Modern radical Islam threatens many countries in Southeast Asia, not only those where Muslims make up the majority of the population, but also the Philippines (with a predominantly Catholic population) and Thailand (where the majority of believers are Buddhists). At the same time, in the Philippines and Thailand, Islamic extremists in places where Muslims live compactly do not stop their long-term war with local authorities, demanding that such areas be separated into separate independent territories that would live according to Sharia law. In Malaysia and Indonesia, the situation is more complicated, because there moderate Islamic circles that fully agree with secular rule act as a serious counterweight to Islamic radicals and their demands for the formation of a state based on Sharia law. So far, the moderates have managed to keep the situation under control, but they are constantly under constant pressure from the radicals, who use every opportunity to advance their plans.

Today, it is impossible not to recognize that radical Islam is becoming more active almost everywhere in Southeast Asia. There are many reasons for this situation. First of all, we should note the aggressive and objectively anti - Islamic policy of the United States towards Iraq and Afghanistan, which causes protest among many Muslims in the Southeast Asian countries. In the Philippines and Thailand, where Islam is present

It acts as the most important element of the identity of local national minorities (Filipino Muslims on the island of Mindanao) and Moro Malays, and it becomes one of the most important forms of struggle for their national rights and independence. The process of radicalization is also facilitated by an important social function of Islam, which, after leaving the sphere of mass ideology of communist ideas, is perceived by the Muslims of the Southeast Asian countries as a social doctrine of equality and justice that meets the aspirations of the poorest and most disadvantaged segments of the population. Among other factors, an important role is played by the active promotion of radical Islam by various religious foundations, mass media, and the distribution of a huge amount of religious literature, which is regularly sent by radical Islam centers from Arab countries to Southeast Asian countries. All this "warms up" politically active Muslim circles that use Islamic slogans as a means in the political and armed struggle.

However, in terms of the activation of radical Islam in Southeast Asia, I would like to emphasize another significant factor that is sometimes overlooked: radical Islamists do not act as isolated local political movements, but as part of the global radical Islamic front, and the part is not peripheral, but, one might say, advanced. In many respects, the structure of radical Islamic organizations in Southeast Asia is clearly structured and organized, and all of them receive serious financial support from outside. At the same time, it would be a mistake to think that radical Islamic organizations use terrorism as the main method of pressure. Among radical Islamists, there are also quite legal structures that exercise strict control over the content of Friday sermons in mosques, over the teaching of religious subjects in pensantren*, and over the activities of political leaders who advocate the construction of Islamic states based on Sharia law in Southeast Asia.

The core of the radical Islamic movement, which includes various semi-legal groups and illegal terrorist groups in the countries of Southeast Asia, is the organization "Jama'a Islamiyya", similar in name and ideology to the Egyptian"Al-Gama'a al-Islamiyya". According to most experts on Southeast Asian countries, it acts in the region as a branch of a well - known radical Islamist organization-Al-Qaeda. Jama'a Islamiyya, like al-Qaeda in its time, has become known around the world for its brutal and inhumane terrorist acts: bombings, murders and kidnappings committed under the banner of the struggle for the victory of "Islam" in Southeast Asia. Jama'a Islamiyya militants are responsible for thousands of innocent victims of various nationalities and faiths. The purpose of its terror was to make Islam a part of the political structure of most Southeast Asian countries, where life and assessments of all aspects of life should be based on the principles of "authentic" Islam. For Southeast Asia, this is reflected in the Jama'a Islamiyya program, published at the very dawn of the organization's existence. It stated that its task should be to transform Indonesia into a Sharia state with the subsequent creation of a "new Asian caliphate", which would include Indonesia, Malaysia, Brunei, Singapore, the southern parts of the Philippines, Thailand and Myanmar [Asia Pacific Report, 25.11.2002, p. 14].

The founders and longtime leaders of Jama'a Islamiyya were two imams: Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir. They began their activities in 1969, and very modestly-with the establishment of a pirate radio station that preached the basics of Islam to the most disadvantaged Indonesians. After that, they opened a special account.-

* Special religious school.

an alternative boarding school, which attracted children from poor large families. Already at this time, the future terrorist number one in Southeast Asia, Abu Bakar Bashir, formulated the main motto of the newly opened school:" Death in the way of Allah is our highest aspiration " [www.agentura.ru, 17.01.2007]. Indonesian teenagers, who received relevant knowledge from their extremist teachers, formed the core of the first radical Islamist groups that began to fight against the repression of Islamic figures who disagreed with the policies of the then ruler of the country, General Suharto.

This stage in the history of Jama'a Islamiyya can be called the stage of formation of the ideological field, when the students of Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir decided to resist the ruling regime and the westernization of Indonesian society, setting an example of" proper " religious behavior. They called, and tried to do so themselves, to live strictly according to Sharia law. The value goal was also proclaimed - to make one's life an example of serving "pure Islam".

However, the "idealistic" stage did not last long. The need to receive financial assistance to expand and develop their activities has forced the most energetic members of Jama'ah islamiyyah to switch from prayer to robber and bandit activities. Together with their then few supporters, they began setting fire to churches, nightclubs, and even movie theaters, which they saw as the main vehicles of Western influence that was corrupting true Muslims.

Since the late 1970s, radical Islamist groups operating in the underground began to gradually unite on a common platform of building a Sharia state and a south-East Asian caliphate and merge in one form or another into the "Jama'a Islamiyya". The first truly high-profile breakdown for the growing radical Islamist movement was the tragic events of 1984 in the Jakarta port of Tanjun Priok. There were bloody clashes with a large number of victims between the government armed forces and extremist supporters of radical Islam. As a result, the leaders of radical Islamists Abdullah Sungkar and Abu Bakar Bashir, fleeing from prison, fled to Malaysia. In Malaysia, they again began recruiting young people (and, as in Indonesia, from the poorest and most deprived families) and decided to strengthen their movement by creating special armed groups. The subsequent phased deployment of recruits to Afghanistan for training in specially prepared camps laid the foundations for the Jama'ah islamiyah militant organization. At the same time, it is known that the recruitment of recruits for sending to Afghanistan was carried out by the Saudi-funded agency "League of the Muslim World", simply referred to as "Rabita". All those recruited were sent to Afghanistan through a "service center" in Peshawar. This center was headed by Abdul Azam, who was appointed by Osama bin Laden as the main ideologist of Al-Qaeda headed by him [www.agentura.ru, 17.01.2007].

The structure of "Jama'a Islamiyya" was organized as follows:: at the top of the leadership was the emir, a position that Abdullah Sungkar himself held for a long time until his death in 1999. Another founder of Jama'a Islamiyya, Abu Bakar Bashir, according to several sources, was Emir from 1999 to 2002, that is, until his arrest and detention. After him, Abu Dujanah became the Emir, about whom it is known only that his power in the organization was nominal [Australian, 17.03.2004]. Most likely, this view is not entirely correct, since in Jama'a Islamiyya, it was the Emir who appointed the four councils under his control: the governing council, the council for Religious Affairs, the supreme theological council, and the disciplinary council. In turn, the entire Southeast Asian region was divided into four districts in accordance with their functional purpose. The first district, which includes Singapore and Malaysia, was selected as a site for extracting funds that support the operation of Ja-

maa islamiyya". The second district covered most of Indonesia and was considered the domain of jihad. The third district included Mindanao, Sabah and Sulawesi and was considered a training area for militants. The fourth district, which extended to Australia and Papua, was intended for financial transactions [www.agentura.ru, 17.01.2007].

Obviously, the unification of disparate Islamist groups in the early 1980s into a single organization and under a single command and control gave radical Islamists energy and opened up new opportunities. This, however, was not immediately apparent, as the Afghan events for many years absorbed the attention and forces of the Islamists of Southeast Asia. Only when the "veterans of Afghanistan" began to return to their homeland, they were able to send their forces to fight in Southeast Asia. The entry into the political arena of Indonesia and Southeast Asia of the new post-Afghan " Jama'a Islamiyya "was marked by the devastating explosion on the island of Bali in 2002. This was followed in August 2003 by a new explosion at the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta, which was also accompanied by a large number of victims. Moreover, in the same year, 2003, "Jama'a Islamiyya" almost became the number one terrorist organization on the planet. Then the efforts of the special services of Thailand and the United States prevented an attempt by the militants of this organization to use the so-called dirty bomb during the APEC summit in Bangkok. According to the then Thai Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra, " the embassies of the United States, Great Britain, Israel, Australia and Singapore were to be targeted by terrorists during the international meeting. The main goal pursued by the terrorists was the assassination of US President George W. Bush. It was planned to use radioactive caesium-137, allegedly imported to Southeast Asia from Russia, as a raw material " [Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 16.06.2003].

After the discovery of the plans of the leaders of the "Jama'a Islamiyya" to destroy world leaders, including the American president, in all countries where its underground cells were supposed to exist, a real hunt for their members began. Thus, one of the leaders of the organization was detained in the Philippines in early 2005 on suspicion of involvement in a series of terrorist attacks in Manila and the preparation of new ones. After his interrogation, Philippine intelligence learned that about 30 members of the Jama'a Islamiyya were carrying out subversive work in the south of the country. At the same time, it turned out that all of them work closely with local pro-Islamist anti-government forces, primarily with the Abu Sayyaf group. It was also revealed that Jama'a Islamiyya was directly involved in all the major terrorist attacks in the Philippines that have occurred in recent years [Pulse of the Planet, 22.03.2005].

The methods used by the Jama'a Islamiyya terrorists are very similar to those used by their Al-Qaeda associates, who place a special emphasis on attracting suicide bombers. This method of struggle was unusual in Southeast Asia until recently. It was adopted by the Jama'a Islamiyya, as it quickly showed its high efficiency. We have to admit that the Governments of Southeast Asian countries, as well as the international community, have not yet been able to find effective ways to counter this form of terrorism. As a fundamentally new form of struggle that contributes to the growth of chaos and disorder in the world, and especially in its key areas, suicide bombing threatens to draw many countries, plunging the whole world to varying degrees into an era of instability.

When describing the internal structure of Jama'a Islamiyya, it is impossible not to say that it is primarily a paramilitary organization with a hierarchical structure of subordination from a brigade to a platoon, operating in conditions of strict secrecy. At the same time, interrogations of members of the group detained by law enforcement agencies of the South-Eastern region show that members of the central command and commanders of the armed forces of the South-Eastern Region of the Republic of South-East Asia have been detained.

divisions have significantly more authority than one would expect with a single-level command. When making decisions about the strategy and tactics of conducting operations, commanders at all levels are not limited to a formal hierarchy and can make independent decisions on circumstances, as well as prepare operations without direct communication with the leadership center.

The strike unit of the Jama'a Islamiyya terrorist brigades is the Laskar Kos special unit. Its existence became known after the explosion of the Marriott Hotel in Jakarta in August 2003, when a suicide bomber was once again used. This unit is particularly classified. According to fragmentary data, it also includes other suicide bombers. Recruitment in their ranks is assigned to specially verified commanders who have passed Afghanistan. The recruits are mostly drawn from conflict-ridden areas, where violence from years of war with the authorities strongly affects people's lifestyles and attitudes. Many of them lost their relatives and friends during the fighting or inter-religious clashes, ready to do anything to take revenge on their enemies. Before a terrorist attack, they are sent for special two-month training. At the same time, not every selected candidate is subjected to tough tests. The role of suicide bombers is usually taken either by very young idealists, or already mature people who are hungry for revenge, trained people who need only a slight increase in their motivation. Through special psychological training, including the use of narcotic and psychotropic drugs, these people strengthen the feeling of revenge and hatred for past atrocities committed by their enemies. They are told that behind the back of their enemies there are always either "infidels" who want to destroy Muslims, or the ruling regime, which in turn is controlled by infidels. In such a situation of total war against Islam, any actions, according to the mentors, are a justification for retaliatory terrorism. This simple propaganda in the real conditions of the underground struggle gives noticeable results. As the interrogations of the Jama'ah Islamiyya militants who were arrested show, many of them consider themselves fighters, participants in the great heroic battle against evil and vice, in order to prevent the West from destroying the Muslim "Ummah" and turning Muslim countries into their new colonies. Having entered the path of a terrorist war at the behest of the soul, many of them declare that, waging a "holy war", they will be happy to die as martyrs for the cause to which they have devoted themselves [HAS, Newsletter, July, 2003].

Admittedly, when assessing the social composition of terrorist groups, the traditional stereotype that the majority of their members come from poor and poorer families sometimes does not work. As the documents of the Indonesian police show, there are such immigrants in terrorist organizations and there are quite a lot of them. However, associations of radical Islamists are a conglomerate consisting of various social groups united by a common ideology. Religious fanaticism, which reaches the point of complete self-denial, is probably equally, if not more, susceptible to people who have received a certain education. This, in particular, is evidenced by the analysis of the social status of suicide bombers who committed their atrocities under the banner of Al-Qaeda. Most of them were people who had received higher education, spoke foreign languages and were familiar with Western culture.

It should be noted that the leadership of Jama'a Islamiyya, which, according to police data, consists mainly of representatives of the educated middle class, did not manage to gain the necessary support in the elections among the poor. The development of the political situation in Indonesia shows that radical Islamists have no chance of serious electoral success. However, as we mentioned, they also do not have a serious social base. In this regard, the Russian

Orientalist G. I. Chufrin notes: "The demands for the establishment of a theocratic Muslim state, which came from the most orthodox Muslim circles, did not receive sufficient support from the population, and Muslim parties, which have always remained an influential force, have not yet been able to radically change the public mood and the course of events in Indonesia in their favor" [South-East Asia..., 1995, p. 35].

It is obvious, however, that a low level of social support does not reduce the activity of extremists, because radical Islamists are more consolidated and purposeful than their opponents. They try to influence ordinary Muslims by extending their influence to nationalist and independent Muslim organizations of a radical nature that operate independently. Representatives of these organizations are often trained in Jama'a Islamiyya camps. Joint activities are based not only on ideological unity and common conditions for training militants, but also on family ties. Precisely because radical Islamist groups represent a complex system permeated by kinship relations, they are often compared to one sprawling huge family [International Crisis Group, N63, 26.08.2003].

According to many experts on terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia, when evaluating the activities of Jama'a Islamiyya, insufficient attention is paid to the role of women, who have a cementing effect on the entire conglomerate of Islamist terrorist organizations in Southeast Asia. In many cases, senior Jama'a Islamiyya leaders build relationships by establishing kinship relationships, using their sisters and other female relatives. One of these Jamaa Islamiya affiliates in South Sulawesi claimed responsibility for the bombing of a McDonald's restaurant and for the December 2002 bombing of a car bomb in Makassar.

In addition to their relatives and friends, the leaders of Jama'a Islamiyya attract real bandits and notorious criminals to terrorist actions. This is especially true in the Moluccas of Ambon and Sulawesi, where inter-religious and inter-ethnic conflicts are particularly acute and where in the context of a long and brutal civil war there are always people who have stained themselves with cruelty, robbery and reprisals. They are threatened with arrest and severe punishment by the authorities, and in the face of such circumstances, they have nothing to lose. The use of criminal identities was undoubtedly also borrowed from the experience of Al-Qaeda, which actively uses various kinds of bandits and robbers in its actions against American troops and the pro-American government in Baghdad.

Along with purely criminal elements, Jama'a Islamiyya also uses radical Islamist paramilitary groups, which are a cross between criminal gangs and insurgents, who alternate political activity with looting, extortion and racketeering. Units of the Indonesian armed Forces have trained and in some cases encouraged Islamist terrorist groups to participate in paramilitary operations. For example, the Jihadist Army, once a military-sponsored group, recruited its soldiers from among the unemployed male population of cities and paid salaries to their families during their service. These gangs were used in the mass murder of Communists in 1965-1966. and fought against East Timor's independence supporters in the 1990s. Now that they are out of business, many of their members have started to cooperate with Jama'a Islamiyya.

Jama'a Islamiyya also operates outside Indonesia. It is known that back in 1995, Abdullah Sungkar moved a training camp for training new fighters of this organization from Afghanistan to the southern Philippines, in areas that are considered dangerous.

They were controlled by rebels from the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF), closer to the main areas of their struggle. Apparently, they were motivated at that time by the desire to create a training base in a neighboring country in order to expand their organization and take a step towards implementing the idea of a single pan-Islamic caliphate. In addition, bases in Indonesia itself would always be in danger of being destroyed, since in 1995 there was little sign of the imminent inglorious end of the regime of General Suharto, who fought most fiercely against radical Islamists.

After the fall of the Suharto regime, the new camp "Jama'a Islamiya" was formed on the basis of the MILF camp operating in the southern Philippines (on the island of Mindanao). Cooperation between Filipino and Indonesian militants was made possible by the fact that the then leader of the Philippine Muslim separatists, Moro Salamat Hasim, himself joined Jama'a Islamiya and turned the MILF controlled by him into a de facto branch of this organization. According to the Philippine intelligence agencies, as we mentioned above, at least 30 members of Jama'a Islamiyya are currently constantly engaged in subversive activities in the Philippines. They work very closely with local anti-government forces, primarily with the terrorist group Abu Sayyaf, which has now become the most active and radical organization fighting for the separation of southern Mindanao from the Philippines. The ideologues of "Jama'a Islamiyya" are engaged in organizational and propaganda activities, are actively "explanatory" work among the rebels on the annexation of the south of the Philippines to the new "pan-Islamic caliphate". There is also evidence that Jama'a Islamiyya is also involved in all the major terrorist attacks that have occurred in the Philippines in recent years [Pulse of the Planet, 27.04.2006].

The answer to the question of the relationship between Jama'a Islamiyya and Al-Qaeda is also relevant today. For a long time, researchers of this problem have considered "Jama'a Islamiyya" as almost a branch of "Al-Qaeda", its division, closely integrated into the organizational structure headed by Bin Laden. Developments in recent years indicate a different form of alliance between these organizations. Jama'a Islamiyya has many features that draw it closer to al-Qaeda, in particular the ideology of "jihad"; they are united by the long joint work of the leaders of both organizations in Afghanistan. The leaders of Jama'a Islamiyya honor Bin Laden and try to follow his instructions. They expressed, for example, their full support for the Al-Qaeda fatwa of 1998, which declares the most implacable struggle against infidels worldwide. For this, they received, by the way, direct financial support from Al-Qaeda [International Crisis Group, N 127, 24.01.2007]. In terms of clarifying the relationship between Jama'a Islamiyya and Al-Qaeda, Abu Bakar Bashir's statement is very characteristic: "I do not belong to al-Qaeda, but I have a deep respect for the struggle of Osama bin Laden, who bravely glorifies Muslims around the world" [The Straits Times, 24.01.2002].

It is impossible not to pay attention to the fact that terrorist activities in Southeast Asia and those figures who personify them are strongly influenced by Osama bin Laden and his "Shura majlis", a kind of "supreme council". The Shura Majlis is also the main source of financial and material support. The strength of Al-Qaeda's influence is shown, for example, by the fact that it was able to persuade several radical Islamic groups in Indonesia to rise above their narrow political, nationalist and religious views and join the Anti-American Terrorist Soldiers coalition to oppose the actions of the United States in Afghanistan. It is also important that it is the links with

Al-Qaeda groups allow terrorists in Southeast Asia to feel that they are part of a front leading a" historic struggle "and see the goal and perspective of their efforts in expanding the boundaries of Islam's influence in the world. In turn, Al-Qaeda provides weapons and ammunition to affiliated groups of Abu Sayyaf and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front in the Philippines, Jama'a Islamiyya branches in Indonesia and other Southeast Asian countries [Inside al Qaeda, 2002, p. 48].

The fact that Islamic radicals in the region are increasingly being drawn into the international terrorist network, adopting well-established methods of fighting and relying on its material and financial base, is evidenced by the reaction of Islamists in Southeast Asia to the events in Iraq. Right-wing Muslim leaders in Malaysia, on the first day of military action, called on Muslims around the world to engage in a "holy war" against the United States and Britain, a war in which Bin Laden is undoubtedly the "first fiddle".

Its association with al-Qaeda makes Jama'a Islamiyya more dangerous than other groups, since its activities are similar to those of international criminal corporations that use armed forms of struggle. This is also facilitated by the fact that Malaysia, for example, does not require any visas for citizens of other Muslim countries, and the Philippines has extremely weak immigration controls. Thailand only adopted its first anti - money laundering law in 1999, the Philippines in 2001, and Indonesia only started drafting it in 2004 with the help of the Asian Development Bank.

At the same time, today it is widely believed that Jama'a Islamiyya is not directly subordinate to al-Qaeda, it has its own strategic tasks, makes its own decisions, and has its own financial base. According to the Times, the leaders of Jama'a Islamiyya, emphasizing their independence, claimed that their organization carried out its first actions more than 50 years ago-long before the world heard about Bin Laden. They also claim that al-Qaeda simply copied their scheme for creating terrorist units, noting that Bin Laden took advantage of the experience of Jama'a Islamiyya veterans who fought the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in the early 1980s and whom he persuaded to join his terrorist group [The Times, 3.10.2005].

There is a need to look at the existence and struggle of Jama'a Islamiyya from another angle. Indeed, this organization is included in the official "black list" of the UN as "terrorist". Moreover, the International Crisis Group, which has compiled a special dossier on Jama'a Islamiyya, which is partially described above, is a highly respected organization that includes prominent political figures from a number of countries, including former presidents, heads of Government and foreign ministers. There are hardly any serious grounds for calling the results of its work into question.

Yet in Indonesia, Southeast Asia, and the international arena as a whole, a growing number of observers are asking a seemingly rhetorical question: in whose interests does Jama'a Islamiyya operate? In other words, only the struggle for "pure Islam", Sharia law and a worldwide caliphate determines its terrorist activity? Are there any other, more mundane and practical goals in all the above-mentioned terrorist activities? After all, it is obvious that, despite arrests, testimonies and high-profile trials, the threads, levers and driving forces of Islamist terrorist networks in Southeast Asia still remain in the shadows. It is also characteristic that the accused terrorists who appear before the court behave brazenly, defiantly, throw mocking remarks, mock the memory of the victims. Founder and one of the main leaders of Jama'a Islamiyya, for many years

once mentioned here, Abu Bakar Bashir, in his testimony, despite the clear evidence, even tried to claim that the very existence of "Jama'a Islamiyya" is nothing more than a myth.

Obviously, in such a situation, one should think about who is interested in such an organization and what political forces can secretly stand behind the back of terrorist fanatics. Upon closer examination, it turns out that there are many "players in this field", and some of them are very far from sharing the above goals and objectives of creating authoritarian Islamist regimes. For them, the presence of a very active and combat-ready terrorist organization is important. This makes serious adjustments to the alignment of political forces and allows certain circles to manipulate the situation in their own interests. Identifying the most interested parties is one of the options for finding the truth.

It is obvious that, if we proceed from the logic of the struggle for building a pan-Islamic state in Southeast Asia, Islamists are interested in supporting the broad strata of the population. However, terrorism as a direct method of achieving the goal led them rather to lose, at least in ideological terms, since, for example, the explosion on the Indonesian island of Bali, which claimed a large number of lives, was a shock to Indonesian and world public opinion, and not only in the Muslim countries of Southeast Asia, but also in the United States. and throughout the Islamic world. The vast majority of Indonesia's population is made up of Muslims, mostly belonging to the moderate trend in Islam. The explosion could not but cause a negative perception in the Muslim community as a whole, and some researchers believe that it negatively affected the results of Islamic parties in the 2004 parliamentary elections.

It is another matter if the initiators of the terrorist attack had the task of "warming up" the situation in the country, in the region and even beyond with this explosion. In this case, the task was certainly solved, and many parties were interested in such a result, including the Islamists of Southeast Asia, who hoped to discredit the governments of the region's countries, destabilize the region as a whole, and strengthen anti-Western and anti-American sentiments in it. By their terrorist acts, they, as Abu Bakar Bashir stated, wanted to convince the residents of the Southeast Asian countries that the real "masterminds" of the bombings were the special services of the United States and Israel and that they are the main enemies of the peoples of Southeast Asia. Thus, after the devastating Bali bombing in 2002, this leader of Jama'a Islamiyya claimed that the bombing was allegedly necessary for Washington to cast a shadow on Islam, show it as a militant religion, compromise Muslims, and " cause inter-religious conflicts." Indeed, the first surveys conducted by the British BBC after the bombings showed that, according to two-thirds of Indonesians, the danger to Indonesia from the United States is greater than from Al-Qaeda [Asia and Africa Today, 2006, N 4, p. 5].

Interestingly, after the explosion, radical Islamists sought to complicate the investigation in every possible way, threatening the lives of foreign experts who arrived. Jama'a Islamiya has threatened to launch a "jihad" against the Indonesian government if the authorities attempt to arrest the Islamists.

There is another point of view, whose supporters believe that the explosions thundering in Indonesia are, in fact, attempts by radicals to arouse the sympathies of Muslims with the help of all-destroying violence, in whose interests the Islamists allegedly fight against the infidels. Bombings and individual terror should create an impression of the power of radical Islamists and thereby increase their stakes in the internal political struggle. At the same time, the use of violence as a means of mobilizing supporters has long been tested by radicals of various stripes. This is due to the fact that, according to many experts on Islamist terror, the radical-

modern Islamism has already passed the peak of its popularity, is exhausting itself ideologically and, as a result, is ready to take extreme measures.

It is obvious that unlike the original Islam of the period of the Arab conquests, or "pure Islam", which the Islamists are so eager to restore, modern adherents of the caliphate use barbaric, inhumane methods of influencing non-Believers and" wrong " Muslims, resulting in outright terrorism. Early Islam was characterized by religious tolerance (primarily to the two other religions of the Abrahamic tradition - Judaism and Christianity) and a preference for flexible forms of Islamization of the population joining the caliphate. This is confirmed, in particular, by the works of Gevond, an Armenian historian of the eighth century. So, not in words, but in deeds, the Islamists of Southeast Asia have come to deny the "pure Islam" that they claim they are striving for. Moreover, as far as Southeast Asia is concerned, terror undermines the credibility of Islamists in the Muslim community, depriving them of mass support.

Since it is not easy for terrorists to attack political and military targets, they direct their attacks against the civilian population. It is not only an easy target, but also a spectacular one. Randomness and unpredictability of strikes contributes to the growth of general anxiety. Any person in any place at any time can become the target of another attack. The threat undermines the ability of the civilian population to live a normal, peaceful life. As R. G. Landa, a well-known expert on Islam, notes, "a struggle without rules, without morals and principles, freed from the "chimera of conscience", discredits any, most just cause, any fighter and the brightest ideals to which he aspires" [Landa, 2005, p.262].

It is obvious that Al-Qaeda members based in Southeast Asia are primarily interested in intimidating everyone and creating an atmosphere of chaos and fear in the region. Representatives of the Indonesian counterintelligence service admit that agents from this international terrorist network infiltrated the islands. Not all of them are included in the leadership of Jama'a Islamiyya. Some members of al-Qaeda operate quite independently in Southeast Asia. According to the Indonesian intelligence services, Al-Qaeda militants managed to establish their own structure in the archipelago and establish contacts with some Indonesian groups. Experts also believe that the very geography of Indonesia as an island state allowed Al-Qaeda to extend its tentacles into Indonesia and use its territory as a transit platform or as a base for hiding terrorists. In this case, it is possible that the assumption expressed by a number of observers, according to which "Jama'a Islamiyya" does not exist as an independent and allied organization with "Al-Qaeda", but already as a division of "Al-Qaeda", stationed in Southeast Asia and attracting local Islamists for terrorist activities, is also true.

It is also clear that terrorist acts are undoubtedly in the interests of the radical Indonesian military, which recalls the times of Suharto, when the army was the dominant force in the country. Extremist attacks raise the stakes of the military as the only force capable of protecting Indonesians from the terrorist threat. Moreover, their stakes are also growing in the international arena, especially in the United States, where radical, anti-Islamic generals are perceived as allies of the US administration in the fight against terrorism. In particular, after the Bali bombings on October 1, 2005, President of Indonesia and Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, speaking on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the national army, said that the armed forces should take an active part in the war against terrorism throughout the country. According to the head of state, along with the special services, the military is obliged to prevent terrorist attacks like the explosions in Bali and Jakarta, which claimed hundreds of lives [The Straits Times, 3.10.2003].

Even more outspoken was Indonesian Defense Minister Juwono Sudarsono, when in May 2005, even before the Bali bombing, during a visit to the United States, he said:: "Due to the weakness of civil society, the military is the only force that ensures the integrity of the country. Indonesia still has to establish a strong civilian government before the army can gradually disappear from the scene " [The Straits Times, 16.03.2003]. Although Yu. Sudarsono is the first civilian to serve as Minister of Defense in many decades, but he is nevertheless known as a supporter of the active political role of the army in society.

The above leads to the conclusion that the actions of Jama'a Islamiyya are not just a cruel and merciless struggle of radical Islamists for their goals. It is likely that, without knowing it, terrorists and extremists from this organization are tools in the hands of more powerful forces that use Jama'ah Islamiyah for their own interests, and when it suits them. One thing is clear: both in Indonesia, in Southeast Asia, and in the world as a whole, there are political forces whose influence only increases after each successful terrorist attack carried out by Islamic militants, forces that hide their true political goals and illegal connections and contacts in every possible way.

list of literature

Asia and Africa today. 2006. N 4.

Landa R. G. Political Islam: Preliminary results, Moscow, 2005.

Nezavisimaya gazeta. 16.06.2003.

Pulse of the planet, 22.03.2005; 27.04.2006.

South-East Asia: Security parameters at the end of the XX century, Moscow, 1995.

Asia Pasific report. Sidney (Australia). N 48. 25.11.2002.

Australian. 17.03.2004.

HAS Newsletter, Leiden. July, 2003.

Inside al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror. N.Y.: Columbia University Press, 2002.

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