V. I. POLUEKTOV

Candidate of MGIMO-University of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Russia

Key words: India, foreign policy, N. Modi, multilateral diplomacy

It has been two years since the leader of the Bharatiya Janata Party ( Indian People's Party-BJP) Narendra Modi became Prime Minister of India. International experts pin great hopes on him for the activation of New Delhi's foreign policy, whose main tasks are to promote national interests and ensure the most favorable conditions for the successful socio-economic development of India.

Emphasis on personal diplomacy, so-called "chai pe charcha" ("negotiations over tea". - author's note), the Indian diaspora as a "tool of influence", as well as multilateral formats of cooperation have borne fruit, and by the first half of the Prime Minister's term, India has significantly strengthened its position in the international arena as a leader of developing countries and a "leading power".

Nevertheless, it is worth noting that, despite the large-scale strategic goals and objectives in foreign policy, the practical implementation of most initiatives remains good intentions, which, as the former head of foreign intelligence of the USSR, KGB resident in India L. V. Shebarshin (1975-1977) rightly noted, are accompanied by " garlands of flowers, heaps of philosophical treatises, fountains of high-flown rhetoric " ¹.

"PARTY GUIDELINES"

After the end of the Cold War, when New Delhi was able to use the contradictions between the USSR and the United States and the blocs led by them in a pragmatic way to improve its own status in world politics (in this context, it is worth recalling the concept of the Non-Aligned Movement, the principles of peaceful coexistence "pancha shila" and "unity in diversity"). India is facing an urgent need to reorient its foreign policy strategy.

In the run-up to the 2014 elections, the BJP published a Manifesto outlining the prospects for developing the State's foreign policy strategy. Even then, many experts noted India's intention to actively participate in global processes not only in the framework of traditional diplomacy, but also using all its economic, scientific and cultural potential on the basis of equality and mutually beneficial cooperation. ²

The BJP has defined the following principles and priorities of the "new" foreign policy::

- pragmatism and mutually beneficial relations;

- striving to reach an international consensus on combating terrorism and global warming;

- preference of the interests of one's own country and regional partners to the interests of the world's poles of power;

- Strengthening regional cooperation platforms (South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), ASEAN);

- continuation of the dialogue in the framework of global forums (BRICS, G20, Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), Asia - Europe Forum, etc.);

- expansion and strengthening of the diplomatic presence abroad;

- Awareness of the importance of the Indian diaspora abroad to promote India's interests;

- granting asylum to Hindus who are persecuted elsewhere ³.

It is noteworthy that at a meeting with the heads of Indian foreign missions in 2015, N. Modi stressed that the main task of foreign policy at the current stage is "to use the current world situation to establish India as a leading power" and " adapt to changes

in the world"⁴. In other words, it is necessary to use foreign policy successes for the economic development of the country.

Thus, when operating in the international arena, New Delhi proceeds from the desire to develop relations with all countries, especially with the leading world powers, and conducts its foreign policy in the spirit of so - called strategic autonomy-a policy of balancing the interests of leading powers while defending its own interests through coalitions and agreements with other countries.

Well-known Russian Orientalists-Indologists A. G. Volodin and S. I. Lunev note that, consistently defending the idea of creating an alternative model of world order based on polycentricity, India is looking for and continues to find new formats of interaction with states based on the principles of "free geometry of international relations"⁵. That is, when the state can participate in various political and economic groups and build a line of behavior based on a "pragmatic understanding of its own interests"⁶ without any ideological background, which allows it to solve its political tasks as effectively as possible.

Shashi Tharoor, a member of the Indian Parliament and former Deputy Secretary-General of the United Nations, described this process as a phenomenon of "multi - connectivity" - India's participation in various international organizations and "club" mechanisms, such as the RIC (trilateral forum with Russia and China), IBSA (South-South cooperation mechanism that unites India, Brazil and South Africa), BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa) and BASIC (the group for environmental negotiations, which includes the IBSA member countries and China), etc. ⁷

"Multi-connectivity" implies the development of mutually beneficial relations between India and the countries participating in various trans-regional and regional groups, in which India, using its leading positions in the economy and/or in the political arena, implements its own development agenda and national interests as effectively as possible.

The natural question is: what are these interests?

NATIONAL INTERESTS AND STRATEGIC PRIORITIES

The key national interests for India are ensuring long-term and stable economic growth, maximum possible employment, equal distribution of national income, improving living standards and other issues on the economic agenda.

In this regard, the programs "Make in India", Digital India, Start-Up India, Smart Cities, Skill India, etc. deserve special mention. Of course, India needs long-term inclusive development, and the country's clear economic success (according to the IMF, Indian GDP growth in 2015 was 7.2% compared to the global average of 3.5% ⁸, as well as the current figure of 7.6%) allows India to focus on maximizing its own potential in foreign policy, in other words, the economic component of development complements the political agenda, and vice versa.

This is exactly what the First Deputy Foreign Minister of India, S. Jaishankar, said at the opening of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace's India Center in April 2016. He noted that an important task of Indian diplomacy is to attract foreign capital and technology for the country's economic development, as well as to convince key partners that the qualitative and quantitative growth of the Indian economy is part of their strategic interests.

Of course, these tasks are extremely relevant for India due to its proximity to its "sworn friends" - Pakistan and China - the main strategic challenges for India in the region. It is known that even in the ancient Indian treatise on politics - "Arthashastra" it is stated that "(the Sovereign), whose land directly borders (with the possession of the one who has the intention to win), is the main enemy"⁹. That is why, as many researchers, such as Jeff Smith, have pointed out, the state of relations between India, China and Pakistan can be described as an "Asian cold world"¹⁰, which contributes to the formation of New Delhi's special foreign policy in the field of defense and security.

In this context, the head of the Indian Center of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, a member of the Indian National Security Advisory Committee, Si Raja Mohan, in his article "India and the political balance", speaks about the existence of "three strategic rings"in the state's foreign policy ¹¹.

To the former, he refers India's interaction with its direct geographical neighbors in the region (China, Pakistan, Nepal, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Myanmar), where India aims to achieve a leading position by improving bilateral relations and cooperation with the countries in which it operates.

first of all, in the field of trade, investment, humanitarian cooperation and security issues, as well as to prevent any interference from third countries.

In the second" strategic ring", S. R. Mohan examines the specifics of India's relations with states in the "expanded neighborhood in Asia" (this includes Afghanistan and Central Asian countries) and along the coast of the Indian Ocean. Here, the task of India's foreign policy is to maintain the existing "balance of power" in the region and not allow its own interests to be infringed.

And finally, India's third "strategic ring" is a global world in which the country seeks to gain the coveted status of a "great power" and play an appropriate role in ensuring international peace and security, developing the world economy, climate change, etc.

Thus, we can say that New Delhi is striving to create an international political environment where, through active pragmatic activities in relation to its partners, as well as in international organizations of a regional, interregional and global nature and in other multilateral formats of cooperation, the country could gradually realize its national interests and the main strategic goal-to become an independent center world politics.

"MODIFIED" POLICY

During his first year in power, Modi visited 16 countries and raised the level of relations with Japan to the level of "special strategic and global partnership "(2014), with the Republic of Korea-to the "special strategic partnership" (2015),with Malaysia - to the "deep strategic partnership" (2015). with Mongolia and Singapore-to the "strategic partnership" (2015), with the United Arab Emirates-to the "comprehensive strategic partnership" (2015)¹².

During the visit of the US President B. The official documents used the terms "enhanced bilateral strategic and global partnership" and "global partnership defining the twenty-first century". A joint BRICS-SCO summit was held in Ufa, where it was decided to start the procedure for accepting India and Pakistan as full members of the SCO. In France in November-December 2015, at the Conference of the Parties to the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change, the Indian delegation made a significant contribution to the work on the final text of the Paris Agreement.

All of the above points to India's individual approach and pragmatic defense of national interests, goals and objectives both at the bilateral level, separately with developed and developing countries, and through multilateral formats of cooperation.

In this regard, we should mention the international conference Raisina Dialogue, organized by the Observer Research Foundation, an Indian think tank, under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of India in March 2016, the theme of which was "Asian Connectivity".

At the conference, Indian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sushma Swaraj, her First Deputy S. Jaishankar and State Minister of Foreign Affairs V. K. Singh made presentations in which they noted the changed position of India in world politics, the role of N. Modi in the state's foreign policy, and also pointed out a number of trends in India's foreign policy strategy for the coming years.

Thus, India, as a responsible regional and global power, declares its commitment to the motto "Sabka Saath, Sabka Vikas!"Together for common progress! "- author's note), which is why it consistently defends the principles of equality, common international participation and a unified approach to global challenges and threats, the so-called "problems without a passport" (terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, climate change, poverty and hunger, human rights and freedoms). disenfranchisement, mass illiteracy, financial and economic crises, the risk of trade protectionism, refugee flows, drug trafficking and epidemics)¹³.

Sushma Swaraj said that the concept of "connectivity" is the main leitmotif of New Delhi's "new" foreign policy, both regionally and globally. If we talk about the Asian interconnectedness, we should take into account the following factors that, according to V. K. Singh, will influence Indian policy:: 1) lack of a well-developed comprehensive security architecture in Asia; 2) security in cyberspace; 3) energy security; 4) economic security and the activities of various integration associations and financial institutions; 5)" politics and economics of water resources in Asia", etc. ¹⁴

Special emphasis in S. Jaishankar's report was placed on the concept of" Security and Growth for All in the Indian Ocean Region " (Security and Growth for all in the Region -

SAGAR) and the positioning of India as a maritime power (for the first time in a long time), which stands for the creation of a safe and interconnected maritime space for all.

The new edition of India's maritime security strategy "Ensuring Secure Seas" (Indian Maritime Security Strategy) reflects New Delhi's approaches to strengthening its national position in the Indian Ocean region, covering the security of coastlines and island territories, international transport corridors and straits, freedom of navigation and the security of international trade routes. cooperation in the field of security with regional (Sri Lanka, Seychelles, Mauritius and Australia) and non-regional (USA and Japan) partners, as well as through multilateral formats of cooperation.

Analyzing the Strategy text, we can draw several conclusions. First of all, there is an expansion of the regional scope of the Indian Navy's activities by including the entire Indian Ocean area in their sphere of responsibility, which cannot but speak about Indian interests and ambitions. It is noteworthy that the authors even use the term Indo-Pacific Region (region of the Indian and Pacific Oceans), proposed by Australia in 2013, but only once.

Secondly, the text emphasizes the mixed nature of threats (both traditional and non-traditional) to the maritime security of India, which is the main task of the Indian Navy. Third, the Indian Navy, as a Net Security Provider, must be prepared to defend national interests and the security of coastlines, island territories, maritime communications and international trade routes for economic and other purposes in the Indian Ocean region and beyond.

Another important topic discussed not only on the sidelines of the Raisina Dialogue conference, but also in the political science community, was India's nuclear doctrine and its desire to join the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Wassenaar Arrangement and the Australia Group*.

Given the "good neighborliness" with two nuclear powers (China and Pakistan), as well as the catastrophic shortage of electricity for its own consumption, India, for obvious reasons, has its own interests in relation to the nuclear and missile programs and cannot guarantee the non-use of nuclear weapons (NW), which is a deterrent in the region.

Official New Delhi believes that joining the NSG will contribute to a more active role of India in the field of nuclear non-proliferation and will allow it to prove its worth as a "responsible state with nuclear weapons" ¹⁵. From a technical point of view, India meets 4 out of 5 requirements for joining the NSG, but does not meet one of the most important criteria: The country is not a party to the NPT or any other international non-proliferation agreement/treaty ¹⁶.

However, New Delhi's accession to the Hague Code of Conduct for the Prevention of Ballistic Missile Proliferation (CCP) and MTCR in June 2016, as well as Modi's visits to Switzerland, the United States and Mexico in May-June, have generated a kind of "band of recognition" and support for India's application to join the NSG. However, China, Austria, New Zealand, Ireland, South Africa and Turkey are strongly opposed, and given that the decision on the issue will have to be made by consensus, the support of NSG Chairman R. Grossi, the United States, Great Britain, France, Russia, Norway and Switzerland will clearly not be enough.

RESULTS OF FOREIGN POLICY PROGRAMS AND INITIATIVES

Many experts point out that the biggest disappointment in India's foreign policy, paradoxically, was what was considered a priority in 2014: a policy towards the "home" region, the so-called Neighborhood First policy. India's bilateral relations with South Asian countries are not going through much better times, not to mention such an integration project as the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC).

With the exception of Bangladesh and Bhutan, the countries of the region are increasingly moving closer to China than to their" big brother " India, which can not but cause them concern. However, in order to avoid the possibility of a complete policy failure in this direction, New Delhi has begun to actively interact with the countries of the region in two -, three-and multilateral formats, such as BBIN (Bhutan, Bangladesh, India, Nepal) and BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Multi-Sector Initiative-

* Multilateral informal export control regimes.

technical and economic cooperation).

Within the framework of such multilateral formats, India can implement those initiatives to improve trans-regional connectivity, as N. Modi said during the election campaign, which were not implemented due to the position of Pakistan. For example, in June 2015, a quadripartite Agreement on road transport between the BAIN countries was signed in Thimphu, which creates mechanisms for further integration, including the possibility of signing a similar agreement on railway communication.

Relations with China under Modi have entered a phase of so-called new realism.¹⁷ "Chai pe charcha "and" personal chemistry " between Modi and Xi Jinping had a positive impact on the nature of relations between the two Asian giants, as evidenced by the active visits of top officials of the states. Countries are gradually becoming aware of their mutual interests at the bilateral, regional and global levels, and if possible coordinate their positions on various international platforms, such as the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank18.

At the same time, the" all - weather "partnership with Pakistan, economic rivalry in the regions of South Asia, the Indian Ocean, the Persian Gulf and Africa, the" One Belt, One Road " initiative, as well as China's tough position on a number of sensitive issues for India (UN Security Council reform) However, India's accession to multilateral agreements and arrangements in the field of export control, as well as the non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (in particular, Beijing's refusal to support India's application to join the NSG, etc.) cannot but cause concern for New Delhi.

Russia has always occupied a special place in India's foreign policy, and Modi successfully continues to cooperate with a special privileged strategic partner. The leaders of the two countries regularly meet at annual bilateral summits, as well as on the sidelines of events of international associations.

Moscow and New Delhi cooperate in trade and economic, investment, energy, space, military and military-technical spheres, as well as in the use of peaceful nuclear energy, education, science and technology, culture, tourism, security, disaster relief, etc., which is reflected in joint Russian-Indian statements "Druzhba-Dosti" and "Through trusting relationships to new horizons of cooperation" ¹⁹.

Speaking about the concept of the second" strategic ring " of Si Raj Mohan, it should be noted that India's relations with the states of Central Asia and along the coast of the Indian Ocean are regulated by the Connect Central Asia foreign policy course, which New Delhi has been pursuing since 2012. Given the growing interest in the region's energy resources (uranium-50% of the former Soviet Union's reserves, gas-4th in the world, oil, iron and copper ores, coal, rare metals, cotton, etc.) ²⁰, this program allows India to build mutually beneficial relations in all key areas.

An example of this is the results of Modi's visits to Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan in July 2015, which confirmed the importance of the region in terms of achieving India's energy security.

Of particular note is Modi's recent visit to Iran, which resulted in the signing of an agreement on the development of the Chabahar port - a strategically important step that demonstrates the strengthening of trans-regional connectivity, which allows India to realize its interests in establishing cooperation with Afghanistan, bypassing Pakistan. Another important event was the signing of a Memorandum of Commitment by India to become a member state of the SCO during the Organization's summit in Tashkent in June 2016.

Another achievement of Modi's foreign policy was the activation of New Delhi's policy in the Persian Gulf region, the so - called Think West concept-building balanced partnerships with all key players in the Middle East.

Given the significant presence of the Indian diaspora in this region (about 7 million people), which provides a large amount of investment and money transfers to India, ²¹ New Delhi is striving to maximize its potential as an effective tool of "soft power". In addition, the deepening of strategic cooperation with Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates in the areas of defense and security, economy and investment, scientific and technical cooperation, and joint fight against international terrorism (both at the bilateral level and in multilateral formats of cooperation) indicates the special place of the region in India's strategy.

As part of the "Act East" course (announced in 2014-author's note) , one of the priority directions of India's foreign policy in the Asia-Pacific region-

ONET (ATP) aims to develop a dialogical strategic partnership with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), which Modi said is in the interests of sustainable growth, peace and stability in ^the region22.

Promoting the idea of strengthening inter-regional connectivity (the India-ASEAN Comprehensive Joint Action Plan for 2016-2020, the establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community, joint work through the ASEAN Profile Coordination Committee, the formation of a collective approach to security in Asia, etc.), New Delhi consistently advocates the formation of a Comprehensive Regional Economic Partnership (RCEP). the main parameters of which correspond to Indian approaches to the development of international trade. In addition, India continues to actively participate in the framework of the East Asia Summit (EAC), the ASEAN Regional Security Forum (ARF), the Meeting of Defense Ministers and Dialogue Partners (SMA+), the Expanded ASEAN Maritime Forum, etc., and also shows interest in joining APEC, but this initiative is met with resistance from many countries. from the Chinese side.

India sees the UN as a central element of the system of international relations and an important tool for establishing multilateral mechanisms to ensure a stable and just world order, although it supports adapting the Organization's structure to modern global challenges and threats, including reforming the UN Security Council.

New Delhi actively participates in the work of the Organization, in the implementation of the UN Development Program, having committed itself to achieving the "Millennium Development Goals", participates in the Agenda of the XXI century within the framework of the activities of the UN Commission on Sustainable Development and the Johannesburg Plan of Implementation.

India is the largest country in terms of the number of UN peacekeeping forces: since 1950. It sent about 180,000 soldiers and police to the UN forces, and participated in 44 UN peacekeeping operations. In 2014, it became the second largest country (after Bangladesh) in terms of the number of UN peacekeeping soldiers (8,123) participating in 12 UN peacekeeping missions and operations.²³

Modi has twice addressed the UN General Assembly sessions, stating the need for reform of the UN Security Council in both categories of membership. New Delhi insists that this should happen during the 70th session of the UN General Assembly through appropriate intergovernmental negotiations (WFP). Also important issues for India are the issue of sustainable development and the need to adopt a Comprehensive UN Convention on Combating Terrorism.

India's involvement in BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) is one of the country's foreign policy priorities. The theme of India's 2016 BRICS presidency is"Building Responsible, Inclusive and Collective Solutions", which demonstrates the seriousness of New Delhi's intentions to strengthen and deepen cooperation with member states in various areas both within the association and on the international stage.

Foreign Minister S. Swaraj, at the inauguration ceremony of the official website and logo of India's 2016 BRICS presidency, said that New Delhi plans to build its work this year in accordance with the principles of the I4C: a) Institutional Building( Institutional strengthening of BRICS); b) Implementation (Implementation of leaders ' decisions) c) integration(Innovation); e) continuity (Continuity)²⁴.

Modi paid special attention to relations with the United States and the EU, as evidenced by the fact that during these two years he visited the United States 4 times and met with Barack Obama 7 times. However, despite frequent meetings, extensive press coverage, and an extensive agenda for India-US and India-EU relations under Modi, key agreements and initiatives have yet to be implemented.

Among them - the bilateral memorandum on mutual material and technical support (LEMOA), which involves the provision of logistics assistance, is in the "negotiation process"; the memorandum of understanding in the field of compatibility and security of communication systems (CISMOA) and agreements on cooperation and data exchange in the geospatial field ( WESA) - in the status of " opportunities conclusions"; the nuclear deal with Westinghouse for the construction of 6 reactors has not yet been implemented; the agreement on bilateral trade and investment between India and the EU (BTIA) has not been signed; the memorandum of understanding on India's purchase of 36 Rafale fighter jets from France has not been implemented. The situation with the Italian Marines accused of murdering two Indian sailors in 2012 has only added to tensions between the two countries.-

New Delhi is also a significant trading partner of the United States and Europe.

N. Modi is trying to get the necessary technologies and investments from the West for domestic development, as well as some political "carte blanche" for more confident positioning of the country as a "leading" and, in the future, "great" power, but today "garlands of flowers" and "fountains of high-sounding rhetoric" do not reflect the actual situation in the country. the essence of the partnership.

* * *

The results of two years of Modi's foreign policy activity are impressive: the Prime Minister visited about 40 countries, signed a huge number of agreements and memoranda of understanding, and the country pragmatically defends its national interests in the international arena both at the bilateral level and within the framework of multilateral cooperation formats, using foreign policy tools to implement its own development agenda and promote economic interests.

The only thing that New Delhi cannot yet do is to "keep up" with the energetic N. Modi: to implement the planned projects, fill them with practical content and ensure their effectiveness. India, of course, must follow the chosen foreign policy courses and initiatives, and then, under the leadership of the pragmatist N. Modi, it can become a full-fledged independent center of world politics.

^{Shebarshin L. V.} 1st Hand of Moscow: notes of the chief of Soviet Intelligence, Moscow, Center-100, 1992 http://lib.ru/MEMUARY/SHEBARSHIN/rukamoskwy.txt

^{Panda Ankit.} 2 Foreign Policy in the 2014 BJP Manifesto // The Diplomat. 2014, April 7 - http://the-diplomat.com/2014/04/foreign-policy-in-the-2014-bjp-manifesto/

³ BJP Manifesto 2014 - http://www.bjp.org/manifesto2014

^{Suhasini Haidar.} 4 Position India in a leading role globally: Modi to Indian ambassadors // The Hindu. 2015, February 7 - http://thehindu.com/news/national/position-india-in-a-leading-role-globally-pm-to-indian-am bassadors/article6868993.ece/

⁵ See, for example: Volodin A. G. India-Russia-China in the free geometry of world Politics. 2006, No. 9 - http://www.intelros.ru/2007/04/16/andrejj_volodin_indija_rossija_kitajj_v_svobodnojj_geom etrii_mirovojj_politiki.html Volodin A. G. The Decade of the new "strategic partnership" / / North-South-Russia 2010. Yearbook / Ed. by V. G. Khoros, Moscow, IMEMO RAS, 2011. (Volodin A. G. 2011. Desyatiletie novogo "strategicheskogo partnerstva" // Sever - Yug - Rossiya 2010. Ezhegodnik / Ed. V. G. Khoros. M.) (in Russian); Lunev S. I. India as one of the new centers of influence // Comparative politics. 2012, N 2(8) - http://www.mgimo.ru/files2/z05_2013/sp_2_12.pdf

^{6. Volodin A. G.} 6 Visit of the President of Russia to India / / West - East - Russia 2014. Yearbook / Ed. by V. G. Khoros, D. B. Malysheva, M., IMEMO RAS, 2015, p. 148. (Volodin A. G. 2014. Vizit prezidenta Rossii v Indiyu / / Zapad-Vostok-Rossiya 2014. Ezhegodnik. M.) (in Russian)

^{Shashi Txapyp.} 7 Life downstream // Russia in global politics. 2014, N 6 - http://www.global-affairs.ru/number/Zhizn-vnizu-po-techeniyu-17195

⁸ IMF Survey. India's Economic Picture Brighter, but Investment, Structural Reforms Key - http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/2015/car031115a.htm

⁹ Cit. In: Teoriya mezhdunarodnykh otnosheniy: Uchebnoe posobie v 2 t. [Theory of International Relations: A textbook in 2 volumes]. Original reading materials. Nizhny Novgorod: FMO UNN, 2004, p. 8.

¹⁰ См.: Smith Jeff M. Cold Peace: China India Rivalry in the twenty-first century. Lexington Books. 2014, p. 277.

^{Mohan S. R.} 11 India and political equilibrium / / Russia in Global Politics. 2006, N 4 http://www.globalaffairs.ru/number/n_7066

¹² For more information, see: www.mea.gov.in

^{Shashi Tharoor.} 13 Decree. Op.

¹⁴ Valedictory Address by Minister of State for External Affairs at Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi (March 03, 2016).

^{Rajeswari Pillai Rajagopalan, Arka Biszeas.} 15 India's Membership to the Nuclear Suppliers Group // ORF Issue Brief. 2016, Issue No. 141 - http://www.orfonline.org/research/indias-membership-to-the-nuclear-suppliers-group/

¹⁶ Ibidem.

^{Mohan C.Raja.} 17 Towards New realism // The Indian Express. 2016. April 16 - http://www.hyderabad-cityonline.in/towards-new-realism/

¹⁸ For more information, see: Yurlov F. N. India. Foreign policy of the Modi Government / / Asia and Africa Today. 2015. N 11, p. 26. (Yurlov F. N. 2015. Indiya. Vneshnyaya politika pravitelstva N.Modi // Asia i Afrika segodnya. N 11) (in Russian)

¹⁹ Подробнее см.: www.kremlin.ru/supplement/4790, www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5050

²⁰ Cit. po: Kovalenko E. S. India is the seventh player in the SCO team? // Asia and Africa today. 2015. N 1, с. 8. (Kovalenko Ye.S. Indiya - sedmoy igrok v komande SHOS? // Asia i Afrika segodnya. N 1) (in Russian)

²¹ Speech by Foreign Secretary at Raisina Dialogue in New Delhi. 2015, March 2 - http://www.mea.gov.in/incoming-visit-detail.htm?26433/Speech+by+Foreign+Secretary+at+ Raisina+Dialogue+in+New+Delhi+March+2+2015

²² Remarks by the PM at the 12th India-ASEAN Summit. Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar. 2014, November 12 http://www.narendramodi.in/remarks-by-the-pm-at-the-12th-india-asean-summit-nay-pyi-taw -myanmar

²³ India and United Nations. Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding - https://www.pminewyork.org/pages.php?id=1985

²⁴ Statement by External Affairs Minister Smt. Sushma Swaraj on Formal Unveiling of India's BRICS Logo and Launch of BRICS Website in New Delhi. 2016, March 22 -www.pib.nic.in/newsite/PrintRelease.aspx?relid=138237

Permanent link to this publication: