India's parliamentary democracy system is at a critical juncture. New and smaller groups of the population are being drawn into politics. The role of local and regional interest groups is growing, and the coalition principle of organizing political forces and forming government bodies in the center and in the states is being established. All this, on the one hand, leads to a temporary revival of traditionalism in politics, and on the other hand, it indicates a further deepening of the democratic process in the country. Shifts in the public consciousness and political culture of the electorate convince us that the country, although slowly and controversially, is moving towards the formation of a certain Indian model of civil society.

TRADITIONAL TYPE OF INTEREST GROUPS

Traditional interest groups have two characteristics. The first is kinship, which unites the members of these groups and underlies their internal solidarity. At the same time, the relationship itself does not have to be real. It can be potential, i.e. possible in principle, and fictitious, existing only in the public consciousness. The second feature is endogamy. Endogamy defines the prescriptive nature of recruiting members of these communities, defines the contours of their external borders and separates " friends "from"strangers". Endogamy, like kinship, has a rather complex nature. It applies not only to those collectives whose members are actually or may be related, but also to communities whose members have never entered into and cannot enter into marriages with each other. Kinship and endogamy are the fundamental principles of organizing traditional social groups.

Structures based on actual or potential kinship include castes and tribes. A survey conducted by the Anthropological Service of India under the leadership of K. S. Singh revealed 4,635 such formations (excluding their internal divisions) 1 . Other researchers cite figures that are much larger. Fictitious kinship groups include some communal structures-village, neighborhood, community, etc. Although they may themselves consist of separate endogamous units (caste, religious, tribal, etc.), society interprets them in terms of kinship (village brother / sister, mohalla brother/sister, etc.). some villages or urban neighborhood communities practice exogamy - members of the same endogamous group within their settlement, like close relatives, cannot marry among themselves .2 In fact, religious communities are also endogamous. And although the Hindus are fragmented

Ending. * For the beginning, see: East (Oriens). 2001. N 4. pp. 48-66.

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despite the many separate endogamous castes, the community as a whole is endogamous to other religious groups, as they are to each other. Due to the fact that religious minorities, including Muslims, Sikhs, Christians, Buddhists and Zoroastrians, were formed mainly through proselytism, i.e. the conversion of Hindus to other religions, or were influenced by the socio-cultural tradition of Hinduism, many of the rules of caste society, including endogamy, although in a weakened form,are not applied in the traditional sense. they also operate within these communities. The American scholar D. Mandelbaum noted that religious minority groups "participate in local social systems as jati" 3, i.e., castes.

Kinship and endogamy do not ensure the uniformity of traditional interest groups. They are highly segmented along the lines of marital relations (patriarchal families, clans, exogamous gotras, relatives on the paternal and maternal lines, etc.e.), based on place of residence or origin, religious (sects, cults), linguistic, ethno-cultural, status, and socio-class differences. Between these numerous divisions in traditional society, there was a well-established system of relationships for centuries, in which fragmentation and segmentation did not violate the stability of individual social groups and society as a whole. The situation began to change with the introduction of modern forces of modernization - market relations, migration, and, especially, social and class differentiation and politicization of society. The impact of modernization on traditional groups is complex and contradictory. On the one hand, modernization creates contradictions within groups, between their various segments. In the press, you can find reports of hostility between representatives of the well-to-do elite of some traditional groups and their less fortunate counterparts. On the other hand, the interests of politicians, as well as the expectations associated with gaining power, mask these contradictions and unite their ranks.

Modernization has an equally ambiguous effect on intergroup relations. It certainly sharpens inter-group competition, increases mutual alienation, and generates conflicts. Thanks to the influx of money from the Gulf countries, the coastal part of Karnataka is experiencing an economic boom, which attracts many immigrants here. A significant part of them are Bayri Muslims. In the Dakshina Kannada district, where bairis already make up 15% of the population, local fish markets, bidi cigarettes, and spices are under their control. The dominant Bant or Nadayev caste and Konkani Brahmins had to make room in business, while the Konkani Christians had to make room in education .4 Each Aboriginal religious community saw the reason for their difficulties in the competition of outsiders-non-Believers, which caused anti-Muslim (and at the same time anti-Christian) pogroms in December 1998.5.

But since "the political context requires that the interest group be sufficiently large," A. C. Bhagabati notes, 6 many groups seek to establish cooperation with close entities and even, which happens much less often, merge with them. "Communities that did not know unity outside their villages until 40 years ago are now consciously engaging in the process of creating identities that include other villages and even other tribes," A. C. Bhagabati writes about the situation in the north - east of the country7 . A typical example in this regard is the Maratha Vatandars and Maratha Kunbi in Maharashtra. Once separate castes, today they have practically merged into a single superstructure called Maratha 8 .

Although the main goal of politics was and still is the struggle for power, the social "genetics" of traditional groups often draws them into the circle of their political interests

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issues that are, strictly speaking, on the periphery of the power struggle - disputes over status, duties and privileges, rules of mutual communication, etc.

In the village of Undhai in Mehsana district in the northern part of Gujarat, a rather serious conflict has developed between the land-owning Patel caste and the Dalits. The occasion for it was an ordinary event-the consecration of a village deity. All groups, including Dalits, contributed money to this event. But when it came time for a collective meal on the occasion of the solemn event, the Patels ordered the Dalits to come with their plates and sit down separately from the" pure " Hindus. This angered the Dalits, who accused the Patels of caste-based discrimination against the law. The police made arrests among the Patels. To top it off, 600 Dalits protested their intention to convert to Christianity. The conflict in the village of Undhai instantly made headlines and put the state government in a very difficult position.

CASTES AND TRIBES

According to the degree of significance and impact on the socio - political life of the country, caste plays the most important role among all traditional groups. In Indian society, it serves as a permeating structure in the sense that the principles of its structure (endogamy and the presence of exogamous internal divisions), its ideology (purity - desecration, hierarchy, status, etc.), psychology (internal solidarity and external self-isolation) in one way or another extend to the whole society, to other traditional groups and their relationship.

Strictly speaking, a caste is what the Indians call a jati, i.e. an endogamous, closed, ranked group of real or potential relatives who live according to their own customs and laws .9 But in the mass literature, a caste is often called a cluster of jatis, which have a common name, usually associated with a traditional profession, and approximately the same ritual status.

The Kumbharas (potters), Goalas (shepherds), Patels (headmen) and others who appear in the press are actually bundles of independent castes. "Some bundles consist of several jatis and number thousands of people, others include several dozen jatis and millions of people." 10 Less often, the term caste is used as a synonym for varna - "brahmin caste", "kshatriya caste", etc. Caste (jati) is a local structure. As a rule, the area of its settlement, and therefore the range of interests and influence, do not go beyond a limited area or, at best, an ethno-cultural region.

Politics is only one of the functions of caste, and of relatively recent origin .11 The role of castes in politics has been constantly changing over the past decades, becoming more active and independent. At first, the caste served only as a" bank " of votes, i.e., as a guaranteed sum of votes. By enlisting the caste elite - the elders of powerful clans, panchayat leaders - professional politicians used castes "to mobilize votes, form political alliances and factions, and select candidates for deputies to legislative assemblies and parliaments." 12 For obvious reasons, politicians primarily focused on the numerically large "dominant peasant castes" and their bundles: Yadavas, Koeri, Kurmi, Jats, Gujaras - in Northern India; Kunbi - in Maharashtra; Reddi-in Andhra Pradesh, etc. "To ensure support in the election struggle of the political elite It stimulated caste identification in peasant communities, " notes Surendra Gopal13 .

According to their ritual status, "peasant castes" have always occupied a low place in the caste hierarchy. But in the process of agrarian reforms, land was redistributed in their favor. Experience of working on land, hard work, favorable economic conditions, state assistance in the implementation of the "green revolution".-

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lucii" gave them the opportunity to significantly strengthen their economic position. Their relatively large numbers, as well as the support of Dalits dependent on them, allowed these castes to strengthen their political influence. This significantly increased their social status and spurred their political ambitions. Panchayats of many castes began to assume political functions.

Thus, in October 1998, the Jat Samaj Panchayat held a meeting attended by representatives of 360 villages. It was dedicated to the reinstatement of fellow caste member Sahib Singh Verma, who was dismissed from his post as Chief Minister of the Delhi Government. The Panchayat issued an ultimatum to the authorities to return S. S. Verma to the government. Otherwise, the panchayat will not allow any newcomer from the center to run in this district and will nominate its own candidates. "If we are outnumbered, we will win with the strength of our lathi (sticks. - A. K. ) " - one of the speakers said threateningly 14 .

The activities of voluntary public caste organizations were also politicized. Many sanghas, sabhas and other organizations created on the basis of individual jatis or bundles of close castes, whose main goal has always been to preserve traditions, strengthen caste identity, and fight for increasing social status and prestige, have now become a means of political education, political pressure and political mobilization.

The self-organization of the "middle dominant castes" served as an incentive for the politicization of their social antipodes - the Dalits. Unlike the "peasant castes", these castes received little land during the reforms and are still forced to work, but this time for new landowners, who sometimes turned out to be even more cruel exploiters than their high-born predecessors. The desire of the new land owners to appropriate the rights and privileges of the traditional caste elite, including the right to receive gratuitous services, has exacerbated the contradictions in the village to the limit. The lower castes and Dalits were gradually freed from the political tutelage of the high and middle castes. Their leaders, inspired by the ideas of the outstanding fighter against caste inequality B. R. Ambedkar, did a lot to rally the Dalits and turn them into an organized political force.

However, soon the leadership of the Dalit organizations-the " Federation of Scheduled Castes "and the" Republican Party " - passed into the hands of the compromising elite. As a reaction to the opportunism of the elite, radical movements such as "Dalit Panther" and others are emerging among the Dalits. But in the 1970s and 1980s, their role began to decrease. A new generation of Dalit leaders became increasingly aware of the broad scope of parliamentary methods of fighting to achieve their goals. Initially, the Dalits tried to block with all-India Congress-type parties. A significant part of the Dalit castes still support the Congress. However, the contradictions between the "peasant" castes and the Dalits, the caste prejudices of the high and middle castes prevented the formation of a broad Dalit bloc with this party. The stage of self-organization of Dalits has come.

The politicization of castes had at least two consequences. The first is the strengthening of caste interest groups. The beginning of this process, as noted, was the rapprochement of the Jati of the same bundle or bundles of similar castes. An example is the Triveni Sangh, an association of three peasant castes: the Yadavas, Kurmi and Koeri. With the politicization of society, Varna is becoming increasingly important for the unity of castes. Almost all varnas today have their own voluntary associations of local or pan-Indian scale - "All India Brahmin Mahasabha", "Brahman Sabha", "Gujarat Kshatriya Sabha", "All India Vaishya Sammelan", etc. The second is the formation of caste-based political parties. The initiative in this regard was shown by the "dominant peasant castes", who created parties such as "Janata Dal", " Lok

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dal", "Samajwadi party", etc. The Dalits followed. In the north of the country, two Dalit parties emerged - the Dur Darshi Samaj Party (1980) and the Bahujan Samaj Party (1984). The Dur Darshi Samaj (DDP) won only 1.2% of the vote in the 1989 elections and almost disappeared from the scene. The Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP), which Pradeep Kumar believes was able to "fill the vacuum created by the decline in the influence of Ambedkar's followers and the weakening of the Congress," was more successful .15

In the 12th general elections, this party held 5 of its deputies to the country's parliament, and in the 13th-already 14. Initially, the BSP counted on the support of all " non-born "castes (sudras and"untouchables") and religious minorities, especially Muslims. But the Muslims did not agree to an alliance with the BSP. The BSP also fails to become a Dalit party on a pan-Indian scale. Many Dalit castes. as well as other categories of "non-born" groups of the population, especially in the south of the country, still prefer to go "under the roof "of the main stream parties - the Congress and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). In Tamilnadu, for example, Pattai Makkal Katchi (PMK), a Vanniar party belonging to the "most backward classes "(NOC), and Puthiya Tamizhagan, a Pallar caste party (now known as Devendra Kula Vellar), joined the Lok Sabha (lower House) elections in 1998. to the BJP-led alliance. In Maharashatra, the Matang and Charmakar castes joined the BJP's Shiv Sena alliance . Today, the BSP's efforts are aimed at attracting to its side those Dalit castes that have not yet determined their political orientation. Among them - Balmiki, Doms, Khatik, Kol, Kinjar, Nath, Kalabaz and Badhik, as well as some groups from the NOC and "list tribes" (SP).

Tribes make up only 7% of the country's population. But their role as interest groups in the socio-political life of the country is constantly increasing. This is due both to the growth of their political activity and to the interests of the country's security and territorial integrity. The strategically important border regions of North-East and North-West India are populated mainly by tribes. The habitats of some of them cover part of the territory of Bangladesh, Burma (Myanma), Nepal, Tibet, and Pakistan, which often complicates India's relations with neighboring countries. The State provides considerable assistance to the tribal population. However, it remains among the poorest categories of Indian citizens.

Tribal interests primarily revolve around obtaining new benefits and allowances from the state. But they also have specific interests. The fact is that the process of economic development entails deforestation, as well as the withdrawal of land for plowing, for the construction of roads, hydraulic structures; the introduction of restrictions on the use of forest land. All this worsens the already poor situation of the tribes and threatens their usual way of life. Other problems are the influx of immigrants to the territories of the original tribes, the purchase and seizure of land, trade and usurious exploitation by the more sophisticated market relations of the alien population. Tribes try to deal with their problems in various ways, including "establishing new connections with neighboring groups, regional communities, the state, and even with the outside world," notes A. C. Bhagabati17 . As an example, he cites the Naga tribes living in Nagaland, Manipur and Assam. Nagas living in Manipur and Assam require that their territory be included in the state of Nagaland18 .

Tribes that are sufficiently integrated into the socio-economic and cultural life of Indian society, as a rule, prefer to solve their problems together with other social forces in the region and the country as a whole. In the Khargon district of Madhya Pradesh, the Adivasi Mukti Sangam tribal people's organization, along with other organizations, fights against the "forest mafia", which conducts unauthorized timber harvesting, sells alcohol and engages in usury .19 Groups that are less integrated into Indian society and live-

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People who live mainly in isolated mountainous areas tend to be isolated and even separatist.

Thus, the National Liberation Front of Tripura (NLFT) guide circular condemns general secondary education, which "breeds careerists"; calls on compatriots not to use the services of Hindu priests; not to worship Hindu gods, etc. 20 . As a result of the Tribal Movement for Administrative Autonomy, the Northeast Frontier Agency was granted Union territory status in 1972 and became a separate State of Arunachal Pradesh in 1987. Since 1963, the states of Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram have already been separated from Assam. Apparently, the administrative division of Assam did not end there. Many Bodo tribes in Assam are fighting for the formation of the state of Bodoland.

An extreme form of isolationism is separatism, the desire not only to create its own statehood, but also to withdraw from the Indian Union. Such movements exist in almost all states of the north-east of the country. The Bodo people of the lower Assam districts are almost split along political lines. Moderate organizations-All Bodo Students Union, Bodo Peoples Action Community, and Peoples Democratic Front-advocate the formation of the state of Bodoland as part of India. As a result of a long struggle, the Bodo achieved the creation of their autonomous "Bodoland Otonomos Council" with a population of 2 million people. Extremist organizations such as Bodo Liberation Tigers and Bodo Security Force have declared their goal to establish a "sovereign Bodoland" and expel all other ethnic groups from its territory (their slogan is "Free Bodoland - only for Bodo!"). To begin with, they call for expanding the territory of the autonomous region to include another 515 villages, where Bodos make up only 2%. Armed groups of extremists seize the land of Nebodo, burn their homes, and kill people regardless of gender and age. As a result, about 200,000 people have already left their homes and found temporary shelter in refugee camps.

The indigenous Nebodo tribes, as well as immigrant communities, are also not idle. The Santals formed two underground paramilitary organizations, Birsa Commando Force and Adivasi Cobra Militant Force. Other communities follow suit, as evidenced by the names of organizations such as Bengoli Tiger Force, Hindu Security Taek Force, Muslim Liberation Tigers of Assam, Gorkha Taek Force, etc. The last organization of the warlike Gorkha tribes, also known as the Gurkhas, has at least 100 armed and trained fighters at its disposal, according to Indian intelligence .21

A dangerous situation is developing in the state of Tripura, where movements are gaining strength that advocate the formation of a sovereign "Holy State of Tribes" and rely exclusively on military methods of struggle.

According to Kalyan Chaudhuri, more than a dozen paramilitary organizations such as All Tripura Tiger Force, Tripura Defense Force, National Militia of Tripura, Tripura Army Tribal Commando Force, and Tribal Commando Force operate on the territory of Tripura. but also abroad. Thus, according to relevant Indian organizations, there are more than 20 such bases in Bangladesh alone .22 The general program of the separatists is to carry out ethnic cleansing ("Tripura - for Tripurians!"). The implementation of this program is accompanied by mass terror against non-indigenous residents. In June 1980, about 30 Bengali immigrants were killed in one day alone, followed by massive inter-communal clashes that killed 2,000 people (mostly also Bengalis) and destroyed 20,000 homes. Murder, violence, and hostage-taking for ransom have become commonplace in the state .23

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RELIGIOUS COMMUNITIES

The inhabitants of India profess all religions known to the world. Hindus or Hindus make up 82.4% of the population, Muslims 11%, followed by Christians 2.4%, Sikhs 2.0%, Buddhists 0.7% and Jains 0.5%. In addition to these main religions, Indian statistics distinguish a group of "other" religions, which include primitive beliefs and cults-they are followed by the population of tribes and they are followed by 0.4% of the country's population. "In India, people's lives are largely controlled by religion. It determines their upbringing, customs, habits, and education. There is hardly any aspect of life that is not directly or indirectly influenced by religion, " notes V. Bhalla 24 .

In a survey conducted by India Today magazine and the Indian Council for Social Research, the young (16 to 30 years old) urban population of Delhi, Mumbai, Chennai and Bangalore asked the question " Do you believe in God?" 94% of respondents answered " yes "and only 6%- "no". Among those who said yes, 91% were men, 96% were women, 92% were Hindus, 98% were Sikhs, 98% were Christians, and 99% were Muslims .25 The survey revealed that even among city residents, religiosity does not fall, but increases. This phenomenon is certainly due to the difficult living conditions, mass unemployment, and uncertainty about the future of the majority of the population.

Religion has always been one of the main foundations for "forming the identities of the vast majority of ordinary people," says Hassan Abdullayev . The erosion of the traditional way of life, the intensification of competition, the struggle for the market, resources, jobs, and power contribute to the growth of self-awareness and the cohesion of religious communities. An appeal to religious feeling also becomes a sure means of uniting and organizing them. Shila Rawal in India Today magazine noted that religion is adopted not only by political organizations, but also by the criminal world. In the internecine struggle for the redistribution of spheres of influence, Mumbai's criminal groups split along religious lines into Hindu and Muslim ones. Communalism, the author claims, has become "a sign of the times."

The influence of religious interest groups and their mutual relations are determined by a number of factors. Of course, the socio-economic position of groups is of great importance, which allows some small groups to play a disproportionately large role in various spheres of life in the country and its regions (Zoroastrians in Mumbai, Syrian Christians in Kerala, etc.). Under the current system of government formation, the size of the group becomes very important. For the majority community, it almost certainly guarantees a dominant position in the system of government, and therefore more favorable conditions for asserting its dominance in other socially significant spheres of life.

The Hindu community is a de facto and de jure majority community. It dominates the economic and political life of the country, determines the socio-psychological atmosphere in most of the largest and most developed regions. To protect the interests of religious minorities, the Constitution of India recognizes their right to preserve their language, writing, and cultural identity. The State provides them with assistance in obtaining education and employment, and allocates funds for the implementation of programs for the socio-economic development of the regions where they are most concentrated. However, this does not save minorities from being discriminated against by the majority, from feeling uncomfortable and dangerous, and society as a whole from inter-communal tensions and contradictions.

The situation is aggravated by the uneven settlement of religious communities. As a result, every community, even the smallest in the country, can be in the majority in the state, district, electoral district, etc., or at least make up the veli-

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the rank that all other groups should count towards. I'll give you some examples. The absolute majority community nationwide is Hindu, but it is a minority in Punjab, where Hindus account for 36.9% of the population, in Jammu and Kashmir-32.2, in Arunachal Pradesh-29.2, in Meghalaya - 18, in Nagaland - 14.4 and in Mizoram - 7.1 %. Conversely, Muslims belonging to the category of religious minorities constitute the majority in the state of Jammu and Kashmir (64.2%). In West Bengal and Kerala, their share exceeds 20%. The most "Christianized" states are Mizoram (83.8%), Nagaland (80.2%) and Meghalaya (52.6%). The concentration of Christians in Kerala is quite high - 20.6%. The area of settlement of Sikhs is limited, but in Punjab they make up the absolute majority-61%. Within the country, the proportion of Buddhists in Sikkim reaches 28.7%, in Arunachal Pradesh-13.7%. Adherents of" other " religions in Arunachal Pradesh account for 51.8%, and in Meghalaya-25.9% of the population.

Thus, depending on the degree of concentration and region, almost every community can be both a dominant and a dominant group. While being discriminated against as a minority in one region, it can take "revenge" as a majority in another. This greatly complicates the picture of inter-community relations in the country. The composition of religious - community interest groups and the nature of their mutual relations vary from region to region, and even from district to district. Intercommunal conflicts tend to arise locally, in areas of close contact between different religious groups. Then they spread like wildfire to other regions.

Across the country, there are two main ideological and political trends among the Hindu majority. One is the cultural and religious nationalism of the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Having started out as the political wing of the Hindu chauvinist organization Rashtriya Sevak Sangh (RSS), the BJP has noticeably softened its attitudes in the struggle for voters and now stands out from a nationwide patriotic position. This gave her the opportunity to expand her social base and gain the support of some religious minorities. However, the BJP's victory and the Congress ' defeat in the last two general elections can be seen as further evidence of heightened tensions between the country's religious communities.

Another trend of the religious majority is religious chauvinism, which is characterized by aggressive intolerance towards non-believers. A prominent representative of this trend is the influential" cultural organization "" Shiv Sena "(SHS), as well as the RCC and its affiliated parties:" Sangha Families "(Sangh pari-var)," Vishwa Hindu Parishad"," Hindu Jagran Manch"," Bajrang Dal " and others, which advocate the construction of a new state. Hindu states (Hindu Rashtra, Hindutva, etc.). Hindu chauvinists bear the main responsibility for cases of intercommunal clashes that have become commonplace in the country's life. In 1998 alone, 626 such collisions were recorded. At the same time, 209 people were killed and 2065 people were injured .

Any fact or event can serve as a reason for inciting hostility towards religious minorities. For example, Ashok Singhal, one of the leaders of the Vishwa Hindu Parishad, even used the award of the 1999 Nobel Prize in Economics to the famous Indian-born scientist Amartya Sen. "These Nobel Prizes," he said, "have one goal - to help expand the base of Christianity in the country." 29 In recent years, Hindu extremists have increasingly used so-called conversions, the conversion of Hindus to other religions, as a pretext for persecuting religious minorities, which allegedly threatens the foundations of society and the state. In fact, proselytism has a limited scope and mainly concerns such categories of the population as tribes and Dalits, who resort to a change of faith in order to get rid of the humiliated position in caste society.

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Relations between Hindus and Muslims are particularly complex. The reasons for this situation are a number of factors. First, it is the memory of mutual pogroms after the partition of India in 1947, which caused a mass migration of Muslims to Pakistan and Hindus to India, accompanied by huge human losses. Secondly, it is the relative number of Muslims who can actually compete, and sometimes do, with Hindus in business, employment, and politics. Third , tensions with Pakistan and suspicions that Indian Muslims are playing the role of Pakistan's " fifth column." One of the most dramatic episodes of relations between the two communities, which has not been erased from popular memory to this day, was the destruction of the Babri Majid Mosque in Ayodhya (Uttar Pradesh) by Hindu fanatics on December 6, 1992, which "caused a wave of Hindu-Muslim clashes, terrorism, bomb explosions..., pogroms, during which many people were killed." many innocent people" 30 .

Relations between Hindus and Christians are becoming increasingly strained. Churches, Christian priests and missionaries are targeted. December 1998 was marked by savage acts of violence and vandalism against Christians in Gujarat. From 25 to 31 December, Hindutva forces burned 9 churches and looted 11 .31 Two organizations from the Sangha Parivar - Vishwa Hindu Parishad and Bajrang Dal-led the pogroms. Siddhartha Bhatt, a professor of political science at Gujarat University, believes:: "What is happening in Gujarat today is part of a well-planned strategy to purge the state of religious minorities by Hindutva forces. This experiment ...it looks like it will be implemented nationwide later. " 32

The Sangha Parivar launched a massive campaign to bring Christians back to Hinduism. Dilip Singh Judeo, a BJP activist and member of the upper house of the Indian Parliament, told Sunday Magazine: "Over the past 17 years, we have returned 1.75 lakhs of 33 converts to Hinduism... This year, we have set a goal to convert another lakh of Christians to Hinduism. " 34 In February 1999, D. S. Giudeo took part in the Ghar vapasi (homecoming) ceremony. - A. K.) in Dindori (Madhya Pradesh). Formally, the ceremony was conducted by the Arya Samaj. But the actual inspirer and organizer of it was a subsidiary organization of the RCC "Vanvasi Kalyan Ashram "(VKA). Sunday magazine devoted five color photographs to the Dindori ceremony, the main one showing D. S. Giudeo, a noble scion of the ruling family of Jashpur, washing the feet of the" prodigal sons of the earth " .35 One of the organization's activists spoke about the methods of the VKA's struggle for the "true faith": "In 1991, we threw stones at a church in the village of Chuta, because its priest was engaged in conversion. In the same year, I learned that a priest in the village of Padaria had burned the Ramayana and the Gita. We threw stones at the church, beat up the priest and made him sing " Jai Sri Ram!" (Glory to Rama! - A.K.) " 36 .

The escalating inter-communal tensions in India pose a serious threat to peace and order in the country. The efforts of the State and social forces advocating inter-communal harmony are not enough. Moreover, under the pressure of communalist sentiments in the country, some parties with a strong reputation for secularist organizations are beginning to lose their positions .37

ETHNO-REGIONAL COMMUNITIES

In recent decades, the importance of ethno-regional interest groups has increased in the social structure of India, although the concept of ethnos in relation to India is rather conditional .38 Indian ethnic groups are characterized by caste and religious fragmentation, differences in everyday culture, etc. "If anywhere on the globe you can find clearly defined, having a single identity and a common culture, quite discrete "peoples", it is only not in South Asia.

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Internally very heterogeneous and mutually heterogeneous categories act as "peoples", "nations", and " tribes "here," writes S. A. Arutyunov. 39

As an example, he cites the large nation of Malayali, for which, it would seem, the concept of "nation" is most suitable, since Malayali has a linguistic unity, a single civil history, they are united by long-standing traditions of national writing, etc. At the same time, Malayalis are divided by religion into Hindus, Muslims and Christians. Each division consists of many denominations. Even among Christians (Jacobites) marriages are not allowed between long-standing Christians who place themselves in high castes and converts who come from low castes. Each group has its own cultural characteristics, which are reflected in customs, diet, clothing details, and much more .40

Ethnic consciousness is multi-tiered. The process of its formation assumes that a certain tier or feature becomes dominant, subordinates the rest. For India, this is primarily a common territory and language. Almost every ethno-cultural group in India has its own original historical territory, and therefore a common history, a common socio-cultural environment. The latter refers to: the language; the composition of the population; the specific nature of the caste system and inter-community relations inherent in this particular region, etc.

Language played a crucial role in the process of ethnogenesis (understood as the differentiation of groups and their internal consolidation) in independent India. The country's population speaks 1,662 dialects, many of which tend to become independent languages, all of which are tied to 14 main languages, often belonging not only to different groups within language branches, but also to different language families, which makes it impossible for their native speakers to understand each other linguistically .41 It was these differences, as well as the issue of recognizing the language of the majority of the population as official, that gave rise to powerful movements of linguistic nationalism, which in the 50s and 60s of the last century led to the reorganization of states on a linguistic basis.

After the creation of linguistic states, the large peoples of India received more favorable conditions for the development of their culture and solving socio-economic problems. Ethnic strife has weakened, and separatist movements in most of the country have lost ground, " I. M. Semashko believes .42 However, the main significance of the formation of linguistic states was that as a result, 83% of tribes and castes were located on the territory of their historical and cultural areas. The unification of social groups that speak the same language and have common historical and cultural roots within a single administrative space stimulated the growth of ethnic identity and its politicization.

"Our survey shows the strength and continuity of regional identifications based on morphological and genetic characteristics of the population, language and literature, material culture, food, rituals, folklore, local forms of religion and holidays that go back to prehistoric times... Regardless of their ranking, these communities are part of a regional ethnic group, " notes K. S. Singh43 . "The growth of regional sentiment around language and culture is quite natural," said Barun De and Surajan Das .44

A number of other factors also contributed to the strengthening of ethnic identity and politicization of ethno-cultural groups. First, there is competition between states for access to natural and financial resources (water, energy, transport, subsidies, investment, etc.). Second, there are purely regional problems that the central government does not attach serious importance to or that it simply does not get its hands on. Third, and perhaps most important , is the emergence of local elites seeking to take control of the life of their regions. Exactly regio-

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local elites have made a conscious effort to increase the importance of ethnic identification and, where possible, to bring the national issue to the fore," notes Surendra Gopal45 . The result, he continues, has been an increase in self-awareness among Tamils, Andhras, Kannadas, Assamese, Punjabis, and other major ethno-cultural groups.

Due to the heterogeneity of Indian ethno-cultural groups, regional interests are usually represented not by one, but by several political organizations that have a certain communal basis.

In the 13th general elections in Maharashtra, for example, in addition to the two national parties - BJP and Congress - 5 regional parties held their representatives in the Lok Sabha. These are the Shiv Sena, Bharipa Bahujan Mahasangha, Janata Dal (Sekular), Neshenelist Congress Party, and Pezants & Workers Party of India .46 Maharashtra is no exception. Of the 532 elected members of the 13th Lok Sabha, only 295 (55%) passed on BJP and Congress tickets. Among the members of the lower house of Parliament from Kerala, representatives of regional parties make up 60%, from Jammu and Kashmir - 67%, from Andhra Pradesh - 76%, from Tamilnadu - 84%, and from West Bengal - even 88%. 47

The growing representation of regional parties in the central government has a number of important consequences. First, it affects the content of its activities. The Lok Sabha and the central government are forced to pay more attention to regional issues than ever before, as many believe, even to the detriment of national problems. Secondly, the balance of power in the country is changing. If earlier, under one-party rule, the center had a decisive influence on the formation of government bodies in the states, today the states determine their composition in the center.

Some politicians see regionalism as a threat to the country's integrity. However, their concerns are hardly justified. The process of ethnogenesis in India is sluggish. The formation of ethnic groups and ethnically oriented political forces is hindered by the same castes, the same communal fragmentation and segmentation of society .48 It is no coincidence that separatism exists and is gaining strength only in the North-East of the country, where the population is more homogeneous and the influence of caste is weak.

POLITICAL PARTIES

So, the basis of Indian politics is the interests of numerous and diverse interest groups, both modern and traditional. But their numerous public organizations can only play the role of pressure groups in politics. They cannot officially take part in the elections. To do this, they must be registered as political parties. Only parties have the right to take part in the election campaign, to propose candidates; only they participate in the formation of governments in the center and in the field.

In principle, any public organization in India can become a party. It only needs to be registered, for which it needs to submit a program, charter, documentation on the financial situation and sources of income. The party leadership must give written consent that it will comply with the provisions of the Constitution and the principles of democracy. Depending on the results of previous elections, the party receives the status of a national or regional party and the corresponding symbol when registering. According to the current rules, the national status is granted to a party that wins more than 6% of the vote in parliamentary elections and has representatives from at least 4 states in the Lok Sabha. All others are considered state parties.

But state parties include organizations of various sizes - both those that really enjoy influence in one or two or three states, and those that operate in the United States.

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especially at the local level, for example, within one or several electoral districts. Therefore, if we proceed from the actual levels of politics, then to the two officially recognized categories of parties - national and state - we should add a third-local or small parties. This conclusion was reached by B. I. Klyuev49 . The mass base of these parties consists of specific communities - castes, religious and other groups. Their field of activity is local government elections, although in coalitions with other parties they can also play a role in the Vidhan Sabha (State Legislative Assembly) and Lok Sabha elections.

In recent years, there has been a rapid growth of local or small organizations. Experts explain this situation by the fact that smaller groups of the population are becoming involved in politics, dissatisfied with the way inter-communal parties defend their interests. This dissatisfaction "caused the peasantry, economically and socially backward strata to vote for caste or communal parties in the hope that they would better take care of their needs," writes Chiranjoy Sen 50 .

Some authors believe that an increase in the number of small parties and an increase in their role in politics serve as an indicator of the progressive development of the democratic process, which in principle can be agreed. At the same time, this phenomenon has a downside - it reinforces "parochial" and narrow-group motives in Indian politics. The main feature of small parties, according to Chiranjoy Sen, is the lack of a "holistic vision" of social phenomena, focusing on the interests of "their own locality or their own subgroup" 51.

If small parties operate at the first, local, level of politics, then the second level - the ethno-cultural region (state) - is represented by such large parties as Dravida Munetra Kazhagam (DMK), All India Dravida munetra Kazhagam (ONDMK), Telugu Desam, Akali Dal, Assam Gana parishad, Gorkha National Recreation Center and Maharashtravadi Gomantak Dal 52 . Well-known Indian political scientist K. Subramaniam is inclined to refer to the regional organizations "Shiv Sena", "Haryana Vikas Party", "Rashtriya Janata Dal", "Janata Dal", "Bahujan Samaj Party", "Samajwadi Janata Party", "Samata Party", "Communist Party of India" and " Communist Party of India (Marxist)" on the grounds that their influence extends to a limited number of states, and they are not able to form a government in the center 53 . It is the state parties that are the main "actors" of the modern Indian political scene. These parties form alliances and coalitions that act on the pan-Indian stage, determine the content of political struggle, and participate in the formation of government bodies in the states and in the center.

At the third, national level, there are so-called national parties. Local and regional forces are becoming more active and their influence on the ground is weakening. Under the new conditions, they can only succeed if they rely on state parties or ally with them, thereby becoming a "roof", an "umbrella", i.e., a coalition of regional political forces. Thus, in the 1998 elections, the Congress bloc consisted of 6 parties, the BJP bloc - of 13, and the United Front - of 10 parties. The National Democratic Alliance, led by the BJP and which won the largest number of parliamentary seats in the 13th general election, comprised 24 parties.

Indian analysts believe that the 12th general election was an important milestone in the development of the political process in the country. "Future generations will remember the 1998 election as the election in which the inevitability of alliances and coalitions was finally recognized by Indian politics. Then, for the first time, all political forces, including the Congress, began to look for allies to ensure electoral success, " write Yogendra Yadav and Rajina Karandi.-

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kar. According to the authors, " the days of national alliances formed around one central slogan are a thing of the past. The era of local alliances, short-term ties, and ideological amnesia has arrived. " 54 However, the coalition nature of political formations is nothing new. "For several decades, social and regional coalitions have existed within the Congress. They looked like routine manifestations of factionalism, opportunism, and internal party conflicts. " 55 After the Congress lost its monopoly on power, the same phenomena spread to relations between independent political parties.

As a result of the strengthening of regionalism, the coalition principle of forming government bodies in the country is also becoming a consequence, which experts predict will have a long life under the current electoral system. The significance of this principle for the socio-political life of India is ambiguous. On the one hand, "a coalition government is capable of expressing public needs more fully than a single party government." On the other hand, this principle sometimes creates insurmountable difficulties in the formation of government bodies and their activities. This is how Pinaki Bhattacharya describes the work of Rajasthan Chief Minister Ashok Gelot, who won the 1998 Congress-backed election: "The large Congressional caucus in the State Legislature makes it virtually impossible to get a majority of its members into government positions. And this causes a fair amount of indignation among this part of the Assembly, which will probably soon lead to the formation of dissident groups. " 57

The selection of candidates for the posts of head of the Congress organization in the state ("Pradesh Congress Community") and Speaker of the Legislative Assembly was a difficult test for Rajput Ashok Gelot. "The Jats, second only in number to the Rajputs and who voted for Congress in the recent elections, have become the aggrieved party. Since they have lost their bid for the Chief Minister position, they would like to see their candidate as the President of the Pradesh Congress Committee. " 58 To ease the tension in relations with the Jats, A. Gehlot proposed a Jat speaker, but a fellow countryman. A powerful Rajput lobby opposed the proposal, insisting that both the post of Congress leader in the state and the post of Vidhan Sabha Speaker were too much for Jats. In general, since the Chief Minister and the candidate for the position of Speaker are from Marwar (Jodhpur), the Speaker must be from Mewer (Udaipur) and not a jat, but a brahmin .59

The coalition principle makes the central and local authorities dependent on the whims and whims of sometimes small political groups, making them insecure and unstable. The government crises of recent years in India were caused solely by the intrigues of the leadership of the parties that were part of the ruling coalitions. This is exactly what happened to the United Front Government, which Congress refused to support. The same thing happened to the previous BJP government as a result of the withdrawal of the UIDMC from the coalition.

In essence, the national party is the same coalition of various local and regional forces, rather loose structurally and amorphous in socio-political relations. The composition of the same national party may vary significantly from region to region. The diversity and sometimes irreconcilable interests of the various members of such a party do not allow it to offer its voters an original program with more or less clear social or ideological guidelines. From election to election, differences in the programs of the main opposing forces are erased. The press stated that in the run-up to the 13th general election, the BJP's program became more and more similar to the Congress program, and vice versa. Referring to the future BJP government in the center, one person close to the party's leadership quipped that it would essentially be a Congress government, only "a little more organized." 60

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To analyze the community-group and socio-class character of the national parties of India, we will use data from the 12th general election. In them, the main opponents were the Congress and the BJP. The election results show that both parties enjoy the support of all communities ["upper castes", "other backward classes" (POK), "scheduled castes" (SC), "scheduled tribes" (SP) and "Muslims"] and all social groups of the population ("rich", "middle class", "poor" and "very poor"), although to varying degrees. SK, SP and Muslims, as well as the "poor" and "very poor" segments of citizens are more attracted to the Congress 61 . In the whole country, 26% of representatives of higher castes, 21% of "other backward classes", 31% of SK, 39% of SP, and 31% of Muslims voted for the Congress. The difference in the votes of the" rich "and" very poor "cast for Congress is 36% in favor of the"very poor". The BJP has mostly gained support from the "upper" and "middle" castes, as well as from the" rich "part of society and the"middle class". 40% of members of the "higher castes" voted for the BJP, 24% for the POK, 13% for the SK, 18% for the SP, and 2% for the Muslims. The difference between" very poor "and" rich "is 2.7 times in favor of "rich".

However, these data, which relate to India "as a whole", do not yet make it possible to say that both the Congress and the BJP - the main national parties - have found their social face. The election results largely depended on local conditions, the presence and strength of regional parties, and relations with them. In Madhya Pradesh, Maharashtra and Gujarat, where the BJP was the main opponent of the Congress, the highest castes-29%, POK - 28, SK - 43, SP - 47, Muslims - 53% voted for it. In Assam, Karnataka,Andhra and Tamilnadu, where the Congress was opposed by the PF, the Congress was supported by 32% of upper castes, 26% of POC, 43% of SC, 32% of SP and 38% of Muslims. However, in areas where Congress had to contend with many opponents at the same time, its electorate turned out to be very"plucked". In Uttar Pradesh and Bihar, the Congress had to face the BJP, PF and BSP. As a result, the "upper castes" and the POC gave him four times less votes than in the whole country, Dalits and Muslims - three times, the Joint Venture - one and a half times. The situation is even more paradoxical in West Bengal and Kerala. In these states, the Communist-led Left - Wing Front ran against Congress in the elections, knocking out its traditional support-the "poor and oppressed" - from under the Congress. As a result, the Congress received the main support from the "upper castes", who gave it 41% of the vote and who can not be considered among the "poorest" and even more so the most oppressed.

ELECTORATE

In the end, the last word in elections belongs to the voter, that is, the ordinary citizen, the "man from the street". Polls conducted before and after the 1st, 12th and 13th elections consistently show that the interests of Indians are basically the same as those of citizens of any other country. If we exclude purely opportunistic issues (the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi, the events in Ayodhya, the invasion of separatists and Pakistani soldiers in Kargil), they are reduced to issues of employment, prices, wages, taxes, etc. 62 . The question is which group, organization, or leader the voter associates with the possibility of solving the problems that concern them. At the same time, the Indian voter's freedom of choice is very limited. Due to the peculiarities of the electoral system, the voter is doomed to play a passive rather than an active role in elections. "The biggest drawback of the election is that the voter does not have a say in the selection of candidates. Candidates are appointed and imposed on constituencies by political parties, " writes Siddharth Varadarajan63 . But even from the list of candidates that is proposed, not all voters can make an informed choice. Indian society is highly differentiated. There is a huge gap between the city and the countryside, the upper and lower levels of society in terms of income, education, culture, and even political culture. Political and business elite, ver-

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most of the "middle class" and some of the skilled workers in the organized industrial sector are sufficiently aware of the situation in the country, are aware of their interests, and are well versed in politics. But they make up a smaller part of the electorate. In addition, the press constantly complains that the interest of the "educated classes" in politics is declining, and their participation in elections is declining.

To get an idea of the cultural and political outlook of the voting majority, I will give the following figures. Almost every second Indian can't read or write. 29% of citizens do not have access to mass media at all 64 . Only 46% of voters knew about the May 1998 nuclear test, which was the most significant event in the country in recent years .65 More than 300 million people live below the poverty line 66 . This is the most downtrodden part of society. It is suggestible, and it serves as a pliable material for manipulation with the help of primitive "technologies" - colorful rituals, processions and shows with the participation of saints, magicians and spellcasters, popular film and television artists. Using the backwardness of the poor, the powerful often literally drive them to the polls and force them to vote for certain candidates. Some political cynics disparagingly refer to this category of fellow citizens as "voting cattle." 67

Thus, it is not easy for a significant part of citizens to understand the intricacies of big politics, programs, and slogans of various contenders for power. The decision on which candidate to vote for and which party to prefer is made by 49% of voters during the election campaign itself, 17% on the day of voting and only 28% before the start of the election race, i.e. on the basis of a more or less stable idea of the parties or candidates.

"This helps explain why some of the big events in the election are happening ... They happen unexpectedly, " say Yogendra Yadav, Alistair Macmillan and Kanchan Chandra in an analytical article on the results of the 12th presidential election . Mass voters are driven mainly by moods and emotions caused by the situation of the moment. These circumstances can largely explain the sharp fluctuations in the voting results. Less than two years passed between the 11th and 12th elections. During this time, the BJP government and its allies have barely managed to prove themselves in any special way. But the share of votes cast for the BJP bloc increased from 24.3% in 1996 to 36.2% in 1998. A particularly noticeable surge of popular sympathy for the BJP was already noted during the elections. Yogendra Yadav and his co-authors could not explain the cause of this phenomenon. "We still need to work on this," they conclude their article.

The charisma of a particular candidate is also important. "Politics doesn't matter... The icon is important, " Arun Ghosh 69 commented sadly on the 13th general election . Voters were asked to choose between two "icons" - Atal Bihari Vajpayee, the BJP leader, and Sonia Gandhi, the Congress leader. In fact, Ghosh believes that none of these candidates were ideal from the point of view of the country's interests. "The country needs a people-oriented economic policy... It takes effort ... to counter the machinations of the United States and Western European countries, which openly use the IMF, the International Bank and the WTO to ensure unfair terms of trade, unequal exchange and establish the hegemony of international financial capital... Meanwhile, all attention is focused on two individuals, one of whom is the oldest citizen, but with little knowledge of economic problems. The other is an ambitious lady whose views ... they remain completely unknown. " 70

The freedom of choice of a mass voter is also limited by the group type of his personality. The Indian is simultaneously part of many groups of both traditional and modern types. A person can simultaneously belong to a certain group of people.-

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be a believer (or atheist), profess Hinduism (or Islam, Buddhism, Sikhism), live in a village (or city), consider Hindi (or Malayalam, Oriya, Punjabi, etc., including hundreds of dialects) to be their native language, work in the following areas: The main problem of the voter is which group or its political organization will protect his interests, which one should be preferred - this is the main problem of the voter. His final choice depends on the degree of individualization of his consciousness. Worldview, social well-being, and behavior, including political behavior, will be determined by the extent to which the voter is able to recognize himself or herself as an independent person, to distinguish his or her own interest from the interests of a particular group.

However, it is important to emphasize that the public consciousness of the Indian electorate is undergoing significant changes.

This is evident from the results of polls conducted by the Indian Council for Social Sciences and India Today magazine. In 1971, 51% of respondents answered positively to the question of whether it is important for a voter to vote together with their community, while in 1996, only 29% answered positively. Conversely, the share of those who hold the opposite opinion increased from 30% to 51% at the same time. In 1971, 22% of respondents expressed the belief that their community voted differentially, i.e. for different candidates from different parties. In 1996, this share rose to 48%. When asked whether there is a party that only defends the interests of your caste or community, in 1996 the answers were distributed as follows: "yes" - 20%, " no "- 64%, "I don't know" - 16% 71 .

Based on a survey conducted by the Center for the Study of Emerging Societies in Delhi, the Economist magazine builds a kind of generalized hierarchy of civil preferences of Indian voters. Within the state, "caste is the most influential factor for the average voter," 72 magazine notes . It is impossible to answer the question of how specifically caste affects voting, "the Economist continues," since there is no such general formula at all. Everything changes from caste to caste, from election to election, from state to state 73 . Loyalty to caste narrows the individual's civic outlook, since " caste-based parties rarely count for anything outside of one state." 74 Loyalty to one's endogamous group is followed by loyalty to the regional community. Half of the respondents agreed with the proposed formula:" We must first be loyal to our own region, and then to India as a whole " 75 .

However, this order of preferences: endogamous group-regional or ethno-cultural group-country, homeland - is very conditional. It can change under the influence of specific circumstances, especially in the event of a threat to a particular group of self-identification, which includes the individual. In certain critical situations, the average Indian citizen is able to move beyond purely communal or local interests and recognize himself as a citizen of the country as a whole.

This was the case during the border clashes on the India-China and India-Pakistan borders, and it was also the case after the assassinations of Indira Gandhi and Rajiv Gandhi. The "waves" of emotions caused by these events not only became evidence of the growth of civil consciousness, but also had a great impact on political life. Another major "wave" of civil unity was caused by the invasion of Kashmiri separatists and Pakistani soldiers on Indian territory in the Kargil region in 1999. A group of employees of Sunday Magazine surveyed the mood of voters on the eve of the 13th general election and found that everywhere and everywhere, whether it is a social cocktail party or a village chaupal (gathering place), all the conversations the upcoming elections revolved around several topics. And one of them is Kar-

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gil. Previously, the survey authors note, it was believed that the sense of patriotism is a purely urban phenomenon. But judging by how well the army's aid campaign was being conducted, this phenomenon also penetrated the village of 76 .

The Kargil wave was used to their advantage by both opposing parties - the BJP and the Congress. The BJP sought to exploit the victory in Kargil as an achievement of its government led by A. B. Vajpayee, and the Congress sought to prove that the lack of readiness of Indian military units to repel aggression, which took place in the first stage of the campaign, is a loss of the government and evidence of the inefficiency of its rule. The BJP's arguments were more convincing. A poll conducted by India Today magazine on the eve of the 13th general election showed that only a victory in Kargil could add another 27% to A. B. Vajpayee's "legitimate" vote. "Before Kargil, Vajpayee was an equal among equals. After Kargil, he's the leader monument, claiming votes on personal merit. When people vote for the National Democratic Alliance, they will do so not out of adherence to the BJP ideology, but out of faith in Vajpayee. " 77

* * *

The Westminster system of parliamentary democracy in India causes a lot of criticism from Indian scientists, politicians and public figures. The critics ' view is that democracy in India does not meet its "natural" goals and does not live up to the expectations that the founders of the state associated with it. Its instruments-parties, trade unions, the opposition, the Parliament, etc. - are formal and ineffective. Democracy reduces the content of politics to a "game of numbers", to the struggle for votes. Winning the election is her ultimate goal. This impoverishes the content of the policy itself, leaving out of its framework such vital problems of society as ensuring sustainable economic development, achieving social justice, and the welfare of the people. The system corrupts and criminalizes politics, and "generates" inter-communal discord. But most importantly, this system restricts the ability of the masses to play a constructive and constructive role in the political process .78

In principle, we can agree with many reproaches. Moreover, it should also be recognized that the existing institutions and procedures need to be improved, and the government itself agrees with this, having created a special commission to correct the Constitution. But despite all the shortcomings and deviations from the "classical" models of democracy, the Indian political system does not prevent numerous groups, as well as individuals included in them, if they identify with these groups, to express and defend their interests, to participate in the competitive struggle for power. In conditions of socio-cultural pluralism and fractional segmentation of society, this system provides a dialogue between groups of different interests. And if we take into account the scale of social contrasts, the severity of social contradictions, then we can assume that it protects society from social upheavals.

Of course, democracy in India has its own characteristics, which are determined by cultural tradition and the level of human development. But there can be no other democracy in India - with an English, American, French, etc. "face". And most importantly, Indian democracy has a resource for self-development. This is manifested primarily in the fact that more and more new strata and groups of the population, including the smallest and most backward, are constantly involved in politics. Politics thus loses its elitist character. This process can be perceived as a rollback to traditionalism. But in reality, it means only one of the stages of the development of democracy in specific Indian conditions. Participation in politics itself is a good school of citizenship, a means of raising political culture, and therefore a condition for the progressive development of the democratic process. This is also supported by the growth of literacy, and the increase in the-

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the development of a common culture, the development of mass media and their increasing accessibility to ordinary people. Shifts in public consciousness, individualization of interests and political behavior of citizens, noted by numerous surveys, indicate that the country, although slowly, is steadily moving towards the formation of an Indian version of civil society.

notes

Singh K.S. 1 Ethnography, Caste and Ethnicity in India // Ethnicity, Caste and People. Proceedings of the Indo- Soviet Seminars held in Calcutta and Leningrad. 1990 / Ed. K.S. Singh. New Delhi, 1992. P. 14.

Mandelbaum David G. 2 Society in India. Bombay, 1989. P. 101-102.

3 Ibid. P. 545.

Assadi Muzaffar. 4 Communal Violence in Coastal Belt // Economic and Political Weekly. February 20-26. 1999. p.447-448.

Fernandes Walter. 5 Attacks on Minorities and a National Debate on Conversions // Economic and Political Weekly. January 16-23. 1999. P. 81.

Bhagabati A.C. 6 Perspectives on Ethno-Cultural Identity Movements in North-Eastern India // Ethnicity, Caste and People / Ed. K.S. Singh. New Delhi. P. 154.

7 Ibid. P. 151.

8 See: Lomova-Oppokova M. Yu. Dominating caste of Maharashtra / / India: country and its regions / Ed.by E. Yu. Vanin. M " 2000. pp. 197-222.

9 For more information, see: Kutsenkov A. A. Evolution of the Indian Caste, Moscow, 1983, p. 305.

Mandelbaum David G. 10 Op. cit. P. 19.

Kutsenkov A. A. 11 Edict. soch. pp. 105-133, 268-291.

Jha Hetukar. 12 Decline of the Village and the Rise of Negative Ethnicity in Intercaste Relations // Ethnicity, Caste and People. P. 89.

Gopal Surendra. 13 Ethnicity, Nationality and Nationalism: the Indian Experience // Ethnicity, Caste and People. P. 47.

14 The Times of India. 17.10.1998.

Kumar Pradip. 15 Bahujan Samaj Party Breaking Gorund in Uttar Pradesh - 2// Mainstream. May 8. 1999. P. 21.

16 Ibid. P. 22.

Bhagabati A.C. 17 Op. cit. P. 151.

18 Ibid. P. 152.

Venkatesam V. 19 End of a Tribal Conflict // Frontline. April 9. 1999. P. 50-51.

Chaudhuri Kalyan. 20 Extremist Resurgence in Tripura // Ibid. P. 46.

Chaudhuri Kalyan. 21 Back on Warpath // Frontline. March 26. 1999. P. 46-47.

Chaudhuri Lakyan. 22 Extremist Resurgence in Tripura // Frontline. April 9. 1999. P. 17.

23 Ibid. P. 46-48.

Bhalla V. 24 Aspects of Gene Geography and Ethnic Diversity of the People of India // Ethnicity, Caste and People. P. 54.

Jain Madhu. 25 My God Hasn't Died Young // India Today. October 5. 1998. P. 50-56. From the results of the survey, it may seem that Hindus have the least number of believers. But this impression is deceptive because of the vagueness of the popular concept of God. While working in India in the 1960s, I once asked my driver if he believed in God. In response, Mohanji described himself as a complete atheist. He said that he did not believe in any God - "neither in Shiva, nor in Vishnu, nor in Krishna". He prays only to "Mata", i.e. the guardian spirit of his family. Mata lives in his house, she takes care of his family and helps her in difficult times.

Abdullah Hasan. 26 Communalism versus Secularism Debate, What It Actually Means // Mainstream. Oktober 2. 1999. P. 10.

Raval Sheela. 27 Unholy War // India Today. April 26. 1999. P. 32.

Klyuev B. I. 28 Dangerous communications / / Asia and Africa today. 1999. N 12. P. 60.

Fernandes Walter. 29 Attacks on Minorities and a National Debate on Conversions // Economic and Political Weekly. January 16-23. 1999. P. 81.

30 The Economic Times. 19.12.1997.

Walia Kaajal. 31 Crossfire // Sunday. January 17-23. 1999. P. 15.

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32 Ibid. P. 18.

33 1 lakh = 100,000

Saxena Deshdeep. 34 Dindori Drama // Sunday. February 28.02-6.03.1999. P. 12.

35 Ibid. P. 12-14.

36 Ibid. P. 14.

Klyuev B. I. 37 Edict. soch. pp. 58-61.

Petrov V. V. 38 Population of India. Demograficheskaya kharakteristika [Demographic characteristics], ed. by B. C. Urlanis, Moscow, 1976, pp. 85-86.

Etnogenez i etnicheskaya istoriya narodov Yuzhnoi Azii [Ethnogenesis and ethnic history of the peoples of South Asia].

40 Ibid., p. 4.

Semashko I. M. 41 Region i etnos [41 Regions and ethnos].

42 Ibid.

Singh K.S. 43 Op. cit. P. 14.

De Barun and Das Suranjan. 44 Ethnic Revivalism: Problems in the Indian Union // Ethnicity, Caste and People. P. 74.

Gopal Surendra. 45 Op. cit. P. 47.

46 Lok Sabha Members. Thirteenth Lok Sabha. Permanent Delhi Addresses and Telephone Numbers. Lok Sabha Secretariat. New Delhi, Februari 2000.

47 Ibid.

48 См.: Kutsenkov АЛ. Ethnic Consolidation in a Caste Society // Ethnicity, Caste and People. P. 170-178.

Klyuev B. 49 Three levels of policy // Asia and Africa today. 1999. N 12. P. 25.

50 The Economic Times. 17.03.1998.

51 Ibid.

Gopal Surendra. 52 Op. cit. P. 48.

53 The Economic Times. 11.12.1997.

Yadav Yogendra and Karandikar Rajeena. 54 India's Alliance Arithmetic//India Today. January 19. 1998. P. 31.

55 Ibid.

56 The Economic Times. 1.12.1997.

Bhattacharya Pinaki. 57 Testing Times // Sunday. December 24-30. 1999. P. 32.

58 Ibid.

59 Ibid.

60 The Sunday Times of India. 22.03.1998.

Yadav Yogendra. 61 Blurred Battle Lines // India Today. February 2. 1998. P. 39-41.

Dasgupta Swapan. 62 BJP's Early Surge // India Today. January 5. 1998. P. 14-20.

63 The Times of India. 2.12.1997.

64 The Economist. October 16. 1999. P. 75.

65 Ibid.

66 See: Economic Survey. Government of India. 1997- 1998. P. 128-130.

67 The Times of India. 20.12.1997.

Yadav Yogendra, Mcmillan Alistair 68 and Chandra Kanchan. Post-Poll: Who Voted for Whom? // India Today. March 16. 1998.

Ghosh Arun. 69 Parties, Personalities and Politics // Mainstream. May 22. 1999. P. 3.

70 Ibid.

Yadav Yogendra. 71 Op. cit.

72 The Economist. October 16. 1999. P. 76.

73 Ibid.

74 Ibid. P. 79.

75 Ibid. P. 76.

76 Sunday. August 29 - September 4. 1999. P. 14-15.

77 The Vajpayee Wawe // India Today. August 23. 1999. P. 14-25.

78 См.: Kothari Rajni. State against Democracy / Search of Human Governance. Delhi. 1988. P. 309.

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