goals in the liberation struggle, testified to the viability of the Gandhian doctrine of active nonviolence, since, despite the use of sabotage, sabotage, etc. by participants in the struggle, the majority still preferred nonviolent means of pressure on the authorities. The movement proved to the Conservatives in London that once the war was over, they would no longer be able to keep India in subjection, and the question of creating a national authorized cabinet in Delhi was central to Indian politics. In this regard, the movement was indeed the "August Revolution" - one of the significant stages on India's path to state independence, which brought its achievement closer. On the other hand, the events of August-September 1942 presented the Congress and its leaders with a socio-philosophical, rather than political, problem of the need to correlate national interest and universal tasks. Finally, this movement has significantly reduced the possibility of preserving the unity of India in the future. The absence of the Congress in the political arena until the end of World War II was taken advantage of by the Muslim League, which expanded its ranks by two million people and launched a well-established propaganda of the "idea of Pakistan".

Ahead was August 1947.

notes

1 См.: Zaidi A.M. The Way Out to Freedom. Bombay, 1975. P. 378.

Azad A. K. 2 India seeks Freedom, Moscow, 1961, p. 123.

Nehru J. 3 Selected Works of Jawaharlal Nehru. V. 12. New Delhi, 1979. P. 262-263.

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4 The Times. 3.03.1942.

Gandhi M. K. 5 The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. V. 76. New Delhi, 1979. P. 361. See: Raikov A.V. The Most Dangerous Hour of India. Lipetsk, 1999.

Gandhi M.K. 7 Op. cit. P. 5.

8 The Transfer of Power 1942-7. Ed. by N. Mansergh. V. 2. "Quit India". L., 1970. P. 158.

9 Ibid.

10 Ibid.

11 Ibid. P. 160.

Churchill W.S. 12 The Second World War. V. 4. Boston, 1978. P. 1.

13 The Transfer of Power... P. 189.

14 Ibid. P. 63.

15 Ibid. P. 204.

16 See more details: New York Times. 1.05.1942; 3.05.1942; 30.05.1942.

17 USA. Department of State. Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers. 1942. V. 2. Washington, 1960. P. 703-716.

18 The Transfer of Power... P. 612, 676.

19 See: Pravda. March-May 1942

20 Ibid.

Gandhi M.K. 21 Op. cit. P. 98-100.

22 The Transfer of Power... P. 115.

Gandhi M.K. 23 Op. cit. P. 172-173.

24 See for more information: Tendulkar G. D. Mahatma. The Life of Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi. V. 6. Bombay, 1953.

25 Ibid. P. 496.

26 The Transfer of Power...P. 208, 218.

27 Ibid. P. 225.

28 Ibid. P. 273.

29 Ibid. P. 961, 978-979.

30 Ibid. P. 404-405.

Tendulkar G.D. 31 Op cit. P. 187.

32 The Transfer of Power... P. 621.

33 Ibid. P. 616.

34 Ibid. P. 617-618, 620.

35 Ibid. P. 620.

36 The Times of India. 10.08.1942.

37 Gandhi's Correspondence with the Government, 1942- 1944. Ahmedabad, 1945. P. 53.

38 See: Hutchins F. G. India's Revolution. Gandhi and the Quit India Movement. Cambridge, 1973. P. 240.

39 Ibid.

40 Quit India Movement. British Secret Report. Ed. by P.N. Chopra. New Delhi, 1976. P. 320.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid. P. 321-322.

43 Source Material for a History of the Freedom Movement in India. Collected from Maharashtra State and Government of India Records. Ed. by B.G.Kunte. V. 3, pt 7. Bombay, 1975. P. 59.

44 Cit. by: Sitaramayya P. The History of the Indian National Congress. V. 2. Bombay, 1947. P. 124.

45 See: Zaidi A.M. Op. cit. P. 101.

46 The Transfer of Power... P. 794-795.

Niyoji S. 47 The 1942 Movement in Bihar // Challenge: A Saga of India's Struggle for Freedom. Ed. by N.R Ray. New Delhi, 1984. P. 423.

Choudhary R. 48 History of Bihar. Delhi, 1953. P. 322.

49 The Times. 28.08.1942.

50 Cit. по: Majumdar R.C. History of the Freedom Movement in India. V. 3. Calcutta, 1963. P. 669.

51 The Transfer of Power... P. 740.

52 Quit India Movement... P. 275.

Bose Sugata. 53 Agrarian Bengal. Economy, Social Structure and Politics, 1919-1947. Cambridge, 1986. P. 262.

54 New York Times. 2.09.1942.

Nehru J. 55 Op. cit. P. 48.

Choudhary D.L. 56 Violence in the Freedom Movement in Punjab, 1907-1942. Delhi, 1986. P. 127, 218.

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57 Source Material... P. 124.

58 The Times. 10.08.1942.

59 Source Material... P. 360.

60 The Transfer of Power... P. 853.

61 Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report. V. 383. L., 1942. P. 302-305.

62 Ibid.

63 Ibid.

64 Ibid. P. 592.

Nehru J. 65 Op. cit. P. 10.

66 The Transfer of Power... P. 1002.

67 Ibid. P. 1003.

68 Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates... P. 1342.

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