For centuries, the political culture in the part of South Asia that became Pakistan 55 years ago has been shaped by many factors. Some of them (the influence of slavery and feudalism, the process of forming borders, etc.), at least chronologically, belong to the area of the distant and not so distant past. Others persist today and continue to influence the consciousness of Pakistanis, which ultimately finds its way into the political culture of society. If you carefully analyze almost any phenomenon in the social and political life of Pakistan, it turns out that it is somehow connected with the Islamic tradition. The multiplicity of manifestations of this tradition suggests that there is no single, unified Islam here and, obviously, never was.

DISUNITY VERSUS STATEHOOD

It is impossible, of course, to ignore other factors in the analysis of mass consciousness, such as the consequences of the colonial past - after all, Pakistan had to accept and equip 7-9 million refugees, organize its life taking into account the existence of two provinces separated by more than 1,500 km of foreign territory, organize the economy, communications, transport and trade. There was often no mutual understanding between the peoples of the new state, and there was no experience of living together. There wasn't even a common language. They did not have a political party that would be able to bring together the disparate components of society, reconcile existing differences, and seek compromises that would not interfere with the achievement of national goals. Nor were there any national political figures after the deaths of M. A. Jinnah (1948) and Liaqat Ali Khan (1951). In addition, the new state had to absorb a large non-Muslim population. In general, Pakistan at the beginning of its journey looked very fragile and weak entity.

This undoubtedly left its mark on the mentality of the citizens of the new state, on the political culture of Pakistan. It should be noted that many factors that, in the absence of the conditions that gave rise to them, should have died out, nevertheless are still active today, and sometimes their impact on the modern life of society is even increasing. These include relations between different religious denominations, as discussed below, as well as differences on ethnic and regional grounds.

The peculiarities of Pakistan also include the fact that civil strife within the country often results in ethnic or national (pseudo-national) movements - Sindhis, Pashtuns, to a lesser extent Balochs, and more recently representatives of the Seraiki community, which require separation into a separate province,

(c) 2003

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and even Muhajirs (natives of India), although they do not represent a homogeneous ethnic community and do not have their own ancestral territory. In fact, these movements are not national movements, since in most cases they do not put forward demands for independence, but only seek to implement the idea of autonomy that is not fully understood, clearly formulated and not shared by everyone. The Muhajirs do not demand this either, but only want "fair treatment" for themselves. These are movements not for anything specific, but against something, in this case against the dominance of another national community-the Punjabis.

The interaction of domestic, regional and international factors in the politics of Pakistan during the formation of its statehood contributed to the fact that the scales tipped in favor of the army and reduced the chances of political parties and their leaders to contribute to the development of the political process to almost zero. The political culture here was formed in the absence of a political party that would have a significant influence at the regional level. The Jinnah Party achieved a decisive preponderance in the country's political arena only after 1946 and was far less influential than the military-bureaucratic complex. If we compare the prestige of the Indian National Congress among Hindus, respectively, and the Muslim League among Muslims, even during the rise of the Jinnah movement, the Congress was many times superior to the Jinnah party. In India, there were almost no people who were unknown to INC and Mahatma Gandhi, while in Pakistan, the percentage of completely apolitical people was quite high.

ISLAM AS A DETERMINING FACTOR

In this situation, the main factor determining the political culture in the country remained Islam. Strictly speaking, there is no single Islam in Pakistan, a religious ideology that is equally perceived by all Muslims. There is the doctrinal Islam of the cities, the Islam of the Ulama, and the so-called popular Islam, the Islam of the Pakistani hinterland. The latter is closely connected with regional and ethnic culture and, if we do not take into account the infrequent manifestations of communalism, is much more tolerant of dissent. Urban Islam is the Islam of sects, for which the idea of unity of all Muslims is anathema, which regularly leads to large-and medium-scale bloodletting on sectarian grounds, outbreaks of aggression and violence. Millions of people, mostly in cities that are influenced by doctrinal Islam, become members of jihadist organizations, carriers of the spirit of violence and terror.

It is precisely because of the fragmentation (including ideological) of the Muslim Ummah that we cannot unambiguously assess the factor of Islamic ideology in the formation of the political culture of Muslim countries and, in particular, Pakistan as conditioned by a strictly defined set of Islamic values.

Thinkers such as M. Iqbal ¹, and before him, J. R. R. Tolkien. They emphasized the need for ijtihad, i.e. a creative approach to interpreting the doctrinal provisions of Islam in order to prevent stagnation in the development of the Ummah. They defended the point of view that nationalism does not contradict its unity, pan-Islamism. As a matter of fact, this is where the understanding of the concept of "Muslim nationalism" began, which received a more concrete justification and practical implementation thanks to M. A. Jinnah and his theory of two nations. The fact that there was no unified approach to this idea among the Muslims of South Asia from the very beginning was due to the inconsistency and narrow-mindedness, and often unscrupulousness of the Ulema, who tried to convey its meaning to the broad masses of believers in a perverse way. The Jama'ate Islami Party (the largest Islamic party established in 1941), led by its leader Abul Ala Maududi, initially categorically rejected the idea of two nations as a political entity.

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an attempt to create a secular Muslim state that is hostile to the idea of an Islamic state, to undermine the unity of Muslims. After Jinnah's death, out of fear of being isolated, the party turned 180 degrees and began to present itself as a consistent advocate of the movement for the creation of Pakistan.

The movement for Pakistan, or rather its ultimate victory, is a historical paradox. It was not a feudal elite movement that emerged in such Muslim provinces of India as Sindh and Punjab; it was not a movement of the weak local bourgeoisie against the dominance of the comprador Indian bourgeoisie; it was not an anti-imperialist movement, as we believed. The paradox was that the slogan of a confessionally separate Muslim state had nothing to do with Islamic ideology. His goal was to create a secular democratic State separate from India ^.2

The anti-Western sentiments of a significant part of the Muslims of British India do not stem from any deep and historically remote phenomena of political culture, but from very specific and relatively modern reasons, or rather from the interests of the Ulama. First, the anti-English sentiments of the Ulama began to manifest themselves as a result of their isolation from the legal system in India, as a result of the reduction to purely nominal functions of Sharia courts and the role of Islamic Qazi judges; secondly, due to the simultaneous, albeit slower, process of isolation of the Ulama from the educational system. Their system of education, with an emphasis on Arabic and Persian and as far removed as possible from the problems of the modern world, hindered the training of specialists for the colonial administration. The third reason was the ruin of Indian (mostly Muslim) Julakh weavers, whose products could not withstand the competition of cheap English factory fabrics ^.3

I must say that anti-Western sentiments were more typical for the followers of the Deoband school of theology, i.e. the townspeople. Here it is impossible not to dwell in more detail on two trends of Islam among the representatives of the Hanafi madhhab, who make up the majority of the population of Pakistan.

The "Deobandites" are followers of the dar-ul - ulum philosophy, students of the Deoband Seminary in India, founded in 1867, who are known for their orthodox views on the basic tenets of the faith and are strongly opposed to English rule and everything Western in general. They did not advocate the creation of an "Islamic state" and defended the ideas of pan-Islamism. Followers of the Deoband school initiated the caliphate movement in the early 1920s, which was strongly condemned by the Jinnah and its supporters ^.4

Followers of the Barelvi school that opposes the Deoband, representatives of the so-called popular Islam, concentrated mainly in rural areas, but also partly in cities, trace their origin back to the first Muslim conquests in India. They are more tolerant of the West and dissent in general, and proceed from other principles of the political culture that developed in rural areas under the influence of factors other than in cities. Sufism and faith in local authorities-pirs (spiritual leaders, mentors) and saints - are an integral part of this syncretic version of Islam ^.5 But even here it is not without myths and mystical ideas. It is generally accepted, for example, that the relationship between feasts and Murids (their disciples or followers) is built solely on the basis of spiritual closeness and spiritual unity of mind. After all, each murid takes an oath of allegiance (bayah), joining the community of followers of a particular feast, and that, in turn, as if takes on the worries and problems of his ward. In fact, everything is much more prosaic. A feast is usually either something like a part of the apparatus of an influential and rich person.-

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He is either a local landowner and politician and therefore defends his interests, or he is a large landowner himself and therefore has a huge (on a local scale) influence or opportunities.

Both the Deoband and Barelvians have organized themselves into political parties-the former in the Jamaatul Ulamai Islam, the latter in the Jamaatul Ulamai Pakistan - whose real political influence is incommensurable with the number of their members.

THE ARMY IS SACRED

The historical development and political culture of individual countries are closely interrelated and sometimes intertwined in the most bizarre ways. The conflict between Islamic traditionalists and modernists in India emerged and developed as an integral part of the process of social development; in turn, the political culture of the Muslim community was formed under the influence of this conflict. There are many examples where historical events were a direct consequence of the nature of the political culture that society acquired at that time. Communal movements that took the form of inter-State conflicts and even wars between India and Pakistan, as well as the bloody sectarian and inter - communal clashes observed in both countries to this day, can also serve as examples of this phenomenon.

The attitude of Pakistanis to the army occupies a special place among the phenomena generated by the current political culture and does not give grounds for speculation about their imminent disappearance. Despite its repeated defeats, including in 1971, when it was not only defeated by India and lost the eastern province (Bangladesh), but also did not escape the capture of more than 90 thousand of its soldiers and officers, many in Pakistan retain a truly reverent attitude towards the armed forces. What are the reasons for this? Of course, the Ulema contributed by developing the" ideology "of Pakistan and as the main point of this" ideology " called the army the guarantor of the independence, territorial integrity and prosperity of Pakistan. But it seems that this problem has much deeper roots.

The active role of the Pakistani army in politics is explained by the specifics of the socio-economic development of this part of colonial India, which was characterized, among other things, by the weakness of the national bourgeoisie, increased attention to the state apparatus on the part of the authorities. However, the exclusive role of the army was largely a result of the traditional British attitude towards the north-west of India, especially Punjab, as a bastion guarding the colony from the north and north-west. If you follow the official reaction of the British to any steps taken by Russia in Turkestan, you can't help noticing how painfully they perceived all its actions in this region. The idea of Russia's desire for the south Seas was very painfully perceived by Whitehall, and this became an important factor not only in creating appropriate defensive structures against possible incursions from outside, but also led to the formation of the cult of the army as the most important state institution. Punjab has always been the center of recruitment for military service for the very reason that Punjabis were distinguished by high physical and strong-willed qualities. The North-West Frontier Province (NWFP), populated by militant Pashtun tribes, also played an important role in recruiting recruits. The population of these areas, which owed its relatively high standard of living to the army, was objectively the mainstay of British colonialism. Even during the struggle for independence and later, when the rest of India was dealing with the cardinal problem of choosing the path of development, they thought about something completely different, in particular, how to maintain loyalty to traditions and the spirit of service. These sentiments are alive and well in Punjab, the most developed country in the world.-

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provinces of Pakistan, and today. And when this province determines the state policy of the country, it becomes clear where the army draws its strength, why it is so difficult for the former to win in the struggle between democracy and authoritarianism.

Popular acceptance of the army is determined by factors such as the confrontation with India, the fear that the latter will engulf Pakistan, and the hope that the army will root out corruption. A hope that is not based on historical experience.

IGNORANCE IS A GUARANTEE OF BACKWARDNESS

The Qur'an says: "Allah does not change what is with people until they change what is with them" (Surah 13-12, II) ^.6 This can be interpreted as the inability of nations to change their face until they themselves want to rethink their heritage and certain concepts that have been ingrained over the centuries (including negative ones), i.e. their political culture. This may explain why, for example, in Pakistan, a democratic system cannot be established, and why the periodic violent removal of civilian leaders elected in elections by the army from power is perceived by the population as something normal and in the interests of the nation. This is not a denial of democracy as such, nor is it an indicator of the servility of the average Pakistani. This is a manifestation of political culture, an indicator of loyalty to traditions and, above all, to the precepts of the Koran. Changing the face of the nation and its current order can only be done by changing the national psychology, covering the entire country with the education system, closing the gap that separates the mentality of a modern resident of the Pakistani hinterland from the realities of today. So far, none of the country's rulers have succeeded. And this is not surprising.

In their efforts to spread literacy and eliminate superstition, the country's leaders face not only a lack of funds and the traditional inertia of the bureaucracy. For centuries, the vast majority of the population has listened daily to the sermons of semi-literate mullahs who repeat truths based on fatalism and superstition. On Fridays, all Muslim believers visit mosques to listen to the sermon of Khatib, a man who is supposed to have special qualities and spiritual authority. But these sermons, as a rule, are delivered in Arabic, which, with the rarest exceptions, is not understood by either literate or illiterate people. Such talented people as the philosopher and poet M. Iqbal, Sayyid Ahmad Khan and others tried to change this order. Referring to the Qur'an, they urged Muslims to understand the meaning of the wisdom contained in it. They, in particular, quoted those verses that emphasize the creative mission of humanity. "Allaah has brought forth the fruits of the earth for your inheritance, and has made ships for you to sail on the sea, and has made the rivers for you, and has made the sun and moon, night and day for you" (Surah 14 (37, 32)) ^.7 Or in Surah 22 (64, b5) ⁸ : "Did you not see that Allah has made all that is in the earth subject to you?" M. Iqbal has a special poem dedicated to this problem:

"Clouds, rain and skies are yours,
The winds and storms are yours,
Forests, mountains, and rivers are yours,
You rule everything like a king,
And the stars look with wonder at your deeds.
The horizon that knows no limits is yours,
The spark in your eyes like the shining sun is yours,
You are the creator of the new world " 

⁹

.

But, alas, all these thoughts remained the property of a handful of educated people, who already did not need calls to abandon passivity. The main part of the population-

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nia continued to live according to the established rules once and for all. The word of the mullah continued to sow prejudice and fanaticism; the word of the feudal lord called for living in accordance with tradition, professing the doctrine of takdir (fate), that is, to accept the existing state of affairs, poverty and even slave labor for their feudal lord. One of the fruits of such a life philosophy (not to call it political culture) was regular ethnic and religious sectarian conflicts. As a result of the latter, a huge number of people died. This once again confirms that the mere presence of advanced ideas does not give hope for improving political culture, especially if deep structural changes do not affect social relations in rural areas, if the practice of self-serving use of ignorance and backwardness of the rural population by politicians will continue to be in use.

EDUCATION, TRADITIONS AND SYNCRETISM

Of course, S. Ahmad Khan was right when he said that the path to progress lies through the elimination of illiteracy and the expansion of the system of modern secular education. Otherwise, as centuries ago, the minds of the younger generations will be dominated by the ulama, who do not recognize any other education than religious. Sunni madrassas, whose number during the recent active cooperation with the Taliban reached many thousands (in Punjab alone there are at least 3 thousand ¹⁰ ; the figure of 40 thousand is also called throughout the country), demand that Pakistan be declared a Sunni state, since the religious majority - sawad - i-azam - makes up the majority of the country's population. Sectarian intolerance is sometimes so intense that armed gangs of Sunni and Shiite fanatics stage bloodbaths even during the Muslim holy month of Ramadan.

In Pakistan, politics usually involves only the elite of society. The grassroots remain outside it and are pawns in the hands of not always honest politicians. Democracy for the" man on the street " remains an imported idea, divorced from the realities and traditions of Pakistani society, from local problems and aspirations. Educated Pakistanis have long understood that bringing democratic principles into local settings and traditions, and combining them in harmony, is the only hope for Pakistan. However, so far, even leaders who are aware of this have been unable to do much to implement the idea of a radical transformation of the foundations of Pakistani politics. And the reason for this is that the interests of the elite, represented by the landed aristocracy, the bureaucracy and the army command, are at odds with the interests of those who advocate the modernization of Pakistani society, the modernization of those social foundations that determine the nature of political culture in the country.

If we agree that in India of the colonial and postcolonial period there were at least two Islamsthe doctrinal or urban Islam and the "popular" Islam, that is, the Islam of the hinterland, then we must also agree that there was more than one Islamic source for the formation of political culture, that there were many such sources and they were diverse. At the same time, there was also syncretism, i.e. the phenomenon of the interpenetration of Islamic ideas into Hinduism, and vice versa. The Pakistani scholar Hamza Alawi writes that in the mid-nineteenth century, reform movements emerged simultaneously among the followers of Hinduism and Islam, and the ideas shared by both movements mixed and began to feed each other. Thus, " the personality and works of Ram Mohan Roy (a famous Hindu reformer. - 0.77.) They had a significant influence on the views and activities of Sayyid Ahmad Khan. " ¹¹ At the beginning of his activity, Sayyid Ahmad Khan defended the interests of his community not as a confessional community, but as an ethnic association. In the United Provinces where he lived, the Muslim community included

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only 13% of the population. Nevertheless, he considered it necessary to insist on equal representation of Muslims in all government bodies, along with Hindus, who were, of course, an absolute majority. Hence the Jinnah's idea to proceed from the principle of equal representation of Muslims and Hindus during negotiations at any level. S. Ahmad Khan liked to compare India with a beautiful bride who would become ugly if her two eyes (Hindus and Muslims) were not the same and equal.

This position clearly reflects the centuries-old fear of Muslims to get lost in the sea of Hinduism, i.e. to be absorbed and assimilated. That is why (even though he was an adept of advanced ideas) S. Ahmad Khan did not insist on a democratic system for India, and even more so on its independence. He was quite happy with the unlimited rule of Britain, since it, as he believed, would guarantee to protect the interests of Muslims from the aspirations of Hindus waking up to a new life. He was suspicious of the Indian National Congress, as this party accumulated new democratic ideas and initiated the movement for granting independence to India.

"SECULAR" ISLAM

To qualify for equal representation, however, Muslims had to meet the level of understanding of the modern world with all its peculiarities. Therefore, the main activity of S. Ahmad Khan was the organization and dissemination of education among Muslims. He founded the Mohammedan Anglo-Oriental College in Aligarh in 1877, which later became the Aligarh Muslim University, a stronghold of Muslim nationalism.

Now all his actions appear as something ordinary and natural. However, it should be remembered that the Ulama, as carriers of the ideas of "canonical Islam", directed all their energy and resources to fight the "sedition" of S. Ahmad Khan. And here they were met with fierce resistance. Among other things, S. Ahmad Khan was well prepared in the field of theology and therefore could give and gave a worthy answer to the Orthodox. He devoted many of his articles and speeches to exposing the failure of the sermons of the Ulama of all four schools (Fiqh) of Sunnism, under the guise of traditions that have been promoting stagnation and ignorance for centuries. Freely operating on the provisions of the Koran and Sunnah, he argued that the dogmas of the Ulama are nothing more than an incorrect and illiterate interpretation of the Holy Scriptures, which has been aggravated for ten centuries. S. Ahmad Khan managed, at least partially, to neutralize the negative influence of the Ulama on the minds of Muslims, to give impetus to the spread of secular education among ordinary people. Thanks to him, the political culture of Pakistan has been enriched: it began to experience the influence of another factor, also Islamic, but qualitatively different from the preaching and wisdom of the Ulama.

An alternative interpretation of Islamic political philosophy was chosen by the famous Muslim philosopher and poet Mohammad Iqbal to fight the Ulama. He spent years of his life trying to show the falsity of the Ulama's claims that God's revelations as interpreted by them were immutable. He considered the overwhelming majority of Ulama to adhere to the principle of taqlid, i.e., unambiguous interpretation of the provisions of Scripture by a mujtahid, the most respected scholar of any of the madhhabs, to be a road leading to nowhere. In this regard, Iqbal called for a return to the practice of applying ijtihad, i.e. creative understanding of the doctrinal provisions of the Koran and Sunnah by every Muslim, as a way to get rid of mental degradation. ¹² Recognizing that at once from-

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to abandon the age-old practice of respecting Taqlid as the only possible approach to the correct perception of the phenomena of life is unrealistic, he considered the most rational and effective way of ijma or social agreement achieved through discussion. Thus, in politics, he considered debates in the legislative body and their outcome as an ijma, i.e., a means of final decision-making. He considered the same principle mandatory in the work of local authorities.

FUNDAMENTALISM ON GUARD OF THE STATUS QUO

The multiplicity of factors affecting the political culture of Pakistan is also due to the fact that most of them affect the consciousness and behavior of only certain social groups. The philosophy of S. Ahmad Khan and M. Iqbal, despite all its harmony and attractiveness, was perceived practically only by the advanced, educated part of society, which Hamza Alavi calls salariat (from the English salary - salary), i.e. people who are in the service. Similarly, extremist Islamic movements were popular with only a small percentage of Muslims, although the fundamentalist Jamaat Islami Party (DIS) is difficult to accurately identify with any particular social group. Rather, it was a community of like-minded people who shared the Islamic radical ideology.

In the initial period of its existence, the party experienced difficult times. It quickly turned into a marginal political force due to the outflow of a large number of members who were dissatisfied with the inconsistent and contradictory views of the leadership. Maulana Maududi, for example, strongly rejected the idea of Muslim nationalism and the creation of Pakistan, adhering to the principles of pan-Islamism, i.e. Islam without national borders. He believed that the mission of every Muslim is to spread Islam in new lands. In 1947, he abruptly changed his orientation and emigrated from India to Pakistan, claiming that the country was on the way to becoming a "truly Islamic state" and that his party was committed to achieving this goal because only it had a real knowledge of Islam and its fundamental principles. Most likely, the Jamaate Islami would have become one of the small regional "tongan parties" ¹³, which are many in Punjab province, where Maududi settled. But fate decreed otherwise. Maududi's activities and radicalism attracted the attention of Saudi Arabia, which considered it necessary to support the militant and energetic preacher and provide him with appropriate assistance. The party's fortunes improved.

Maududi became the founder of fundamentalism, which flourishes in Pakistan to this day. He outlined a program for building a "truly Islamic state", according to which power in the country should pass to the real, loyal defenders of militant, purposeful Islam, that is, to him and his party. The new state should become a centralized body governed by an unquestionable leader, who could rely on a cohesive, ideologically "correctly" oriented, combat-ready army and administration. Jamaat Islami assumed the task of" correct " ideological education of future party members, ensuring submission and devotion to the proclaimed goals and, above all, to the supreme leader, the amir, i.e., to themselves. Among a certain part of the command staff of the armed forces, these ideas met with understanding and a positive response.

Jamaat Islami has always been a cadre party with limited membership. Its social roots have never been particularly deep or strong. That is why in all the elections it suffered a clear, and sometimes crushing defeat. The exception is the 2002 elections, but this was not due to the party.

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After the partition of the Jamaat, Islami enlisted the support of Muhajirs, natives of India, who lost their property and habitable places and, after sometimes incalculable suffering, finally found themselves in Pakistan. Muhajirs became a breeding ground for DEE's chauvinistic anti-India campaigns. However, after several years, this cooperation began to weaken until it gradually stopped altogether. Many of the Muhajirs who had settled in Sindh identified themselves with the Sindh movement and strongly condemned Jamaat Islami for its support of the crackdown on members of the movement for greater autonomy in Sindh during the military regime of Zia ul-Haq. After the creation of the Muhajir Qaumi Movement (National Movement of Muhajirs) by Altaf Hussein, the outflow of Indian immigrants from the Jamaat of Islami increased dramatically. A natural question arises: where does the DI get its strength in Pakistan, what is the source of its political influence inside the country?

Hamza Alawi, a Pakistani researcher, writes that Jamaat Islami receives generous financial assistance from big businesses, landowners, and even sympathetic Pakistanis in America, not to mention Saudi Arabia and other Middle Eastern countries ^.14 Abundant funding, in addition to freedom of action, also creates problems. Groups that defend the interests of certain political forces have emerged within the party. DI's ideologues, mainly concentrated in Karachi, are opposed to unprincipled following of political conjuncture for the sake of extracting short-term benefits. During the DI's collaboration with the military regime of Zia ul-Haq, Naib Amir (Vice-President of the party) Ghafoor Ahmed, who represented its" ideological " wing, insisted on distancing himself from the army, as, in his opinion, too close association of the DI with the military would damage the party's prestige in the long term and alienate a significant part of its followers. A group of pragmatists, including the late Maududi himself and his successor, Amir Mian Tufail Mohammed, believed that the party should be sensitive to the changing political environment and use all opportunities for its own benefit, despite the criticism of the Puritans. There is also a third group-armed fanatics from the youth, who are ready to smash everything and beat everyone at the behest of party functionaries. They are mostly members of the Di - Islami youth wing of Jamiateh Tulab, particularly terrorizing university campuses.

Jamaat Islami also contributed to the confusion of ideas concerning the attitude of Muslims in Pakistan to the doctrine of Ijtihad. Unlike the Islamic traditionalists of the Deoband school of theology, DEE defends Ijtihad, dismissing claims that it is an obstacle to building an Islamic state in the country. However, the party vehemently protests against M. Iqbal's position that ijtihad is a step towards the realization of the principle of ijma, in its interpretation - representative democracy. Maududi opposed this idea of Iqbal, repeatedly emphasizing that following it can only lead to a distortion, a misinterpretation of Islam, since in a representative democracy, non-Muslims may be voters, or even if they are Muslims, they may not be sufficiently trained to" correctly " understand Islamic principles.

Thus, Maududi introduced an element of illogic in his version of Islamic ideology. While recognizing the right of the individual to creatively interpret the canonical provisions of Scripture, he simultaneously denied them to the community, thus challenging the generally accepted Muslim principle that ijtihad expressed in ijma, the consent of the entire community, takes precedence over the ijtihad of a single theologian - Alim. In fact, he has shown here his fears that the idea of representative democracy will gain legal status and in the future become a reality of the state.

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the slogan of the Muslim social movement. Maududi also protested against Iqbal's proposal to expand the education system as widely as possible, as, in his opinion, education does not guarantee a correct understanding of the canonical provisions of the Koran and Sunnah. The meaning of this position is very simple - only DEE was the guardian and interpreter of Scripture, only she and her leader Maududi could know the correct interpretation of an Islamic principle.

The position of only one Islamic party, the Jamaat Islami, which is one of the largest, however, shows that it is impossible to clearly assess the degree of influence of religion on politics, as well as the contradictory nature of the formation of traditions that form the political culture in Pakistan. Certain social strata, ethnic and regional groups are adherents of one of the many versions of Islam, profess different principles, and the latter may change in different periods of the country's history or, conversely, acquire a new life. All this creates a kind of chaos, in which it is difficult to distinguish causes from effects, but it has its own laws.

The struggle of supporters of the creation of an Islamic and secular democratic state in Pakistan has led to the polarization of forces and the organizational formation of supporters of the secular concept within the Muslim community. The personification of this concept was Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a native of cosmopolitan Bombay. He was educated in England and was one of those Indians who were influenced by the liberal-socialist ideas professed by such prominent public figures as Harold Lasky, Bertrand Russell and others. The whole life and activity of M. A. Jinny, his struggle and final triumph indicate that ideas introduced from outside and not organically connected with the traditions, customs and political culture of the country in general, as a rule, have a short life and are doomed at best to become some symbols and a set of slogans for the few supporters of these ideas. The tragedy of Jinnah's fate is that he fought for the creation of a Muslim state in South Asia and achieved it, but today's Pakistan has nothing to do with the image of the secular, liberal-democratic and advanced state that Jinnah cherished as a lifelong dream. Moreover, its concept has now been forgotten by most Pakistanis.

His friends and close associates included INC founder G.K. Gokhale, Indian nationalist Ferozshah Mehta, and other liberals. He joined the Muslim League (ML) only in 1913, much later than its creation. This was a time when the positions of Congress and the League on major political issues were rapidly converging. In 1916, the Lucknow Pact was concluded, which established cooperation between the two parties and outlined a plan for further joint actions. Ironically, the final rapprochement between INC and ML did not occur, on the contrary, their paths soon began to diverge. The reason for the divergence, and later the emergence of hostility between the two parties, was the support of M. Gandhi for the caliphate movement created by the most radical and reactionary Ulema. The caliphate supported the Ottoman Empire, which did not survive the First World War and collapsed after it. What Gandhi intended as a means of uniting Muslims and Hindus had exactly the opposite result. The initial ideas of the caliphists were in no way consistent with the views of the secular-minded Muslim salariat and were perceived by them as an attempt by the Congress to split the politically active part of the Muslim community.

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THE MUSLIM LEAGUE IS GAINING STRENGTH

The entry of the Muslim salariat into the political arena after the formation of ML marked a new turn in the politics of the Muslim community of India. The desire to seek the patronage of the colonial administration as a means of protection against the dominance of the Hindu majority began to weaken markedly. Now the politically active Muslims had their own organization (the League), which was able to defend the interests of the Muslim community before the British. Objectively assessing the situation at that time, it should be recognized that these were just the first steps of the Muslim community on the way to establishing it as an independent force in the political arena of India. The salariat as the driving force of Muslim nationalism was just beginning to give voice. It was nothing more than a test of strength. The main fights and challenges were ahead.

Jinnah, who joined the Muslim League in 1913, understood and appreciated the need to form a separate Muslim electorate as a tool for protecting the interests of the Muslim community. However, at that time, he did not even think about any independent Muslim movement outside the framework of the pan-Indian nationalist movement. The first push to reassess the need for the Muslim League to work together with the Congress was the latter's support for the caliphate movement. He described the action as a cynical move that put inter-communal (Hindu-Muslim) relations in India to ^the test15 . An unsuccessful attempt to reach an agreement with the Congress on the distribution of candidates in a number of districts for the 1937 provincial assembly elections reinforced Jinnah's desire to fundamentally expand the ML's geographical influence and extend it to all areas of compact Muslim population. This was not an easy task, since in most of these areas the situation was under the control of large landowners-feudal lords who were not going to share their power with anyone.

After 1937, Jinnah used all his influence and persuasive skills to persuade local landowners to participate in politics as representatives of the Muslim League, even if only nominally, while maintaining complete freedom of action. The goal of this policy was for the ML to formally gain the status of the ruling party in all "Muslim" provinces, which would give legitimacy to the League's claim to be the sole representative of the Muslim community in Indian politics. Needless to say, this could have been a far-sighted and effective policy, if not for one circumstance. In a number of districts, it was not the Muslim League that took over the local feudal lords, but rather the local feudal lords who forced them to act on their orders.

Punjab was dominated by the Unionist Party (UP), which was almost equally represented by Hindu, Muslim and Sikh landowners. They were wary of the idea of creating a state based on confessional principles, as they rightly saw it as a threat to their power. Interestingly, Punjabi Muslim landowners also shared this wariness: a Muslim state would mean the end of their party and power. The gulf that separated them from the urban (and rather weak) salariat was so deep that it was not necessary to seriously talk about the possibility of influence, and even more so control, of the latter over the landowners who actually made politics. In words, YUP leader Sikander Hayat Khan and other members of the leadership agreed to the fictitious primacy of the League (after all, the Congress could be the alternative, and he was in favor of land reform), but in reality they treated the Punjab salariat at best leniently and vigilantly monitored its actions. Mohammad Iqbal repeatedly wrote to Jinnah about

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the dangers of an alliance with the UP and personally with Sikander Hayat Khan ¹⁶, but the ML needed Punjab, and Jinnah always put the interests of the party above his political sympathies.

In Sindh, the salariat was practically nonexistent, and local landowners had little reason to advertise their membership in the Muslim League. The position of landowners there was about the same as in Punjab. Jinnah made a bet on the local feudal lord G. H. Hidayatullah, but he himself admitted that this was an unreliable ally.

The psychology of large landowners is difficult to understand if one does not take into account the specifics of the moment, which had no precedent in the history of India and its political culture. Until the second half of the 1940s, it was completely unclear in what direction the development of events would go. What was obvious was that the issue of Indian independence should be resolved soon. Landowners could not know who would take the helm of the state and what kind of state it would be. If it happens that the Congress will rule, then their situation will be significantly complicated due to the inevitable land reforms in this case. If the Muslims are going to rule, then we should immediately start establishing relations with the Muslim League, the only representative of the Muslims of India. Ideology did not play any role here, class interests were decisive.

Thus, when the question of the formation of a separate Muslim state was decided, the landowners put aside all other considerations and adopted the FLAG as their banner. Very soon, they held this banner in their hands. But Jinnah did not live to see it. He did everything that was even theoretically possible, and yet the period of his activity was only an episode in the history of Pakistan. Success was based solely on Jinnah's charismatic personality, will to win, and political skill. Immediately after his death, Pakistan was plunged into a discussion about the role of Islam in the life of the newly established country, in which the Ulama set the tone. In the future, their role in Pakistan's politics steadily increased, until the question of its "Talibanization" by the end of the XX century seriously arose. This was prevented only by the next coming to power of the Pakistani army.

notes

^{Iqbal Mohammad.} 1 The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. Lahore, 1958.

² Ahmad Jamil-ud-Din (ed.). Speeches and Writings of Mr. Jinnah. Vol. 1. Lahore, 1963.

^{Alavi Hamza.} 3 Pakistan and Islam: Ethnicity and Ideology // Fred Halliday and Hamza Alavi (eds.). State and Ideology in the Middle East and Pakistan. MacMillans (London) & Monthly Review Press. N.-Y., 1987.

^{Faruqi Zia-ul-Hasan.} 4 The Deoband School and the Demand for Pakistan. London, 1963.

^{Alavi Hamza.} 5 Politics of Dependence: A Village in West Punjab // South Asian Review. Vol. IV. N 4 (January 1971).

⁶ Koran, Moscow, 1986, p. 207.

⁷ Ibid., p. 214.

⁸ Ibid., p. 280.

⁹ Translated from English by the author of this article.

^{KhalidBin Sayeed.} 10 Reconstructing Muslim Society // Dawn. 3.03.1998.

^{Hamza Alavi.} 11 Pakistan and Islam... P. 89-90.

^{Iqbal Mohammad.} 12 The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam. P. 175.

¹³ Horse-drawn gig for the transportation of people, which can accommodate several passengers.

^{Hamza Alavi.} 14 Pakistan and Islam... P. 95.

¹⁵ Ibid. P. 99.

^{Iqbal Mohammad.} 16 Letters of Iqbal to Jinnah. Lahore, 1963. P. 28.

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