Events in the international arena at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries follow each other so quickly and unpredictably that it is sometimes very difficult to understand all the vicissitudes and nuances of what is happening, and even more so to objectively assess or outline the prospects for their development. However, many international relations experts almost unanimously identify two major revolutionary shifts on the world stage during this period.
The first is in the military sphere, or, in the words of the American scientist, Professor P. Kennedy of Yale University, author of the acclaimed book "The Rise and Fall of Great Powers", in the art of war1. With its help, the United States was able to defeat the Taliban regime in Afghanistan and Saddam Hussein in Iraq, although the results and consequences of these campaigns are far from ambiguous, and they will be repeatedly analyzed and discussed on the pages of academic journals and in various forums.
The second parallel shift is in geostrategy. If the former is related to technological changes and conceptually new use of military force, the latter is a significant re-evaluation of the Asian geostrategic space. The main engine of the "revolutions" was and is the United States, which showed an indomitable desire to reshape the entire hemisphere-from the Middle East to the Pacific Ocean.
This policy of the United States was accompanied, on the one hand, by a certain weakening of their attention (at least in the military sphere) to Europe and Northeast Asia, and on the other-by a noticeable turn to the Central Eurasian space, especially to the emerging geopolitical region of Central Asia.
REASSESSMENT OF THE ASIAN GEOSTRATEGIC SPACE
However, as if it had caught itself in time, the American leadership corrected the above-mentioned temporary inattention to Europe in recent years by developing and implementing a plan to create a new structure for the US military presence in the Old World. And in December 2005, an agreement was already signed with Romania on the deployment of four military bases on its territory. Poland, the Czech Republic and Bulgaria are currently on the agenda. Thus, by 2010, new bases on Eastern European territory will create a missile defense system that will be able to control vast areas from Pakistan and India to China, not to mention Russia.2
Along with these shifts in international relations (MO), a less noticeable but irreversible process of redrawing traditional, established regions is taking place in different directions (for example, one can point out in this connection a certain convergence of Southeast Asia with East Asia, the obvious attraction of Central Asia to the Indian Ocean zone, on the one hand, and North-East Asia on the other hand, etc.) into a single space, apparently as a reflection or part of globalization, as a new, higher level of global integration.
As a result of these processes, the geographical contours of a familiar, previously generally accepted region become much wider, and this, in turn, dramatically changes the conceptual vision of many problems, primarily security problems, forcing MOD participants to take into account the strategic features of the surrounding environment in an expanded format.
It is not by chance that at the beginning of the twenty-first century, there was active talk of a gigantic super-region - the "Greater Middle East" - encompassing the Arab world and the Islamic East-Pakistan and Afghanistan, as well as parts of Central and South Asia. Some experts include Turkey, Israel, and the newly independent states of Transcaucasia in the super-region.
Thus, both due to the reconfiguration in this field and due to the increasing importance of geo-economic and geopolitical factors, the" Greater Middle East " becomes essentially a region that connects, although to varying degrees, the vital interests of most countries of the world.
The geographical region of South Asia is noticeably filled with a different content. This gives grounds for some strategists and political scientists, primarily Indian ones, to come up with the concept of a" Greater South Asia", including Afghanistan and part of Central Asia.
INDIA IS DEVELOPING THE INDO-PACIFIC ZONE
In connection with the noted new trends in the Ministry of Defense in the framework of this article, it is necessary to answer
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to a few crucial questions:: 1) What is India's place and role in this emerging area? 2) How is India adapting to the broader geopolitical landscape as a whole? 3) What are the country's intermediate and longer-term goals in a rapidly changing world?
India is one of the largest countries in the world and Asia due to its impressive demographic potential, extremely favorable geostrategic position and dominant position in South Asia, significant success in various areas of domestic and foreign policy, science and culture, recognition of its role in the international arena, weight in the UN, in the Non-Aligned Movement, etc.
The success and growing influence of India have become fully taken into account not only by its neighbors on the Hindustan peninsula, but also beyond its borders and even the United States. All this allowed the country to noticeably intensify its relations with many Indo-Pacific states since the mid-1970s.
The reasons that led it to focus on this area are diverse and diverse: geographical proximity, historical contacts that go back to ancient times, convenient, shortest transport routes; extensive ethnic ties with the Indian diaspora in the Indian Ocean basin, numerous island possessions; and finally, strategic interests and security goals.
In the 1970s and 1980s, when India's economic development began to reach the level of the so-called "developed developing" country, there was a qualitative leap in its relations with the Indo-Pacific countries. This was facilitated by India's policy of expanding and deepening friendly relations with both large (for example, Australia, Saudi Arabia) and small island states of the region (Mauritius) since the early 1970s. Thus, the foundation was laid for the activation of regional political, economic and other interstate relations and for the creation of a" privileged zone of influence " along the Indo-Ocean coast3.
India's diverse social and economic development successes and achievements, its viability and relatively high level of stability in the presence of a complex national, ethnic and religious composition of the population, fraught with outbreaks of conflicts and separatist attacks, have contributed to a noticeable change in the country's image in the eyes of the "developing world" and especially the Indian Ocean States. India's prestige also increased due to the expansion of exports of its goods to the countries of the region, the increase in the supply of wheat, rice, fruits and vegetables on a credit basis to Mauritius, Afghanistan, the Persian Gulf zone, and the provision of services by India for the construction of enterprises designed by Indian firms. In this area, they successfully competed at that time even with some Japanese and Western European companies.
Obviously, India's competitiveness at that time was higher where the most acceptable technology in the developing world was required - in civil engineering, infrastructure, construction of railways, power plants, cement and sugar factories, etc. Nevertheless, India was able to provide a full range of services, from project consultation to turn-key delivery, including staff training and maintenance of the future enterprise, which proved very attractive for developing countries in region 4.
In addition, India has significantly stepped up its activities in the framework of South - South relations in such areas as providing technical assistance, training in science and education, and providing military assistance.
What geographical vectors did India's activities in the region follow? These are primarily Hindustan, Southeast Asia, the Persian Gulf, East Africa, and island microstates. In its policy, India found different nuances and methods for each of the directions, flexibly using the features and differences in their capabilities. A few examples. For example, it provided educational assistance to Malaysia, given the presence of an Indian community here. In its relations with the Arab countries of the Persian Gulf, India emphasized the export of Indian hired labor and showed a special interest in obtaining oil, being extremely dependent on external energy flows.
In the 80s. India has conducted three successful scientific expeditions to Antarctica, and then, since 1985, when it became a member of the Antarctic Treaty Advisory group, it has begun to conduct research activities here on a permanent scientific basis. In the same decade, the country (the first in the "third world" and one of the six leading powers of the planet) began to develop the technology of extracting mineral resources from the seabed and monasitic coastal sands containing sulfur and thorium.5
Indian scientists actively use the waters of the Indian Ocean for space research, satellite communications, geophysical observations, underwater and aerial monitoring, etc.
Based on the broader tasks that emerged in the 1980s (ensuring the security of maritime borders with a length of more than 5,5 thousand km, protecting trade and maritime communications and energy supplies, the 200-mile economic zone, island possessions, as well as ensuring strategic interests in the Indian Ocean as a whole), the Indian leadership quite naturally revised the strategy and principles development of its own Navy, has taken a number of measures to re-equip them.
Large warships, submarines and patrol boats of various classes were purchased, and the creation of own production of some types of vessels under licenses of Western European states was initiated. With the significant expansion of ocean operations, India's particular interest in aircraft carriers is understandable.6
In general, India sought to build powerful fleets simultaneously on the west and east coasts of Hindustan. In parallel, the modernization and construction of new naval bases and facilities in Goa, Cochin, Madras, Calcutta, Bombay (now Mumbai), the creation of bases in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, lying near the Strait of Malacca, began actively.
All this testified to the obvious desire of India to create a qualitatively different level of naval forces in terms of their functionality and tasks, which would allow them to act as the third or fourth (depending on the level of French
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or the British naval presence) of a serious naval force capable of influencing the strategic situation in the most sensitive points of the Indian Ocean region in the future.
In the early 1990s, during the transition phase to the new world order, India's activity was limited in two vectors: in the northwest and west by the countries that are part of the so-called "Muslim crescent", and in the east-first by the implicit, and then quite real, aspirations of some states of the Asia-Pacific region (APR) to prevent it from being included in their emerging or existing cooperation structures. For example, a ten-year moratorium on new members joining APEC was announced.
The geo-economic and geopolitical concept of expanding the borders of the Asia-Pacific Region by including most of the Indian Ocean with the South China Sea did not help India either.
In proposing such a reconfiguration, India was guided by the following considerations: if stability is disrupted in this zone or any military conflict arises that could paralyze the transportation of oil from the Persian Gulf along the most important sea routes, then the security (primarily economic) of the East Asian region will be dealt a severe blow. According to this concept, the security system was considered within the boundaries of a triangle, the vertices of which would be India, Australia with New Zealand and China with Japan. 7
The implementation of this idea corresponded to India's desire to join the integration processes going on here, which opened wide doors for it in the Asia-Pacific region. However, the concept did not work, and under these conditions, India was practically "squeezed out" to the south, towards the Indian Ocean, which it still very actively continued to develop in all azimuths.
"DISCOVERY" OF CENTRAL ASIA
However, after the collapse of the USSR in 1991. India has turned its gaze to the north, to the new emerging geopolitical region of Central Asia in the post-Soviet space, based on the principle of understanding its immediate environment as an "expanded strategic neighborhood". However, according to analysts from the Delhi Institute of Defense Studies and Analysis, India is somewhat "late" in the fierce struggle that has unfolded here between the world's leading states for rich and diverse resources and control over communications in this region.
Meanwhile, India's centuries-old successful trade and economic relations with Central Asia, its strategic, economic and cultural interests, long-term relations with the USSR, the beginning of the process of natural attraction of Central Asia to the Indian Ocean zone (under the conditions of active construction of oil and gas pipelines and communications that allow the "closed" countries of the region to get access to the ocean, guaranteed security, etc.) makes this area extremely important for India, which, due to its many well-known advantages, can also play a key role in the new geopolitical space in this area.
However, in the early 1990s, apart from India's very limited trade with Central Asia via Iran, their level of interconnection was low. Several factors were at the root of the current situation. First, as a result of the disintegration of the USSR, its foreign trade and other structures that operated in accordance with previous trade and other agreements were broken down and then replaced. In the independent Central Asian countries themselves, there was administrative chaos, a production crisis and instability in the economy, lack of business infrastructure, etc. 8
Secondly, the problem of transport turned out to be extremely difficult due to the loss of ports in the Baltic republics, Transcaucasia, and Odessa on the Black Sea. Third, the long-standing conflict between India and Pakistan over Kashmir encouraged India to take into account the "Pakistani factor" in all its projects in the region, especially those related to solving new transit transport and communication problems (all this, however, did not prevent the development of shuttle trade between India and the Central Asian countries, the implementation of profitable daily trade routes). flights on the Tashkent - Delhi-Tashkent route, which indicated a significant potential for their interconnections).
In addition, we should not forget about the political and strategic component. From the point of view of many politicians and strategists, especially Indian ones, the last decade of the last century has made significant adjustments to the situation in the new geopolitical field.
The collapse of the Soviet Union and then the initial withdrawal of Russia from the scene of Central Asia changed not only the balance of power in the region, but also weakened to some extent the position of India, which considered them in the context of an "expanded strategic neighborhood". The emergence of new major players (including non - regional ones), the expansion of the potential for diverse conflicts and contradictions, the emergence of easy access to destructive elements of poorly demarcated borders, the intensification of drug trafficking and the flow of contraband weapons-these are not all components of the changed configuration of Central Asia. Its proximity to an ever-belligerent and highly unstable Afghanistan, and its growing and escalating struggle for influence and access to energy resources, created additional challenges for India and, above all, for its security.9
India's leaders, however, make no secret of their intentions to achieve a breakthrough in the energy market of Central Asia in the twenty-first century in order to keep up with China and other powers of the West and East, and to raise the level of trade and economic relations. There was talk both in India and in the Central Asian countries about establishing a strategic partnership, realizing the numerous threats to their security lurking in the region.
EVOLUTION OF NAVAL STRATEGY
The events of September 11, 2001 in the United States, and then the brutal terrorist attacks in a number of countries around the world, clearly showed that terrorism is the No. 1 evil for humanity. In the course of the unfolding anti-terrorist struggle against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban in Afghanistan and Iraq, the demand for international routes of the Indian Ocean, its connecting role between the Atlantic and the Pacific Ocean, and the importance of located nearby ports have significantly increased.
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there are support military bases (and not only American ones), the possibility of deploying large Naval detachments in the water area, etc. Because of this, almost the entire northern part of the Indian Ocean zone was in the epicenter of global events.
Military operations of the United States and its allies, including from the sea, updating the protection of the most important international routes and gaining access to almost any point of the world ocean, reorienting part of the fleets to purely peaceful, humanitarian and peacekeeping functions (for example, to resolve conflicts or to eliminate the serious consequences of the devastating tsunami of December 26, 2004). The need to combat piracy and terrorism on the seas allows us to speak about the beginning stage of the globalization of maritime power, and in a broader sense - the maritime factor. This is also happening in the air force, according to well-known American military experts E. Lathok, S. Tengredi and others. 10
Occupying a unique geopolitical and geostrategic position, owning a group of islands that are far away, thousands of kilometers advanced into the water area, and a significant economic zone, India rightfully ranks itself among the leading maritime powers, which became particularly relevant in the current situation at the turn of the century. Its maritime strategy has gone through several stages of development. But if back in 1979, Admiral A. K. Chatterjee put forward the idea of creating a fleet whose power would be comparable to the armed forces of one of the superpowers stationed in the zone, which actively competed in the Indian Ocean in the 70s-80s, then at the turn of the XX-XXI centuries, India had extremely high demands in the field of security of trade routes and especially oil flows in the Indian Ocean.
Due to these circumstances, there was an urgent need to extend India's control over the area from the northern part of the Arabian Sea to the borders of the South China Sea, i.e. from Socotra to Singapore.
As a result of the implementation of many specific measures to achieve these goals, the Indian Navy has become the strongest in the region (excluding the US Navy). In the same context of expanding India's naval capabilities, it is necessary to point out the imminent commissioning of the base in Karwar, near Mumbai, which will become the largest not only in the Indian Ocean, but also in Asia, with a unique special platform and lifting systems capable of simultaneously receiving 42 ships and servicing vessels with a payload capacity of up to 10 thousand tons. the Indian Navy hasn't had one yet. The order for the construction of this base, carried out by the British company Rolls-Royce, cost the treasury $ 32 million. It is here that the Indian command plans to transfer the main part of the fleet 11.
Undoubtedly, India's progress further and further from its shores into the depths of the ocean, the desire to establish control in the most important "Choke points" * - in the Red Sea, near the Straits of Hormuz and Malacca-causes mixed reactions from a number of coastal states (Pakistan, Indonesia, whose naval forces only previously could compete with the Indian ones), as well as China. These countries are wary of India's "center-power aspirations" (the growing potential of Beijing's own fleet in the future will allow it to cross the boundaries of the coastal and 200-mile zone and enter the central waters of both the Pacific and Indian Oceans). The eastern part of the latter, and especially the area at the junction of the two oceans, may well become the scene of Sino-Indian rivalry over time.
As recent events have shown, other areas of Indo-Chinese rivalry are also emerging. In an effort to provide their rapidly growing economies with energy, China and India have begun to clash over the right to access oil fields in the vast expanse from Sudan to Russia's Siberia. The Indian Ocean area remains very attractive for both countries, where at the turn of the century their search for resources intensified in Uganda, on the Kenyan shelf, around Madagascar and in other areas.
A few examples. In December 2004, both New Delhi and Beijing were negotiating with Moscow, which was looking for sources of financing for the renationalization of Yugansneftegaz. China and India could not get a share in its assets. However, Beijing provided Russia with a loan of 6 billion rubles. in exchange for guaranteed oil supplies at a very favorable price. In the same year, in Angola, the Chinese petrochemical corporation won over the largest Indian state oil and gas company (ONGS) in a competition for an oil field exploration site that was offered for sale to Shell Oil.
In August 2005, China, having inflated the price at the auction, in which the Indian ONGS also participated, when buying the Petrokazakhstan company registered in Canada, managed to get its hands on it.
So far, China is leading the race for oil, which is acting faster and more aggressively. There is no doubt that China has more financial power - over the past five years, the Chinese oil and gas Corporation has invested $ 45 billion in new energy sources, while the ONGS has invested only $ 3.5 billion. The two countries will certainly cooperate in many areas, but energy will certainly not be among them 12.
Paradoxically, the same area also shows examples of the opposite nature: in 2004, negotiations on the construction of a pipeline by joint efforts of Pakistan, Iran and India moved forward. Negotiations began 10 years ago and have been very long due to the difficult, sometimes conflicting relations between New Delhi and Islamabad.
The parties came to the conclusion that the Iran - Pakistan energy corridor can become a "pipeline of peace", since ensuring its security can contribute to improving the situation in the entire region13.
INDIA'S ROLE IN PROMOTING REGIONAL COOPERATION
One cannot discount another area of influence of India, which, together with South Africa and Australia, became one of the "locomotives" of the idea of creating the Association for Regional Cooperation of the Indian Ocean Countries (ARSIO). The new interstate organization was formally formed in March 1997, clearly lagging behind similar integration processes in other regions of the world (the EU, the North American Free Trade Area (NAFTA), APEC, etc.).
* Choke points - narrow sea straits that pose a serious threat to the navigation and security of a particular region in the context of conflict situations and maritime piracy.
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Although the first stages of ARSIO's existence were characterized by internal leadership struggles between South Africa, Australia and India, lobbying for the interests of a particular member state, huge differences in the levels of socio-economic, historical and cultural development of its members, and new negative aspects of the MOD associated with the beginning of the fight against terrorism, ARSIO is a natural and undisputed leader It became India. Geostrategic and other interests, the growing potential of the fleet, India's significant economic recovery, and the leading position in ARSIO have become an important factor of India's influence in the Indian Ocean zone, which is difficult to ignore.
At the same time, it is becoming increasingly clear that by the beginning of the twenty - first century, the Indian Ocean had become only a kind of testing ground for various mechanisms of India's policy and strategy, and that this was one of the intermediate stages on its path to becoming a global power.
It seems that India is already becoming "crowded" in the region. It is also somewhat "cooling down" to ARSIO as an organization of mainly developing countries. At the same time, India has already become a country with a rapidly developing economy based on high-tech production, a country that widely exports innovative technologies aimed at developed countries.14
In fiscal 2003-2004, its GDP growth exceeded 8%. In these areas, India shows dynamism comparable to that of China. By 2008, it is estimated that software exports will bring India up to $ 100 billion a year15.
ARSIO, on the other hand, has too many difficult-to-solve problems, its structures are clumsy and ineffective. Moreover, there are fears that ARSIO may repeat the sad experience of the Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), which, according to S. D. Muni, a well-known expert of the J. Nehru University, has not managed to get rid of tensions between its members or implement any significant projects in its 20 years of activity.
It is no coincidence that at the beginning of the XXI century, the Indian leadership, on the one hand, is activating the Central Asian direction by significantly increasing the level of diverse interaction with the Central Asian countries, including military cooperation. For the first time in August 2003, joint Tajik-Indian exercises of special forces units were held to combat terrorism. India has started training the Tajik Armed Forces ' contingent in the highlands, and officers in Indian military schools. It was decided to increase the number of flights between the two countries, establish technical assistance and exchange information. Finally, in April 2006, an agreement was signed to provide India with a military air base in Ayni on the territory of Tajikistan, the first of its kind outside its borders, where work immediately began on the modernization of the runway, the construction of necessary services, the placement of the first few Indian Russian-made aircraft, etc. 16
According to foreign observers, strengthening India's position in Central Asia as a whole and developing closer military ties between New Delhi and Tajikistan are in the interests of the Russian Federation: having become a major player here, India can play the role of a balancer to balance the American and Chinese presence in the region. It is not without Russia's support that India acquires observer status in the organization established in June 2001. NTO C, whose influence is gradually increasing with the appearance of Iran and Pakistan in the same capacity, and already goes beyond the Asian continent after Belarus applied for participation in this organization.
On the other hand, India is once again making active "visits" to the Asia-Pacific region, trying to infiltrate its structures. India is eager to participate in the deepening integration processes, especially at the junction of Southeast Asia and East Asia (ASEAN + China, ASEAN + China + Japan + South Korea). That is why, at one of the ASEAN + China + Japan + South Korea leaders ' meetings in November 2004, the Prime Minister of India, who was present as an observer, made an important initiative about its intentions to create a single trade space with the organization by 2016, which fully coincided with the main goals of these countries to form a single trade space with the organization since 2005. d. the Pan-Asian Free Trade Area (FTA).
Moreover, despite their wishes, India has turned out to be somewhat of a "trump card" in the complex game between China and Japan for supremacy in the newly created structures. Beijing initially sought to limit the number of participants in the East Asian Summit (ASEAN + 3), and Japan made a proposal to include India, as well as Australia, New Zealand, etc., in order to "blur" China's rather strong positions (in Beijing's opinion, as well as Japan itself, these countries can pursue a pro-American line there). To prevent this, China proposed that Russia be included in the emerging system of international order in East Asia.17
In the long term, Beijing may also initiate the creation of a Central Asian FTA based on the SCO, with the ultimate goal of turning it into a pan-Asian free trade area.
The Indian leadership, it seems, will make every effort to win its niche in this, another fundamentally new, but far from the last direction, naturally considering it as an important step forward on the way to India's ultimate goal - turning it into a global power.
1 The Financial Times, 12.08.2002.
2 Kompas, N 1-2, Bulletin of Foreign Information ITAR-TASS, 07.01.2006, p. 48.
Lebedeva N. B. 3 Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniya v zonone Indiskogo okeana [International Relations in the Indian Ocean zone].
4 Ibid., pp. 99-100.
5 The Indian Ocean. Perspectives on a Strategic Arena. Ed. by W. L. Dowdy and R. B. Trood. Durham, 1985, p. 315 - 316.
6 India in Global Politics, Moscow, 2003, pp. 82-110.
Chang Hsi-mo. 7 Oil and geopolitical reconfiguration after the end of the Cold War. Abstract of the dissertation, Moscow, 1998, p. 17.
Lebedeva N. B. 8 Central Asia and the Indian Ocean Zone-The Search for Interaction in a New Political Context-in: Central Asia in the MO System, Moscow, 2004.
9 World Focus, August 2000, vol. 21, N 8.
10 The Journal of East Asian Affairs, vol. XVII, N 2, Fall/Winter 2003, p. 331.
11 Globus, N 40, 07.10.2005, p. 46.
12 Bussiness Week, 2005, October, N 46.
13 Kompas, No. 3, 2006, p. 36.
14 India. Achievements and Problems, Moscow, 2002, pp. 136-138.
15 Ibid.
16 Daily Mail, 30.12.2003, p. 4; Observer, 11.01.2004; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 08.08.2003; Hindustan Times, 22.04.2006.
17 Kompas, N 52, 23.12.2004, p. 44-46; Kompas, N 3, 16.01.2006, p. 30.
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