MAIN DIRECTIONS AND PROBLEMS

F. N. YURLOV

Doctor of Historical Sciences

Institute of Oriental Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences

Keywords: India, USA, China, Russia, BRICS, SCO

In May 2014, the conservative Bharatiya Janata Party (Indian People's Party - BJP), led by Narendra Modi, came to power in India as a result of parliamentary elections, and became the country's Prime Minister. The new Government began to show itself very vigorously in the international arena. It significantly modifies the country's foreign policy course compared to the previous government of the Indian National Congress (Congress).

The search for new accents in foreign policy is largely connected with the changed situation in the world in recent years. Hence the emphasis on pragmatism, taking into account national interests.

But this government did not operate "from scratch", but based on the "achievements" of previous governments, both the Congress and the coalition government led by the experienced and popular BJP leader A. B. Vajpayee (1996, 1998-2004). The ruling coalition then consisted of 24 parties. Vajpayee stated that the government's activities should be based on the consensus of the coalition members. This also applied to foreign policy.

Modi's new team did not have enough experienced figures familiar with the nuances of foreign policy. Therefore, the government had to rely heavily on professional officials inherited from the Congress Government.

Relations with the United States and China, as well as with Japan, have taken a special place in the activities of the Modi government. India began to boost cooperation with the United States, but could not help but look back at China with its vast resources and border problems of both countries.

Japan was the first major country Modi paid an official visit to. It resulted in the signing of significant trade and economic agreements, especially in the field of Indian infrastructure.

In September 2014, Modi made a trip to the United States. First, he went to a meeting of the UN General Assembly, where he made a speech in which he outlined the main directions of India's foreign policy.

Modi was then given an emphatically warm welcome by President Barack Obama at the White House. The Americans wanted to show that the past-the refusal of the Chief Minister of Gujarat Modi's visa to visit the United States after the Muslim pogroms in this state in 2002-is forgotten and it is necessary to move on to full-scale cooperation. From this point of view, Modi's visit to the United States was a success, although the actual results were modest.

INDIA, USA AND CHINA

In January 2015 Obama visited New Delhi and participated as the guest of honor at the parade marking the 65th anniversary of the Republic of India. During his visit, a number of documents aimed at deepening cooperation between the two countries were signed. Obama emphasized India's growing role in the Asia-Pacific region. He said that he supports the reform of the UN Security Council, as a result of which India would become a permanent member of the Security Council. Obama's comments about the need for cooperation between the United States and India expressed thoughts that some Indian observers considered to be directed against China.

During the talks between Modi and Obama, agreements were reached to expand cooperation in important areas of the economy, including nuclear energy. However, the specific facts and figures of such cooperation were not indicated. However, it was noted that Obama's two visits to India during his tenure as President of the United States represent an exceptional event in the history of Indian-American relations, which demonstrates the dynamic cooperation between the two countries.

To prepare for Obama's visit to India, US Secretary of State John Kerry will meet with the President of the United States. Kerry attended the Booming Gujarat conference. There, he declared that the" oldest democracy " in the world (USA) and "the biggest demo-

kratia (India) can help create an era of shared prosperity and security. Kerry noted that trade between the two countries has grown 5-fold since 2001 and can be increased by the same amount.¹

Some Indian observers pointed out the possible negative consequences of India's accelerated rapprochement with the United States. Among them are the following: an attempt to unite the efforts of India and the United States against China may lead to an aggravation of relations with the PRC; close Indian-American cooperation may contribute to the creation of a partnership between China, Russia and Pakistan; election of India as a permanent member of the UN Security Council is impossible without the active support of Russia and will it continue this activity in the context of rapprochement between India and the United States?

It was also noted that India and China share similar positions on climate change issues with the WTO, the IMF and the World Bank. A split between the two countries in these areas may lead to a weakening of India's position in these organizations.

Just a few days after Obama's visit to India, Foreign Minister S. Swaraj headed to China. One of the main outcomes of her talks with Chinese leaders was Modi's decision to visit Beijing in May 2015. Chinese President Xi Jinping said at a meeting with Swaraj that after his visit to India in September 2014, relations between China and India have entered a new phase. On the Sino-Indian border issue, he said that it should be resolved gradually and patiently so that it does not hinder the growing cooperation between China and India.

At the same time, the 13th meeting of the Foreign Ministers of China, Russia and India was held in Beijing. An agreement was reached on the coordination of economic, security and cultural cooperation between the two countries. The Foreign Ministers of the three countries confirmed their desire to end the era of unipolar peace. They called for a reform of the international system that respects the diversity of political structures in different countries. Representatives of the three countries called for reform of the IMF, including an increase in the quotas of developing countries in this organization.

China's quota is 4%, Russia's 2.5%, and India's 2.44%. Thus, the three countries have 8.94% of the vote. At the same time, all key decisions in the IMF require the approval of 85% of votes. The United States has 17.69% of the vote. This means that they have the actual right to veto certain decisions.²

At the meeting, support was expressed for India's desire to join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation Organization (APEC). India's desire to become a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization3 was also supported.

In this general context, the establishment of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank in March 2015 under the leadership of China should be considered. In addition to China, its founders are India, Russia, Brazil, South Africa, Great Britain, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, France, Switzerland, and other countries. The bank's initial capital was $50 billion. The United States and Japan refused to participate in the work of this bank.

The Modi government's efforts to expand cooperation with the United States have shown that the Americans are ready to do this, including in order to weaken China's position in Asia. India would not mind such a course of events. But the United States did not support this with a desire to massively "invest" in the Indian economy.

There are very influential groups in India that advocate the active development of Indian-American relations, including in the field of security and defense. But there are also many who believe that both India and the United States need cooperation with China and cannot afford to confront it. We are talking, first of all, about the economic power of China, which largely determines the growth of both the American and Indian economies, and the global economy as a whole.

In March 2015, India's Foreign Affairs Secretary, S. Jaishankar, warned against rushing to establish large-scale relations with the United States. He said the Cold War-era political order is still part of India-US relations. This is despite the fact that both countries are "entering a transit period" after 50 years of limited rapprochement.

Jaishankar warned against haste and high expectations in the development of Indian-American relations. "We are still deeply rooted in the past," he said, " and we cannot fully grasp the possibilities that are opening up for us... At the same time, if we jump over the stages and exaggerate expectations, we can lose a lot."⁴. The symbolism is important, but the nuclear cooperation agreement with the United States has not yet been signed.

In an interview with Time magazine in May 2015, Modi said that India and the United States are "natural allies." At the same time, he noted that Indian-American relations should not be considered in a narrow context.: what India can do for the US, and what the US can do for India. We need to take a broader approach :" What can India and the United States do together for the world?" Such a statement can be interpreted as a kind of request for the special role of joint efforts of both countries in the current world.⁵

US DISCUSSION ON RELATIONS WITH INDIA

The rise to power of the Modi-led BJP in India has given serious impetus to discussions in the United States about the future relations between the two countries. Nicholas Burns, Professor of Practical Diplomacy and International Politics at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University and former First Deputy Secretary of State for Political Affairs, took part in the meeting.

For a number of years, Burns worked on issues of US-Indian relations, speaking on behalf of the US government headed by President J. R. R. Tolkien. Bush, Jr. At that time, in his opinion,

Bush and US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice have developed relations with India and made them a priority. At that time, a historic agreement was reached on civilian nuclear issues, military ties were strengthened, and trade and investment exchanges between the two countries expanded.

The US-India relationship has not been this close in decades, although India has continued to be a difficult and uncomfortable partner for the US at the UN on major international issues. And even in recent years, India has not shown the necessary "foresight or courage" in dealing with the United States on global trade, climate change, or critical threats such as Iran's quest for nuclear weapons, or the "NATO intervention" in Libya.⁶

Nevertheless, during the presidency of Bush Jr., and then of Obama, positive changes were achieved in relations between the United States and India. Washington and New Delhi have supported the Karzai-led Afghan government in its fight against the Taliban. India appreciated the US military involvement in Afghanistan and was really concerned that America would withdraw its troops from it too soon (in 2016).

The United States and India have become partners in the security of both countries. Their defense ties continued to expand and deepen. Both countries shared concerns about " China's new aggressive behavior in the East and South China Seas." These concerns of India were in the interests of the United States. For many reasons, China is at the center of a new strategic partnership between the United States and India. Both Washington and New Delhi are China's partners on trade, investment, and climate change. But the United States and India will compete with China in terms of military influence in the region. The United States and India will continue to strengthen ties in this area, often together with Japan. This serves their basic interests in order to counter China's growing power in Asia.⁷

According to Burns, the formation of a Modi-led government in India gives the Obama administration a "chance" to correct the situation in relations between the United States and India. To do this, India needs to take a priority place in US foreign policy. It is necessary to restructure US-Indian relations in 5 areas: expand mutual trade; strengthen military cooperation; jointly fight against threats to the security of both countries; stabilize Afghanistan after the withdrawal of US troops; and, especially, look for common approaches to such transnational challenges as climate change.

However, this is hindered by the problems that have recently arisen between the United States and India. In the economy and trade , these are disputes between both countries in connection with "Indian protectionism" in agriculture, metallurgy, pharmaceuticals, etc. This has led the US to ban the import of many goods from India. The standoff between the US and India in the WTO over agricultural products has reached a high level of tension and even led to India being excluded from one of Obama's most ambitious projects in Asia-the Trans-Pacific Partnership. ⁸

It is emphasized that India must find ways to interact more effectively with the United States on major global challenges. The main ones are climate change and Iran. On these issues, India has historically been a" weak partner " of the United States.

These complex problems are not easy to solve. Moreover, India has been a firm supporter of non-alignment for almost the entire period of independence and has resisted being on the side of the United States. And it is still unclear how the pragmatic Modi will behave, whether he will want to reconsider decades of previous Indian foreign policy. If India continues to oppose the liberalization of global trade, the two sides will remain on " fundamentally opposite positions."

However, Burns believes that the United States should recognize the " unique nature of the US-India relationship." "India is too big and too proud" to become a formal US ally like Germany and Japan. India, for example, may " insist on maintaining strong military ties with Russia and continue to trade with Iran." "The US is used to giving orders to its allies in Europe or East Asia. This will not work with India, which will demand equal relations with the United States."

To deal effectively with New Delhi, Americans must pay special attention to the" sensitive " points for India, understand what is possible and what is impossible in relations with India. The main conclusion reached by analysts like Burns is that in the twenty-first century, US strategic interests align more closely with India than with any other power in Asia.⁹

Robert Boggs, a professor at the Washington Center for the Study of Strategic Issues in the Middle East and South Asia who spent 32 years at the US State Department, disagrees with this approach to the prospects of US-Indian relations, among others.

He believes that countries such as the United States and India, although they are close on issues of public administration, do not always have the same interests and adhere to similar foreign policy courses. In India's case, the burden of colonialism and economic underdevelopment are the reasons why it opposes many of the US policies. India continues to view America as an " arrogant superpower and rival." And if India can realize its goal of becoming an economic global power, then its rivalry with the United States will only increase.

India has little interest in working with America to coordinate defense and political efforts in the Asia-Pacific region. In Afghanistan, India refused to take part in the NATO security mission. When India is a member of multinational organizations, it tends to oppose initiatives put forward by the United States and other Western powers.

India has a policy of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries. This leads her to vote against human rights resolutions at the UN and openly criticize the UN's intervention in the civil wars in Libya and Syria. India also opposes the West on many economic issues. It works with BRICS countries that aim to create alternatives to the World Bank, the IMF and other Bretton Woods institutions.¹⁰

In South Asia, India prefers to act alone, without the participation of Western countries, in order to maintain its dominance in the region. It sees the US as a threat in this area of the world.

Robert Boggs points out that as a diplomat who worked in South Asia from 1985 to 2004, he witnessed how Indian officials constantly urged neighboring countries not to cooperate with Washington. In 2014 India opposed the US call for fair elections in Bangladesh, as it feared that voters would not favor a pro-India party.

Boggs also writes that in order to increase its influence in South Asian countries, India, through its intelligence services, provides financial support to anti-government organizations in Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka. As for India's relations with China, he notes that "Modi openly admires the Chinese development model and may prefer diplomatic and economic cooperation with China, rather than trying to contain it."

"Many Indian analysts," Boggs continues, " do not believe that the United States will stand up for India if the US-India military partnership provokes Chinese aggression." Boggs believes that Modi remains a "mystery" to American politicians. It appears that he wants the US to help India revive its economy, but it is far from clear that he wants a long-term political and defence partnership with the US. As a staunch Hindu nationalist, Modi most likely wants to continue the line of India's regional dominance in South Asia.

Boggs concludes with the following conclusion. A realistic approach to Indian values and goals will best serve American strategic interests. India is unlikely to become a" critical partner " of the US in any near future. New Delhi will only strengthen ties with Washington if it is in its best interests to do so. Washington should do the same ¹¹.

In this regard, Modi's interview with the American Time magazine in May 2015 is of interest. In it, he spoke with conciliatory positions on the acute issue of the Indian-Chinese border.

Modi said that for the past 30 years, the border has been mostly peaceful and calm, and there have been no major violations. Not a single shot was fired there over the years. This suggests that both countries have taken into account the lessons of history. Of course, a significant part of this long border is disputed. But both countries have shown their maturity, which ensures extensive economic cooperation, extensive mutual trade, investment and the development of joint projects.¹²

Some Indian analysts point out that, more broadly, India and China are in favor of creating a road map to bring together the two countries ' efforts to strengthen ties between Asian states, which will help them better respond to economic, diplomatic and strategic challenges in this region of the world.¹³

It seems that the Modi government has yet to decide how it will build relations with the United States and China. It is obvious that India's antagonistic relations with its largest neighbor can hardly meet the strategic interests of India, which faces not only serious foreign policy tasks, but also large-scale internal problems of socio-economic development.

INDIA AND RUSSIA

India-Russia relations should also be considered in the general context of India's relations with the world's largest countries.

Given the current geopolitical situation, including the events in Ukraine, relations between India and Russia are not going through the best of times. Nevertheless, India has taken a restrained position on Ukraine. It did not support those who launched a direct attack on Russia. Moreover, for reasons of principle, it opposed the introduction of sanctions against Russia.

This position is largely due to the fact that Western countries imposed sanctions against India in 1998, when the country's government led by Vajpayee detonated nuclear devices. These sanctions were lifted shortly before US President Clinton's visit to India in March 2000.

Then China and Pakistan also condemned India. Russia has refrained from such actions. In a broader sense, it can be argued that India and Russia (the Soviet Union) have never, unlike the United States and China, had any unsolvable conflicts and contradictions. And today, despite the modest volume of trade and economic cooperation (about $10 billion annually), Russia continues to be India's largest partner in the field of military-technical cooperation. All this, taken together, defines the relations between our countries as a particularly privileged strategic partnership.

In this context, Russian President Vladimir Putin visited India in December 2014. They discussed fundamental issues of cooperation between the two countries, such as nuclear energy, oil supply to India, cooperation in infrastructure and military-technical cooperation. An agreement was reached to increase the bilateral trade turnover to $30 billion by 2025, as well as to raise the level of mutual investments to at least $¹⁵ billion by that time14.

Naturally, both sides did not ignore the fact that after the collapse of the USSR, India diversified its arms supplies at the expense of other countries. Nevertheless, Russia is a reliable partner of India in this area. More than half of all Indian weapons were purchased-

It is produced in Russia or created with its cooperation in India itself (according to some sources-about 60-70%¹⁵).

This is especially highly appreciated by the Indian side, which seeks to be not just a buyer, but to cooperate in the joint production of weapons in India. So, in July 2015, an agreement was reached on the joint production of 200 combat helicopters in India using Russian technology.¹⁶

It is no coincidence that during the visit of Vladimir Putin, N. Modi said that times are changing, but the friendship between India and Russia remains the same. He also said that Russia is India's most important partner in the defense sector ¹⁷.

During his visit to Russia during the celebration of the 70th anniversary of Victory in the Great Patriotic War, President of India Pranab Mukherjee stressed: "Relations between India and Russia are not subject to the winds associated with temporary global political changes. Russia has always been a pillar of support and strength in difficult moments of India's history... India will always respond with its support. " ¹⁸

Of course, in the current difficult situation for Russia, there are many problems in implementing the agreements reached. Moreover, Russia has enough competitors in the field of cooperation with India. But having the political will on both sides is a serious investment. The question is how to make the best use of it. One way or another, Russia, for its part, must do everything in its power to preserve such a large partner as India, which is becoming an important player in the international arena.

INDIA AND THE COUNTRIES OF SOUTH AND SOUTHEAST ASIA

Despite the enormous importance of relations with the world's major powers, the Modi government traditionally began building foreign policy priorities with India's inner circle.

The first country Modi visited was the small kingdom of Bhutan on the northeastern border between India and China. He then paid a visit to Nepal, where a meeting of the heads of State and Government of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) was held. In 2014, the Indian Foreign Minister and other government representatives visited Pakistan, Myanmar, Afghanistan, Singapore, and Hong Kong.

In March 2015, Modi paid a visit to Sri Lanka, Seychelles and Mauritius. These visits were intended to emphasize India's special interest in ensuring its security in the Indian Ocean, including in view of China's policy of increasing its influence, especially in Pakistan and Sri Lanka.

During Modi's visit to Bangladesh in June 2015, an agreement was implemented that ended the border dispute between the two countries and removed an irritant in bilateral relations.

The agreement involved the exchange of 111 border enclaves (10,000 acres) that were transferred to Bangladesh for 51 enclaves (3,000 acres) that were transferred to India. Thus, the issue of citizenship of more than 50,000 people living in these territories was resolved, and the process begun in 1974, which provided for this exchange at the India-Bangladesh border, 4,096 km long, was completed.

A month before this event, the Indian Parliament, in the presence of Prime Minister Modi of India and Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina Wazed of Bangladesh, unanimously adopted the Land Boundary Agreement between the two countries.¹⁹ Thus, a precedent was set for the peaceful resolution of border disputes in South Asia and possibly between India and China.

Modi updated the slogan "Look to the East", which was first voiced back in 1996 under the government of the United Front of Centrist and Left-wing Parties led by Prime Minister I. K. Gujeral. But Modi put it in a more offensive way: "Act in the East", referring to the great economic and political opportunities of the countries of Southeast Asia for the growth of the Indian economy and expanding its influence in this region. In fact, Modi's trip to Australia and the island nation of Fiji, where a significant part of the population is made up of ethnic Indians, served the same purpose.

INDIA AND BRICS

India actively cooperates in BRICS ²⁰, including under the Modi government. Thus, at the BRICS summit in Brazil in July 2014, the desire to develop cooperation between the countries that are members of this organization was confirmed. In November of the same year, BRICS leaders, including Modi, met again in Australia on the sidelines of the G-20 summit. They condemned the anti-Russian sanctions, calling them illegal, violating the UN Charter and hindering global economic development.

At the next summit in Ufa (8-9 July 2015), the leaders of the BRICS countries expressed the need for comprehensive, transparent and effective multilateral approaches to solving world problems. They reaffirmed their deep commitment to the UN as a universal multilateral organization designed to help the international community maintain international peace and security, promote global development, and strengthen and protect human rights.

China and Russia reiterated that they attach great importance to the status and role of Brazil, India and South Africa in international affairs and support their efforts to play a stronger role in the UN21.

The BRICS countries reaffirmed their commitment to the territorial integrity, independence and national sovereignty of the Republic of Iraq and rejected all forms of foreign interference that could hinder the consolidation of its national democratic institutions. They expressed concern about the consequences of instability in Iraq and Syria resulting in increased terrorist activity in the region, and condemned acts of violence committed by terrorist and extremist groups.-

such as the self-proclaimed State of ISIL ²².

At the initiative of Russia, the BRICS countries ' Economic Partnership Strategy until 2020 was adopted, aimed at expanding multilateral business cooperation between these countries in order to accelerate their socio-economic development and increase the competitiveness of BRICS members in the global economy.

In the joint declaration of the Ufa Summit, Brazil, China, Russia and South Africa expressed their gratitude to India for its offer to host the 8th BRICS Summit in 2016 and expressed their readiness to provide full support in this regard.

INDIA AND PAKISTAN JOIN THE SCO

By July 2015, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, China, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan were members of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO).

For 14 years, the SCO has become an important platform for strengthening cooperation among developing countries. At the same time, there is a need to further strengthen this association. This was revealed in the course of discussions at the SCO summit, which took place in Ufa immediately after the BRICS summit.

The main outcomes of the SCO summit in Ufa were the Joint Declaration and the SCO Development Strategy for the next 10 Years.²³ One of the points of the declaration called for the early restoration of peace in Ukraine on the basis of the Minsk agreements. The SCO members also said that the settlement of the Iranian nuclear issue will open the door for Iran's accession to the SCO. On the situation in the Middle East and North Africa, the SCO stressed that the resolution of conflicts in these regions should take place without external interference. ²⁴

The document SCO Development Strategy until 2025 stated that the economic situation in the world requires joint efforts and more active cooperation between the SCO countries.

The SCO development strategy is also linked to the expansion of this organization. During the summit, it was announced that India and Pakistan will be admitted to the SCO. It was also decided to grant Belarus observer status in the SCO, and Azerbaijan, Armenia, Cambodia and Nepal-the status of a "dialogue partner" ²⁵.

Indian Prime Minister Modi congratulated Pakistan on becoming a full member of the SCO. He stressed that India will cooperate with all its neighbors and countries in the region. For his part, Pakistani Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif noted that the opportunity to become a full member of the organization is of great importance for his country. Joining the SCO shows how much the landscape of the region is changing today. Pakistan has important land and sea routes that will help promote cooperation in the SCO region and beyond, he said.

Taking into account the expansion of the SCO, President of Uzbekistan Islam Karimov noted that the accession of states with nuclear weapons to this organization can affect the balance of power on the world stage.

It was agreed that the next SCO summit will be held in 2016 in Uzbekistan, which will preside over the organization.²⁶

* * *

In present-day India, there is an intense political debate about the choice of the country's future development paths and its foreign policy. This is essentially a debate at a deep, fundamental level about India's long-term national interests. We are talking about pragmatic cooperation with major political forces in the world within the framework of India's multi-vector policy, which corresponds to its current and future global status. With this in mind, India cannot and most likely will not "put all its eggs in one basket".

In general, it should be said that the main features of the foreign policy of the current Indian leadership are far from being fully expressed. The further development of this policy depends on the dynamics of international relations both in Asia and at the global level.

¹ WSJ, 26.01.2015; Outlook, 23.01.2015; 27.01.2015; 02.02.2015; The Hindu. 26.01.2015; 27.01.2015; 28.01.2015; 02.02.2015; The Telegraph. 12.09.2015.

² Lenta.ru. 02.02.2015.

³ Ibid., 05.02.2015; Kommersant, 03.02.2015; Xinhua, 02.02.2015; 04.02.2015; The Hindu, 04.02.2015.

⁴ The Hindu. 17.03.2015.

⁵ PM Modi's Interview with Time // Posted by Outlook Web Desk on May 08, 2015.

^{Burns Nicholas.} 6 Passage to India. What Washington can do to Revive Relations with New Delhi // Foreign Affairs. September/October 2014, p. 132-141.

⁷ Ibidem.

⁸ Ibid.

⁹ Ibid.

^{Boggs Robert.} 10 Friends without Benefits. Is the U.S. -Indian Relations Built to Last? On the Rocks // Foreign Affairs. January-February, 2015, p. 165-168.

¹¹ Ibidem.

¹² PM Modi's Interview with Time...

^Cherianjohn. 13 Look West. Act East // Frontline. June 12, 2015.

¹⁴ India-Russia Review. Druzhba-Dosti: Strengthening parthership over the next decade // Republic Day Special, p. 16.

¹⁵ The Hindu. 19.07.2015.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ Ibid.

¹⁸ The Hindu. 09.05.2015.

¹⁹ India, Bangladesh make history with land swap // The Hindu. 06.06.2015.

²⁰ BRICS is an informal association of Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa (before South Africa joined in 2011-BRIC). It was founded in June 2006. The total area of the BRICS countries is 26% of the world's land area, and the population is 42% of the global total. In 2013, BRICS accounted for 16.1% of global trade, 10.8% of military spending, and 40.2% of traditional energy production.

²¹ http://tass.ru/politika/2107022

²² http://tass.ru/politika/2107038

²³ See also: Kozyrev N. I., Sidorov D. A. The SCO: New Contours of Eurasian Integration / / Asia and Africa Today. 2015, N 10. (Kozyrev N.I., Sidorov DA. 2015. ShOS: novye kontury evraziyskoi integratsii // Aziya i Afrika Segodnya. N 10) (in Russian)

²⁴ http://tass.ni/ekonomika/2111072

²⁵ http://tass.ru/mezhdunarodnaya-panorama/2112624

²⁶ http://www.ltv.ru/news/polit/287612

Permanent link to this publication: