^{According to some experts, the definition of territorial sovereignty can be achieved by recognizing "so-called natural borders in accordance with international law, or by recognizing signs of delimitation that are not in doubt, or by reaching formal agreements between interested neighboring States, such as border agreements, or special acts recognizing a State within fixed boundaries." has long been the subject of research by specialists in the field of international law. In his Treatise on the Principles of International Law, published in 1901, Harris Taylor wrote that if, for any objective or subjective reasons, there are doubts about the definition of the boundary line, one should adhere to the fundamental rule, which can be formulated as follows:: "When two states are separated by a chain of mountains or hills, the watershed line forms a boundary line or frontier."} 3 ^{Finally, according to experts, there was an immutable rule that borders that actually existed over a long period of time "should be subject to changes as little as possible"} .

Speaking in 1935 at a meeting of the Royal Society of Arts in London, an expert on the region, Sir Henry MacMahon, drew attention to the difference between the concepts of "frontier", which the Oxford English Dictionary interprets as "part of a country bordering another country", and "border " or" boundary", which is explained as "the border of a country". "border line". According to G. McMahon, the first concept means a wide strip of border territory, which under certain circumstances can be considered as a buffer zone between two states. The second concept is the boundary line, which is defined verbally and on maps, i.e. delimited, or actually defined on the spot, i.e. demarcated. Thus, in the second case, the concept of border (boundary) defines the borders of the sovereignty of a particular state ^.4

The Himalayas are a natural, almost inaccessible border zone between two geographical, geopolitical and civilizational areas-China and India. The Himalayan region includes the territories of Tibet, Nepal, Sikkim and Bhutan, which form a geographical and ethnic community connected by historical and religious ties. Connections between the territories located on both sides of the Himalayas are made only through high mountain passes and narrow valleys of mountain rivers. Located relatively low above sea level, the passes on the Sikkim-Tibet border remain passable even in winter. Geographical conditions made it difficult to communicate both between the States of the region and between their countries.

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both with the outside world and the de facto isolation contributed to the preservation of traditional socio-economic relations and the feudal-theocratic system of power.

A well-known Indian expert on the border problem, K. Gopalachari, gives the following description of the border between India and China: "In the north, the border runs along the watershed line between the Indus River system in India and the Yarkand and Yurung Kash river systems in China. Further south, it follows the watershed between the Sutlej River in Tibet and the Ganges in India. To the east of Nepal, the spurs of the Himalayan Range form a watershed between the Tista, Sankosh, Raidak, Manas, Kameng, Khru, Kamba, Dihang and Dibang Rivers flowing into the Brahmaputra from the north in Sikkim, Bhutan and the North-Eastern Border Agency (NEFA), and the Tsangpo River flowing from the south in Tibet. This Himalayan watershed, as if bordering the Tibetan plateau, is also called the "roof of the world" ⁵ .

The Himalayan and Karakoram mountain ranges, stretching from Ladakh to the state of Arunachal Pradesh (until 1973-the North-Eastern Border Agency, then until 1987 - the Union Territory), from west to east and from north to south, separate Hindustan from Tibet and other areas of Chinese Central Asia and form the main watershed between the two countries. rivers flowing south towards India, and north towards Tibet. The river valleys were used for migration within the region, and it was the rivers that served as communication routes between India and Central Asia.

The ethnic composition of the population of the Himalayan region is diverse, and state borders in the Himalayas do not always coincide with ethnic ones. The population of territories located both to the north and south of the Himalayas has a lot in common in terms of ethnic characteristics, religious affiliation, economic activity, etc. The tribes inhabiting the border areas of north-eastern India (Naga, Mizo, etc.) and Ladakh, as well as the indigenous population of Sikkim and Bhutan, are more likely to gravitate towards Tibet and Xinjiang on ethnic and religious grounds. Nepalese people are ethnically, historically and culturally close to the population of India. It is also necessary to take into account the active migration processes in the region, due in particular to the fact that in the Himalayas and adjacent areas there are sacred sites of Hindus and Buddhists. Important factors were the development of trade and mass movements due to political events (the flow of Tibetan refugees after the anti-Chinese uprising of 1959 to Bhutan, Nepal and northern India, and the migration of Lepcha from Sikkim to Bhutan and Nepal, and Nepalis to Sikkim).

Most of the population south of the Himalayas are Hindus, while those to the north are Buddhists. An important part of the Himalayan region - Tibet-is a universally recognized center of world Buddhism, where pilgrims from various parts of Asia, from other countries and regions of the world traditionally flocked and flock. This circumstance, as well as the special strategic position of Tibet in the center of the Asian continent, at the junction of the borders of the largest Asian civilizations, played a significant role in the fact that the Himalayan region in the XIX - early XX century.became the object of a sharp struggle between the Anglo-Indian colonial authorities and the ruling circles of the Manchu dynasty. At the same time, we can say, using a modern concept, that both sides were playing a "zero-sum game" here: strengthening the position of one of the Asian giants was considered by the other as contrary to its interests. Both men were aware, however, that extending control of the region to any third power was tantamount to creating a foothold in the heart of Asia against the interests of both British India and the Qing Empire.

On the slopes of the Himalayas between India and Tibet, the small kingdoms of Nepal and Bhutan and the principality of Sikkim, which is now part of the Indian Empire, are "squeezed".-

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Volume of India. After independence, the Government of India continued to consider the problem of ensuring the security of the republic within the entire South Asian region and, taking into account the important strategic position of the Himalayas, in 1949-1950, it began to implement measures aimed at consolidating in a contractual manner the relations with the Himalayan regions that had developed during the colonial period.

So, on August 9, 1949. A treaty was signed in Darjeeling between India and Bhutan, according to which the Bhutanese government agreed to "follow India's advice in matters of foreign relations" while maintaining autonomy in internal affairs; India undertook to provide significant economic assistance to Bhutan ^.6 On December 5, 1950, in Gangtok, India and Sikkim signed a treaty declaring Sikkim a" protectorate "of India, enjoying" autonomy in internal affairs." The Government of India assumed responsibility "for the defence and territorial integrity" of the Principality and therefore acquired "the right to apply such measures as it deems necessary, including the deployment of troops, the construction and strengthening of strategic roads and other means of communication, in consultation with the Government of Sikkim". India received full control over Sikkim's foreign relations, in return for which it pledged to provide it with comprehensive economic assistance ^.7 In India, the treaty was seen as a "guarantee" and "an important step in strengthening border defenses" ^.8

Nepal was almost never part of the British Colonial Empire, but rather was in its "shadow". Signed on July 31, 1950. The Indo-Nepal Treaty recognized the sovereignty, territorial integrity and independence of Nepal. The treaty stipulated that both Governments would "inform" each other of any differences and misunderstandings that might arise between each of them and their neighbors. On the same day, a mutual exchange of letters took place, in which it was stated that each State would not allow the security of the other to be threatened by the aggressor, and in the event of such a threat, it would take effective countermeasures ^.9

The Chinese Government also took military and political measures to strengthen its position in the Himalayas: in 1950, units of the People's Liberation Army of China were introduced into Tibet, and on May 23, 1951, the "Agreement between the Central People's Government of China and the Local Government of Tibet on measures for the peaceful Liberation of Tibet" was signed in Beijing.Proclaiming the national autonomy of Tibet "under the overall leadership of the Central People's Government" of the PRC ¹⁰ . Thus, Tibet ceased to play the role of a "buffer" between the territories of China and India, and the two largest Asian powers came into direct contact on significant parts of the Himalayan border.

The Himalayas are a border zone, a buffer zone between China and India, where the actual drawing of the border line is extremely difficult due to the peculiarities of geographical conditions and low population of the border areas. If we ignore purely political considerations, it is the lack of a clear demarcated line on certain sections of the border that initially formed the basis of the ongoing border dispute in the Himalayas between India and China.

In making territorial claims against India, the Chinese side argued that there had never been a historically legitimate definition of the border line and that the entire border was the result of the expansionist policies of British imperialism. In the note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Embassy of the Republic of India dated December 26

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In 1959, it was stated that "the Sino-Indian border was never established, Britain left a legacy of some controversial issues in this regard, and the Indian Government brought a number of unacceptable charges against China, which made disputes inevitable." ¹¹ According to the Indian side, the entire border line is defined either by treaties and agreements, or by tradition, although it is not always demarcated on the ground. Be that as it may, there was a traditional border line adopted by both sides, which for centuries was not violated and through which pilgrims and merchants passed. At the same time, both India and China practically exercised political, military and administrative control over those parts of the disputed territories that they considered vital for ensuring their own security.

During the long-standing controversy between India and China over the border issue, each side used its own system of reasoning and interpreted the same historical facts and documents in an acceptable form, as a result of which their interpretation is sometimes diametrically opposed.

The border between India and China with a total length of about 3.5 thousand km runs along the world's highest Himalayan range and is divided into three sections.

The western section -about 1,600 km long-is the border of the Indian state of Jammu and Kashmir with Xinjiang and Tibet, which starts from the Karakoram Pass in the very north of Kashmir and runs to the border with Tibet in the Spiti region. The situation on this section of the border is complicated by the fact that approximately one-fifth of it is the border of China with the part of Kashmir under the jurisdiction of Pakistan. Moreover, Pakistan, in accordance with the agreement with China signed in March 1963, transferred to it part of the territory of Jammu and Kashmir, which India considers its own. Therefore, the border settlement process in this area affects Pakistan-China relations, which makes it difficult to reach an agreement. In general, China, according to India, occupies here about 33 thousand square kilometers of the territory of Aksai Chin, occupied by it in 1955-1959 and secured as a result of military operations in 1962. Due to its sparsely populated nature and inaccessibility from Indian territory, this area has no economic value for India, while the question of its belonging is a matter of its prestige, national sovereignty, and restoration of the "honor of the nation". For China, the real value of this territory lies in the fact that a section (about a hundred kilometers) of the strategic Xinjiang-Tibet road built in the mid-1950s passes through it. In the same area, the parties are contesting sections of the border between Tibet and Ladakh from the Changchenmo Valley to Spiti, as well as certain territories in the Chushul and Demchok districts.

According to the Indian side, the western section of the border was established by a number of international treaties, primarily the Tibeto-Ladakh Treaty, signed as early as 1684,12 and confirmed by the descriptions of Englishmen W. Moorcroft, Major Lloyd and Captain A. Gerard, who made trips to the Ladakh and Aksai Chin regions in the first half of the 19th century .13 also by the peace treaty signed in September 1842 between the ruler of Jammu, Gulab Singh, on the one hand, and representatives of the Emperor of China and the Tibetan Lama Guru, on the other ¹⁴ .

On March 16, 1846, a treaty was concluded in Amritsar between Gulab Singh and the British colonial authorities of India, which provided for the creation of special commissions to determine the eastern boundary of Gulab Singh's possessions. ¹⁵ The Ladakh-Tibet border, which was approved as a result of the activities of the border commissions of 1846 and 1847 and the signing of the Tibeto-Ladakh Agreement of 1852, basically coincides with the requirements of the Indian side. On the travel map of one of the officials of the British Geographical Service in India, W. G. Johnson, published in 1865, Aksai Chin is shown as the territory of India ¹⁶ .

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In the 90s of the 19th century, the struggle between Britain, China and Russia for influence in Central Asia sharply escalated. Under these circumstances, the issue of demarcation in the regions of Xinjiang and Kashmir has become particularly important.

The Chinese authorities declared their claims to the Karakoram Pass area and drew up a map on which not only the disputed area, but also the entire territory of Aksai Chin was included in China. Given the further complication of Anglo-Russian relations, the British authorities did not consider it appropriate to further aggravate relations with the Qing. Therefore, the British Consul in Kashgar George. McCartney proposed a compromise: given the unpopulated and inaccessible Aksai Chin area, he favored dividing it along the east-west line of the Lak Tsang hills, i.e., along the watershed between the Indus and Tarim River basins. The part of Aksai Chin to the north of this line was to be considered Chinese; the Lingcitang Plateau to the south of it was to be included in the British Empire. In the summer of 1898, the Government of British India accepted this proposal, and on March 14, 1899, a corresponding note was sent to the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs by the British Ambassador in Beijing, C. MacDonald . The proposed line of demarcation is called the McCartney-MacDonald line. Beijing and local authorities in Xinjiang did not object to the English proposal.

However, in the UK, there was a group that held a different point of view. Thus, the head of British military intelligence in 1886-1897, J. Ardag, believed that in the context of the growing "Russian threat" in Central Asia, it was necessary to push the borders of British possessions as far as possible into China, drawing a border line along the Kuenlun Ridge and including the sources of the Yarkand and Karakash rivers within the limits of British possessions.

If the administration of British India, headed by Lord Elgin, refused to accept the proposal of J. R. R. Tolkien, If Ardaga agreed with the McCartney-MacDonald line, then with the coming to power of the new Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon, an ardent supporter of the offensive anti-Russian policy in Central Asia, the point of view of the British side is decisively changing. As noted by the well-known researcher of this problem A. Lamb, since 1899 the Ardagh line has become the accepted "British doctrine" ¹⁸ . The McCartney-MacDonald line was forgotten until the Chinese side, during the Indo-Chinese border conflict of 1959-1962, remembered the K note. McDonald's.

The same A. Lamb claims that from 1927 to 1940, neither the British nor Chinese administrations exercised control over Aksai Chin, where only occasional hunters, travelers or shepherds occasionally penetrated. Indian maps published after India's independence included the entire territory of Aksai Chin as part of India ^.19

Prime Minister of India J. R. R. Tolkien Nehru, speaking to the Council of States on September 10, 1959, said that the area "has never been under any administration", and on November 23, he also said that " under English rule... there was no population in the area and there were no outposts. " ²⁰ These speeches of the Indian Prime Minister were widely used by the Chinese side to prove their case.

At the same time, according to some experts, there was no convincing evidence of a legitimate Chinese presence west of Kuenlong. This is also confirmed by a map submitted in 1893 by a high-ranking Chinese official, Huang Tachen, to the British Indian mission in Kashgar. A similar map was published by the Chinese authorities in 1917. The absence of a Chinese "footprint" was also confirmed by tax collection reports published by Indian and Chinese ^{officials in 1961.21}

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In the above-mentioned note of December 26, 1959, the Chinese Foreign Ministry gives its interpretation of the 1842 Treaty of Tibeto-Ladakh. The Chinese side believes that the text of the treaty "only states that the border between Ladakh and Tibet should be preserved in the state in which it was, and that both sides should manage the border between Ladakh and Tibet." it did not contain any instructions or hints about the specific location of the border" ²² . The note further noted that the treaty was concluded by the local authorities of the Tibet region of China and the authorities of Kashmir, while approximately 80% of the disputed territory belongs to the part of China - Xinjiang, which was not a party to the treaty. The border proposal of 1899 is considered by the Chinese side as "unilateral", on the basis of which it is impossible to "appropriate the territory of another country" ²³ .

In a letter to the leaders of Asian and African countries on November 15, 1962, at the height of the border conflict in the Himalayas, Premier Zhou Enlai of the State Council of the People's Republic of China put forward his interpretation of the situation on the western part of the border. In particular, he wrote that in the 1960s of the 19th century, "British imperialism, looking for a convenient way to invade the depths of Xinjiang, turned its eyes with lust to Aksai Chin... and he sent his own military intelligence agents there to conduct illegal research activities. These scouts, carrying out the will of British imperialism, outlined various dividing lines for Xinjiang. " ²⁴ The Chinese premier further noted that the British authorities were trying to " erase the traditional habitual border line that has developed between China and India for a long period of time, and achieve their imperialist aggressive goal by dividing Chinese territory and expanding the territory of British India." However, according to Zhou Enlai, England "did not have the courage" to deny the existence of a traditional border line. Therefore, on the English and Indian maps published from 1865 to 1954, "the line of the western section of the border was either not marked, or was marked in an unclear form, but with an indication that it is not established" ²⁵ .

The Chinese side considers India's claims to Aksai Chin "far-fetched and devoid of any grounds." As arguments, such facts are given as the entry of the People's Liberation Army of China into Tibet in 1950 through the territory of Aksai Chin, and, most importantly, the construction in 1956-1957 of the "gigantic Xinjiang-Tibet highway", the existence of which India learned from a publication in a Chinese illustrated magazine. At the same time, Zhou Enlai specifically drew attention to the fact that up to 1958 India has never claimed that the area belongs to it, and at the time of the conflict claimed that China did not appear here until 1957. The Chinese premier also noted that Kyrgyz and Uyghurs living in Xinjiang constantly graze their cattle here, and the name Aksai Chin means "White Stone Shoal of China" in Uyghur ^.26

Some Chinese experts claim that China carried out transportation on the Aksaychin highway as early as 1950-1959, but the Indian side denies this information, and states that at the end of 1959, five months before Zhou Enlai's visit to India, there was still no evidence of Chinese presence in such areas as the Chup Chap and Galvan valleys, districts of Lanakha-Damchok, Changchenmo, Pangong, Kongka La, etc. These areas were occupied by Chinese troops in 1960 and later. Therefore, according to the Indian side, any settlement requires the liberation of these areas by China ^.27

If we ignore the ideologized rhetoric, the Chinese side, when assessing the situation on the western part of the border, cites in its own interpretation the same facts that India essentially operates with. The only difference is that the Indian side, relying on existing international treaties and agreements, recognizes their legal nature, while the Chinese side tries to prove that they have no legal force.

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Central section: the border of the Indian states of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh with Tibet, running along the Himalayan range from the Sutlej River to the border with Nepal. Its length is about 640 km. From India's point of view, the issue of the border line in this area was resolved by the signing in 1954 of the Agreement on Trade and Relations between India and the Tibet Region of China, which marked six passes-crossings: Shipki, Mana, Niti, Kungri Bingri, Darma and Lipu Lek-through which traders and tourists could move. pilgrims from one country to another, which gave reason to consider them borderline, and the border-established ²⁸ . The Chinese side considers such a system of reasoning "untenable", justifying its position by saying that during the negotiations on signing the Agreement, Chinese Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Hanfu, in an interview with Indian Ambassador to China Rangunath, said that "in the current negotiations, the Chinese side does not want to touch on the border issue" ²⁹ . According to Zhou Enlai, in the central section of the border, India, in 1954, in addition to "long inherited from British imperialism captured San and Chunsha", captured several other settlements, as well as the Shipki pass. Thus, China disputes that India owns about 2 thousand square kilometers where the important mountain passes of Spiti, Bara Hoti, Nilang and Shipki are located. The Chinese side argues in favor of its version that these areas were traditionally ruled by local Tibetan authorities, and the population of the disputed areas is almost entirely made up of Tibetans ^.30

Eastern section: the border of the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which runs mainly along the so-called McMahon Line between the sections of the Indian border with Burma and Nepal. Its length is about 1,100 km. This border line was named after the British representative at the trilateral Anglo-Tibeto-Chinese conference in Simla in 1913-1914. The Chinese side considers the Simla Convention illegal and raises the question of a completely different border line running at the foot of the Himalayas south of the McMahon line for about 100 km, and claims an area of about 90 thousand square kilometers located between these two lines. In addition, China claims that India has set up border posts in some areas north of the" illegal " McMahon line.

The MacMahon line ran along the Himalayan divide in the border territory of Assam, located in the northeast of British India and inhabited by warlike mountain tribes. The British colonial authorities, who occupied Assam during the Anglo-Burmese war of 1824-1826, repeatedly tried to suppress the anti-English protests of the Assamese tribes, sending punitive expeditions to the mountainous regions. In 1873-1876, the British drew the so-called Outer and Inner Lines in Assam. The outer line ran along the watershed and was considered an international border. The inner line, which ran through the foothills of the Assamese Mountains and separated the Assamese plain from the tribal belt, was intended to somewhat limit the entry of British tea planters and military personnel into the tribal zone, who had to obtain special permits to cross it. However, this did not mean that the territory between the two lines was outside the jurisdiction of the British, who considered the Internal Line an administrative, rather than an international border. In some areas, the Outer Line coincided with the Inner One. Lamb suggests that the British considered the tribal areas in the Assamese Himalayas between the two border lines to be within the British sphere of influence ^.31

In 1913, at the Anglo-Tibeto-Chinese conference in Simla, convened to determine the status of Tibet, British representative Sir Henry MacMahon proposed to divide Tibet into Internal (with the predominant influence of China) and autonomous External Tibet-a buffer between China and the British possessions in India. British-

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The Chinese representative marked the border between Inner and Outer Tibet with a single red line on the map, and the border of Tibet with Assam and Burma, which coincided with the Outer Border Line. The Chinese representative at the talks, Ivan Chen, put his initials under the text of the trilateral convention and the attached map with a line drawn by G. McMahon. However, the Chinese authorities in Beijing categorically refused to ratify this agreement on the basis of a strong disagreement with the border line between Inner and Outer Tibet and at the last moment declared Tibet's ineligibility as a vassal of China to participate in the international conference. The section of the McMahon Line that established the border of Tibet with Assam and Burma did not cause doubts on the Chinese side. In 1914, an exchange of notes took place between the British and Tibetan negotiating representatives, as a result of which the Tibetan side also agreed to the version of the border between Tibet, Assam and Burma.

In May 1919, the issue of the Tibeto-Chinese border was discussed again, and on the map presented by China, the McMahon line marked in red remained unchanged and did not cause any discussion. In 1960, the Burmese - Chinese Border Agreement was signed, according to which China officially recognized the Burmese section of the McMahon Line as the international border.

However, the Chinese side now claims that the traditional border line between China and India runs along the southern foothills of the Himalayas, and the territory disputed by India, whose population consists of Tibetans and related nationalities, has long belonged to China. This, in his opinion, is also evidenced by the Tibetan names of geographical points located on this territory.

As for the MacMahon line, Zhou Enlai believed that British imperialism took advantage of the Xinhai Revolution of 1911 to try to separate Tibet from China, and the Simla Conference of 1913-1914 was convened against this background. However, as the Chinese premier noted, at this conference, the British representative "did not dare" to openly demand the rejection of a significant part of China's territory, and only behind the back of the Beijing government delegate did the British and Tibetan representatives exchange secret notes, and G. McMahon drew his "notorious" line, which the Chinese government never recognized. The Chinese side now claims that "the Simla Convention itself has no legal force", and India demands that China "recognize the unequal treaty, which the Chinese government did not even sign". However, according to A. Lamb, who is not at all pro-Indian, the Chinese side used its claims to the territory of Arunachal Pradesh as "a symbol of refusal to recognize the fact that after 1912 Tibet was released from Chinese control and turned into an independent state for all its purposes and intentions" ³² .

After giving a whole series of arguments to support their point of view, the Chinese leadership comes "to the following irrefutable conclusion: the entire Sino-Indian border, neither in the western, nor in the central and eastern sections, has not been established. The Treaty of 1842, to which the Government of India refers, did not define any border between China and India in the western section at all, and the Xinjiang region of China, which is most closely connected with this section of the border, was not a party to this treaty. The 1954 Agreement referred to by the Government of India did not address the issue of the central or other sections of the border between China and India. The 1914 Convention itself, to which the Government of India refers, has no legal force, and the 1914 conference did not discuss the question of the border between China and India at all." ³³

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Undoubtedly, the nature of the territorial dispute, the actual differences and forms and methods of argumentation of the parties regarding the passage of the border line or the ways and methods of its establishment are quite contradictory in themselves. They are determined by the features of traditional approaches to solving existing problems, the nature of the political culture of India and China in the first decades after their independence. It seems that the Indian side is more committed to adhering to the" letter and spirit "of existing international treaties and agreements, while China analyzes them in detail and scrupulously, finds" vulnerabilities " in them, which it actively uses to prove its own rightness.

The course of the Indo-Chinese conflict, its ups and downs show that it can hardly be considered as purely territorial: as it developed, it became more and more politicized, fitting into the foreign policy concepts of both countries at various stages of their formation and development.

notes

¹ Cit. по: Appadorai A. Chinese Aggression and India: An Introductory Essay // International Studies. V. V. N 1-2, July-October 1963. P. 7.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid.

^{Lamb A.} 4 The China-India Border. The Origins of the Disputed Boundaries. Oxford, 1964. P. 14.

^{Gopalachari К.} 5 Basic Facts About India-China Border // Akashwami. V. XXIII, N 50. P. 3.

^{Coelho V.H.} 6 Sikkim and Bhutan. New Delhi, 1971. P. 122-125.

⁷ Ibid. P. 115-117.

^{Goyal N.} 8 Prelude to India. New Delhi, 1964. P. 143.

⁹ Foreign Policy of India. Text of Documents. Lok Sabha Secretariat. New Delhi, October 1958. P. 21-23.

¹⁰ The truth. 24.05.1951.

¹¹ On the issue of the Sino-Indian border. Beijing, 1962. pp. 59-60.

^{Woodman D.} 12 Himalayan Frontiers. A Political Review of British, Chinese, India and Russian Rivalries. L" 1969. P. 20.

¹³ Ibid. P. 22-24.

^{Lamb A.} 14 Op. cit. P. 48.

¹⁵ Ibid.

¹⁶ Ibid. P. 43.

¹⁷ Ibid. P. 101-104.

¹⁸ Ibid. P. 107.

¹⁹ Ibid. P. 112.

²⁰ Premier Zhou Enlai's letter to the leaders of Asian and African Countries on the issue of the Sino-Indian Border, 15.11.1962. / / On the issue of the Sino-Indian border. p. 17.

^{Ramachandran K.N.} 21 Chinese Article On Border Legalities // The Times of India. 18.05.1982. On the issue of the Sino-Indian border, pp. 61-62.

²³ Ibid., pp. 7-41.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ Ibid.

^{Ramachandran RN} 27 Op. cit.

²⁸ India-China Agreement. China-South Asian Relations. 1947-1980. Ed. by R.K. Jain. V. 1. Radiant, New Delhi, 1981. P. 61-64.

²⁹ On the issue of the Sino-Indian border, pp. 64-65.

³⁰ Ibid., p. 64.

^{Lamb A.} 31 Op. cit. pp. 125-126.

³² Appadorai A. Op. cit. P. 13.

³³ Note of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the People's Republic of China to the Embassy of the Republic of India in the People's Republic of China dated 26.12.1959. / / On the issue of the Chinese-Indian border. pp. 71-72.

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