In the course of adapting the societies of Asian and African countries to the realities of the modern world in the XX century, the traditional political culture of local societies and state-political institutions borrowed from outside were interpenetrated. Using the example of the long-term struggle of Myanmar's "second generation" modernists, and above all their leader Aung San Suu Kyi, to regain the positions lost in the structure of the country's post-colonial elite at the end of the 20th century, and at the same time for political control over the radical urban counter-elite, the article proves the effectiveness of the long-term policy of the modernist wing of the Burmese/Myanmar national elite to adapt the traditionalist Burmese It is shown that the successful implementation of these tasks became possible after 1945 as a result of the consistent convergence of representatives of Burmese modernists with influential circles of the British elite.

Keywords: Burma / Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi, Ne Win, traditional culture, convergence, modernists, elite, counter-elite.

LOCAL TRADITION AND CONVERGENCE OF THE WORLD'S ELITE: THE PHENOMENON OF AUNG SAN SUU KYI

Dmitry A. BRODYAK

The article discusses the long struggle of the Myanmar modernists of the "second generation" and especially their leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi for the return of the positions in the structure of the post-colonial elite they had lost at the end of the twentieth century and, simultaneously, for political control of the radical urban counter-elite. The article proves the effectiveness of the long-term policy of the modernist wing of the national elite of Burma/Myanmar for the adaptation of traditionalist Burmese society to the modern political practices; it is also shown that the successful implementation of that policy became possible after 1945 as a result of the convergence of the Burmese modernists with influential circles of the British elite.

Keywords: Burma/Myanmar, Aung San Suu Kyi, Ne Win, traditional culture, convergence, modernists, elite, counter-elite.

Throughout the 20th century, in the process of the formation of the modern global world, traditional societies in Asia and Africa experienced a deepening identity crisis, accompanied by the marginalization of broad segments of the population and the emergence of various radical political groups of both the right and the left. As in a number of other regions of the East, in Burma / Myanmar, during the colonial and postcolonial periods, pauperized urban strata grew, and an urbanized protest environment was formed-a breeding ground for the emergence of a local right-wing counter-elite. Activity of this company

Dmytro BRODYAK-Candidate of the History Department of V. N. Karazin Kharkiv National University, methodologist of the Kharkiv Regional Library for Children, Kharkiv, Ukraine; harrus777@gmail.com.

Dmitry A. BRODYAK - PhD Applicant, V.N. Karazin Kharkiv National University: Methodist, Kharkiv Regional Library for Children, Kharkiv, Ukraine; harrus777@gmail.com.

page 40
Since 1988, the counter-elite group has been inextricably linked with the name of Aung San Suu Kyi, the daughter of the national hero of Burma/Myanmar, General Aung San, the founder of the modern Burmese state.

The figure of Aung San Suu Kyi , an outstanding female politician and winner of the 1991 Nobel Peace Prize, has attracted the attention of both Russian researchers [Listopadov, 1998; Listopadov, 2012; Simonia, 2015] and Western researchers [Aung Zaw, 2013; Houtman, 1999; Lintner, 1990; Stewart, 1996] - Burmanists. At the same time, the study of the political career of General Aung San's daughter in the context of her relationships with representatives of the Burmese postcolonial elite, which is of great importance for identifying the mechanisms of the evolution of local elite groups, has not yet found proper reflection in modern Burmese studies. Similarly, the functioning of the modernist wing of the elite of independent Burma as a component of the structure of world elites, including Western elites, has been overlooked by researchers.

Russian(Vasiliev, 2010, p. 115-352; Listopadov, 2012; Simonia, 2011 (2); Simonia, 2015) and Western (Callahan, 2010; Taylor, 2009, p. 219-506; Taylor, 2015) researchers have so far mainly covered the stages of inter-elite confrontation in post-war Burma/Myanmar. It is not necessary to discuss the internal evolution of local elite groups and not to link the formation of the latter with the reactions of traditional society to the invasion of the realities and values of modern globalism, but rather to discuss the issues of "army - opposition", "authoritarianism-democracy", and "order and anarchy".

Meanwhile, the complexities and contradictions of the colonial and postcolonial stages of the history of developing countries are reflected in the concrete political phenomenon of Aung San Suu Kyi and in the overall difficult fate of her homeland. Before Burma was finally subjugated by the British in 1885, after three wars, three traditional eastern structures of the imperial type successively replaced each other on its land during the 2nd millennium AD [Ivashentsov, 2014, p.75]. As in a number of other Eastern countries, power in pre-colonial Burmese society was primarily a capacity for patronage. At the top of the paternalistic social hierarchy was traditionally the monarch - the highest type of guardian, the embodiment of the idea of patronage given to the sangha, officials, and the people. In general, the search for a leader gradually became the basis of Burmese political culture at all levels of the social pyramid [Aghajanyan, 1987, pp. 322-323; Nash, 1965, p. 275].

During the third Anglo-Burmese war in November 1885, these well-established ideas about political culture were challenged by the victory of the colonialists, the fact that traditional Burma was powerless to resist the onslaught of Europeans. Nevertheless, the confusion of Burmese society in connection with the collapse of traditional foundations of life soon gave way to the emergence of a broad resistance movement in the country, which was led by representatives of the deposed Konbaung dynasty [Kozlova, 1972, pp. 234-235, 244].

The Burmese armed resistance to British colonization that lasted for about five years, along with the monarchical peasant uprising led by Sai San in 1931 [Herbert, 1982, p. 13, 30-32] and the class regime of the pro-Japanese "Burmese State" during World War II [Mozheyko, 1973, p. 239; Taylor, 2009, p. 226-228 The event demonstrated the strength and vitality of the traditional political culture, which has had a strong impact on the entire recent history of the country.

The emerging post-colonial elite had to reckon with the old-Firm political ideas during this period. The core modernists, the Takins ("masters") of the pre-war patriotic association Dobama ("Our Burma"), were part of the Adipadi ("supreme ruler")government during the years of Japanese rule Ba Mo and March 27, 1945 raised an uprising against the Japanese occupation of the country [Mozheyko, 1973, p. 244]. After the victory over the Japanese, relations between the Burmese modernists and the British military were different

page 41
close and versatile cooperation. Lord Louis Mountbatten (1st Earl Mountbatten of Burma), a prominent British military and statesman and great-grandson of Queen Victoria, played a special role in strengthening contacts with Burmese patriotic forces and in shaping the Burmese post-colonial elite in general. In 1943-1946, he was the Supreme Allied Commander in Southeast Asia, in particular, he led the defeat of Japanese troops in Burma (together with the commander of the 14th British Army, Field Marshal William Slim), and in March 1947 became the last viceroy of British India [Mauntbetten of Burma, 1951, p. 145-202]. Representing a part of the British ruling elite close to the Windsor dynasty, Lord Mountbatten opposed the inflexible, negative official course towards the emerging groups of national elites in India, Ceylon, and Burma. He strongly promoted cooperation and compromise with patriotic modernist forces in the British colonies in the south of the Asian continent [Nehru, 1965, p. 116, 119; Zabolotny, 2010, p.33-34, 38-39].

Already in the spring of 1945, L. Mountbatten and his entourage established fruitful business contacts with the head of the Burmese National Army, General Aung San, and his associates. At the May 16, 1945 meeting between Aung San and Field Marshal William Slim, the two sides expressed their mutual respect and desire to cooperate for the liberation and restoration of Burma [Vasiliev, 2010, p.142. Aung San impressed W. Slim as "a true patriot and balanced realist... I could do business with Aung San, " the general commented on his negotiations with the Burmese leader [I could do..., Aung San of Burma, 1962, p. 83-85]. The British Field Marshal and his chief, Lord Mountbatten, had warm relations with Aung San's closest associate, Colonel Ne Win , the future commander-in-chief of the armed forces of independent Burma. Ne Win repeatedly noted that L. Mountbatten, thanks to his outstanding diplomatic tact, "won the hearts of Burmese residents" [Zabolotny, 2010, p.33]. Already at the head of the Burmese army and state, General Ne Win maintained close informal contacts with Mountbatten until the latter's death at the hands of an Irish terrorist in 1979 [Listopadov, 1997, p. 60].

Unsurprisingly, English language training in the Burmese armed forces has always been at a high level. Anglo-American political theories, in particular the theory of convergence ("convergence") of various social systems and elite groups, which was popular in the 1940s and 1980s, were not alien to the emerging Burmese elite [Sorokin, 1944, p. 157-159]. Thus, back in 1947, Aung San, setting out the program of socio-economic measures after independence, considered the social structure he designed as "something between capitalism and socialism", defined it as internally mobile and accessible to external influences [Kaufman, 1973(1), p. 119; Kaufman, 1973 (2), p. 75].

However, Burmese modernists were aware that when building a modern state, it is impossible to ignore the traditional ideological ideas of the Burmese village, which were manifested in the political life of the country throughout the colonial period. It seems that within the framework of this political discourse and in the context of a bloody civil war between the ruling modernists and the left-wing radical counter-elite, the entourage of the commander of the national army, General Ne Win, conceived the idea of stabilizing the state institutions of independent Burma, which are not quite legitimate in the eyes of the traditionalist-minded population, by forming a new party-political structure. Such a power vertical was supposed to be created with the participation of the "legitimate" heir to General Aung San, who tragically died in July 1947. In accordance with traditional old Burmese beliefs, such a political successor to the national hero could only come from the circle of blood relatives of the founder of the modern Burmese state. As you know, the deceased left after

page 42
His widow, Do Khin Kyi, with two sons and a daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi (born June 19, 1945). After his father's death, they lived in Rangoon under the patronage of the leadership of the ruling Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (ALNS), primarily the commander-in-chief of the Burmese Armed Forces, Ne Win, the most influential representative of the national elite. Burmese modernists understood that in the era of the formation of a global capitalist world order, Aung San's children could gain a foothold in the ruling elite of independent Burma only if they received a modern education and at the same time if they were organically incorporated into the ranks of the world, including Western, elite.

As a result, General Ne Win agreed to the proposal of the new British Ambassador to Burma, Sir Paul Gore-Booth (head of the British diplomatic mission from 1953 to 1956), to provide the diplomat with the opportunity to oversee the education and upbringing of the 10-year-old daughter of the late Burmese Modernist leader, whose family Gore-Booth met during his stay in the country [GoreBooth, 1974, p. 317; Stewart, 1996, p. 31]. This hypothesis does not contradict the previously mentioned post-war strategic course of the British elite to strengthen personal and state contacts with the ruling groups of the newly independent states adjacent to China - potential partners and allies on the world stage. It helps explain both the British patronage of Suu Kyi and many of the events of her life.

Suu Kyi's mother, a former chief nurse at a Rangoon hospital, had a major influence on shaping her personality. After Aung San's death, his wife Do Khin Ji held a high position in the national establishment, in particular, she was a member of Parliament, headed a number of social services and the Women's Affairs Department of the Anti-Fascist People's Freedom League (ALNS) [Burma..., Documentation..., 31.07.1995]. Her children, including Suu Kyi, attended Burma's most prestigious secondary school, the Rangoon Methodist English Grammar School (Stewart, 1996, p. 13,17).

After Suu Kyi's new guardian, Baron Paul Gore-Booth, was appointed head of the British diplomatic mission in Delhi in 1960, Do Khin Kyi was also sent to India as Burma's Ambassador to India and Nepal. This was the first and only appointment of a woman to the post of head of a Burmese diplomatic mission in history [Aung Zaw, 2013, p. 12-13]. Suu Kyi moved with her mother to the Indian capital, where she continued her studies first at a local private gymnasium, and then at the Lady Sri Ram Liberal Arts College of the University of Delhi. Here, Aung San's daughter, who followed political events in her homeland from a young age, included representatives of South Asian elites, including the grandsons of Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru-Sanjay and Rajiv Gandhi [Stewart, 1996, p. 22, 26].

In 1967, during a period of sharp escalation of political confrontation in Burma, Do Khin Kyi resigned as head of the Burmese diplomatic mission in India [Burma..., Documentation..., 31.07.1995].

In turn, back in 1965, the British Ambassador to India, Gore-Booth, received a new appointment and served as Deputy Foreign Minister of Great Britain for four years [Roger Louis, 2006, p. 712]. His family continued to take care of Aung San Suu Kyi, who moved to England to continue her education. Living in the Gore-Booth House in London, she studied at St Hugh's College for Women, Oxford University, from 1964 to 1967. Despite her particular penchant for literature, Suu Kyi studied political science, philosophy, and economics , all of which could be useful in her public and political activities. [Stewart, 1996, p. 29-30]. Suu Kyi met Michael Ayres, a tutor for the children of the King of Bhutan and a major expert on Tibetan history and culture, at the Gore-But House, which was regularly visited by members of the British elite. In 1972, she married him [Hoge, The New York Times, 30.03.1999].

page 43
Since 1969. Suu Kyi worked for three years in New York at the UN secretariat, where she gained the necessary political and administrative experience for her future career [Stewart, 1996, p. 33-34]. Later, she helped her husband with his research, worked on his father's biography, and raised her sons Alexander and Kim, who in 1986, accompanied by their mother, visited their grandmother Do Khin Ji in Rangoon and underwent a traditional Buddhist monastic tonsure ceremony [Aung San... Biographical]. This action, as well as the Buddhist wedding ceremony of Aung San Suu Kyi with M. Ayres [Hoge, The New York Times, 30.03.1999], allowed Aung San's daughter to strengthen her position in the eyes of the Burmese political elite with its strong traditionalist sympathies.

Meanwhile, in the post-war period, the expansion and reform of the modern education system contributed to the growth of the political weight of student counter-elite groups, despite the preservation of power in the hands of the national military elite. In the second half of the 20th century, radicals from the urban counter-elite organized several anti-government demonstrations-in 1962, 1974, 1976, and 1987 [Vasiliev, 2010, pp. 306, 313-320]. The economic failures of the Ne Win regime sparked new student unrest in the spring of 1988, which began with a minor conflict between students and local youth in a Rangoon street cafe [Student..., Burma press summary, March 1988, p. 32-33; Vasiliev, 2010, p.321]. The political situation in the country began to get out of control of the authorities.

By the time of the crisis, the "second generation" of the Westernized wing of the postcolonial Burmese elite had already formed and was preparing to enter power. In addition to Suu Kyi, it was represented, for example, by the former head of Ne Wien's personal security and chief of military intelligence, General Khin Nyunt, Director General of the Army Supply Department, General David Abel, a Catholic by religion, and General Ne Wien's daughter, son-in-law, and other relatives [Simonia, 2011(1), pp. 296-297]. The modernists understood that a legitimate heir to the" architect " of independent Burma would be able to stay in power only if he managed to take control of the powerful student movement, while maintaining ties with the military elite and maintaining contacts with Western politicians. Aung San Suu Kyi had acquired the necessary education, administrative experience and personal connections to meet this challenge in the previous period of her life. The sharp deterioration of the domestic political situation in Burma proved to be a good time to start her active political career, and on April 1, 1988, she urgently flew from London to Rangoon [Aung San... Biographical].

Do Khin Ji's stroke, which occurred on the eve of her death after a long illness on December 27, 1988 [Suu Kyi..., The Irrawaddy, December 27, 2010], hastened the departure of her daughter to her homeland. In light of the above, it is not surprising that after returning to the country, the future leader of the Burmese opposition, through the mediation of Aung San's long - time ally, U Myint, immediately tried to meet with General Ne Win, after which, in a personal message addressed to him, she confirmed her readiness to actively engage in political life [Aung Zaw, 2013, p. 13].

In June 1988, Burma was rocked by a new wave of riots, with demonstrators clashing with the police. At the extraordinary congress of the ruling Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP), held on 23-25 July 1988, its Chairman, General Ne Win, resigned. The crisis of the PBSP regime has entered its final stage. Demands for political reform were expressed by representatives of various groups of Burmese society. For example, Ne Win's long-time opponent, retired Brigadier General Aung Kyi, published several open letters to the Burmese leader starting in March 1988, in which he sharply criticized the policy of the PBSP [Letters..., Burma Debate, p. 16-18; Vasiliev, 2010, p. 321]. Ne Win's..., Burma press summary, July 1988, p. 5.Ne Win himself suggested at the end of July 1988 to consider abolishing the one-party system and holding democratic elections in the country.

page 44
Such actions prepared public opinion in advance for the appearance of new faces in the political arena. Against this background, on August 15, 1988, the first public statement of the future leader of the Burmese opposition appeared: in an open letter to the government, Aung San Suu Kyi proposed the formation of a special advisory body to prepare for general elections [Aung San... Biographical].

From that moment on, she positioned herself as an independent political player, strictly adhering to the course of maximum distancing from the unpopular PBSP regime and Not Wine. Unrelated to the ruling modernist group, Suu Kyi has been a vocal critic of the Burmese military's rule from the start of her political career. In turn, General Ne Win expressed disapproval about the contacts of the daughter of his comrade-in-arms with the British [Aung San Suu Kyi, 2010, p. 310, 314; Simonia, 2011(1), pp. 288-289; Taylor, 2015, p. 399]. Distancing herself from the previous regime allowed Suu Kyi to avoid political responsibility for the unpopular policies of the previous regime.

In the heated political climate of the summer of 1988, the Government of Burma's civilian President Maung Maung, forced to make concessions to the opposition, lifted the previously imposed martial law in Rangoon and the surrounding area on August 24. On the same day, General Aung San's little - known daughter visited wounded demonstrators in a Rangoon hospital and made her first public address to the assembled opposition, calling for calm and order. On August 26, at a grand rally of half a million people at the Buddhist shrine of Burma - Shwedagon Pagoda - Aung San Suu Kyi made a larger political declaration, saying that the daughter of the national hero of Burma can not watch the escalation of the crisis with indifference and is therefore actively involved in the political process. This speech marked a turning point in the political biography of the new Burmese modernist leader. It turned Suu Kyi into a symbol of the protest movement, presenting her as a national politician [Aung San Suu Kyi, 2010, p. 270; Oppositionists..., 1988; Aung Zaw, 2013, p. 13,14].

It seems that at that stage of her political career, Suu Kyi successfully implemented Ne Win's plan to resolve the 1988 crisis, which included a combination of forceful pressure and verbal and psychological pressure on the crowd by a figure who enjoyed the confidence of the opposition. In the midst of the crisis, Suu Kyi's speeches calmed the angry people as much as she could, dispersed and directed their uncontrolled aggression in a neutral direction [Vasiliev, 2010, pp. 341-342]. In the future, she was to lead and lead to victory in the elections a national political party that was apparently not connected with the PBSP regime.

Delegates to the extraordinary Congress of the PBSP and the session of the People's Assembly held on September 10, 1988, agreed to hold multi-party elections in the country while maintaining the authority of the current civil administration. The radical part of the student opposition opposed this decision, demanding the formation of a radically updated provisional government [ibid., p. 331]. In a special statement, Suu Kyi softened the ultimatum tone of the urban radical agenda. She noted that holding multi-party elections is only one of the demands of the opposition and will be possible if the new government is acceptable to the whole society, not excluding the ruling civil and military modernists [Daw Aung San..., 1988; Multi-party..., 1988].

It must be said that the very possibility of a democratic transfer of power to the inexperienced hands of Suu Kyi in the midst of an acute political and economic crisis caused sharp rejection among the conservative part of the Burmese military [The 93rd State..., 1990, p. 5]. The biography of "foreign Mrs. Ayris", a person who spent most of her life abroad, also caused dissatisfaction having a foreign spouse and half-blood children [Vasiliev, 2010, p. 339]. Against this background, the mass opposition movement continued to expand steadily. Reports of riots and casualties

page 45
they came from everywhere. In the outlying regions, rioters often physically exterminated members of the district committees of the PBSP; cases of ritual cannibalism were recorded [Chamovskikh, 1988, p. 20]. Burma was gradually slipping into anarchy and chaos, and the threat of general disintegration of the country was growing.

In the face of such a threat, a military coup took place in the country on September 18, 1988, with the consent of General Ne Vin. For the first time in the history of independent Burma, conservative-minded military personnel from the Burmese Army Ground Forces command came to power. Meanwhile, the results of the multi-party elections held under the previous regime and supported by military conservatives on May 27, 1990, were unexpected for many participants and observers. The main opposition party, the National League for Democracy (NLD), won by a large margin not the National Unity Party (PNE, the successor of the PBSP), with which the new authorities hoped to establish a constructive dialogue, but the main opposition party [Election..., 1990, p. 9-37]. The NLD won 392 out of 485 parliamentary seats, or more than 80%, while the PNE won only 10. The electoral success of the NLD was achieved in the face of mass repression and arrests of many of its supporters. In July 1989, about a year before the election, Suu Kyi was also placed under house arrest, deprived of the right to participate in the upcoming election campaign [Daw Aung San..., 1989, p. 15; Vasiliev, 2010, p.348].

After the crushing defeat of the military modernists in the elections, the conservatives of the ruling State Council for the Restoration of Law and Order (SCR) declared that they would transfer power only to a responsible civilian government elected in accordance with the new Constitution [The 93rd State..., 1990, p. 4-5]. But as the National Constitutional Convention, which first met in January 1993, worked slowly and intermittently on the text of the new Basic Law, a military regime was established in the country for a long time - more than two decades. All this time, while under house arrest, which was interrupted by infrequent periods of free movement around the country, Suu Kyi tried to negotiate with the ruling military conservatives, while at the same time trying to preserve the organizational structures and personnel of her main political pillar - the National League for Democracy [Vasiliev, 2010, pp. 348-349, 366].

The Myanmar opposition leader's bright start to his political career was widely known and recognized around the world, thanks in no small part to the personal connections and lobbying efforts of her husband, M. Ayres, who spent many years teaching at the prestigious St. John's and St. John's Colleges. At that time, such prominent representatives of the British and world elite as the Anglo-German politician, sociologist and economist Lord Dahrendorf, British Prime Minister E. Blair, US Senator and presidential candidate G. Hart, and others were associated with them. When Suu Kyi, after her return to Myanmar, came into sharp conflict with the local military conservatives, the board of the College of St. John's Worcestershire. St. John's granted Michael Ayres a full-time sabbatical to protect his wife's interests in the international arena [Ibid.]. Largely due to M. Ayres ' contacts, the head of the NLD was already awarded the Freedom of Thought Award in the summer of 1991. Andrei Sakharov Prize awarded by the European Parliament. In the fall of that year, Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for her "nonviolent struggle for democracy and human rights.".., Biographical].

Simultaneously with the award ceremony, Aung San Suu Kyi's autobiographical book "Freedom from Fear" was published in the United States, Great Britain and several other countries around the world. In it, in particular, she emphasized her commitment to the political principles of her father, General Aung San, who supported the formation of a democratic political system in the country, which, combined with a strong and popular army, could prevent the disintegration of the state [Aung San Suu Kyi, 2010, p. 272-273].

page 46
At the same time, Suu Kyi often addressed the Buddhist religion - one of the main Myanmar political values-in her speeches and publications, focusing on a broad Myanmar audience with its traditionalist sympathies [Ibid., p. 282, 362-367; Houtman, 1999, p. 292-293, 295, 298-299]. Speaking about the promotion of women to leading roles in the political life of Myanmar in the late twentieth century, it should be emphasized that this phenomenon is entirely consistent with the traditional Myanmar political culture, which excluded discrimination against women in public affairs [Hall, 1955, p. 127].

After more than 14 years of intermittent detention, Suu Kyi was finally released on November 10, 2010, a few days after the general parliamentary elections [Daw Aung San..., 2010, p. 8]. This event, which marked the beginning of the democratization of Myanmar's political regime, became possible as a result of the consistent implementation of the so-called Road Map towards Democracy, proposed back in 2003 by the Government of Khin Nyunt, a former ally of General Ne Win [Roadmap..., 2003]. However, in March 2010, Suu Kyi's party decided to boycott the upcoming elections and voluntarily dissolve itself in protest against article 59f of the 2008 Constitution, which prohibited citizens with foreign family ties from running for president, and against the exclusion of persons with criminal records from registered parties [Constitution.., 2008, p. 19-20; Simonia, 2010, pp. 208-210].

Both before and after the 2010 elections. Suu Kyi skilfully maneuvered between the groups that made up her entourage, gradually subjugating them to her influence. So, in May 2009 she initiated an episode with an illegal visit of a foreigner to her villa (with a subsequent trial in this case) in order to bring the NLD under legal liquidation and re-registration [Press briefing.., 2010, p. 3; Simonia, 2011(1), pp. 300-303]. As noted by the Russian researcher P. N. Kozma, thanks to this action, Suu Kyi, through the hands of the ruling conservatives, carried out a general purge of the party's leadership and maximally reduced the personnel ballast in the face of the old generation of its "founding fathers". Instead, new faces appeared in the NLD leader's entourage, which allowed her to solve the long-standing task of political subordination of the Myanmar elite to the right-wing urban counter-elite. In particular, according to P. N. Kozma, on the eve of the by-elections to the parliament in April 2012. Suu Kyi managed to attract several former student protest leaders to the party's ranks: they were promised parliamentary seats and positions in the NLD structures. In the run-up to the next parliamentary elections in November 2015, when forming party lists, Suu Kyi's NLD finally pushed the radical wing of the Generation 88 group to the periphery of national politics. So, during the selection process, the number of candidates for deputies did not include "iconic" figures of the Myanmar democratic movement - Min Ko Naing, Ko Ko Kyi, Min Zya, Ko Thei Chwe and others, the most famous representatives of the "generation of students of 1988". At the same time, it turned out that the NLD leadership promised to include them in the list until the last moment and refused the oppositionists only when they did not have time to run in the districts, for example, as independent candidates [Myanmar..., 2015; Kozma, 2015]. In other words, long before the election, Suu Kyi began forming a fully managed parliamentary faction.

At the same time, like the "first generation" Burmese modernists, Suu Kyi's political strategy took into account the strong traditionalist sympathies of the average Myanmar. From 2012-2013, she launched a campaign for the village voter , the social pillar of all military regimes in Myanmar's history. In particular, at this stage of her political career, the leader of the Myanmar opposition constantly emphasized her commitment to Buddhism-she surrounded herself with a group of close monks who accompanied her on trips around the country, and sought common ground with the most conservative and nationalistic sector of the sangha (Buddhist community) - the Ma Ba Ta movement [Myanmar..., 2015; Kiryanov,

page 47
2015]. During the conflict between Buddhists and Muslims in Rakhine State in western Myanmar, which peaked in 2012-2013, the head of the NLD strongly avoided expressing support for the Muslim minority, fearing to alienate the nationalist Buddhist majority of the country [Rigby, 2015]. Suu Kyi herself, actively using the theme of "a future for your children" in her election speeches, presented herself to the voters as the "mother of the nation" - a modern embodiment of the traditional Myanmar monarch, who provides each resident of the country with her own patronage, protection and assistance [Kiryanov, 2015; Kozma, 2015].

It should be noted that the considerable political, economic, and image successes of the military regime gave Myanmar traditionalists reason to hope for broad electoral support during the upcoming parliamentary elections [Kiryanov, 2015]. However, events have shown that the lack of legitimacy of political institutions, especially the army, in post-colonial Myanmar could not be filled by either significant achievements of the military or their appeals to traditional political culture [Tsekhanova, 2006, pp. 359-369]. During the election campaign against Suu Kyi, they had to hear directly from their fellow countrymen about the illegitimacy of the military's rule. According to observers, candidates from the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party (SPSR) were sometimes told by voters during pre-election meetings: "Yes, we know you, you are a very worthy person. But we will vote for the NLD", i.e. for Aung San Suu Kyi [Kiryanov, 2015].

Suu Kyi's 27-year-long struggle to strengthen the political position of Myanmar's modernists resulted in a convincing victory for the NLD in the parliamentary elections on November 8, 2015 , the first open duel between the opposition and the ruling military elite since 1990. According to the Myanmar Union Electoral Commission, out of 657 seats in both houses of Parliament, the opposition NLD won 390 seats, or just over 59.4% of the seats (if we take into account the 25% parliamentary quota guaranteed to the army under the 2008 Constitution). As in 1990, it won about 80% of the contested seats. According to the results of the elections, the Myanmar opposition was able to independently, without a coalition with other political forces, elect a new president and form the country's government [Simonia, 2015, p. 109; Kiryanov, 2015].

Despite the restrictive articles of the 2008 Constitution, the head of the NLD, reflecting the traditionalist, pro-monarchist demands of the majority of voters, soon after the announcement of the election results, confirmed that she was going to become a key politician in the country. "I make all decisions because I am the leader of the winning party. And the president will be the one whom we choose in accordance with the norms of the Constitution. He should be well aware that he will not have power, but will act according to the decisions of the party, " Suu Kyi said in an interview [Joshi, 2015]. It should be noted that following the results of the elections, the emerging political system of Myanmar gains additional stability due to the hierarchical structure of the new ruling party, the National League for Democracy, being built into it. At the same time, it is worth noting that the military segment of the national elite does not leave the political scene in the new conditions, but remains an important stabilizing element of the ruling elite [Constitution..., 2008, p. 11].

The political changes that took place after the 2015 parliamentary elections in Myanmar were the result of a long struggle of Myanmar's "second generation" modernists, and above all their leader Aung San Suu Kyi, to regain their lost positions in the political power structure at the end of the 20th century and at the same time to control the radical urban counter-elite. The daughter of Aung San, the head of Myanmar's "first generation" of modernists, like her predecessors, managed to stop the threats from radicals and helped stabilize the emerging civil political system. At the same time, the successful implementation of the tasks that had long been faced by the ruling elite of independent Burma became possible after 1945.

page 48
as a result of the consistent convergence of Burmese modernist representatives with influential circles of the British elite. In this sense, some major diplomatic events of recent times, first of all, the state visit of Chinese Leader Xi Jinping to the United Kingdom in October 2015 [Xi Jinping, 2015] and the five-day official trip of the head of the Myanmar opposition to China that preceded it in June 2015 [Burma's..., 2015; Simonia, 2015, p. 123-124] can be considered as an important intermediate result of the above-mentioned strategic course of the British ruling elite to form a geopolitical alliance with the elites of the new China and its neighboring countries, including Myanmar. In general, the study of the political phenomenon of Aung San Suu Kyi, her personal and political biography in the context of relations with various circles of Burmese and world elites allows us to conclude that the long-term policy of gradual adaptation of the traditionalist Burmese society to modern political realities formed by the Burmese/Myanmar leadership is effective.

list of literature

Agadzhanyan A. S. Gosudarstvo i traditsionnaya politicheskaya kul'tura Burmy [State and traditional political culture of Burma]. Gosudarstvo v dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestvakh Azii [State in pre-capitalist societies of Asia]. Main Editorial Office of Eastern Literature, 1987. = Agadzhanian A.S. Gosudarstvo i traditsionnaia politicheskaia kul'tura Birmy // Gosudarstvo v dokapitalisticheskikh obshchestvakh Azii / Ed. by G.F. Kim, K.Z. Ashrafian. Moscow: Nauka. Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1987.

Baryshnikov V. Orientalist Aida Simonia-on Myanmar's opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi / / Radio Liberty. 29.05.2012. - http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/24597226.html. = Baryshnikov V. Vostokoved Aida Simoniia - o lidere oppozitsii M'ianmy Aung San Suu Kyi // Radio Svoboda. 29.05.2012. - http://www.svoboda.org/content/article/24597226.html (accessed: 20.12.15).

Vasiliev V. F. Istoriya Myanmar/Burma [History of Myanmar / Burma]. XX century. Moscow: IV RAS, Kraft +, 2010. = Vasil'ev V.F. Istoriia M'ianmy/Birmy. XX vek. Moscow: IV RAN. Kraft+, 2010.

Zabolotny V. M. Lord Mountbatten-the Last Viceroy of British India (Experience of reconstruction of the transition period from the British Empire to the Commonwealth of Nations) // Bulletin of the Peoples ' Friendship University of Russia. Series "Universal History" / Ed. by S. A. Voronin, Moscow: RUDN University, 2010. N 2. = Zabolotnyi V. M. Lord Mountbatten - poslednii vitse-korol' Britanskoi Indii (Opyt rekonstruktsii perekhodnogo perioda ot Britanskoi imperii k Sdruzhestvu natsii) // Vestnik Rossiiskogo universiteta druzhby narodov. Seriia "Vseobshchaia istoriia" / Ed. by S. A. Voronin. Moscow: RUDN. 2010. N 2.

Ivashentsov G. A. Myanmar: Changing milestones.Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn. 2014. N 2. = Ivashentsov G.A. M'ianma: smena vekh // Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'. 2014. N 2.

Kaufman A. S. Burma: ideologiya i politika [Burma: Ideology and Politics]. Main Editorial Office of Eastern Literature, 1973. = Kaufman A.S. Birma: ideologiia i politika. Moscow: Nauka. Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1973.

Kaufman A. S. Ideological path of Aung San / / Peoples of Asia and Africa. 1973. N 3. = Kaufman A. S. Ideinyi put' Aun Sana. // Narody Azii i Afriki. 1973. N 3.

Kiryanov O. The opposition won the election in Myanmar / / Rossiyskaya Gazeta. 22.11.2015. - http://www.rg.ru/2015/11/22/myanma-site.html = Kir'ianov O. Oppozitsiia oderzhala pobedu na vyborakh v M'ianme. // Rossiiskaia gazeta. 22.11.2015. - http://www.rg.ru/2015/11/22/myanma-site.html (accessed: 22.01.16).

Kiryanov O. Expert: Myanmar believed in a beautiful fairy tale about democracy // Rossiyskaya gazeta. 10.11.2015. - http://www.rg.ru/2015/11/10/myanma-site.html = Kir'ianov O. Ekspert: M'ianma poverila v krasivuiu skazku pro demokratiiu // Rossiiskaia gazeta. 10.11.2015. - http://www.rg.ru/2015/11/10/myanma-site.html (accessed: 24.01.16).

Kozlova M. G. English conquest of Burma. Main Editorial Office of Eastern Literature, 1972. = Kozlova M.G. Angliiskoe zavoevanie Birmy. Moscow: Nauka. Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1972.

Kozma P. Myanmar: Why can the ruling party lose the election? // Regnum. 7.11.2015. - http://regnum.ru/news/polit/2007046.html = Koz'ma P. M'ianma: pochemu praviashchaia partiia mozhet

page 49
proigrat' vybory? / / Regnum. 7.11.2015. - http://regnum.ru/news/polit/2007046.html (accessed: 07.02.16).

Listopadov N. A. The Riddle of Suu Kyi / / Asia and Africa today. 1998. N 1. = Listopadov N. A. Zagadka Suu Kyi // Aziia i Afrika segodnia. 1998. N 1.

Listopadov N. A. Ladies and Generals: enmity or Compromise? // Asia and Africa today. 2012. N 12. = Listopadov N.A. Ledi i generaly: vrazhda ili kompromiss? // Aziia i Afrika segodnia. 2012. N 12.

Listopadov N. A. U Ne Vin / / Voprosy istorii [Questions of History]. 1997. N 11. = Listopadov N.A. U Ne Vin. // Voprosy istorii. 1997. N 11.

Mozheyko I. V., Uzyanov A. N. Istoriya Burma (Kratkiy ocherk) [History of Burma (Short essay)]. Main Editorial Office of Eastern Literature, 1973. = Mozheiko I.V., Uzianov A.N. Istoriia Birmy (Kratkii ocherk). M.: Nauka. Glavnaia redaktsiia vostochnoi literatury, 1973.

Myanmar: "Discontent with opposition candidates is spreading across the country" / / Regnum / Irravaddy. 8.08.2015. - http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1950355.html = M'ianma: "Nedovol'stvo kandidatami ot oppozitsii idet po vsei strane". // Regnum/Irravaddy. 8.08.2015. - http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1950355.html (accessed: 14.01.16).

Myanmar: the opposition tried to make peace with Buddhist nationalists / / Regnum / Irravaddy. 1.10.2015. - http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1983123.html = M'ianma: oppozitsiia popytalas' pomirit'sia s buddiiskimi natsionalistami // Regnum/Irravaddy. 1.10.2015. - http://regnum.ru/news/polit/1983123.html (accessed: 10.01.16).

Nehru D. Save the World (Speech on London radio 12.01.1951) / / Nehru D. Foreign Policy of India. Selected speeches and speeches, 1946-1964. / Translated under the editorship of V. I. Likhachev. Moscow: Progress, 1965. = Neru D. Sokhranit' mir (Vystuplenie po londonskomu radio 12.01.1951) // Neru D. Vneshniaia politika Indii. Izbrannye rechi i vystupleniia, 1946-1964. / Ed. by V.I. Likhachev. M.: Progress, 1965.

Simoniya A. A. Vlastvuyushchaya voennaya elita v Myanmar [The ruling military elite in Myanmar] / Drugov, N. P. Maletin, and O. V. Novakova, Moscow: Klyuch-S. 2011. = Simoniia A.A. Vlastvuiushchaia voennaia elita v M'ianme // Elity stran Vostoka / Ed. by A.Iu. Drugov, N.P. Maletin, O.V. Novakova. Moscow: Kliuch-S. 2011.

Simonia A. A. Myanmar in the run-up to the parliamentary elections / / South-East Asia: actual problems of development. / Ed. by N. P. Maletin. Moscow: IV RAN. 2010. N 14. = Simoniia A. A. M'ianma v preddverii parlamentskikh vyborov // Iugo-Vostochnia Aziia: aktual ' NYE problem razvitiia / Ed. by N. P. Maletin. Moscow: IV RAN. 2010. N 14.

Simonia A. A. (2) Novy oblik voennogo rezhima v Myanmar [The new image of the military regime in Myanmar]. / Ed. by N. P. Maletin, Moscow: IV RAS, 2011, No. 16. = Simoniia A.A. Novyi oblik voennogo rezhima v M'ianme // Iugo-Vostochnaia Aziia: aktual'nye problemy razvitiia / Ed. by N.P. Maletin. M.: IV RAN. 2011. N 16.

Simonia, A. A., Parliamentary Elections in Myanmar: Vector of Future Foreign Policy, in Yugo-Vostochnaya Aziya: aktual'nye problemy razvitiya, Ed. by N. P. Maletin, Moscow: IV RAN, 2015, No. 29. = Simoniia A.A. Parlamentskie vybory v M'ianme: vektor budushchei vneshnei politiki // IugoVostochnaia Aziia: aktual'nye problemy razvitiia / Ed. by N. P. Maletin. M.: IV RAN. 2015. N 29.

Xi Jinping is received royally in London. 20.10.2015. - http://www.bbc.com/russian/uk/2015/10/151020_china_uk_xi_visit = Xi Jinping'a prinimaiut v Londone po-korolevski // BBC. 20.10.2015. - http://www.bbc.com/russian/uk/2015/10/151020_china_uk_xi_visit (дата обращения: 30.12.15).

Tsekhanova L. V. Politika GSMR v religioznom voprose // Yugo-Vostochnaya Aziia: aktual ' NYE problemy razvitiia / Ed. by N. P. Maletin, Editor-in-chief, Moscow: IV RAS, 2006, No. 9. = Tsekhanova L. V. Politika GSMR v religioznom voprose N. P. Maletin. Moscow: IV RAN. 2006. N 9.

Chamovskikh F. Army, opposition and the fate of the nation. 1988. N 40. = Chamovskikh F. Armiia, oppozitsiia i sud'by natsii // Novoe vremia. 1988. N 40.

Aung San Suu Kyi - Biographical - http://www.nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/peace/laureates/1991/kyi-bio.html (дата обращения: 28.11.15).

Aung San Suu Kyi - Biographical // Nobel Lectures in Peace 1991-1995 / Ed. by Irwin Abrams. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co., 1999.

Aung San Suu Kyi. Freedom from Fear and Other Writings / Ed. with introduction by Michael Aris. 3rd ed., revised. New York and London: Penguin Books, 2010.

Aung Zaw. The Face of Resistance: Aung San Suu Kyi and Burma's Fight for Freedom. Chiang Mai: Silkworm Books, 2013.

Burma and the role of Burmese women. Documentation and Research Centre All Burma Students' Democratic Front. 31.07.1995. - http://www.burmalibrary.org/reg.burma/archives/199510/msg00070.html (дата обращения: 03.12.15).

page 50
Burma's Aung San Suu Kyi meets China's President // The Irravaddy / By The Associated Press. 11.06.2015. - http://www.irrawaddy.com/burma/burmas-aung-san-suu-kyi-meets-chinas-president.html (дата обращения: 27.12.15).

Callahan M. The Endurance of Military Rule in Burma: Not Why, But Why Not? // Finding dollars, sense and legitimacy in Burma. / Ed. by Susan L. Levenstein. Washington: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 2010.

Constitution of the Republic of the Union of Myanmar. Ministry of Information of Myanmar, 2008.

Daw Aung San Su Kyi // Burma press summary (from The Working people Daily). Vol. II. N 9. September 1988.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi arrested // Burma press summary (from The Working people Daily). Vol. III. N 7. July 1989.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi (father U Aung San) granted pardon // The New light of Myanmar. 2010. 14 November.

Election Returns. // Burma press summary (from The Working people Daily). Vol. IV. N 6. June 1990.

Gore-Booth P.H. With Great Truth and Respect. London: Constable. 1974.

Hall D. A History of Southeast Asia. London: Macmillan Limited, 1955.

Herbert P. The Hsaya San Rebellion (1930-1932). Melbourne: Centre of Southeast Asian Studies: Monash University, 1982.

Hoge W. Michael V. Aris, 53, dies; scholarly husband of Laureate // The New York Times. 30.03.1999. - http://www.nytirnes.corn/1999/03/30/world/rnichael-v-aris-53-dies-scholarly-husband-of-laureate.html (дата обращения: 18.02.16).

Houtman G. Mental culture in Burmese crisis politics: Aung San Suu Kyi and the National League for Democracy. Tokyo University of Foreing Studies, Institute for the study of languages. Study of Languages and Cultures of Asia and Africa. Monograph Series. 1999. N 33.

I could do business with Aung San by Fild. - Marshall Sir William Slim // Aung San of Burma / Ed. by Maung Maung (Dr.). Published for Yale University. Southeast Asia Studies, 1962.

Joshi V, Htusan E. Burma election: Aung San Suu Kyi wins seat - but cannot be president // The Independent. 11.11.2015. - http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/asia/myanmar-burma-election-aung-san-suu-kyi-wins-seat-but-cannot-become-president-a6729566.html (дата обращения: 10.02.16).

Letters to General Ne Win from U Aung Gyi // Burma Debate. 2015. Vol. IV. N 3.

Lintner B. Outrage: Burma's Struggle for Democracy. London: Diane Pub Co., 1990.

Mauntbetten of Burma. Report of the Combined Chiefs of Staff by the Suprime allied Commander, South East Asia 1943-1945. London: Military Affairs. 1951. Vol. 15. Iss. 3.

Multi-party elections called // Burma press summary (from The Working people Daily). Vol. II. N 8. August 1988.

Nash M. The Golden Road to Modernity. University of Chicago Press, 1965.

Ne Win's speech // Burma press summary (from The Working people Daily). Vol. II. N 7. July 1988.

Oppositionists address rallies // Burma press summary (from The Working people Daily). Vol. II. N 8-A. August (2) 1988.

Press brifing Aung San Suu Kyi in Yangon, Myanmar. 14.11.2010.

Rigby J. Aung San Suu Kyi aide: Rohingya are not our priority // The Telegraph. 19.11.2015. - http://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/destinations/asia/burma/12006208/Aung-San-Suu-Kyi-aide-Rohingya-are-not-our-priority.html (дата обращения: 11.01.16).

Roadmap to democracy: crucial turning point in Myanmar's history // The Myanmar Times. Vol. 10. N 181. 1-7 September. 2003. - http://www.ibiblio.org/obl/docs3/MT181.htm (дата обращения: 01.12.15).

Roger Louis W. Ends of British Imperialism: The Scramble for Empire, Suez, and Decolonization. London, New York: 1. B. Tauris, 2006.

Sorokin P. Russua and the United States. New York: Literary Classics, 1944.

Stewart W. Aung San Suu Kyi: Fearless Voice of Burma. Minneapolis: Lerner, 1996.

Student killed in riot // Burma press summary (from The Working people Daily). Vol. II. N 3. March 1988.

Suu Kyi pays tribute to her mother // The Irrawaddy. 27.12.2010. - http://www2.irrawaddy.com/article.php?art_id=20420 (accessed on 18.02.16).

Taylor R. General Ne Win: A Political Biography. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2015.

Taylor R. The State in Myanmar. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 2009.

The 93rd State LORC press conference // Burma press summary (from The Working people Daily). Vol. IV. N 6. June 1990.

page 51

Permanent link to this publication: