I. Agrarian reforms

More than half a century after India's independence, agricultural relations in this country have gone through a complex evolutionary path. The Indian version of land ownership, as well as the legal basis for managing it, is still not similar to the organization of land use in other countries. What are the specifics of this option and what are its positive and negative aspects? This is discussed in the article published today - the first of a series of materials on the socio-economic problems of rural India.

As you know, modern India is a great Asian industrial and agricultural power, one of the largest states in the world. In a relatively short historical period - half a century after independence in 1947 - India's economic and social structures underwent profound changes, encompassing not only the hotbeds of modernization - the cities, but also the vast rural periphery. Although agriculture has ceased to occupy a dominant place in national production (its share in GDP fell from 55 to 29 percent between 1950 and 1998), almost two-thirds of the country's population is employed in this industry, and three-quarters of the self-employed part of the population lives in villages. ¹ The relations between different groups of the rural population that arise in the production process still largely determine the social appearance of Indian society.

The study of the processes taking place in the Indian agrosphere, in particular, related to the emergence of new forms of management, is of not only academic, but also practical interest.

The most extensive changes in the country's agricultural sector took place over the course of twenty years-from the mid-40s to the mid-60s. During this period, an essentially anti-feudal revolution took place in India, initiated and carried out from above by peaceful means - in the form of land reform, which consisted of two main components: the elimination of the" mediation system " (the abolition of the Zamindari system) and the transformation of lease relations by legislative means. These measures were accompanied by the creation of a land cadastre, an audit of the land tax system, and land management works related to the reduction of interlacing.

A fundamentally important feature of the agrarian system of India, which was formed during the colonial period and was preserved by the time of independence, was that the role of its "supporting structures" was played by land relations inherited, albeit in a modified form, from the pre-colonial, feudal era. It was based on rural neighbor communities, whose full members collectively formed the taxable estate (raya). They had ownership rights (economic use, inheritance and alienation) to the land they owned. The main part of the rayats consisted of farmers - direct producers. Formally, the feudalized upper class of the rural community also belonged to the taxable estate. From among the representatives of this elite, the lower levels of the administrative and tax apparatus were formed in the Mughal Empire and in other feudal states of India. This group of communists either rented out their land to other districts, or worked it with the labor of completely landless tenants - sharecroppers or intra-communal semi-serfs ("kabalniki"). As officials of the administrative and tax apparatus, these officials were responsible for collecting land tax from rayats - draft community members in their village (or part of it) or living in several neighboring villages. For this, they deducted in their favor a certain part of the collected land rent (tax), and also paid tax at reduced rates from the lands they owned (sir, khudkasht).

Unlike the communal peasants, this socio-class stratum of the rural population was designated by a special term-zamindars. In the XVII-XVIII centuries, the same term became most commonly used to refer to persons of the administrative and tax apparatus at the level of districts (pargana), provinces (sarkar) and viceroyships (suba). All zamindars, both "lower" and" higher " (zamindars-i-umda), as we said above, had the right to deduct in their favor "for service" a certain share of rent-a tax collected from territories under their jurisdiction. These service grants of various levels gradually became hereditary and alienable.

This whole system of land ownership and use combined to form the Indian version of eastern state-feudal land ownership.

During the development of the occupied territories, the British colonial administration carried out a land tax reform in the late XVIII-first half of the XIX centuries, the purpose of which was to ensure that each land plot had only one owner, receiving-

page 55

its status as an owner (from the point of view of English bourgeois property law) and a taxpayer.

In the provinces of British India, the Zamindari land tax system was introduced in 57 percent of the territory, according to which either "lower" or "higher" zamindars were declared land owners, and the draught community members-rayats under their jurisdiction received the status of permanent and hereditary tenants of land in Zamindar estates. In 38 percent of the territory of British India, the rayatwari system was introduced, according to which the rights of land owners were given to rayats-peasants, "grassroots" zamindars - to their lands. Similar rights were granted to tenants of land belonging to the community, who paid rent-a tax directly to the treasury. The mahalwari system was implemented in five percent of the territory, and it differed from the Rayatwari system in that the colonial administration considered the village as a unit of taxation, within which the land tax was paid directly to individual farms by the rayats themselves.

Within the framework of the Indian federal Constitution, agricultural policy, including land reform, is the responsibility of the states. This situation, in particular, is due to both significant, historically formed differences in the agrarian system of individual states, and their unequal socio-political structure. Laws to abolish the Zamindari system have been passed in the states at various times. However, nationwide legislation was introduced in 1946-1955, which extended to the possessions of zamindars both in the states-former provinces of British India, and in the states - former principalities. The practical implementation of the provisions of this legislation was mostly completed by 1957-1958. In the following twenty years, most states adopted additional legislation that either affected certain types of Zamindar land ownership that were not previously covered by laws abolishing the Zamindari system, or adjusted the conditions for alienation or vesting ownership rights to certain groups of owners. The laws on agrarian reform adopted in the states (which applied either to all Zamindar-type land ownership or to its individual specific legal forms) had the following main aspects.

All ownership rights of persons subject to the reform were divided into three categories. The first category included rights to lands that were in perpetual lease from the Rayats, which was confirmed by the receipt of rent; these rights were subject to alienation. The second category consisted of land rights that were at the economic disposal of the owner of the Zamindar type and were cultivated either by the labor of tenants without permanent lease rights, or by the labor of hereditary bonded labourers, or by the labor of hired workers. The rights to these lands (sir, khudkasht) were reserved for landowners. The third category included rights to all other territories within the Zamindar-type domain (including wastelands, forests, roads, land in public use in settlements, bazaars, etc.), irrigation sources, mineral resources, and other land that was not in the individual use of either the zamindar or rayats. These rights were automatically transferred to the State. All other movable and immovable property of the zamindars (including homesteads, livestock, inventory, etc.) was retained by them.

The share of sire-type land in the total area of Zamindar holdings varies from state to state. According to our calculations, it was in the states - former principalities: Rajasthan - 8 percent, Bhople - 10, Vindhya Pradesh-23, Saurashtra - 31-32 percent (the last three states after 1956 became part of neighboring enlarged states). A very small area of sire was in the largest former principalities of Hyderabad and Mysore. In the states-former provinces of British India-the share of Sire Zamindar lands was approximately 0.4 percent in Tamilnadu and Andhra Pradesh. West Bengal - 3.4, Bihar - 14.8, Uttar Pradesh-20.6, Madhya Pradesh - 28, Gujarat - 54 percent.

Zamindars received monetary compensation for the lands alienated from them, the amount of which was established by law. During the reform, the Zamindari land tax system was eliminated and the Rayatwari system was introduced in the former Zamindars ' possessions. At the same time, former zamindars and Zamin rayats registered their ownership rights to the land left to them as private land owners who paid state land tax.

The adoption by state legislatures of laws on agrarian reforms, and then their practical implementation by the administrative and tax apparatus, took place in an atmosphere of active co - operation with the government.-

page 56

resistance of the zamindars and the unfolding anti-feudal peasant movement. A rather explicit recognition of the role of the peasant struggle in the reform of the Zamindari system was contained in the speech of the Chief Minister of Bihar, S. K. Singhi, delivered in the State Legislative Assembly when introducing the Agrarian Reform Bill of 1946. Addressing the Zamindars, he said: "I repeat to you that you are at the crater of a volcano that could erupt at any moment." ² In unison with Singha's speech was the conclusion of the Committee for the Abolition of the Zamindari System in Uttar Pradesh (1948): "Long-standing, barely contained discontent, sometimes breaking out in acts of open disobedience, and sometimes violence, has reached a critical state both in our province and in other parts of India... Discontent can develop into a revolution, and our social security will be threatened... If the abolition of the zamindari is delayed for several years, then it will already mean expropriation without compensation and, quite possibly, blood and violence. " ³

The push from below was carried out in unison with the strategic course of the ruling Indian National Congress led by Jawaharlal Nehru to eliminate feudal and semi-feudal forms of ownership as the main obstacle to the country's economic and social progress. In 1976, the National Commission on Agriculture clearly outlined this fact in the following conclusion:" The elimination of feudal and semi-feudal elements was thus a necessary prerequisite for ensuring the growth of the country's productive forces. " ⁴

Despite all the subterfuges of the Zamindar landlords and their allies in the legislative and executive branches, the implementation of legislation on the elimination of" statutory land ownership " led to the elimination of the Zamindars as a specific socio-class stratum of Indian society. We estimate that nationwide, the Zamindars have lost about 75 percent of their cultivated land. According to the calculations of the Planning Commission of India, on the eve of the land reform, the zamindars ' estates covered 40 percent of all privately owned cultivated land ^.5 After the land reform, they still own about 10 percent, and by now, taking into account the overall growth in acreage, 7-8 percent of privately owned land remains. Most of the former zamindars were integrated into the upper group of land owners (owners of ten or more hectares).

For alienated arable land, zamindars received monetary compensation calculated on the basis of their "net income" in inverse proportion to its level. The total amount of repurchase payments was set at Rs 6.7 billion ^.6 Since the payment of compensation to zamindars lasted for 40 years, they received annually from 1/2 (small zamindars) to 1/40 (large zamindars) of the amount of their previous income from the alienated part of their estates. Complete ruin of former feudal landlords, especially in areas that were previously part of the principalities, was quite common.

Former tenants (zamin rayats) of land alienated from the Zamindars received land ownership rights (in some states, for example in Uttar Pradesh, for a moderate purchase) and began to pay land tax at rates that were reduced compared to previous lease payments. It is estimated that 25 million Zamin rayats were affected by these changes ^.7

In the first decade after independence, along with advocating for the abolition of the Zamindari system, the struggle of tenants for better lease conditions and, ultimately, for land was the main focus of both organized and spontaneous peasant movements. This circumstance contributed to the adoption of parallel laws in the states on the abolition of the Zamindari system of rental legislation, the implementation of which became the second component of agricultural reforms.

After the elimination of the Zamindari system, land leases remained in the possession of former zamindars, large zamin rayats, as well as large land owners in Rayatwari districts. Since these leases were generally not recorded, accurate statistics on their distribution across the country in the late 40s and early 50s, i.e. by the time the implementation of rental legislation began, are not available. According to P. S. Appu, one of the most respected researchers of agricultural reforms in India, by the time the country achieved independence, "unregulated" rent occupied about half of the total area under cultivation ^.8

Rental legislation, adopted in the United States mainly in the late 40s-50s, had the following main aspects:: 1) granting tenants the rights of "protected" (i.e. permanent and regulated by law) lease; 2) regulation of rent rates and other parties to the lease relations; 3) termination of the lease relations and transfer of land-

page 57

4) the purchase by tenants of the ownership rights to the leased land plots.

The legislation itself thus protected the opposing interests of landowners and their tenants. The landlords did not fail to take advantage of this and, under the legal pretexts of "moving to their own economy" and "voluntary termination of lease relations by the tenant", began a mass drive of tenants from the land. Assessing its scale, one of India's leading agricultural economists, the late Professor M. L. Dantwala, wrote that in the first 10 years of India's independence, more tenants were driven away than in the last 100 years of the colonial regime ^.9

In 1976, the National Commission on Agriculture identified 24 different" legal grounds " for the removal of tenants contained in the rental laws adopted in various states. The Commission's report highlights the ridiculous" grounds " for the drive-in: "if the tenant does not notify that he is starting harvesting" (Tamilnadu); "if the tenant does not cultivate the land properly" (Orissa); "if the tenant does not farm in accordance with the accepted tradition" (Punjab, Haryana); "if the tenant does not contribute a share of the crop in due time" (Assam, Andhra Pradesh), etc^.

The socio-economic content of the process of removing tenants from the land is ambiguous. On the one hand, this was a kind of preventive measure on the part of landowners, aimed at preventing the possibility of a tenant who had the rights of a "protected", that is, permanent lease, ultimately becoming the owner of the land he was cultivating. In Bombay, for example, the number of protected tenants decreased by 20 per cent between 1948 and 1951, and in Hyderabad, by 57 per cent between 1952 and 1955! ¹¹ At the same time, sample surveys conducted in Bombay, Hyderabad, Gujarat and Bihar showed that land plots from which protected tenants were removed were often re-leased, but on more favorable terms for landowners ("unprotected" lease), usually under the sharecropping system.

On the other hand, the withdrawal of land from tenants really meant the transition of landowners to running their own economy, that is, to cultivating the land by family or wage labor. In the state of Bombay, for example, 70 per cent of the land area from which tenants were removed was effectively being converted to "own farm" ^.12 In Hyderabad, this transition was achieved in 57 per cent of land seizures from tenants. ¹³

Unfortunately, there is no summary data on how much of the land seized from tenants was again transferred to the sharecropping lease, and how much was cultivated by hired or family labor of landowners. One survey conducted in the State of Haryana found that 58.08 per cent of the land "seized" from tenants in the 1960s and 70s was farmed by hired and family labor, while the rest was leased out again ^.14

The reform of the system of lease relations provided for both granting tenants the rights of permanent and hereditary ("protected") leases, and obtaining tenants (usually for redemption) ownership rights to the land plots they rented. However, these provisions are not included in the rental laws of major states such as Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, Rajasthan and Tamilnadu, which can be explained primarily by socio-political reasons. In all these states, the vast majority of tenants who have survived the abolition of the Zamindari system belong to the lower (Shudra and "untouchable") castes, while the majority of large and medium-sized (by land area) tenants, on the contrary, belong to the local "agricultural dominant" castes, whose representatives play a decisive role in local legislative and executive bodies the authorities. At the same time, sharecropping of land to socially disenfranchised rural lower classes is an important source of income for the rural elite.

In the same industrialized states (Maharashtra, Gujarat), where leases played a subordinate role in the land use system, as well as in states where during the implementation of the lease legislation, governments were either dominated by communists (Kerala) or the left wing of the Indian National Congress (Karnataka), a mass of tenants (in Kerala -almost 100 percent) received the rights of land owners. According to official data, as of May 1993, the owners ' rights were acquired by: 1,492,000 tenants on 4,621,000 acres in Maharashtra, 1,263,000 on 2,566,000 acres in Gujarat, 2,842,000 on 1,450,000 acres in Kerala, 605,000 on 2,632,000 acres in Karnataka. In total, according to the same data, 11213 thousand tenants on 15332 thousand acres were granted the status of either land owners or "protected" (permanent and hereditary) tenants ^.15

Changes in the system of lease relations, the emergence of millions of land owners - an organic part of the overall evolution of the agricultural system of India. The subsequent stages of this evolution will be discussed in other publications.

(To be continued)

¹ Economic Survey 1999-2000. New Delhi, 2000.

² Abolition of Zamindari System. Patna, 1946, p. 4.

³ Report of the United Provinces Zamindari Abolition Committee. Vol. 1. Allahabad, 1948, p. 358.

⁴ Report of the National Commission on Agriculture, 1976. Pt. XV. Agrarian Reforms. Delhi, s/a, p. 50.

⁵ Implementation of Land Reforms. A Review by the Land Reforms Committee of the National Development Council. Delhi, 1967, p. 277.

⁶ Report of the National Commission on Agriculture, p. 51.

⁷ P.S. Appu. Land Reforms in India. A Survey of Policy, Legislation and Implementation. Delhi, 1997, p. 73.

⁸ Ibid., p. 108.

⁹ M.L. Dantwala. Land Reform in India. - The Eastern Economist. Annual Number 1957. Bombay, January 1958, p. 60.

¹⁰ Report of the National Commission on Agriculture, p.66.

¹¹ Reports of the Committees of the Panel on Land Reforms. Planning Commission. Delhi, 1959 p. 36.

¹² V.M. Dandekar, G.J. Khudanpur. Working of the Bombay Tenancy Act, 1948. Report of Investigation. Poona, 1957, p. 90.

¹³ Bhujang Rao Kulkarni. Eviction of Protected Tenants in Hyderabad. Results of an Enguiry. - AICC Economic Review. Vol. VII, N 8-9, 15.8.1956, p. 86.

¹⁴ Sheila Bhalla. Changes in Acreage and Tenure Structure of Land Holdings in Haryana, 1962-1972. - Economic and Political Weekly. Vol. XII, N 13, Review of Agriculture, pp. A-11, A-14.

¹⁵ P.S. Appu. Edict. soch., pp. 111-115, 265.

Permanent link to this publication: