The philosophical and religious system of Jainism has generally attracted less attention than its rival Buddhism. Its influence on the religious, intellectual, and political life of ancient and medieval India was also generally less than that of Buddhism, a complex and powerful religious and philosophical system with developed dogmatic principles, rich and complex psychotechnics, and deep and diverse philosophical concepts. However, Jainism has also received attention, because in it, as in Buddhism, one can find dogmatics, psychotechnics, and philosophical concepts - in short, everything that is found even with the most superficial study in any religion. It is all the more interesting to consider the views of modern historians of Indian philosophy on the system of Jainism, because they can not only establish some specific characteristics of the Jain worldview, but also determine what place modern historians assign to the religious and philosophical system under consideration.

Modern historians (in particular, historians of philosophy and religion) distinguish different aspects of Jainism, with different interpretations of this undoubtedly multi-faceted and interesting phenomenon of the intellectual life of ancient India. Their analysis, in turn, can show us what features of Jainism itself were important for certain historians, and most importantly-helps us understand why these aspects were important for them. In other words, here we will try to consider not the proper features of Jainism, but the peculiarities of understanding Jainism by different authors.

Most interesting for us, of course, will be Indian authors, since for the European historian of Indian philosophy, Jainism, as well as Indian culture in general, still remains a phenomenon largely "extraneous" in the cultural sense, because the European perceives it only as an object of study, which can be viewed from very different positions, not just from the point of view of the author. without touching on their own cultural roots. For the Indian author, however well-versed in Western culture, however educated in the Western sense of the word, Jainism, like any other Indian religious or philosophical system, remains part of his own culture. Its research becomes essentially a self-reflection, an attempt to better understand oneself by looking at the "self of the past". Of course, in some cases, such studies are not without a certain touch of apologetics, the desire to prove (not so much to others as to oneself) the superiority of Indian culture over all others, but this is one of the factors that make the study of modern historical and philosophical studies in India especially important and interesting, because it makes it possible to see that modern-

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many Indian philosophers and historians consider their own culture to be the most valuable, and understand what is living and what is dead in Indian philosophy (using the title of the famous book by D. Chattopadhyay).

Among modern Indian historians of philosophy, of course, it is impossible not to pay attention to S. Dasgupta, the author of the fundamental five-volume work "A History of Indian philosophy" - a book that has been repeatedly referred to, probably, by everyone who has at least a little engaged in the history of Indian philosophical thought. S. Dasgupta's influence on modern indological research is difficult to overestimate, although, of course, not all historians of Indian philosophy agree with him, and this is natural, since more than fifty years have passed since the writing of this work, rich in intellectual events in the field of indology. In addition, we intend to involve the works of S. Radhakrishnan, an equally important thinker of modern India, whose work "Indian Philosophy", according to the author himself, was created specifically for educational purposes and is addressed primarily to Indians (unlike Dasgupta, whose book is more of a purely academic study).. "The strange thing is," Radhakrishnan writes, " just when India is no longer fanciful in the eyes of the West, it appears in this light in the eyes of some of its own sons. The West has tried its best to convince India that its philosophy is absurd, its art empty, its poetry uninspiring, its religion bizarre, and its ethics barbaric. Now that the West feels that its opinion was not entirely correct, some of us insist that it was absolutely correct" (Radhakrishnan, 1994, vol.2, p. 725). It is precisely against these views that Radhakrishnan's book is directed. We will also take into account a small but in many ways very remarkable article on Jainism by K. S. Ramakrishna Rao [Ramakrishna, 1975, p. 85-100], which is interesting for us primarily because of its peculiar perception of this religion - in it Jainism is interpreted largely through the prism of Western philosophical and religious thought. Of course, in order for the comparison to be complete and as accurate as possible, it will be necessary to take into account the results of research by Western authors.

Perhaps the first thing that attracts attention in this religious-philosophical system is its obviously materialistic metaphysics, in which even karma has come to be understood not as a certain force that affects a person due to his own actions, but as a special substance that accumulates in us due to our actions and enslaves us.Masson-Oursel wittily compared it to the dirt that settles on the parts of a machine during its use, or to the salts that are deposited in the joints, causing arthritis [Masson-Oursel, 1923, p. 73]. The task of a person is to expel this karmic substance from his own personality and thus gain liberation (moksa), which is perceived, in essence, as the liberation of the jiva - soul as one of the substances. In this sense, the worldview of Jainism is much more naturalistic than the teachings of other schools: in it, not only is karma material and even material, but the soul also appears as one of the substances directly included in the world. It is enough to compare these views, for example, with the Buddhist teaching, where the principle ofanatma is one of the key elements without which Buddhism (once the main and probably the strongest competitor of Jainism) would cease to be itself.

The naturalistic and perhaps even materialistic tendency of Jainism is even more noticeable when comparing it with Sankhya, in which the Purusha (the soul, and the soul is not empirical, not the ordinary " I "that we are all used to dealing with, but the" I " is deep, true, revealed only in a state of deep meditation). it is completely separate from prakriti (matter) and has nothing to do with it. In the Sankhya Purusha

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it acts as a principle that only "enjoys" the activity of prakriti, without being in any way essentially connected with it, and in this respect it most resembles-if we illustrate its position with the realities of our everyday life - the spectator in the theater, who is interested in watching the performance being played out on the stage and, completely absorbed in it, forgets about himself. Liberation consists in remembering that you are only a spectator in the theater, and the play is only a play and nothing more, and to understand that Purusha is not connected with prakriti in any way and is initially free. Enslavement in sankhya, therefore, seems to be an illusory phenomenon: the soul is initially free, but, as a rule, it is not aware of its own freedom, and the shackles of samsara fall from the soul when it understands that there are no shackles on it. Advaita Vedanta is even more radical with regard to liberation, in which, as in sankhya, the soul is initially free, but, unlike Kapila's teaching, there is no prakriti (as something real), and the world appears to us as a universal illusion generated by the creative play of Brahman (devalila). as in sankhya, moksa turns out to be illusory, since there is essentially nothing to get rid of.

Against the background of these concepts, Jainism looks like a really quite naturalistic system, in which both enslavement, karma, and liberation are real, and religious practice is needed not so much for changing one's own consciousness (as in Advaita Vedanta or Buddhism), but for direct and objective influence on karmic matter in order to eliminate it. Karma, like other objects of the world, is not perceived by Jains as a mere product of our own consciousness (as in Buddhism) or of any deity (as in Vedanta), especially since Jainism rejects any idea of a deity, such as, for example, the Vedantic one [Masson-Oursel, 1923, p. 223]. However, Jainism has a number of features that are related to other philosophical and religious systems of India, and first of all this is the interpretation of the very concept of moksa:" Jains, like other Indian thinkers, define "Liberation" mainly negatively - it is "freedom from", and not "freedom for", which, however, it is quite natural from the point of view of the Indian concept of karma. Human goals are conditioned by the influence of karma: when it is absent, there is no conditioning of consciousness, including conditioning by goals" [Lysenko, Terentyev, Shokhin, 1994, p. 358].

Actually, moksha in Jainism is not just liberation from the fetters of karma, but the separation of two different substances-the soul and karmic matter. The understanding of the concept of "substance" in Jain philosophy is also quite naturalistic. In the treatise of the Jain Digambara philosopher Kundakunda, substances are understood as follows: "Souls, material bodies, conditions of motion and rest, and finally space - [these are] substances. And [they are] numerous, eternal, not created by anyone. Extended substances are that which [possesses] own nature with attributes and different modes that fill the three worlds. And so these eternal substances, which are changed by the states of the three times, and are endowed with the ability to pass from one state to another, create objects." And further: "Substance is that which, having [different] modes, preserves the nature of being" [Kundakunda, 2000, p. 180, 181]. In other words, the Jains are trying to avoid both the extreme idealistic monism of Advaita, in which only Brahman properly exists, and the radical point of view of Buddhism, in which only instantaneous (ksanika) dharmas - "atoms of psychophysical experience" - truly exist. It is noteworthy that S. Dasgupta also writes about this in his "History of Indian Philosophy". He explicitly says that "the solution to Jainism is to reconcile the extremes of Vedanta and Buddhism on the basis of everyday experience" (Dasgupta, 1951, p. 175).

In general, for Dasgupta, the so-called common-sense experience is a very important feature of Jain metaphysics. In the CA-

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in fact, he writes, in real everyday practice, we can easily see that a thing changes, but, despite this, remains itself, because some of its qualities remain unchanged (which, in fact, ensures its constancy as this particular thing), others appear, others disappear: when a potter makes a pot out of a lump of clay, the lump itself disappears, the pot appears, and the clay itself remains generally unchanged (Dasgupta, 1951, p. 174). All the radicalism of both Vedanta and Buddhism stems from the sharpening of one side of reality: Vedantists pay attention only to the constancy of things and seek it, ignoring what is transitory and temporary, while Buddhists, on the contrary, see only the transitory and impermanent, refusing to notice those properties of things that remain unchanged for a long time."that time. In other words, Dasgupta speaks about the kinship of Jainism with other philosophical trends of the era that are contemporary to it, but this kinship is understood purely philosophically - as the presence of common values.These were purely intellectual problems that faced the Buddha, Gina, and other thinkers of the era who were looking for some answer to these intellectual challenges. In principle, Dasgupta can find a hidden indication that Buddhism and Jainism sought solutions to common problems also because of the purely social community of the founders of the compared teachings - this historian devotes a small (about half a page) paragraph to the life of the future Jina before his departure from the world and the beginning of ascetic practice, specifically emphasizing the similarity of religious beliefs. the ideals of two currents-kevala-jnana (exclusive knowledge) in Jainism and Bodhi ("Awakening") in Buddhism. It is noteworthy that Dasgupta does not elaborate on this curious and perhaps very fruitful comparison for a better understanding of the origin of both religions, but goes straight to the consideration of Jain ontology and points to the well-known Jain doctrines anekantavada ("the doctrine of relative pluralism" in Dasgupta's interpretation [Dasgupta, 1951, p. 175]) andsyadvada (a term that is sometimes conventionally translated as "epistemological relativism" or "theory of relativity of knowledge" (Sharma, 1960, p. 52)). Meanwhile, as the data of modern studies on the history of this era show , both Jainism and Buddhism were in one way or another reactions of the then Indian society not so much to the intellectual problems faced by educated Brahmins, but to purely cultural problems related, in turn, to social problems. Thus, regarding Buddhism, it has long been indicated that the peoples and kings who adopted and supported Buddhism were probably mostly non-Aryan - at least, the first Buddhist kings of Bimbisara and Ajatashatru belonged to the Shishunaga dynasty, in the name of which the naga component draws attention - the Aryans called the local Dravidian-speaking and Munda-speaking Aryans" nagas". population [Khizhnyak, 2005, p. 224] 1. In addition, it is impossible to ignore not only ethnic issues, but also purely social and even political ones. It should be taken into account that the times of Jina and Buddha were a time (among other things) of a radical breakdown of the traditional tribal system in the process of the formation of early states, accompanied by the destruction (or at least a serious transformation) of the usual tribal ideology [Androsov, 2001, p. 13-15], so early Buddhism can be considered to some extent a reaction as It also affects the processes of ethnogenesis that took place in the Ganges Valley during the time of the Buddha, as well as purely social and political changes in the society of those times.

Similar considerations may be valid (at least in part) and with regard to the religion of Gina, who was, as is well known, an older contemporary of the Buddha and whose teachings may have been the same as Buddhism, a reaction to social, poly-cultural conflicts.-

1 For the first time, the version about the non-Aryan component in the social substratum of Buddhism was expressed by R. S. Sharma in his book "Ancient Indian Society "(Moscow, 1987).

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demographic and ethnic processes. However, in both cases, the influence of the non-Aryan substratum can also be traced here, and this is exactly what the German indologist W. Ruben does, who, based on the analysis of the Jain ideas about the soul and the "subtle" and "gross" bodies that clothe it, makes a rather bold and interesting conclusion that, at least in some parts of the world, the soul is not a part of the The influence of archaic shamanic beliefs about the world can be quite clearly traced back to the Jain worldview. So, in particular, he writes about the possibility for a Jain adept to separate one of his "subtle" bodies from an ordinary physical body and in such a "subtle" body wander for some time through the Universe, rising to its rather high levels, up to the world of siddhas-souls completely freed from karmic matter [Ruben, 1954, S. 126-127]. All this, in his opinion, closely resembles the practice of "shamanic flight" common among many primitive peoples and indicates the influence of the non-Aryan substrate on the formation of the Jain worldview. Ruben believes that the same conclusion can be drawn about Buddhism, and directly points to the Indus Valley civilization as the source of both the Jain and Buddhist traditions (Ruben, 1954, pp. 125-126).

The same ideas are expressed by H. Zimmer , who does not specify, however, which of the pre-Aryan traditions is associated with Jainism [Zimmer, 1951, p. 217].

Undoubtedly, all these conclusions are bold, radical and require further analysis and verification, but this is not what is important for us now. What is much more interesting is that neither Dasgupta nor Radhakrishnan say anything about the possible non-Aryan substratum of Buddhism and Jainism, nor about their social roots, much less about the possible links between the religious and psychotechnical practices of these religious and philosophical systems and shamanic practices. In other words, it is not so much what these historians say that is interesting, as what they don't say. Similarly, K. S. Ramakrishna Rao does not mention the possible non-Aryan roots of Jainism, but notes that "Jainism was partly a protest movement against Hinduism, like Protestantism in the West in the sixteenth century" (Ramakrishna Rao, 1975, p. 85). Such a comparison is, in general, quite revealing and characteristic of modern Indian historians, who try to demonstrate the connection of the processes that took place in the intellectual world of ancient India, primarily with the orthodox religious tradition represented by the Vedas and Upanishads.

Thus, regarding the genesis of Buddhism, Dasgupta asserts that the Dharma of the Buddha owes its origin mainly to the intellectual and spiritual needs of ancient Indian society, in which by the VI-V centuries BC there was a need to change the ossified Vedic ritual, which turned into a self-sufficient, closed and ritualistic system that did not meet the spiritual requirements of the then Indian society. In order to bring the religious side of culture in line with the needs of society, first the Upanishads were created, and then Buddhism emerged. At the same time, the greatest value of the Upanishad ideology, according to Dasgupta, was that it focused primarily on individual salvation, regardless of his Varna status, but its main disadvantage was that it was focused primarily on ascetics who were ready to renounce society and fulfill their Varna duty for moksha; naturally, the Upanishad ideology was based on the fact that the Upanishad ideology It is shown that in the case of a conflict between individual desire for salvation and social duty, the latter usually won [Dasgupta, 1941, p. 255-257]. Ramakrishna Rao emphasizes the fundamental " anti-ritualism "of the teachings of Vardhamana and his followers:" The early Jains, "he writes," rejected Vedic rituals and practices, declaring that religion consists in a certain way of life and thought, and not in performing prescribed rituals " (Ramakrishna Rao, 1975, p. 85). Similarly, as we have just seen, Dasgupta acts in relation to Buddhism, and logically

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We can assume that he also held similar views about Gina's teachings, since both of these trends originated and developed in the same social environment and, therefore, were answers to the same (at least very similar) philosophical questions.

Sarvepalli Radhakrishnan, another historian whose views should be taken into account, explicitly wrote about the predominantly ethical nature of Jainism as a philosophical and religious system [Radhakrishnan, 1994, vol. 1, p. 247]. In his opinion, the role of Jainism, as well as the role of Buddhism, was primarily to reform the moral component of the then Indian culture, and for this purpose, Jains, like Buddhists, tried to dissociate themselves from Brahmanic orthodoxy and treated the Vedas and their authority, if not hostile, then at least indifferent [Radhakrishnan, 1994, vol. 1, p. 250]. Historians also draw attention to the problem of Varna distinctions in Jainism - more precisely, the denial of their significance for the Jains. In other words, Jain ideology was perceived and is still perceived by Indian historians of philosophy as a phenomenon not so much of a socio-cultural order, but of a narrower ideological, i.e. religious and philosophical one. Looking ahead, we note that the silence of Indian historians about the social, ethnic and similar roots of Jainism, as well as other unorthodox ideological trends of the times of Buddha and Jina, can be interpreted as a desire to show the isolation of the ideological component of Indian culture, which was perceived by these historians, apparently, as completely self-sufficient, governed only by its own laws and not affected by more general socio-cultural patterns. In addition, many modern Indian historians do not deny the very possibility that the thinkers of ancient India posed purely moral problems in the form in which they can be formulated in our time. Indeed, can we really believe, as Ramakrishna Rao does, that the well-known Jain principle of ahimsa (non-harm to the living) is not limited to "nonviolence" itself, but is an embodiment of the principle of universal love (Ramakrishna Rao, 1975, p. 88)?

If we take into account the considerations expressed by Reuben and Zimmer (and other Western authors not mentioned here), Jainism, being the heir to the oldest pre-Aryan traditions and a certain type of worldview associated with them, embodied rather the idea of universal animation, characteristic of quite many forms of primitive worldview. The Jain concept of" nonviolence " requires the adept of this religion to carefully monitor his actions so as not to cause the slightest harm to even the smallest of living beings, and in compliance with this strict prohibition, Jains are known to drink only strained water so as not to accidentally swallow anyone, and sweep the ground in front of them when walking to avoid stepping on someone.

Ramakrishna Rao interprets this as a manifestation of universal love, directed not only at people, but also at all living beings in general. Radhakrishnan understands this principle in a somewhat similar way, stating that ahimsa is "respect for all living things and refraining from harming them" [Radhakrishnan, 1994, vol. 1, p. 285]. Moreover, the word "respect" draws attention to itself here, the meaning of which in the context of Jain philosophy and faith Radhakrishnan does not explain in any way, although from the text of his work it can be understood that violence is perceived by him as a crime - first of all against another living being. "Sin," he writes," is a misdemeanor not before God, but before man" [ibid., p. 284], and it is unacceptable to harm a living being precisely because it has an independent unique value. In other words, "respect" here means recognition of the independent value of another living being, whoever it may be - a person, a co-worker, etc.-

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a tank or an insect. But at the same time, what can make a person show respect for other living beings, if he does not suffer any negative consequences for committing violence against them? After all, even the most abstract prescriptions of ethics, whether we like it or not, go back genetically to the idea of, roughly speaking, punishments and rewards, to conditioned reflexes (according to the teachings of I. P. Pavlov), conditioned by negative or positive reinforcement. And Radhakrishnan himself writes about such reinforcements as they are formulated by Jain thinkers: "Morality is necessary to cause a remaking of human nature and prevent the formation of new karma" [ibid., p. 283]. In other words, doing evil, harming other sentient beings is necessary not so much for the sake of respect for them, but for the sake of rebuilding the Jain adept's own nature, without which he will not be able to find salvation.

In this sense, Jainism fully fits into the general scheme of religion, which implies, in particular, the division of the entire universe into two unequal parts - "our" world, the lower one, full of suffering, wrong and unrighteous (the" fallen "state of man in Christianity, Samsara in Buddhism, "post-heavenly" in Taoism, etc.) and "that" world, the highest, best, righteous, true-in a word, positive in all respects (the Kingdom of God in Christianity, Nirvana in Buddhism, the state of immortality in Taoism, etc.); and it is impossible not to notice that even the most positive properties of "our" world are understood as transitory, illusory, etc. untrue ("Maya "in Vedanta and Hinduism), while" that " world is positive untrue and highly reliable.

Jainism, like any other religion, has this property, but since there is no concept of God in this religion and even Jains pray to their tirthankaras solely as a sign of reverence for them and for the sake of better meditative concentration, without expecting any help from Vardhamana, Parshvanatha, Arishtanemi and others in the matter of salvation [Zheleznova, 2005, with. 132-133], then the only incentive for performing good deeds rather than unwholesome ones will be the idea of karma, which accumulates, keeps a person in samsara and pulls him into the abyss of unwholesome births. No "God's will" or any other supernatural agency can keep a person from committing sin here, and all that can motivate him to keep within the bounds of morality is an idea of the immutable laws of nature and, in particular, the law of karma, which is just as unthinkable to circumvent as it is to circumvent, for example, the law of universal gravitation. In other words, a person in Jainism does not have the opportunity to communicate with the higher principle either in individual prayer or through the mediation of priests, he can only individually strive for liberation and make efforts to achieve Jain Nirvana, which is different from Buddhist in Jains and is understood as simply the liberation of a living being from karmic matter [Lysenko, Terentyev, Shokhin, p. 357].

In our opinion, such a state of affairs can hardly be a good soil for the growth of such a peculiar intellectual "flower" as the idea of love for another living being, because in this case a person is closed as a person and ultimately completely alone among other people who can not help him in the matter of salvation - except to pass on to him the knowledge of how nirvana can be achieved. Only the individual can apply this knowledge in practice at his own peril and risk. Moreover, he can neither count on the help of supernatural beings, nor help other people to find salvation. He cannot, as in Christianity, Islam, or Mahayana Buddhism, pray for others or expect, as in Mahayanists and Christians, that Avalokiteshvara Bodhisattva or Jesus, respectively, will lend him a helping hand. All this makes the process of salvation completely unrelated ontologically to what happens to other living beings.

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Given all the above, it is impossible not to agree with O. V. Mezentseva that " ahimsa is not love, the content of these concepts differs fundamentally: the prevention of violence is aimed at preserving, preserving the reserve of spirituality of the most potential perpetrator of violence (emphasis added-S. B.). Nonviolence does not require love for another; state, reaction, the feelings of the person against whom the violence might have been directed are not taken into account. For those who might become the subject of violence, this principle takes on the meaning of a legal rather than a moral norm: the right to violently destroy or destroy another integrity is not given to any person in the Hindu tradition " [Mezentseva, 2001, p. 135]. And in Jainism, as in Buddhism, all this is clearly visible: a person, in the words of the Buddha, should be his own lamp and not seek salvation in anything but himself and his own efforts.

In this case, it is logical to ask: where did modern Indian historians get such interpretations of Jain ideology (and, above all, Jain ethics) as those mentioned above? In our opinion, the problem here is, first of all, the search by Indian intellectuals for methods of self-reflection that, on the one hand, would adequately reflect the specifics of Indian culture with all its differences from Western and other cultures, and on the other hand, would meet the requirements of modernity, would not be anachronistic, and would help Indians to communicate with others. representatives of other cultures in a generally understandable ideological "language". When Ramakrishna Rao speaks of ahimsa as universal love, he is using a genealogical Christian concept that attempts to convey at least some features of the specifically Indian concept of Ahimsa. It is even possible that he wants not only to show the European reader the closeness of the two civilizations - Indian and Western - but also to demonstrate the superiority of the former, as Abul Kalam Azad directly does, claiming that at the time when philosophy in Greece was still taking its first steps (the Ionian school), India already had a complex system of philosophy. both a highly developed philosophy and the argument that Buddhism and Jainism, which emerged in the era when Thales and Anaximander taught in Greece, could not have appeared without a long previous development of philosophical culture in India (Abul Kalam Azad, 1955, p. 157-158).

In any case, the specificity of Indian religiosity does not seem to imply love of man for man, although it is quite possible in many cases to love man for God (for example, the bhakti movement). In our opinion, the very concept of love that Ramakrishna Rao spoke about is borrowed from Western philosophical and religious (Christian) discourse, where love for one's neighbor is not only allowed as a possible relationship to another person, but also directly prescribed as one of the main conditions for religious salvation. Thus, here Ramakrishna Rao uses a non-Hindu and generally non-Indian concept to explain a purely Indian religious phenomenon - the ahimsa principle.

Radhakrishnan draws equally interesting conclusions when considering the ideology of Jainism. He compares some key concepts of Jain philosophy with those of Western philosophy , such as the teachings of Leibniz and Bergson (Radhakrishnan, 1994, vol. 1, p. 292). In general, in his opinion, Jain metaphysics is similar to Leibniz's monadology, while in Bergsonianism he finds parallels to the Jain doctrine of the jiva (Skt. jiva - "soul"). In Jain metaphysics, there are five or six substances (respectively in the Svetambara and Digambara sects): "(1) jiva - living, soul, spiritual substance; the number of jivas is infinite; (2) substance (pudgala); (3) space (akasa); (4) and (5) dharma and adharma, which are conditions 6) time (kala)" (Lysenko, Terentyev, Shokhin, 1994, p. 335). At the same time, time is recognized as the substance of only digambara [ibid., p. 339]. Jiva in

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this concept appears as exactly the substance that is subject to enslavement, the suffering associated with it, determined by the process of accumulation of karmic matter, and is able to free itself by reaching nirvana. This substance is immersed in something that is alien to it and does not depend on it in any way in relation to its own nature, its own essence - in ajiva, which includes all other substances except the jiva.

In principle, one might say, if one considers Jain metaphysics through the lens of Western metaphysics, that Jainism is closer to Descartes ' teaching with its idea of two substances - res cogitans and res extensa. However, according to Radhakrishnan's fair statement (in a certain sense and in a certain context), Jainism is no less close to the teachings of Leibniz, since the jivas are many and they do not depend on each other in their existence, being substantial; they are, so to speak, ontologically independent, and this is what makes it impossible for them to be independent. whatever the actions of one soul directed directly to the salvation of another-to be saved, as already mentioned, you can only be alone. Indeed, the set of ontologically closed jivas strongly resembles the set of equally closed Leibnizian monads, which are essentially the same substances as Descartes ' res cogitans , with the only difference that Descartes has only one thinking substance. Similarly, one can compare jiva with Bergson's elan vital-a completely free creative principle that does not contain any norms, principles and laws and is clearly opposed to inert matter [Kuzmina, 2004, vol.1, p. 19]. But in such a comparison, we should not forget that the concepts of Mahavira and Henri Bergson may seem similar only at a superficial and inattentive glance, but on closer examination it turns out that there is not so much in common between them as Radhakrishnan believed.

Indeed, Jainism, as we have already seen, proceeds from a completely realistic attitude, not considering space, time and matter as products of consciousness. For a Jain, all this is real, and this is all the more true for karmic matter, from which one's own soul must be freed; if matter were not real, then no liberation would be necessary, and in this case we would not have an independent Jain philosophy, but some (perhaps rather peculiar) one.) a variant of Advaita Vedanta or madhyamika. For Bergson, the external world, as we imagine it, is understood only as a mental construct. For the French philosopher, objects of the external world are "the objectified totality of our experiences, they are subjective elements brought out through language, and space is the form of our sensuality" (Chanyshev, 1960: 28-29). For him, the external world undoubtedly exists, but not quite as it is given to our knowledge, because the power of the intellect is always involved in knowledge, which significantly distorts the reality in which the subject actually exists.

This - if we compare Bergson's philosophy with Indian darshanas-is more like Buddhist philosophy (madhyamika or, to a lesser extent, yogachara) than Jainism with its "common sense" attitude about the world around us and its inherent laws. Intelligence as a discursive, discriminating cognition is opposed by Bergson to instinct, which in humans manifests itself in the form of intuition and is the most reliable means of cognition - in any case, much more reliable than intelligence [Russell, 1993, p.308]. All this, in our opinion, is hardly compatible with the sufficiently rationalistic spirit of Indian philosophy, in which every worldview requires clear and accurate evidence, and among them there can be no reference to one's own intuition or any yogic experience.

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Why do Indian philosophers need such an interpretation of Jain ideology? Perhaps V. G. Lysenko is right in asserting that while the Western philosopher usually sought to oppose himself to some old tradition in order to be noticed and to have his word heard, the Indian thinker, due to the very specifics of the historical and philosophical process in India (where all the main darshanas originated almost simultaneously, whereas the history of Western philosophy is the history of successive changes in different philosophical systems) had to prove loyalty to the philosophical tradition in order to be heard, which deprived him of a certain intellectual distance in relation to this tradition - the distance that would allow him to see his tradition as if from the outside. Therefore, modern Indian philosophers, seeking to better understand and evaluate the place of Indian philosophy in the global context, are forced to turn to the richest and most dynamically developing set of philosophical traditions today - Western civilization [Lysenko, 1986, part 1, p. 26].

However, this conversion itself, as we have seen, occurs somewhat differently. Thus, Ramakrishna Rao interprets Jainism and its characteristic worldview in fact through the prism of the Christian perception of the world (however, understood by the Indian historian somewhat superficially, since the Christian worldview is far from being limited to the concept of love, and this concept itself is much more complex than just some special type of relationship between people), although he does not say so straight ahead. Ramakrishna Rao sees the common features of the Jain religion that it shares with others "in its emphasis on the ethical and sacrifice of the self, in its concept of liberation and the need for man to transcend his lower and false self, in its belief in the soul and kevala 2, in its emphasis on the search for truth and its self-determination." tolerance orientation" [Ramakrishna Rao, 1975, p. 100]. We actually see here a description of some basic attitudes of Western philosophy (tolerance, self-sacrifice, attention to the ethical aspects of life), which are mixed with certain worldview principles that are more characteristic of India-the concept of liberation (which is not, say, in Christianity or Islam , but in them there is salvation, which is far from identical with the Indian concept moksa), the idea that there is a higher and lower ego in a person, of which the latter is illusory, while only the "true self" - the Atman-has true existence (this is also a purely Indian phenomenon, and it is impossible to find something like this, for example, in the Abrahamic religions or in Taoism, unless you resort to gross stretching). What Jainism has in common with other religions is rather that, as mentioned above, the world is fundamentally divided into two parts - "this world" and "that world".

We see a similar attitude in Radhakrishnan, with the difference that he has in mind more Western philosophy as such than the ideas about philosophy and religion that are widespread in the mass consciousness of the West. It is not without reason that he refers to Bergson (Radhakrishnan's sympathies for this philosopher are quite noticeable), the British neo-Hegelians, Leibniz, Kant, and others. He tries to draw parallels between Western philosophers and Indian philosophers, to see common features in both cultures, by which it would be possible to determine - at least approximately and preliminarily - the essence of philosophical thinking as such, to understand what makes philosophy a philosophy, and not, for example, mythology or Gnosticism. In this sense, Radhakrishnan quite clearly continues the line of comparative studies that was outlined in the XIX century in the works of such linguists as W. Humboldt, Raek, Bopp, Grimm and a number of others, and is already continued in the cultural and philosophical context of F. Kropotkin. Schlegel's

2 This refers to kevala-jnana - "exclusive knowledge", a special, higher form of knowledge in Jainism, which only siddhis possess.

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in "The Language and Wisdom of the Indians" or in the most interesting work of M. Bjornsherny "Theogony, philosophy and cosmogony of the Hindus", in which the author tries to draw interesting (although from the height of our modern knowledge and completely unacceptable) parallels not only between the philosophical teachings of India and the West, but also between mythological constructions and names-so, he he finds similarities (for Bjornstjerna himself) between the names of Buddha and the Scandinavian Odin (German Wotan), as well as between the names "Edda" and "Veda" [Bjornstjerna, 1843, p. 118]; he also, incidentally, draws further parallels, finding similarities in the myth of the flood in the mythologies of the Indians Persians, Greeks, Chinese, ancient Armenians, and Chaldeans (Bjornstjerna, 1843, pp. 152-158). Radhakrishnan is interesting because he continues to search for and find not only random, but also well-founded similarities between the philosophical systems of the West and India - similarities that are not the result of simple coincidence and indicate the fundamental identity of the laws by which culture develops.

In contrast, Dasgupta is a much more academic historian, less interested in finding any commonalities between Indian philosophy and other philosophical traditions. For him, the most important thing is to search for those laws that govern the development of Indian philosophy itself, rather than to find any parallels between Indian and Western philosophy, and not because Indian culture is closed and incomparable with the cultures of other countries, but because the commonality of the basic structures of human thinking is self-evident for Dasgupta, it is not the same This is the postulate from which Dasgupta proceeds when discussing the nature of philosophy in general and the specifics of philosophical thought in different regions of the world. At the same time, it is impossible to ignore the remarkable statement made by Dasgupta at the very beginning of his opus magnum: according to the historian, most of the philosophical problems that are discussed in modern Western philosophical thought have already been developed in India and have received sufficiently satisfactory solutions, so that the study of philosophical trends in ancient and medieval India will be useful for any Western a thinker - if only to save himself from the need to "reinvent the wheel" and discover what was discovered long ago in India [Dasgupta, 1951, p. VIII].

He confirms this point openly and develops it a few pages later when he says that " the human mind follows more or less the same forms of rational thought... Many of the philosophical doctrines of European philosophy are essentially the same as those that we discover in Indian philosophy. The main difference is often the difference in the angle of view from which the same problems are viewed in all their various forms in these two regions" [Dasgupta, 1951, p. 9].

In the context of Dasgupta's concept, it is noteworthy that the ideology of Jainism is only a reconciliation of the extremes of Vedanta and Buddhism based on the realism of everyday experience (see above). In essence, he speaks here about the fundamental isolation of Indian philosophical thought as a system, about the fact that Indian philosophy as an intellectual phenomenon is closed in relation to all aspects and aspects of culture that do not have a direct ideal value - to the economy, politics, social structure and, especially, to ethnic processes. Even when talking about the Aryan invasion of Hindustan in the 2nd millennium BC, he does not mention the influence of the pre-Aryan population of present-day India on the formation of Brahmin culture and religion, as Radhakrishnan does, for example. In other words, for him (as well as for Radhakrishnan), philosophy may well be influenced by religion or art and have the opposite effect on them, but for philosophical knowledge and religious practices, the processes of ethnogenesis, social dynamics, etc. are irrelevant.

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Quite the opposite approach is shown by Western historians. For Ruben, Zimmer and others, not only the purely philosophical aspect of the historical and philosophical process in ancient India is important, but also the social, ethnic, etc. In the works of Western authors, Jainism appears as a result of the influence of the culture of the autochthonous population of Hindustan on the culture of the ancient Aryans and the reaction of this latter to the penetration of foreign cultural elements into it. In this sense, among Indian historians of philosophy, perhaps only Radhakrishnan interprets the history of the development of Indian philosophical thought, referring to the process of interaction of cultures, but in his case it takes on peculiar features: the ancient Aryans appear to Radhakrishnan as a people much more civilized than the local population, bringing the light of culture to the Dravidians and Mundas, striving to raise those who they were called dasa or dasyu, before themselves. Radhakrishnan portrays the Aryas as cultural tragers, much as in the mass Western consciousness of those times a European was portrayed as a missionary, bringing the light of true faith and true culture to the unenlightened peoples of Asia ("the white man's burden"). It is possible, I think, to argue that it was this ideologeme that influenced Radhakrishnan in his study of the history of Indian philosophical thought.

Thus, we can say that the above-mentioned Western historians of philosophy perceive the philosophical phenomenon they study as a part of culture, connected with it not only ideologically, but also socially, ethnically and in other ways. They are characterized by a systematic approach that requires the researcher to see not only the phenomenon under study itself, but also its entire cultural context down to the most basic and everyday levels - the levels of everyday social practices. Indian historians, on the other hand, demonstrate a clearly opposite approach, trying to understand the course of development of Indian philosophy primarily as the evolution of a certain set of ideas - religious views, philosophical concepts, etc. - in relation to which the level of everyday social practices is perceived as "lower", axiologically less valuable and therefore unable to affect the sphere of the ideal. At the same time, Indian authors (for example, Ramakrishna Rao) often and not always justifiably modernize the views of the same Jains, thereby not so much exploring the Jain ideology itself as trying to show its connection with modernity and understand what can be considered relevant for our time - especially for modern Indian culture.

In the light of what has been said, Dasgupta's words about Jainism, Buddhism, and Vedanta also become more understandable, since he cannot admit that it is obvious (to him) that the Dravidians and Mundas inferior to the Aryans could have influenced the formation and development of Indian culture; he tries to interpret the phenomena of Indian philosophical thought without going beyond the Indo-Aryan one Western historians pay more attention to the connection of this culture with the autochthonous cultures of Hindustan, trying to understand it in a broad ethno-cultural context. Radhakrishnan does the same thing as Dasgupta, recognizing that dasa is only an incentive for certain changes in Indian culture, carried out by its representatives themselves on their own material. In other words, Western historians, studying ancient India, in particular Jainism, have in mind a broad historical context that is contemporary to the phenomenon under study, while Indians pay more attention to the diachronic connections of the phenomenon under consideration - to what aspects or features of Indo-Aryan culture it could have been generated and how it influenced its further development.

Of course, there are other equally notable historians of Indian philosophy, both Indian and Western, who are not included in this study: the Indian Marxist D. P. Chattopadhyaya, who tries to link the evolution of Indian philosophy to the social characteristics of Indian philosophy

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culture; S. Chatterjee, etc. The most interesting thinker is J. N. Mohanty, whose research is conceptually close to the theories of Dasgupta and Radhakrishnan that we have discussed; and the most interesting thinker is J. N. Mohanty, who considers the rationalistic aspect of the Indian philosophical tradition. Those whose views we have discussed in this article actually belong to the same tradition, which ultimately goes back to Vedanta and to its characteristic idea of the closest connection between man and the deity (the well - known principle of tat tvam asi - "You are That", that is, Brahman). In their conceptions, man is actually "god incognito" by virtue of the principle of identity of Atman and Brahman, and this imposes a certain imprint on their ideas about culture and the place of philosophy in it. Philosophical knowledge is for them a very special, super-mundane knowledge, for they ultimately ascribe all Indian philosophy to the sacred texts of the Vedas. Therefore, it is not surprising that they perceive Jain ideology exclusively in the context of Vedic ideology (in the sense that it goes back to the Vedas and Upanishads interpreted in an idealistic spirit).

In contrast, the Western historians of philosophy discussed here focus more on the ideals of accuracy and objectivity accepted in Western science, which forces them to consider Jainism in a synchronous historical context, including analyzing its most distant connections, up to connections - through Indian culture as a whole - with other civilizations of the world.

list of literature

Androsov V. P. Buddha Shakyamuni and Indian Buddhism, Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 2001.
Zheleznova N. A. Uchenie Kundakunda v filosofsko-religioznoy traditsii jainizma [The Teaching of Kundakunda in the philosophical and religious tradition of Jainism]. Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 2005.

Kuzmina T. A. Henri Bergson / / Philosophers of the twentieth century. Vol. 1. Moscow: Iskusstvo XXI vek, 2004.

Kundakunda. Panchastikaya-sara (The essence of the Five extended substances) / Translated from Skt. by N. A. Zheleznova / / History of Philosophy. 2000. N 7.

Lysenko V. G. Darshana, anvikshiki i dharma: k receptsii ponyatii filosofii i religii v sovremennoi indiskoi mysli [Darshana, anvikshiki and dharma: towards the Reception of concepts of philosophy and Religion in modern Indian Thought]. Metodologicheskie i mirovozrencheskie problemy istorii filosofii stran Vostoka, Part 1, Moscow, 1986.

Lysenko V. G., Terentyev A. A., Shokhin V. K. Early Buddhist Philosophy. Philosophy of Jainism, Moscow: Vostochnaya literatura, 1994.
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Khizhnyak O. S. Sotsial'naya baza buddiiskogo kul'tovogo stroitel'stva v drevnoi Indii [Social base of Buddhist cult construction in ancient India]. 2005. Issue 4.

Chanyshev A. N. Filosofiya Anri Bergson [Philosophy of Henri Bergson]. Moscow, 1960.

Abul Kalam Azad. Indian and Ionian Philosophy // Indian Inheritance: Literature, Philosophy and Religion / Ed. by K. M. Munshi and N. Chandrasekhara Aiyer. Bombay: Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, 1955.

Björnstjerna M. Die Theogonie, Philosophic und Kosmogonie der Hindus. Stockholm: P. A. Norstedt & Söhne, 1843.

Dasgupta S. N. A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951.

Dasgupta S. N. Message of Buddhism // Dasgupta S. N. Philosophical Essays. Calcutta: Calcutta University Press, 1941.

Masson-Oursel P. Esquisse d'une histoire de la philosophic indienne. P.: Paul Geuthner, 1923.

Ramakrishna Rao K. S. Jainism // Indian Thought: an Introduction / Ed. by D. H. Bishop. New York - Toronto: John Wiley & sons, 1975.

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