India is committed to maintaining peace and stability in the South Asian region and globally through active diplomacy and effective military deterrence. It also proceeds from the fact that in recent years the threats of terrorism, including State-sponsored terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the illegal trade in drugs and weapons, as well as violence under the guise of religious fundamentalism, have increased.

INDIA'S NUCLEAR DOCTRINE

Five years after the 1998 test, India unveiled the political principles by which it manages its nuclear arsenal. These principles are in line with the doctrine prepared by the National Security Advisory Council. 1 The essence of India's nuclear doctrine is as follows: do not use nuclear weapons first; keep the potential at a reliable minimum level of deterrence; do not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear States; in the event of a nuclear attack on India, the nuclear response to this will be "massive with the aim of causing crushing damage" to the enemy; India reserves the right to choose the India will continue to control the export of nuclear and missile technologies and materials; India will adhere to its previously announced moratorium on conducting nuclear tests. At the same time, it declares its commitment to global disarmament [The Hindu, 05.01.03; The Indian Express, 05.01.03].

At the same time, the Government of India announced the creation of a nuclear arsenal management body - the Management of the Nuclear Command 2 (NCC), and approved the rules and procedures for its functioning. It consists of a Political Council headed by the country's Prime Minister. The Council is the only body responsible for the use of nuclear weapons. Thus, the nuclear "button" is at the disposal of the Prime Minister. This council also includes the Ministers of the Interior, Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance and the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission. In addition to the Political Council, an Executive Council headed by the National Security Adviser to the Prime Minister has been established. The Executive Council provides the UAC with data and information and implements the directives of the Political Council. In order to directly implement the instructions of the UAC, the Strategic Forces Command has been established, which is responsible for managing them [ibid.].

Ending. For the beginning, see: East (Oriens). 2009. N 3, pp. 92-103.

1 National Security Advisory Board.

2 Nuclear Command Authority.

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Unlike India, Pakistan does not reject the possibility of being the first to use nuclear weapons if it "feels that a threat to its territorial integrity has been created." The Pakistan Nuclear Command and Control Director3 includes military personnel who play a dominant role in the decision-making mechanism, as well as political and scientific advisers. The final decision on the use of these weapons belongs to the President of the country [Sotnikov, 2003, pp. 170-191; The New York Times, 05.01.2003].

India and Pakistan have no official data on the number of nuclear warheads and their means of delivery. But according to the Jane's Strategic Arms System Institute in London4, India had between 100 and 150 nuclear warheads at the beginning of the twenty - first century, and Pakistan had between 25 and 50 [The New York Times, 05.01.2003].

India has a large number of nuclear weapons carriers. These are combat aircraft: Mig-27, SU-30 MKI, Mirage-2000, Jaguar, as well as various types of missiles. In accordance with the rocket science program adopted in 1983, India put into service the Prithvi missile in various modifications (for the ground forces, Air Force and Navy) with a launch range from 150 to 250 km. Together with Russia, the BrahMos supersonic anti-ship missile was developed and produced for sea and air deployment (range up to 300 km). In 2002, the Agni liquid-fueled rocket (range 1500-2500 km) was tested. Missiles of this class are supplied to the Armed Forces. Development of the Agni solid-fuel rocket is underway, including with a range of up to 5 thousand km. It is also planned to create an intercontinental ballistic missile "Surya" with a range of up to 8-12 thousand km. Interceptor missiles are being tested.

All of these and other shorter-range missiles were developed and produced mostly in-house on a national base using most of the Indian components. Note that back in 1980, India launched an artificial satellite into low-Earth orbit with the help of its rocket. In January 2007, an experiment was conducted in India to return a satellite from space that was in Earth orbit. Launched with the help of an Indian rocket, the satellite (550 kg) landed in the Bay of Bengal at a distance of about 140 km from the coast. The Indian Space Research Organization has stated that the successful test of the technology to return satellites to earth was an important start of the Indian program to send people to space in the coming years [The Hindu, 22.01.2007]. For comparison, the first Chinese cosmonaut successfully flew into space in 2003, and in 2005 a spacecraft with two astronauts on board was flown.

India is closely monitoring the state of the nuclear missile forces of other countries, especially China. However, in many respects it is significantly inferior to it. According to American expert Richard Fischer, China's declared "small number" of nuclear weapons and non-first-time nuclear strike doctrine "can be considered appropriate to its nuclear missile forces. China can indeed use these missiles to deter other nuclear powers." The number of nuclear intercontinental ballistic missiles (20) and medium-range missiles (100-200) is small compared to the nuclear missile forces of the United States or Russia. According to Fischer, the Pentagon estimates that the number of Chinese ICBMs could reach 60 by 2010. Many of these missiles can carry separable nuclear warheads.

Among these missiles are the DF-5 ICBM (liquid-fuel, range up to 12 thousand km, load of 3 tons). Its modification of the DF-5A ICBM (since 1986) is designed for a range of up to 13 thousand km with a load of 3,200 kg. The missile carries a single nuclear warhead. By rating

3 Nuclear Command and Control Authority.

4 Jane's Strategic Weapons System.

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According to the Pentagon, the total number of these missiles is between 18 and 26. The DF-4 medium-range missile (liquid-fuel, 4,750 km range, 2.2 t load) has been in service since 1980, with about 20 missiles. A mobile DF-31 ICBM is being developed (solid-fuel, with a range of up to 8 thousand km, a load of 700 kg, can carry guided nuclear warheads), the number of missiles is unknown.

In 2001, data appeared that China was developing a new DF-31A ICBM, which, according to the Pentagon, could be deployed at the end of the decade (by 2010). The missile has a range of 12 thousand km and is capable of carrying separable nuclear warheads [Fisher, p. 152-181]. Another American expert, Jeffrey Lewis, believes that the only missiles that can reach the territory of continental America are the DF - 5 ICBM [Lewis, 2005, p. 55].

There are other assessments of the state and prospects of China's nuclear missile forces. Thus, A. Arbatov and V. Dvorkin believe that in 2003 the strategic nuclear forces of the People's Republic of China consisted of 252 carriers and 300-400 nuclear warheads, They were based on land-based launchers, 120 obsolete N-6 (TU-16) aircraft, and one nuclear submarine with 12 missiles. Non-strategic nuclear forces had 150 delivery systems for these weapons (aircraft, artillery, and shorter-range missiles). According to some estimates, within 10-15 years, China may have 100-150 intercontinental ballistic missiles with separable nuclear warheads, 3-4 nuclear submarines. The total number of nuclear warheads can range from 500 to 900 [Arbatov and Dvorkin, 2006, p. 44]. According to M. E. Sosnovsky, in addition to the SSBN available since 1987 with 12 ballistic missile launchers (range up to 1,700 km), another new generation SSBN was added in 2006, equipped with 16 Julang-2 ballistic missile launchers (range up to 8,000 km), which is a marine modification of the DF ICBM-31 [Sosnovsky, 2006, pp. 32-37].

On January 12, 2007, China confirmed its capabilities in the military use of space, successfully using a ballistic missile to destroy its own weather satellite at an altitude of about 850 km, launched into orbit in 1999. So far, only the Soviet Union (1968-1982) and the United States (in 1985 and 1986) have been able to do this. A Chinese official said that China has informed interested countries, including the United States, and that the PRC opposes the militarization of outer space and the arms race in it. The US responded that the test was not in keeping with the spirit of cooperation between the two countries in space. Note that America's space doctrine states that it has the right to freedom of action in space. In addition, the United States itself is developing weapons capable of hitting space objects. China insists on negotiations to abandon the militarization of outer space, but the United States does not go for it [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/world/asia/19china.html/].

Indian media reported that China was trying to challenge American supremacy in space in this way, and that the United States has limited capacity to respond to this. The Indians point out that the destruction of a satellite by a ground-based missile occurred for the first time. The United States used to use an air - launched rocket for this purpose, and the Soviet Union used an orbiting satellite [Rediff India Abroad, 22.01.2007]. During a visit to India on January 25-26, 2007, Russian President Vladimir Putin said: "China is not the first country to conduct such tests. In the US military circles, we still hear the study of the militarization of outer space. No need to let the genie out of the bottle. Space must be free of weapons." Indian Prime Minister M. Singh also said that India opposes the militarization of outer space [Vremya novostei, 26.01.2007; Izvestia, 26.01.2007; BBC News: http://news.bbc.co.Uk/go/pr/fr/-/1/hi/world/south_asia/629871.stm/].

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American nuclear scientists K. A. Lieber and D. G. Press write that in 2001, the US administration confirmed the importance of nuclear weapons for national security strategy and approved programs that would significantly increase the offensive nuclear potential of the United States. In the same year, 2001, America withdrew from the ABM Treaty and began to create a national missile defense system (NGO). In 2004, the first contingent of NGO interceptors was put into service in the United States. And that was just the beginning. The United States has doubled its investment in missile defense and in the development of NGOs on land, in the air, at sea, and in space [Lieber, Press, 2006, p. 27-29].

Other American experts on nuclear weapons note that the Pentagon's program provides for the deployment of weapons in space that can strike with great accuracy (less than three meters) anywhere in the world within 45 minutes, which will provide the United States with an unprecedented opportunity to destroy enemy strategic forces, including intercontinental ballistic missiles. The program called "God's Punishment" 5 provides for the creation of an orbital platform with weapons that will be launched and directed by satellites to destroy targets anywhere on Earth within a few minutes. According to the official doctrine, the main targets of this program will be heavy intercontinental missiles in silos and enemy satellite systems [Weiner, 2005; Anzera, 2005].

In their calculations to maintain and develop nuclear deterrence, the Indians, of course, rely on the experience of the great Powers, including those that directly affect their interests. So, after the Indo-Chinese war of 1962, the United States considered the possibility of using nuclear weapons if China starts a second war against India. This is reflected in the American documents, which were recently removed from the classification of secrecy. In a conversation between US President John F. Kennedy and Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara, the latter said:: "Before we make any definite commitment to defend India against China, we must recognize that in order to fulfill this commitment, if there is any massive Chinese attack, we will have to use nuclear weapons. Any serious Chinese attack on any part of this region will require America to use nuclear weapons, and this is preferable to the deployment of large numbers of American soldiers." Kennedy replied ," We have to protect India, and so we will protect India if it is attacked" (Giridharadas, 2005). During the war with China, Nehru turned to the United States and Great Britain with a request for military assistance [Belokrenitsky, Moskalenko, Shaumyan, 2003, p.22]. At this time, Kennedy announced the beginning of a new phase in relations with democratic India, which was fighting communist China. However, in reality, American military assistance to India was insignificant. Some American scholars believe that President Kennedy was deeply interested in preemptive military operations. He often discussed this issue with US political and military leaders, and insisted on receiving reports on the mechanism and effectiveness of a first-strike nuclear strike during the Berlin crisis of 1961, should this crisis escalate into an armed conflict. Kennedy believed that a preemptive strike was a possible political response [Trachtenberg, 1999, p. 289-297; Kaplan, 2001, p. 81-86]. September 19, 1961 Kennedy demanded that the Joint Chiefs of Staff immediately provide him with information, since " the Berlin events may create a situation in which we can afford to take the initiative to transfer the conflict from the local level to the regional level."-

5 Rods from God.

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at the beginning of a general war." "General war," Lieber and Press write, " was a euphemism for nuclear war. That is, it was about the possibility of a nuclear war against the USSR "[Lieber, Press, 2006, p. 7].

In 1971, during the Indo-Pakistani war, which ended with the victory of India and the formation of independent Bangladesh, US President Richard Nixon considered the possibility of using nuclear weapons against the PRC if it intervened in this war [Nixon, 1985].

INDIA'S MILITARY-TECHNICAL COOPERATION WITH RUSSIA AND OTHER COUNTRIES

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia's ability to meet Indian requests for weapons has significantly decreased. Moreover, in the first half of the 1990s, Russia's foreign policy essentially adopted a one-sided orientation towards the West. The episode with the transfer of cryogenic booster engine technology for a space rocket to India was very significant. Under pressure from the United States, which accused Russia of violating the non-proliferation regime of missile technologies, the latter abandoned the already signed agreement, which caused a negative reaction in India and cast doubt on Russia's ability to supply India with the high technologies it needs.

The vacuum in the supply of military technology and weapons could not remain for long. India has increasingly turned to the West in an effort to modernize its armed forces.

Today, India ranks France, Israel, Russia, South Africa, the United Kingdom, and the United States among its largest defense partners. (In this order, they are listed in the annual report of the Ministry of Defense of India for 2006.) [http://mod.nic.in/reports/pdf]. India has noticeably stepped up military-technical cooperation with the United States, and especially with its ally Israel.

With the consent of the United States, Falcon early warning systems and Barak anti-missile systems were delivered from Israel to India. Cooperation is expected in the construction of submarines, joint efforts to create unmanned aerial vehicles "Searcher-2", "Heron" (some of these funds have already been delivered to India). Israel has become the second largest supplier of arms and military equipment to India after Russia. In 2004, its arms sales to that country reached $ 1.5 billion (compared to only $ 250 million in 1998). At the same time, Israel supplies mainly high-tech types of weapons and military equipment. Israel is also helping to train the Indian military in counterterrorism operations, and to create an electronic fence on the India-Pakistan border and in the eastern sector of India to prevent the flow of illegal immigrants. The national press also mentioned cooperation between India and Israel during the Indian-Pakistani armed conflict in Kargil in 1999.

In 2007, the Indian Ministry of Defense considered the possibility of implementing 18 military-technical cooperation projects with Israel. This applies to the supply of various types of weapons to India, including medium-range missiles, precision-guided missiles and bombs, cruise missiles, and artillery systems. Even the modernization of the MiG-21, MiG-29, etc. is being studied. Israel has a chance to become one of the leading suppliers of military equipment to India [The Hindu, 2007].

According to some reports, India is working on purchasing high-tech weapons and equipment from the United States, including radars, flight control systems for light combat aircraft, as well as spare parts for Sea King helicopters, rescue ships for submarines, and anti-ship missiles.,

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communications and reconnaissance equipment on land, sea and air, weapons using laser technologies. There are plans to conduct joint development of computer programs in the field of defense with the United States.

India is also developing military-technical cooperation with other countries, including France and the United Kingdom.

In the second half of the 1990s, Russia gradually began to regain its lost positions in military-technical cooperation (MTC) with India, but in new conditions, with noticeably increased competition from Western powers. Until the 1990s, India's main partner in military-technical cooperation was the Soviet Union. More than half of the weapons in the Indian armed forces were Soviet, and then Russian military equipment, according to some estimates, in the ground forces-by 60%, the Air Force-by 70%, the Navy-up to 80%. Nevertheless, at the beginning of the XXI century, the situation changed significantly not in favor of Russia.

However, the military-technical cooperation between Russia and India is improving. In 2000, a 10-year agreement was signed covering about 200 projects valued at $ 18 billion. In October 2007, Russia and India decided to launch a new program of long-term cooperation in the military-technical sphere. It provides for new strategic relations in the military-technical cooperation based on closer cooperation, including joint development and production of high-tech weapons, as well as their supply to third countries. In addition, it was decided to increase the number and scale of joint military maneuvers, as well as programs for training military specialists on a mutual basis [http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200710182026.htm].

Among the previously signed contracts, the following are the largest. In 2000, an agreement was signed for the production of 40 SU-30 MKI fighters in India (worth $ 3.5 billion). It is envisaged that by 2010, the Indian company Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd (HAL) will be able to produce these machines entirely from Indian components, and their production will be completed in 2014. In 2001, an agreement was reached to supply India with 310 T-90S tanks (124 Russian-made tanks and 186 manufactured under a Russian license). This can be seen as India's response to the delivery of 300 T-80U tanks from Ukraine to Pakistan earlier. In 2007, issues related to the implementation of this contract, as well as the delivery of an additional 347 tanks, were clarified. Negotiations are underway for India to lease a nuclear submarine of the Akula-2 class from Russia for 10 years, starting in 2008 or 2009 [ibid.].

In 2004, a contract was signed to supply India with the heavy aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov, 16 ship-based fighters and 9 anti-submarine defense helicopters to equip this ship, which is undergoing modernization in Russia under the new name Vikramaditya (the transaction amount is $ 1.6 billion). This means that this ship may enter service with the Indian Navy in 2009-2010 or somewhat later. In the coming years, the Indian fleet will include 3 frigates that are being built at Russian shipyards (a contract worth $ 1.6 billion). Other types of weapons are also supplied [Rossiyskaya Gazeta, 04.12.2004; Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 01.12.2004, 03.12.2004; Kommersant Guide, 25.01.2007; Mazin, 2007; Yurlov, 2005].

During the visit of Russian President Vladimir Putin to India in January 2007, important issues of Russian-Indian cooperation, including in the military-technical sphere, were discussed. In this context, Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh said that despite the huge changes in international relations over the past decade, "Russia remains extremely important for India's strategic interests." [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26].

During the visit of the Russian President, negotiations were held on the licensed production of the MiG-29 in India and the joint development and production of a multi-purpose transport aircraft. They also discussed the construction of a multi-purpose building.

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a fifth-generation Sukhoi-based fighter. In October 2007, an agreement was reached on the joint development and production of such an aircraft. According to Indian Defense Minister A. K. Anthony, the agreement on this fighter gives a new quality to India's defense ties with Russia. It means the beginning of cooperation in the latest weapons systems [http://www.hindu.com/2007/10/19].

Earlier, an agreement was reached on India's use of the Russian GLONASS navigation satellite system for peaceful purposes. It was assumed that India could take part in the creation and launch of satellites for this system. They also discussed plans for India to buy helicopters and further cooperation in improving the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile joint production and its possible sale to third countries. [http://www.nytimes.com/apon-line/AP-India-Russia.html, January 26, 2007; http://www.nytimes.com/reuter/world/internation-al-russia-india.html, January 25.2007; Chenoy Anuradha, 2004].

During the Russian-Indian negotiations in January 2007, Russia's intentions to participate in the tender for the supply of 126 MiG-35 multi-role front-line fighters to India were announced. The tender was officially announced in August 2007. However, Russia has serious competitors: the United States, France, the United Kingdom, the EU and Sweden. India's choice of a partner in this major deal will largely determine the nature of its military-technical cooperation with Russia [Makienko, 2006; Vremya Novostei, 30.08.2007].

The development and improvement of the armed forces in the foreseeable future is considered by India as an important condition for strengthening its position in the world on the path to becoming a great power. India's strategic line is determined by its growing relations with the United States, Japan, and the EU, the normalization of relations with China, the desire to maintain partnership relations with Russia without becoming dependent on it in the military-technical sphere, as well as the situation in South Asia, especially relations with Pakistan.

India will continue to build up its military advantage over Pakistan. Nevertheless, it will have to pay a lot of attention, including in military terms, to the problematic relations with this country, including the unresolved Kashmir issue.

As a growing global power, India will strive to achieve strategic military power parity with China. However, this task will require a long-term mobilization of economic and financial efforts.

India is intensively developing and improving its armed forces based on advanced technologies. First of all, this applies to nuclear forces. It will strive to meet its weapons needs at the expense of its own resources. However, its military-industrial complex will not be able to meet the country's needs for high-tech weapons and armaments for a long time. Therefore, India will continue large-scale purchases of weapons and military technologies abroad (according to some sources, only in 2007-2011 it can spend up to $ 30 billion on such purchases). At the same time, India is increasingly giving preference to joint development and production of military equipment with foreign partners. Therefore, competition from India's other military-technical cooperation partners will increase, which may lead to a narrowing of Russia's real capabilities in this area. Nevertheless, India's military-technical cooperation with Russia remains an important element in this area, at least in the near future.

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http://www.hindu.com/2007/10/19

http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/holnus/001200710182026.htm

http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/26

http://www.nytimes.com/reuter/world/international-russia-india.html, January

PERIODICALS

News time.

Izvestia.

Kommersant Guide.

Nezavisimaya gazeta.

Rossiyskaya gazeta.

Rediff India Abroad.

The Hindu.

The Indian Express.

The New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2007/01/19/world/asia/19china.html/)

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