Legally, India under the British was called the Indian Empire, and consisted of two parts: British India and Princely India. The achievement of independence by British India in the form of its division into the Indian Union and Pakistan was the result of the historical development of Indian peoples, their faiths and political organizations. However, without a solution to the question of the future of Princely India, i.e., the numerous princely States - a significant part of the Indian Empire - the transfer of power and constitutional reorganization in Hindustan in 1947 would have been impossible or extremely difficult. If the principalities refused to integrate into the newly formed dominions during the transfer of power, multiple hotbeds of local conflicts and even the "Balkanization" of Hindustan could arise. The formation of states of different sizes, short-lived and unviable due to their artificial self-determination within the Indian Union and Pakistan, would very likely lead to the fact that most of them would begin to quarrel both with each other and with the dominions due to lack of economic resources, territorial, ethno-linguistic, religious and other problems. The purpose of this article is to reveal the content and essence of the integration of the principalities during the partition of British India against the background of the struggle of its leading political forces.

The principalities, which numbered up to 600, occupied 45% of the territory of Hindustan. Their population, according to the 1941 census, reached 93.2 million people, i.e. 24% of the population of India. They were Eastern feudal autocratic entities headed by princes: maharajas, rajas, raos (Hindu titles), nawabs, sheikhs (Muslim titles). Some principalities were larger and more populous than a number of Western European states; about 400 principalities had an area of only 25 to 30 square kilometers. The vast majority of them were part of the provinces of British India and were inhabited by the same peoples.

Since 1858, according to the Proclamation of Queen Victoria and the Government of India Act, a stable system of relations between the British Crown and the principalities has developed, which presupposes the preservation of formal independence of the principalities. The "principle of supremacy" was proclaimed, according to which the princes transferred part of their powers - "supreme power" - to the Crown. Foreign policy and defense were now her responsibility. Under the Viceroy, who headed the colonial administration of British India, a special structure for princely affairs was created - a Political department that had its own armed forces, police, and a staff of residents or political agents who were located in each large principality or controlled several small principalities.

In 1877, at the Congress of princes, Queen Victoria was proclaimed Empress of India, and the princes were declared vassals of the British Crown [Menon, 1985, p. 11]. Without undue interference in internal affairs, while respecting the privileges of princes, this system of relations with the Crown helped to strengthen the regimes of maharajas and nawabs, who at any time counted on the support of their suzerain, the monarch of Great Britain. At the same time, for the first time in the history of India, a strictly ordered system of governance has emerged.-

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It is based not only on London's individual agreements with each of these Indian States, but also on the legal foundation of the Indian Empire.

The largest principalities were: Kashmir, Hyderabad, Mysore, Baroda and Gwaliyar. They were independent units of the Indian Empire, ruled by their own princes, who were directly subordinate to the Viceroy. Further, there were agencies-associations of principalities that were under the control of agents or residents of the Political Department: Central India, which united 150 principalities; Rajputana (20 principalities); Balochistan (2 principalities); Bengal (2 principalities); Madras (5 principalities); Bombay (350 principalities); Punjab (34 principalities). And finally, the rest (mostly estates), which were managed by provincial political agents.

An exotic reflection of the hierarchy was the Salute Report Card, published in 1864. For the maharajas and nawabs, the most convincing confirmation of their status in the empire was the salute of cannon volleys in their honor at the Viceroy's receptions. The question of" salutes " was exclusively the Viceroy's responsibility, and he used this right to reward or punish individual princes, respectively increasing and decreasing the number of salutes fired in their honor.

Five rulers of the largest principalities were awarded the highest honor-21 salutes. They were referred to in official documents as "principalities of 21 salute volleys". Below them in rank were the principalities, which were saluted with 19, 17, 15, 13, 11 and 9 volleys. Finally, for small estate principalities, this procedure was not intended at all, and they were qualified as "non-currency principalities" (Phadnis, 1968, p. 26).

In an effort to strengthen relations with the principalities, London on February 8, 1921, created the Chamber of Princes, an advisory body to the Viceroy. The House was to meet annually to discuss matters concerning both the Indian Empire as a whole and the relationship between the princely states and British India. The Chamber of Princes consisted of: 108 permanent members-the rulers of the principalities with the status from "21 salute volleys" to "11 salute volleys" inclusive; 12 representatives from 127 principalities "9 salute volleys", who were elected every three years by the rulers of these small principalities.

The Viceroy was the head of the Chamber, but the members of this advisory body also elected the President (Chancellor), who led the Chamber in the absence of the Viceroy. At various times, the rulers of Bikaner, Patiala, and Nawanagar were elected to this post. In 1944, Nawab Bhopala Hamidullah (1886 - 1967) became the Chairman of the House of Princes. With the establishment of their own advisory body, the Indian maharajas and nawabs became more actively involved in the political life of the empire. According to one researcher, the Chamber has become a "princely trade union" (Copland, 1982, p. 276).

Princes have traditionally supported Britain. During the First and Second World Wars, the British authorities turned to them for help in mobilizing human and material resources, for financial support, and were not refused. So, to fight against the Hitler coalition, the Nizam of Hyderabad mobilized 8 thousand people, contributed 170 thousand pounds to the account of the Royal Indian Navy, sponsored the formation of an air division of bombers. The Maharaja of Kashmir equipped a detachment of 10 thousand people [Handbook..., 1958, p. 72]. The princes financed units recruited and trained by the British and sent their troops to the front [Menon, 1985, p. 447-49].

Determining the future of the Indian princedoms was a difficult problem for the political forces of India. The Indian National Congress (INC) limited its powers to the territory of British India, as it was forbidden to operate in the territories of the principalities. However, claiming the rights of the All India National Party, he began to circumvent this ban on the eve and during the Second World War. At the Haripur session of the INC in 1938, the main principles of its policy towards the principalities were proclaimed: "Purna swaraj, or complete independence, is the goal of the Congress for

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all of India, including the principalities, because the integrity of Hindustan must be preserved... The only form of future federation acceptable to the Congress is one in which the principalities participate as free partners, enjoying the same degree of democracy and freedom as the rest of India" (Coupland, 1943, p. 172). Thus, the INC saw the future independent India as a federal state, in which the principalities and provinces of British India would acquire the status of administrative units.

In 1939-1945, the population of the principalities was influenced by the rapidly developing liberation movement in the provinces. Under the auspices of the Congress, a session of the All India Princely Peoples ' Conference (ACPC) was held in Ludian in February 1939, where one of the leaders of the INC, Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964), was elected its chairman. The HCPC brought together elected representatives of various principalities and aimed to create representative bodies and accountable governments under the princes, to ensure the gradual democratization of the political and administrative life of the principalities. In many princely states, local Congress committees were formed, as well as organizations close to the INC - the so-called People's Associations ("Praja Mandal", "Praja Parishad", etc.) [Sitaramayya, 1947, p. 142]. The WCPC began to work closely with them, expanding the influence of the INC and its leaders.

At the Udaipur session in December 1945, the HCNC reaffirmed its approach to the problem of principalities. Nehru promised the princes that after independence, their states would become part of a unified India. At the same time, it was assumed that 15-20 large principalities would form autonomous administrative units, and the vast majority of the principalities would be "dissolved" into provinces. Nehru guaranteed the princes personal pensions and privileges [Sitaramayya, 1947, p. 146].

The INC's political opponent, the Muslim League (ML), which had set out to create Pakistan since 1940, did not pay much attention to the principalities for a long time. From the content of the Lahore resolution, it followed that the" Muslim Fatherland "would be" limited to the territories of British India with a Muslim majority of the population "and does not imply the inclusion of" many Indian principalities " [The Evolution..., 1962, p. 354-355]. Muslim princes, however, criticized this" narrow approach " of the League to the problem of "Muslim brotherhood in the principalities" [The Evolution...., 1962, p. 357-360]. They sought protection from the Congress ' planned transformation of the principalities, fearing, not without reason, for their thrones and the fate of their dynasties.

In 1940, the ML established the All India Muslim League of Princely States (VSLC) to protect the interests of the Islamic community in Princely India. The intensification of the ML's activities has led to an acceleration of the process of confessional self-identification of Muslims, an increase in the mood of communal unity of supporters of Islam in the principalities and provinces of British India. The ML leadership, led by Mohammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), encouraged not only the princes, but also their subjects (in principalities with Muslim populations) to think about the prevalence of the Hindu majority, the establishment of a "Hindu Raj" and the complete insecurity of the Muslim minority after the departure of the British. Thus, on the eve of independence, the two leading political forces in British India - the INC and the ML-realized the need to fight for influence in the principalities and attract both the princes and their population to their side.

The consolidated position of the maharajas and nawabs of Princely India became clear during the work of the" Cabinet Mission "led by Lord Pethick-Lawrence, who was in Delhi in March-July 1946. On April 2, 1946, the Chairman of the House of Princes, Nawab Bhopala Hamidullah, told the British lord that the rulers of the principalities opposed the transfer of "supreme power" to the future Indian state. to the government. They want to preserve their sovereignty. "If British India is divided into two states", then, according to Hamidullah, it is advisable to form a third one - a "federation of princedoms" [Menon, 1985, p. 61-62].

On May 12, 1946, a Memorandum developed by the "Cabinet Mission" and the head of the Political Department, Conrad Corfield, was presented to the House of Princes. More important-

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the main provision of the document was the statement that "during the transition period... the British Government will not transfer suzerainty over the principalities to the Indian Government under any circumstances" [Constitutional..., vol. 11, 1982, p. 511]. The crown took into account the opinion of its vassals and intended to transfer "supreme power" to the princes. At the same time, the Memorandum strongly recommended that the princes decide on "federal relations" or the conclusion of separate agreements with the future government of India [Constitutional..., vol. 11, 1982, p. 511].

The choice of the future system of relations with India was left to the princes. Theoretically, the possibilities of this choice were as follows: a) joining an independent unified India or two dominions in the event of a division of the country; b) maintaining the independence of individual principalities; c) creating their own federation of principalities [Constitutional..., vol. 7, 1977, p. 25]. However, the further work of the Cabinet Mission showed that the independence of the princes is a chimera, that both the British and Indian political forces intend to interfere in their internal affairs, and, finally, that the principalities cannot exist outside of India.

The final document of the Pethick-Lawrence mission was the Declaration of May 16, 1946. It provided for the creation of the State of India-a union of provinces and principalities. The central government was responsible for issues such as defense, foreign policy, and internal communications. The Declaration contained a provision on preserving the autonomy of the principalities. The rulers of the princely states were guaranteed the right to participate in negotiations on the drafting of a new Indian constitution and representation in the future Legislative Assembly [Constitutional..., vol. 7, 1977, p. 582-591].

The INC and ML supported the Declaration of May 16, 1946, with numerous reservations. INK criticized the idea of princely autonomy. In addition, he stated that the Legislative Assembly cannot consist of "two warring parts", and the principalities should appoint their representatives to Parliament "by the same methods as it will be done in the provinces" [Indian National Congress..., 1946, p. 159], referring to the electoral system of representation in the future constitutional court. the organ. Under the auspices of the INC, a session of the All-India Conference of the Peoples of the Principalities was held on June 8-11, 1946. In his speech, Nehru said that " The 'Cabinet Mission' ignores the interests of the peoples of the principalities... Princes decide the fate of more than 100 million people... "supreme power" in the principalities should be transferred to the government of the future federation. The session resulted in a resolution of the Supreme National Congress supporting the Congress 'course towards a" united and independent India" " [The Indian Annual..., 1946, p. 213].

Given the leading role of the INC in the country's political arena, the Cabinet Mission instructed Nehru to form a coalition Provisional Government of British India, which from September 1946 began to act as an executive body under the Viceroy during the transition period until India's independence. The Muslim League did not see in the documents of the "Cabinet Mission" a clear decision to divide India, refused to join the Provisional Government until the end of 1946, and launched a campaign of "direct action" for Pakistan.

The year 1947 marked a milestone in the fortunes of Princely India. In the spring, when the last Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten (1900-1979), arrived in India to prepare and implement the transfer of power, the problem of the principalities again worsened. The princes disagreed with Mountbatten on the need for negotiations with the government. Guided by the instructions of the Political Department, they believed that they could manipulate the Nehru government to their advantage if they did not announce their intentions to join the newly formed state (or states) literally before the day of the transfer of power. Corfield encouraged the princes to create a united front to fight for their "right to independence" (Hodson, 1985, p. 360).

Under the growing tide of Hindu-Muslim pogroms and massacres, the INC agreed to partition the country and form the Indian Union and Pakistan. Ma-

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Untbatten realized that with the British gone, the princes could only be protected with the help of the Indian and Pakistani governments. As a result of lengthy negotiations with the parties and the House of Princes, the Viceroy proposed to solve the princely problem using the formula of the Commissioner for Reforms in the Provisional Government of India, the Congressist V. P. Menon (1894 - 1966), which reflected the terms of the Memorandum of May 12, 1946: the princes would retain their titles, the right of extraterritoriality and personal property; they would one of the two dominions, but only such areas as defense, foreign policy, and transportation development will be transferred to the central government. The accession of the principalities must take place before August 15, 1947.

On June 3, 1947, the British government, in a draft of the Indian Independence Act drawn up by Mountbatten, taking into account the views of Indian politicians, stated: "Nothing will prevent any territory from entering or leaving the dominions; nothing will prevent Indian princedoms from joining either of the two dominions" [Constitutional..., vol. 12, 1983, p. 235-238].

In the final weeks before the transfer of power, the Congressists and the League stepped up their efforts to attract principalities to their future dominions.

June 15, 1947 The All India Congress Committee issued a resolution on the principalities, in which it called on the princes to cooperate in creating "a free Indian Union in which the principalities will become equal and autonomous on an equal basis with other members of the federation" [Constitutional..., vol. 11, 1982, p. 399-400]. The Committee stated that "the abolition of' supreme power 'will not lead to the independence of the principalities" [Constitutional..., vol. 11, 1982, p. 400]. Nehru's speech following the resolution was even tougher on princely states that decide not to" join " India.: "We demand the power of the suzerain ,the 'supreme power'... The INC does not recognize the independence of any princely states in India... and any case of recognition of such independence by a foreign power will be regarded by us as a hostile act" [Constitutional..., vol. 11, 1982, p. 399].

Thus, the INC, having agreed to the partition of India, did not intend to concede in the struggle for the principalities and made it quite clear that instead of the right to self-determination, a very strict policy was assumed for their entry into the Indian Union and Pakistan (for those principalities that were directly located inside the future Pakistani provinces and which were prevented from joining Pakistan by the INC couldn't).

The position of the Muslim League was different. The League held its last meeting of the Central Committee before declaring independence in Delhi on July 9-10, 1947. Jinnah was given the authority to work out the details of the complete and final partition of the country, including the question of the principalities, on the basis of the draft "Independence Law" [Sardar..., vol. 4, 1972, p. 148]. The League did not criticize the foundations of the principalities, did not intimidate their rulers with the prospect of giving up their titles, privileges and wealth, and did not plan to turn the Muslim principalities of north-west and north-east India into administrative units of the future Pakistan. In contrast to Nehru, Jinnah stated that "the principalities have the full right to self-determination and may not join any of the dominions" [Dawn, 31.07.1947].

This position of the ML was explained by the fact that there were few principalities in the provinces that Jinnah saw as part of Pakistan and near its future borders. To attract the princes to its side, the League, even in cases where the subjects of the Hindu prince were Muslims and opposed their ruler, supported not the population, but the princes. In addition, within the territory of the future congressional dominion were principalities with Muslim rulers (for example, Hyderabad). The League hoped to take them under its protection if they remained independent.

On the basis of the draft "Independence Law", the Provisional Government of India launched a discussion on the integration of the principalities. Two documents were discussed:

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The so-called Transition Formula, which assumed that all existing agreements with the principalities would remain in effect until new ones were concluded, and the "Principles of Accession".

The "formula" categorically excluded the possibility of transferring "supreme power" to the central government and guaranteed that the authorities of the future dominion (s) would unconditionally respect all the privileges of princes that currently exist [Constitutional..., vol. 11, 1982, p. 384-385].

The "Principles of Accession" contained three options for including principalities in dominions:

140 sovereign principalities joined the dominion of India and transferred only defense, foreign policy and communications issues to the central government.;

in almost 70 principalities of Kathiawar, Central India and Simla Hills, formerly administered by residents, the functions of the latter were transferred to representatives of the government;

small principalities and estates in Kathiawar and Gujarat transferred power to the central government (Hodson, 1985, p. 370-371).

Negotiations between the Viceroy and the Provisional Government with the princes were conducted both officially and informally. Mountbatten sought to determine the fate of each principality in the course of discussions. "I am trying to do everything I can to create an integrated India," he wrote to Prime Minister K Attlee, "and if I am allowed to work without interference, I will undoubtedly succeed" [Ziegleer, 1985, p. 408].

By the end of July 1947, the leaders of the INC and ML had come to an agreement on the question of the principalities, agreeing to form a "two-pronged" Department of Princely Affairs for the Indian Union and Pakistan, instead of a colonial Political Department. Prior to the formation of the two dominions, the new Department was supposed to be under the supervision of the Minister of the Interior of the Provisional Government of India, and then split into two separate bodies [Constitutional..., vol. 11,1982, p. 549]. Vallabhbhai Patel, a lawyer and leader of the conservative wing in Congress, took over the head of the Department of Princely Affairs for the Indian Union. Sardar Abdur Rab Nishtar (1899-1958), a member of the ML Working Committee, Minister of Communications in the Nehru Interim Government, headed the same department for Pakistan. Corfield's office was now to co-exist with the Department of Princely Affairs and prepare for liquidation.

The historic meeting of the House of Princes was held on July 25, 1947, after the ratification of the "Indian Independence Act" by the British Parliament and the King. The meeting was attended by 25 chief princes and representatives from 74 principalities. Mountbatten came to this forum in order to deliver his speech, which became the "apogee of persuasiveness" [Mountbatten,1949, p. 51-54]. "The' Law of Independence', "the Viceroy said," on August 15 releases the principalities from all obligations to the Crown... But during the British rule, a system of coordinated management on all issues of common importance was formed... The principalities are theoretically free to link their future with any dominion. But at the same time... you can't avoid natural geographical gravitation. Of the nearly 565 principalities, the vast majority are geographically connected to the Dominion of India... Although important, there are still a few principalities that gravitate towards Pakistan." Mountbatten's speech in the House of Princes reflected the essence of the British approach to the problem of principalities. The Viceroy did not deny the principalities their right to self-determination, repeatedly emphasizing that they have "complete freedom", that they are "independent". At the same time, these statements were followed by numerous "buts", with which Mountbatten explained to the princes the political meaninglessness and practical futility of their desire for independence.

The rivalry between INC and ML in integrating the principalities into their dominions has entered a crucial phase. It counted for days, and the battle was fought for each principality.

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Jinnah began corresponding with the Muslim rulers of a number of predominantly Hindu principalities, such as Hyderabad and Bhopal. Liaqat Ali Khan (1895-1951) (member of the ROK ML, Minister of Finance of the Provisional Government) visited the principality of Rampur. In the principalities with Hindu dynasties adjacent to the territory of the future Pakistan, the League also made attempts to assert its influence. Jinnah negotiated with Hanwant Singh of Jodhpur and Hari Singh of Kashmir, and persuaded the princes of the small entities of Ghara, Diobar, Tharad, Suigam and adjacent Radhanpur to join Pakistan. Their significance to the League lay in the fact that these principalities were adjacent to Kach Rann, and the direct route to Thar Parker in Sindh passed through Suigam. Apparently, under the influence of ML propaganda, some of the principalities expressed their readiness to either join Pakistan or remain independent states [Copland, 2005, p. 139].

On June 22, 1947, Nehru drew Mountbatten's attention to statements made by the divan of the Principality of Travancore, Ramaswamy Iyer, that "Travancore will be independent after August 15" and that Jinnah agreed to accept a Travancore representative and "establish mutually beneficial relations with this principality" [Constitutional..., vol. 11, 1982, p. 537]. The Provisional Government protested that "today there is no dominion of Pakistan, and it is impossible to send ambassadors to non-existent states" [Constitutional..., vol. 11, 1982, p. 537]. Under pressure from the Viceroy, Travancore joined the Indian Union.

Maharaja Bikaner, when deciding on integration, was concerned about the problem of the Firozpur region, which, "according to rumors," during the division of the country, the British wanted to give West Punjab, i.e. Pakistan. Firozpur district included the upper reaches of the Ganges Canal, which was dug in the two rivers of the Jamna and Ganges in 1847-1854 for irrigation and navigation [Istoriya Vostoka..., vol. 4, 2004, p. 424]. The Bikaner Principality received a certain amount of water from this canal throughout the year. Mountbatten defended Bikaner's economic interests by declaring in London his intention not to transfer the upper Ganges Canal zone to the jurisdiction of West Punjab. As compensation, Mountbatten was willing to grant Pakistan other territories of equal size [Constitutional..., vol. 12, 1983, p. 747]. The Maharaja of Bikaner joined the Indian Union.

A major problem for Mountbatten, Inc. and Jr. was Junagadh , a small principality on the Kathiawar Peninsula surrounded by principalities that intended to join the Indian Union. About 80% of the population of Junagadh was Hindu, but the Muslim Nawab joined Pakistan on August 15, 1947. Far from politics, he came under the influence of his minister Shah Nawaz Bhutto. Shah Nawaz drew up and handed over to Jinnah the treaty and accompanying documents on the annexation of Junagadh to the Muslim dominion. Many Hindu families began to move to areas that were part of the Indian Union, and the orderly payment of taxes ceased. The Indian government's response was extremely harsh. The fate of Junagadh was important to him as a precedent for dealing with more significant issues. Patel rejected Mountbatten's proposal to resolve the issue through arbitration [Sardar..., vol. 4, 1971, p. 388-389]. By order of Nehru and Patel, troops were sent to Junagadh in November 1947. A referendum was held in the principality, which was attended by 190,870 people. 91 people opposed joining the Indian Union, and Junagadh became part of the Hindu dominion. The court aristocracy of the nawabg. including Bhutto, was sent to Karachi (Menon, 1961, p. 148-149).

Due to its geographical location, the agencies of the principalities of the North-Western Border Province (Hunza, Chitral, Swat, Nagar, Dir) entered Pakistan without a struggle. Soon after the formation of Pakistan, the Balochistan principality of Lasbela joined it. Rich in natural resources, including chromites and oil, the Balochistan principality of Kelat, on the contrary, declared its independence on August 16, 1947 and maintained vassal relations with Great Britain. Moreover, the Prince of Kelata

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He demanded that Pakistan return the district of Quetta, which was annexed by the British East India Company during the colonization of Hindustan. It was only after the Attlee Government decided to deploy its military installations and bases in Pakistan that Kelat joined the Muslim dominion (see Menon, 1985 for more details). Thus, almost all the small principalities adjacent to Pakistan became part of it.

The greatest difficulties were encountered in the integration of the largest principalities - Bhopal, Hyderabad and Kashmir.

Bhopal was located in close proximity to Rajputana, which was a compact agency and bordered Pakistan. It was a Hindu-populated principality headed by a Muslim ruler, Nawab Hamidullah. He had served for many years as President of the House of Princes, had a long-standing friendship with the Viceroy, and the Nawab hoped for a favorable resolution of the fate of his principality. However, the terms of the "Indian Independence Act" disappointed him, and he came to the conclusion that the princes were deceived, their dynastic interests were betrayed. On June 4, 1947, he resigned as Chairman of the House of Princes and stated that Bhopal would not join any of the newly formed dominions and possibly create Rajasthan-a separate dominion from the principalities [AWPRF...].

At a cabinet meeting on 25 June 1947, the Viceroy informed the Nawab that he had informed London of his idea of uniting the principalities into a separate dominion, but that the INC would not allow more than two dominions to be created. The Nawab replied that "the 150,000 militant Muslims of Bhopal will never agree to join a purely Hindu dominion" [Constitutional..., vol. 11. 1982, p. 689]. In addition, the Nawab distrusted the Congress, believing that Nehru's socialism was "only a thin layer that hides crude communism" [Constitutional..., vol. 11, 1982, p. 528-529]. Mountbatten advised Hamidullah "not to declare Bhopal's independence, as it would harm both the principality and him personally." However, the prince was adamant, refusing even to attend a meeting of the House of Princes on July 25, 1947, and declaring that he intended to abdicate in favor of his daughter, Princess Abida Sultan. The Viceroy felt that "it would be cowardly in such a difficult hour to hand over the throne to a 23 - year-old girl", that the nawab simply had to remain in office "for at least a year" [Constitutional..., vol. 12, 1983, p. 592].

Together with Jinnah, Hamidullah persuaded other princes - the young Maharaja of Jodhpur, the rulers of Baroda, Jaipur, Kacha, Udaipur-not to sign the "Principles of Accession". When the Nawab saw that most of the princes were still joining the dominions, he hesitated. He talked about the likelihood of his service in Pakistan, first as governor, and then as Jinnah's successor as Governor - General. He probed the ground for the possibility of signing the "Transition Formula" without joining, but received a sharply negative response [Constitutional..., vol. 12, 1983, p. 603]. Independence Day was approaching. The Nawab found himself completely isolated and eventually gave in, signing a document of accession to the Indian Union.

Hyderabad, home to about 20 million people, was the largest principality in India. Although there were only about 15% of Muslims in the principality, not only Nizam Mir Osman Alikhan (1886 - 1967), but almost all of his government, army and police were Islamic. On June 12, 1947, the Nizam issued a firman on "non-alignment with any of the newly formed dominions and the intention to declare the sovereignty and independence of Hyderabad" [Constitutional..., vol. 11, 1982, p. 308]. He was afraid of the Congress and the transfer of power to a pro-congress government, with its program of relying on the "peoples of the principalities" and democratization.

The geographical position of the principality played a decisive role in the historical fate of Hyderabad. Even the purely hypothetical assumption that Hyderabad could have become independent raised a natural question: how long would it have been possible for Millet to have become independent?-

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Should this enclave exist within the Union of India, which was landlocked and economically dependent on neighboring territories?

However, until August 15, the decision to annex Hyderabad to India or Pakistan was not made. Mir Osman said he was "ready for any crisis." "I am glad that the Jinnah approves of my behavior," he bragged [Constitutional..., vol. 12, 1983, p. 650]. The Viceroy decided to extend the period of negotiations with the Nizam for two months. Vallabhbhai Patel, head of the Department of Princely Affairs, advocated drastic measures against Hyderabad, while Nehru showed restraint and hoped that common sense would prevail [Sardar..., vol. 4, 1973, p. 56].

The moderate position of the Indian government in Hyderabad was regarded as a weakness. In 1948, inter-communal riots began in the principality, instigated by the radical organization Razakars, which was under the patronage of Mir Osman Alikhan himself. From Pakistan, military equipment was regularly delivered to Hyderabad on bombers owned by Great Britain and piloted by British crews. At the end of April 1948, stability in southern India was threatened.

The situation in the principality was aggravated by another factor: in the eastern part of Hyderabad - Telingan - there was a peasant uprising. This movement began in the mid-1940s and developed under the leadership of the CPI and the local national organization Andhra Mahasabha, which numbered about 100 thousand people in its ranks [Istoriya Vostoka..., vol. 5, 2006, p. 359]. The news that Mir Osman did not intend to join the Indian Union increased the indignation of the local population. The uprising has spread over a vast territory with a total population of more than 5 million people [People's Age, 12.12.1948] and has spread to other parts of Hyderabad. The Nizam's government was powerless to suppress the Telingan revolt.

Under the influence of these events, Nehru changed his view on the Hyderabad problem and declared an economic blockade of the principality, but it did not produce any visible results. Small groups of militants began to invade the territory of the Union of India, and the long and fruitless process of negotiations with the Nizam stopped. In July-August 1948, preparations for the military action "Polo" began, and on September 7, the Government of India announced the deployment of a military contingent to Hyderabad. There was no fighting. After 108 hours, Mir Osman Alikhan surrendered. The principality was incorporated into the Dominion of the Indian Union. As for the uprising in Telingan, the Indian troops who entered Hyderabad immediately began to suppress it, but it was not until 1949 that order was restored in the areas where the peasant guerrilla war was going on under the slogans of solving the land issue.

Located in the north of Hindustan, where routes from Russia, China, and Afghanistan intersect, Kashmir was of great strategic importance. This principality, with a predominantly Muslim population, was ruled by the Hindu Maharaja Hari Singh (1895-1961). A Hindu from the Brahmin caste, the prince of Kashmir was a weak, indecisive man who spent time either in the winter capital of Jammu or in the summer residence in Srinagar, the central city of Kashmir, the "Venice of the East" (Collins and Lapierre, 1994, p. 145). Hari Singh had an army and decided not to join any of the dominions. He feared that he would be stripped of power in Pakistan on religious grounds, and he was prevented from joining the Indian Union by "fierce hatred" for Nehru , a man with socialist views.

There was a fierce battle for Kashmir between the INC and the ML. A mass movement was launched in the principality under the slogan "Maharaja, get out of Kashmir!", which was led by the Military Council of the National Conference of Jammu and Kashmir (NCDC). This political party in the principality was founded in 1932 by Sheikh Abdullah (1905 - 1982), a friend of Nehru and head of the Kashmir Committee of the INC. The NCDC advocated the establishment of a republic in Kashmir and the right to self-determination. Struggle committees were established in the Mir district-

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pura, Pooncha, the movement covered the Kashmir Valley, a number of districts of Jammu. Despite the arrests (Sheikh Abdullah was jailed), the movement grew.

Nehru was extremely concerned that the Maharaja of Kashmir would not issue a declaration of independence. Being a native of Kashmiri Brahmins, Nehru could not allow his small homeland to go to Pakistan or become a separate state. Mountbatten's visit to the Maharaja in July 1947 to negotiate accession to the Indian Union did not produce the desired result [Campbell-Johnson, 1972, p. 120]. In turn, the ML encouraged Hari Singh to join Pakistan, but in conversations with the leadership of the colonial administration and the Provisional Government, Jinnah categorically refused to admit that he had corresponded with the Maharaja of Kashmir on this issue [Constitutional..., vol. 11, 1982, p. 935].

After August 15, 1947, the Kashmir problem escalated. The "Maharaja, get out of Kashmir!" movement was growing, and its character was becoming more complex as events unfolded. The mass democratic movement has acquired a pro-Muslim connotation. Against the background of inter-communal pogroms that accompanied the partition of India, Hindus attacked Muslims in Jammu, and about 500 thousand Muslims were forced to leave this area of the principality [Baranov, 2005, p. 17]. There were retaliatory actions from Muslims in Poonch province (the western part of the principality adjacent to the border with Pakistan). Hari Singh's attempts to stop the massacre in September 1947 only served to increase the unrest against the Hindu Maharaja.

The Indian Union and Pakistan sought to use the situation in the principality to their advantage. In September and early October 1947, groups of Pakistani Muslims and Pashtun tribal militias began crossing the Kashmir border to "help" the Poonch insurgents repel Hari Singh's "punitive troops". According to Patel, India was aware of Pakistan's intention to annex Kashmir. Nehru recommended that Hari Singh instruct Sheikh Abdullah, who was released from prison in September 1947, to create a temporary cabinet and set a deadline for holding elections [Sardar..., vol. 4, 1971, p. 45].

On October 23, trucks and jeeps of the Pakistan Army crossed the border with Kashmir and moved towards its capital Srinagar. The invading group of about 5 thousand people consisted of armed Pashtuns of the north-western border tribes. Pakistan's military action to seize Kashmir was essentially launched, although official Karachi did not take responsibility for its organization, describing what was happening as a "voluntary action of the Muslim Brotherhood" [Kashmir..., 1956]. On October 24, Mountbatten urgently called a meeting of the Indian Defense Council, which decided at dawn on October 27, 1947, the First Sikh Regiment was sent by plane across the Himalayas to Kashmir, which immediately entered the battle. In the Srinagar Palace, Hari Singh signed an official document on the accession of the principality to the Indian Union (see [Kashmir..., 1956; Menon, 1961]). But two days before the document was signed, the Poonch rebels created the Interim Government of Azad Kashmir (Free Kashmir), which controlled the northern regions of the principality and came under the protection of Pakistan. As soon as Jinnah learned of the arrival of the Sikh regiment in Srinagar, he immediately ordered the deployment of two brigades from Rawalpindi and Sialkot to capture the Maharaja, among other things. So the "bloodless" transfer of power, along with inter-communal pogroms in Punjab, caused a real threat of an Indo-Pakistani war. Only under pressure from the Supreme Commander of the armies of both Dominions, General K Auchinleka Jinnah reversed his order. But the conflict was not settled. The Pakistani side remained confident that Kashmir's accession to the Indian Union was carried out by force. But even Azad Kashmir could not be returned to India, which meant the division of the principality, with which neither Nehru nor Jinnah intended to reconcile.

The emergence of Hyderabad, Kashmir and similar problems testified to the imperfection of the procedure for dismemberment of the territory of Hindustan.-

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It demonstrated the complexity of the practical implementation of the right of both an individual, a religious denomination, an ethnic group, a nation, and a State entity to self-determination. Legally impeccable British formulations about the right of Indian principalities to self-determination proved to be untenable in the conditions of the partition of India. To a certain extent, the Governments of the Union of India and Pakistan have tried to adhere to political methods, avoiding open clashes. But in the end, it was power that decided the inclusion of certain princedoms in India or Pakistan.

After the transfer of power in India, the following picture emerged: the Indian Union included all the principalities of Punjab (except Bahawalpur), Bhopal, the principalities of Rajputana, Gwaliyar, all the principalities of Central India, the principalities of Chattisgarh, Bihar and Orissa, Bengal and Assam, Gujarat and Deccan, Madras and Kathiawar, Baroda, Cochin, Mysore and Travancore Hyderabad, part of Kashmir. Pakistan was joined by the Balochistan Principality Agency, the Punjabi Principality of Bahawalpur, the North-West Frontier Province Principality Agency, and part of Kashmir [Eastern..., 1947, p. 18-19].

In the circumstances of the second half of the twentieth century, Mountbatten-Nehru-Patel's policy of integrating the principalities into the newly formed dominions was justified and fruitful. It has prevented more destructive developments in Hindustan: the threat of large-scale disintegration, the breakdown of ethnic and economic ties, and the "hyper-Balkanization" of the peninsula.

list of literature

Archive of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation (LVP RF). F. 56 b. Op. 10. p. 223. D. 239. L. 7.

Baranov S. A. Separatism in India, Moscow, 2003.
Istoriya Vostoka: V VI tt. [History of the East: In the VI volume]. Rybakova R. B., Alaeva L. B., Belokrenitskogo V. Ya. et al. / / T. IV: Vostok v novoe vremya (kontsa XIII-nachalo. XX century). Book 1. Moscow, 2004; Vol. V: Vostok v sovremennoe vremya: 1914-1945 gg. Moscow, 2006.

Handbook of the Armed Forces of India, Moscow, 1958.
Campbell-Johnson A. Mission with Mountbatten. L., 1972.

Collins L., Lapierre D. Freedom at Midnight. Delhi, 1994.

Constitutional Relations between Britain and India. The Transfer of Power 194 - 1947 / Ed. by N. Mansergh and P. Moon. In 12 vols. L., 1971 - 1983.

Copland I. The British Raj and the Indian Princes. Paramountcy in Western India, 1857 - 1930. Bombay, 1982.

Copland I. State, Community and Neighbourhood in Princely North India, 1900 - 1950. N.Y., 2005.

Coupland С Indian Politics 1936 - 1942. Report on the Constitutional Problem in India. Pt 2. L., 1943.

Dawn. 31.07.1947.

Eastern Economist Pamphlets. Basic Facts Relating to Hindustan and Pakistan. New Delhi, 1947.

The Evolution of India and Pakistan. 1938 to 1947. Select Documents I Ed. by C.H. Philips. In 4 vols. Vol. 4. L" 1962.

Hodson H.V. The Great Divide: Britain-India-Pakistan. Karachi, 1985.

The Indian Annual Register I Ed. by N.N. Mitra. Calcutta, 1946.

Indian National Congress. March 1940 to September 1946. Being the Resolutions passed by the Congress, the All-India Congress Committee and the Congress Working Committee. Allahabad, 1946.

Kashmir 1947 - 1956. Excerpts from Prime Minister Nehru's Speeches. New Delhi, 1956.

Menon VP. The Story of the Integration of the Indian States. L., 1961.

Menon VP. Integration of the Indian States. Madras, 1985.

Mountbatten L. The Time Only to Look Forward. Speeches of Rear-Admiral the Earl Mountbatten of Burma as Viceroy of India and Governor-General of the Dominion of India 1947 - 1948. L., 1949.

People's Age. 12.12.1948.

Phadnis U. Towards the Integration of Indian States. 1919 - 1947. N.Y., 1968.

Sardar Patel's Correspondence 1945 - 1950. In 10 vols. Ahmedabad, 1971 - 1973.

Sitaramayya P. The History of the Indian National Congress. Vol. 2. Bombay, 1947.

Ziegler P. Mountbatten. An Official Biography. L., 1985.

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