The article focuses on the commercial advantages that caste connections gave to Indian entrepreneurs in the field of credit.

Credit is a necessary condition for the formation of the capitalist system and at the same time an integral part of capitalism, ensuring its functioning and development. In this sense, the influence of caste on credit activity in India reflected the specifics of both the formation and functioning and development of Indian capitalism.

Credit activity in India has traditionally been a monopoly of the merchant-usurer castes and was their hereditary profession. These castes developed means and methods that allowed their members to occupy an exclusive economic position.

In Russian historiography, the problems of socio-economic development of colonial India and, in particular, Indian credit were widely covered in the works of N. D. Grodko, A. I. Levkovsky, V. I. Pavlov, A. I. Chicherov, G. K. Shirokov and others. The role of caste in the activities of Indian merchants and moneylenders of the colonial period was first considered as a separate problem by V. I. Pavlov, who dealt with the genesis of the Indian bourgeoisie (Pavlov, 1958). His conclusions on this issue were generally shared by other Russian indologists.

According to V. I. Pavlov's point of view, caste means and methods of conducting commercial (in particular, credit) activities were one of the manifestations of feudal remnants that the colonialists put at their service. The existence of capitalist credit would negate caste advantages [Pavlov, 1958, p. 146]. Consequently, caste connections could only give merchants an advantage in the pre-capitalist, feudal sphere.

The capitalist system that was emerging in colonial India did indeed introduce certain changes in credit activity. However, historical facts show that the influence of caste on it persisted. Without explicitly refuting Pavlov's point of view, we will try to show in general terms how the caste tried to maintain its influence in the field of credit.

The late 19th and early 20th centuries in India were characterized by an intensive process of formation of the national bourgeoisie, including the layer of Indian bankers. At the same time, the role of usurious capital remained significant. The article deals with the economic manifestations of caste ties in two areas of credit-usury-

For the first article, see: Orient (Oriens). 2004. N 1. pp. 37-48.

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banking activity, with a greater emphasis on banking activity due to its importance for the capitalist system.

Let's define the main difference between these loan forms. In general, a loan is a receipt by one person (the borrower) of a certain amount from another person (the lender or lender) with the obligation to return this amount together with a surcharge, the amount of which is determined in accordance with the agreed coefficient (percentage), depending on the repayment period. When receiving a loan, the borrower provides security (or collateral), which, in case of late payment, the lender has the right to turn in its favor.

The main occupation of a pawnbroker is issuing loans at a high interest rate (20-40%, but sometimes 100% or more). The pawnbroker keeps the loan security (or mortgage). As a rule, the usurer does not accept deposits. The usurer's profit is determined by the difference between the amount received and the amount originally issued.

The banker provides monetary amounts at interest (gives loans) and accepts monetary amounts with the condition of interest payment (accepts deposits, or deposits). The banker's profit is formed by the difference between loan and deposit interest, i.e. the difference between the income from the borrowed amounts and the expense on the deposited amounts. The first one is more, otherwise the banker's activity would become unprofitable, while the largest bank interest is significantly less than the usurious one (for example, deposit -3 - 10%, loan-10-20% with 30-40% or more for the usurer). Further, the banker plays an important role in settlements between merchants, acting as a guarantor of settlements and significantly speeding them up. In particular, the banker buys other people's debt obligations for cash (i.e., keeps track of bills of exchange), withholding a certain percentage. In addition, the banker accepts payment orders. When using payment orders, the banker can open a letter of credit from another banker or take into account a bill of exchange. Banking accelerates the transfer of capital from one industry to another, accelerates the circulation of goods, reduces the time of capital turnover, and also serves as a powerful means of concentrating and centralizing capital.

As already mentioned, usury in India was a traditional occupation of several caste groups and was almost entirely in their hands. One such caste group was the Marwari, a fairly large group of people from Marwar (part of the Rajputana territory) [Enthoven, 1990, vol. Ill, p. 412 - 442]. It included five significant castes: Agarwala, Khandelwal, Maheshwar, Oswal, and Parwar (Enthoven, 1990, vol. I, p. 1; vol. II, p. 194, 418; vol. Ill, p. 150, 235]. Marwari excelled in various areas of commercial activity. In the second half of the 19th century, these caste groups became major industrialists and entrepreneurs, bankers and merchants of India (Timberg, 1978, pp. 179-185). In the field of credit, the Marwari were actively engaged in usury. There were also Marwari banks created on the basis of usurious savings [Mehta, 1966, p. 66].

Another caste group, the Nattukottai Chettiars (also known as Nagarattars, as they called themselves), is a large Tamil-speaking caste group in southern India, whose original area of residence was the Ramnad District (Ramanathapuram, informally Chettinad) in what is now Tamil Nadu. Historically, it traces its origins to the large Chetti caste, whose traditional occupation was small-scale coastal trade. Over time, a certain part of chetti began to expand the scope of its activities, gradually moving from trading to banking. Subsequently, they almost completely ceased to engage in direct trade and focused on banking, extending their influence to almost the entire territory of the Madras Presidency, Ceylon, and the west-

¹ The name" nagarattar " in medieval Tamil Nadu was identified with representatives of the urban community ("nagaram") [Alaev, 1964, p. 46; Tsygankov, 1973, p.138].

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most of Burma and some Southeast Asian countries. As their occupation and financial situation changed, they began to call themselves Nattukottai Chettiars, or Nagarattars (Thurston, 1909, vol. II, p. 91 - 97]. The activities of the Nagarattars represent a unique example of capitalist credit management.

The sources on which we were based can be divided into three groups.

First, materials from reference publications (primarily gazetteers) and ethnographic materials. They contain various types of information on the second half of the 19th century. [Bombay..., 1879-1885; Imperial..., 1908; Thurston, 1909, etc.].

Secondly, the reports of the Indian Central Banking Inquiry Committee (Burma Provincial Banking Inquiry Committee, Madras Provincial Banking Inquiry Committee, Ceylon Banking Commission, etc.), which studied banking and usury activities in India, Burma and Ceylon for 1929-1934. This source is built according to the "question-answer" scheme. The questionnaire was divided into three groups. Of interest for the present study is the second group devoted to native credit. Officials, merchants, landowners - zamindars, authorities, representatives of liberal professions (doctors, lawyers, etc.) were surveyed.The source provides unique material in importance.

Third, memoirs, testimonies of contemporaries and materials from the Nattukottai Chettiars and Marwari family archives, drawn from research literature. Obstacles to the author's direct study of these sources were their inaccessibility in Russia and their uniqueness in India itself (in particular, the author's inability to have personal contact with prominent Indian businessmen and bankers). Using these materials, we refer to the relevant studies, the authors of which were able to study them directly [Krishnan, 1959; Mahadevan, 1976; Rudner, 1994; Timberg, 1978; Tun Wai U, 1962; Weersooria, 1973].

During the study period, the credit system of colonial India can be divided into two groups. The first group included British and foreign banks, joint-stock and cooperative banks, and a few Indian banks. The second group was formed by the so-called bazaar-moneylenders and bankers standing outside the banks (marwari, Nagarattars, shroffs, etc.). The difference between these groups was partly that they were subject to different legal norms.

The legal system of colonial India in the late 19th and early 20th centuries consisted of three layers of norms: statute law, i.e. acts and laws of the colonial administration, British case law (common law) and local law (local law - ways and custom law), i.e. Hindu and Muslim customary law. The first two groups formed the "official" colonial law and regulated relations in which Europeans were involved in one way or another. These norms were focused on the interests of the mother country.

British, foreign, joint-stock and co-operative banks (including some Indian banks) were established under "official" colonial law and operated in accordance with it. He was treated as: The Negotiable Instruments Act, the Usury Laws Repeal Act of 1855, and the Usurious Loans Act of 1918 ² .

In the part that did not relate to relations with Europeans, the "bazaar" was not subject to "official" law. Neither the organization, nor the composition of participants, nor the methods of conducting credit activities, nor reporting here were regulated by "official" law. Practically, for the colonial officials, the "bazaar" did not pose a serious problem.-

² See interview with Judge of the 1st class of the Akola District Court D. V. Paranjpe [Central..., 1930, p. 336-337].

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the battle had no system, and its participants seemed disjointed and disorganized [ Central..., 1930, p. 19, 150]. The bazar's creditor, in particular, could not apply to the colonial court with a demand to recover the debt from its debtor in a compulsory manner. Of course, the colonial courts dealt with such cases (in some cases this was mandatory), but the decisions they made did not always satisfy creditors [Krishnan, 1959, p. 53].

Sources note that the scale and scope of native bankers 'activities are almost impossible to accurately estimate, but caste cohesion is clearly visible:" Bankers operate without a formal organization, but in accordance with each other, their profession is passed down from generation to generation. It is difficult to say how much capital they invest and how much they earn, but it is quite clear that the costs of their activities are extremely low " [Central..., 1930, p. 373]. The bankers ' rate was not arbitrary, but depended on the activities of other bankers in the given region [ Central..., 1930, p. 21]. The percentage of bazar was generally significantly higher than that of British banks (Grodko, 1956, pp. 197-203).

One of the most striking manifestations of the caste connections of the bazaar participants was the practice of intra-caste lending, the essence of which was that a businessman starting a new business or being financially stranded was granted a loan on preferential terms by members of his caste. The existence of this practice was first noted by V. I. Pavlov [Pavlov, 1958, p. 145].

At the end of the 19th century, the Marwari caste group used intra-caste lending in the following way. The source reports that "when starting a business, a moneylender can apply for financial assistance to many members of his caste who are ready to meet him halfway" [Imperial..., 1908, p.165]. Such a loan was often granted without any security and required by European standards of registration. Due to caste connections, the creditor was well aware of the debtor's affairs (including his solvency), and the latter's honesty was guaranteed by caste customs [ Bombay..., 1879-1985, vol. XIX, p. 181]. In case of deception, various sanctions could be imposed on the offender, up to exclusion from the caste. Sources do not provide information about this practice in the Marwari environment, but in the Chettiar group, exclusion was applied not only from caste, but also from the family [ Burma..., 1930, p.207, 209].

Initially, the practice of intra-caste lending was aimed at expanding the business by involving other members of the merchant-usurer caste in it and at accelerating the recovery of the business in the event of a collapse.

The issue of issuing an intra-caste loan was decided by a board of authoritative persons of the caste-the guild. Members of the guild were called mahajans ( Enthoven, 1990, vol. III, p. 413). The guild was headed by seth, or Patel [ Gazetteer of Bombay City..., 1909, p. 107-108]. The position of seth was hereditary [ Gazetteer of Central..., 1901, p. 107-108]. Administrative matters were handled by a special hired person - gomashta ( Gazetteer of Bombay Presidency, 1884, p. 108). All of these individuals were members of the same caste.

The documentary expression of intra-caste lending was found in native khundi bills, which were initially used only among caste-related merchants and moneylenders [Imperial..., 1908, p. 165]: "There is a regular quotation of bills, well known to the brotherhood of bankers-Marwari and practiced by them in their mutual transactions, but marwari is not at all common. they are too shy to take as much as they can from random customers" [ Gazetteer of Central..., 1901, p. 333-334].

Obviously, initially hundi was a promissory note, i.e. a payment obligation of one moneylender to another, taking into account their belonging to the Bank of Russia.

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one caste. The liquidity of hundi was determined by a meeting of the mahajans of the caste. This practice allowed us to accumulate significant usurious capital.

However, such activities had serious disadvantages for the development of the capitalist system. First of all, the capital accumulated by usurers continued to remain passive, "dead", unsuitable for investment - even despite its impressive scale. A curious fact is that in 1876, a cotton mill owner named Jamshetji Tata, who was building a cotton mill in Nagpur, needed money to build a dam. He approached a local marwari with an offer to become a shareholder, but Marwari refused, saying that he, who was used to getting money out of the ground, should not bury it back [cit. by: Pavlov, 1958, p. 228].

A certain credit alternative to usurious activity was banking, which gives a profit from working capital. The latter could not be limited to caste or communal frameworks, but at the same time be created partly by caste methods.

I must say that banking activity in India took place along with usury in the feudal period (an example is the once flourishing banking house of Jagat Seth). With the intensification of colonial expansion from the end of the 18th century to the beginning of the 19th century, feudal banking activity began to decline. The second half of the 19th century was marked by the beginning of a new stage of Indian banking activity, when the main client of bankers was a merchant and small commodity producer.

Considering the ratio of moneylenders and bankers in the native credit of India at the end of the XIX-beginning of the XX century, it is necessary to indicate the following:

1. Usury and banking did not necessarily constitute different stages of credit development. Thus, the Marwari caste group began to engage in banking based on usurious savings [Mehta, 1966, p. 66; Timberg, 1978, p. 148-151], while the Nattukottai Chettiars switched to banking primarily from trading, bypassing usury [ Rudner, 1994, p.53-55].

2. Usury and banking were not mutually exclusive. Often there was a combination of functions [ Central..., 1930, p. 31], as well as the coexistence of moneylenders and bankers even in large cities [Grodko, 1956, p.203].

3. Credit management has not always been the sole occupation of a merchant. There were merchants who were engaged in banking in order to obtain the capital necessary to expand their main business [ Central..., 1930, p. 31]. Often, the functions of a banker, buyer and shopkeeper were combined in one person, since loans could be issued not only in monetary form, but also in kind [ Central..., 1930, p.121].

4. The practice of advance payment was widespread in trade. For example, an Indian cotton merchant advanced another merchant who came from the same caste during the peak of business activity [ Central..., 1930, p. 31].

The usurious interest rate varied greatly depending on the territory and type of activity being credited. Even in large cities (Bombay, Madras), the difference in rates reached 4-5% (Jain, 1929, p. 98).

At the same time, the bank interest rate was approximately the same. On average, the deposit rate was 5-12% per annum [ Central..., 1930, p. 49, 139], and the loan rate was 12-24% per annum [ Central..., 1930, p.136, 373]. The rate of return on banking activity was also mostly stable and amounted to 15-18% [ Central..., 1930, p. 50].

Bankers ' personnel costs were low partly due to the fact that they used members of their own caste (munim), whose work, obviously, did not need to be paid only in cash [ Central..., 1930, p.373].

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A typical example of early twentieth-century Indian banking is the Nagarattaras, who built their commercial empire on the basis of a complex system of interdependent family banking firms.

Such a firm conducted banking activities in the foreign and domestic markets, was involved in trade, usury, and invested in industry. It accepted cash deposits, issued promissory notes and other financial instruments to transfer the received deposit capital to its branches and other banks. Each Nagarattar firm was associated with other firms of the same caste group (Rudner, 1994, p. 89-90). Well-known businessmen Ramanathan Chettiar and Lakshmanan Chettiar (Rudner, 1994, p.55) have made substantial fortunes on the basis of such firms.

As a result, a system of firms was formed that were connected not only by credit, but also by common origin, territory, marriage and cult relations, i.e., in fact, a banking structure based on caste. According to D. Rudner, this system had two features similar to Western European banking systems:

a) it consisted of separate banks, each of which was directly or indirectly connected with other banks: it accepted deposits from them and provided loans to them;

b) within the framework of this system, special institutions were developed for the accumulation and distribution of capital reserves, affecting interest rates, the value and supply of credit and money [Rudner, 1994, p.90].

Consider the financial transactions and instruments used by Nagarattara bankers.

When conducting each financial transaction, the Nagarattars took into account the caste status of the participants in the transaction and the conditions for repayment of the amount. Based on these criteria, we can distinguish four types of liabilities:

1. Demand deposits on kadei kanakku accounts ³ .

2. Nadappu ⁴ deposits in kadei kanakku accounts - transactions conducted only in the Nagarattar environment.

3. Term deposits (for 2, 3 or 6 months) from your teammates on thavaney kanakku accounts ⁵ .

4. Term deposits from outsiders in wayan watti kanakku accounts. These were fixed-interest accounts.

The interest rate on nadappu deposits served as a reference point for interest rates on other deposits and resembled the prime rate of ⁶ .

Nadappu's interest was the percentage paid by a Nagarattar banker for a deposit to kadai kanakku's account. Its rate was set on the 16th day of each month at joint meetings of Nagarattara bankers in major business centers (primarily in Depakottai, Madras, Colombo, Penang and Rangoon).

On deposits in kadei kanakku accounts, simple interest was paid at the nadappu rate for the deposit period.

In contrast, deposits in thavanei kanakku accounts were paid a compound interest consisting of a capital amount (deposit amount) and a fixed (non-progressive) premium for the deposit period (two, three or six months).

On deposits in wayan watti kanakku accounts, interest was paid at a compound rate consisting of the nadappu rate plus a few annas (1 annas = 1/16 rupees) per month.

³ Kadai kanakku-literally, "market account, calculation, calculation" (Tamil).

⁴ Nadappu-letters, " prosperity, current moment "(Tamil).

⁵ Thavanai-letters, "due date" (Tamil).

⁶ Prime rate - in modern developed countries, the base, minimum interest rate set by the central bank. Serves as the basis for all other interest rates.

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1 month. At the same time, these deposits brought only a simple percentage [Rudner, 1994, P-91].

This system of interest rates allowed the Nagarattaras, firstly, to attract relatively cheap capital (nadappu deposits) from their peers for use in current accounts in the event of unpredictable demand, and secondly, to attract term deposits of thavans from their peers-more expensive, but not requiring immediate repayment. In both cases, the Nagarattaras could use the deposit capital, which was cheaper than deposits from outsiders (wayan watti).

An official of the Burma Banking Commission described the procedure for setting the nadappu rate as follows: "[nadappu] is set on the evening of the 16th day of every Tamil month at 9 o'clock. at the Nagarattar Temple in Rangoon, and remains unchanged until the 16th of the following month... At the meeting, the current financial situation is discussed, and with this in mind, the rate over the salary is set. It also takes into account interest fluctuations, the thavaney rate, interest rates among bankers in Marwari, Multani, Gujarati, as well as interest rates on nagarattar loans from joint-stock banks. Much attention is paid to determining the rate based on the current period's needs, as the profits and losses of each Nagarattar banking firm depend on the nadappu percentage. During the 16 days before the rate is set, points of view are discussed and a consensus is reached, and the interest rate of thavaney is adjusted. All these discussions are taken into account when determining the bid for the apu " [Burma..., 1930, p. 225].

In practice, the nadappu rate was determined by taking into account fluctuations in thavaney rates. In other words, it was determined by taking into account the interest paid by the Nagarattaras for predictable borrowed capital in the form of thawan deposits. Apparently, due to competition between Nagarattarian banking firms, the thavaney rate remained informal until the 1920s. However, since the 1920s, the thavaney rate has been systematically adjusted every Sunday at 9 o'clock. in the morning at a meeting at the Nagarattar temple in Rangoon, taking into account all the conjuncture of Nagarattar banking activities. It was not linked to the bid for the nappu, but was determined formally independently. In fact, the nadappu rate influenced it [Burma..., 1930, p. 227].

The main instrument of financial activity of the Nagarattars was promissory notes-hundi. Most of the hundi that used nagarattars in the 1920s were bills of exchange. They were an order from one person (tracer) to another person (tracer) to pay a certain amount to a third person (remitter). The diplomat (also known as the banker) was always Nagarattar. Trassants and remitants could be members of other castes. To issue a hundi, the tracer had to have an open account and maintain correspondence with the tracer banker. Thus, these hundi were also used outside the Nagarattar caste group, since they could be issued by any merchant who had an open account with a Nagarattar banker.

Deposit accounts were kept separately from loan accounts, while the latter were secured by various bills of exchange and collateral - Moreover, the loan was paid in a single amount and could not be repaid by issuing hundi [Madras..., 1930, p.227].

Sometimes hundi was used simply to transfer money from one place to another (a service provided mainly among Nagarattars), but quite often hundi was used in trade settlements - both between Nagarattars and between Nagarattars and outsiders.

By the 1920s, about 75% of all Hundi nagarattars in Burma were trade notes. In such cases, the scheme looked like this. For example, a trader of unbroken rice (paddy) buys a batch of goods at a local market in Burma for a bill of exchange-hundi, which he writes to his account from a local naga banker-

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rattara. The nagarattar banker pays the hundi to the seller, withholding from the buyer 1-3% for the bill of exchange accounting, and acts as a guaranteed sender of the goods by rail. The banker then sends the hundi and the consignment note to his firm's Rangoon headquarters, along with instructions to debit the buyer's account. If the banker does not have an office in Rangoon, he sends the hundi and invoice to another banker, from whom he can debit the account. The receiving banker re-registers the bill, but usually does not retain the accounting interest. To receive their batch of paddy from any of the above bankers, the merchant buyer must have sufficient funds in their open account with a Rangoon banker to cover the payment. After the merchant's Rangoon account is debited, he is issued a bill of lading, on the basis of which he unloads his goods that arrived by rail [Rudner, 1994, p.93].

The Nagarattaras used four types of hundi:

1. A demand note payable immediately upon presentation (darshan hundi). It was paid from the kadei kanakku account within three days from the date of presentation. The bearer and place of payment were indicated in the bill.

2. "Internal" promissory note (nadappu hundi). It was also paid from kadai kanakku's account. It was used only among the Nagarattars. This was a special intra-caste loan for a payment obligation to a third party. One Nagarattar (A) lent money to another Nagarattar (B) even though he owed the money to a third party (C). B's only obligation was to pay A interest until A's obligation to B. Interest was paid at the nadappu rate from the time the money was lent until the debt was settled [ Madras..., 1930, p. 259-261]. We emphasize that A and B came from the same caste, while C could have been any person (including the Bank of England).

3. "Reserve" bill of exchange (thavaney hundi). It was paid from thavanai kanakku's account and used as a short-term certificate of deposit. ATM banker (payer) he could not pay the remitter (recipient) on demand until the specified date, usually 60-90 days from the date of issuing the bill [Tun Wai U, 1962, p. 45]. This repayment condition was called thavaney, the "reserve period".

4. A bill of exchange issued in lieu of a receipt for the payment of a monetary allowance for the conduct of a marriage ceremony. It was paid from a special complex account achchimar panam, which belonged to the thavaney type [Rudner, 1994, p. 93-94].

Most hundi earned interest based on the nadappu rate, but some were interest-free (in particular, most of the "darshan" hundi in Madras) [Madras..., 1930, p. 259].

Hundi were not enforced by colonial law, and unless they specified all the conditions absolutely required by law, they were not recognized in the colonial courts. Basically hundi contained the following:

a) a specific amount of money that the drawee (or transferee) was obligated to repay, or a specific account that could be debited for a certain amount;

b) the direct name of the financial transaction that gave the bill a turn. In addition to the above, the nadappu hundi did not contain any payment obligations [ Burma..., 1930, p.150; Madras..., 1930, p. 51-52].

At the same time, it should not be assumed that Hundi was not provided with anything. The Nagarattaras held collective meetings to set interest rates. Hundi could be secured by the power of a caste council (panchayat) decision. The banker's delay of the consignment note served as a means of guaranteeing settlements. "There are 136 bankers' firms operating in Chettinad with a total capital of Rs 110 million, but

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bad debts amount to only 430 thousand rupees, or about 0.5%" [Krishnan, 1959, P-41].

Indian bankers used the system of bills of exchange-hundi not only for settlements, but also for currency exchange.

By the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the Nagarattaras had gained a monopoly on settlements in the rice trade between Ceylon and Madras. The Nagarattars themselves were not engaged in trade, but only provided settlements. Ceylon merchants, selling nuts and spices to Europeans, received pounds sterling. To make payments with the buyer, the merchant resorted to the banker's agent-nagarattara. However, the agents of the Nagarattars (rice monopolists in Colombo) did not accept pounds sterling. Ceylon rice merchants had their agents in Madras, to whom they sent pounds sterling in exchange for a bill of exchange-hundi. The bill thus obtained from Madras was sold to a Nagarattar agent in Colombo for rupees, for which the Nagarattar agent charged the merchant a percentage of the bill's accounting. Thus, the bill was bought at a price below par. The Nagarattar agent in Colombo forwarded this bill to his banker in Madras. A Nagarattar banker in Madras presented the received bill of exchange to a Madras agent of a Ceylon merchant for payment at face value. Nagarattara's profit was the difference between the purchase price (the amount paid for accounting for the bill) and the sale price (i.e., the actual face value) of someone else's bill [Rudner, 1994, p. 59].

Thus, pounds sterling was changed to rupees if necessary. This mechanism was used not only by Indian, but also by British merchants (McKenzie, 1954, p. 90).

A Ceylon merchant might not have resorted to nagarattar. A hundi in pounds sterling could be sent to India, exchanged for rupees in an English bank, and cashed in Ceylon. However, it took almost a month. There was another option: a Ceylon merchant could wait for his bill to be registered in London, buy silver there, ship the silver to India, sell it there for rupees, and send the cash to Ceylon. But this took more than a year (McKenzie, 1954, p. 90).

Banking activities of the Nagarattaras in Ceylon have taken on a significant scale. This was largely due to the practice of Nagarattaras receiving short-term loans from British exchange banks. The capital extracted in this way worked for the Indians (while remaining English).

From 1870 to 1916, the number of Nagarattara firms in Ceylon increased from 150 to 700 (see the Nagarattara magazine in Colombo "Vshiyamitran" from 25.12.1916 [cit. by: Mahadevan, 1976, p. 112]). By 1929, the volume of their business operations was estimated at 150 million rupees [ Ceylon..., 1934, vol. I, p. 42]. Later, the volume of loans issued by British banks to Nagarattaras decreased, so the assets of Nagarattaras decreased to 100 million in 1934 [ Ceylon..., 1934, vol. I, p. 42].

English exchange banks were faced with the problem of investing funds deposited by English customers. Although they did not extend their activities to Ceylon, they provided loans to respected Nagarattar (adathi) clients, content only with the guarantee of another Nagarattar. Indian Nagarattaras, in turn, lent these sums to Ceylonese Nagarattaras at a higher interest rate (Rudner, 1994, p. 76).

However, it should not be assumed that the British banks provided unlimited credit to any Nagarattara. On the contrary, there were restrictions. So, small firms were refused. The loan was granted only if the guarantor belonged to the adatha circle (the list of these persons was approved by the head office of the Imperial Bank of India), which guaranteed the borrower's integrity. The amount of surety depended on the authority of the adathi (a more respected adathi was sured for large sums, etc.) [ Ceylon..., 1934, vol. II, p. 253, 316, 354 - 355].

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However, these restrictions were ineffective. A Banking Commission official reported that in the 1920s, the Chettiars found a way out of this situation: "Because different banks have different payment dates, Chettiars borrow an amount from one bank to pay an obligation to another bank, so when a Chettiari firm has financial problems, it easily overcomes them. If it becomes really insolvent, then the greatest losses are borne by the bank to which the firm must pay last, counting by the terms of loans. The Chettiars ' intra-caste lending system is the cornerstone of their credit success. If cash is needed, chettiar easily borrows it from fellow students. The interest on such a loan is 6 or so, or slightly higher than the percentage of the bank, from which, if necessary, the chettiars borrow the missing amounts. So, as long as one of the chettiars does not develop a reserve of credit from banks, any successful Chettiar with a good reputation can not be afraid of delaying their short - term loan from the bank. Thus, the Chettiars, who have a long-standing intra-caste loan as a safe haven, can use loans from one bank to secure loans from another bank (and sometimes the same bank). In this sense, it was the bank capital, and not the Nagarattar capital, that allowed the latter to take short-term loans from banks with very strict repayment conditions " [ Ceylon..., 1934, vol. II, p. 353 - 354].

On the above-described practice of intra-caste lending to nagarattars, we will make two comments. In the first place, the Chettiars never gave money, even to members of their own caste, for nothing or almost nothing. Obviously, the six percent repeated in the source represents the rate generally accepted among Chettiars, which is used in such cases. Secondly, if the Nagarattara lender did not have his own cash and resorted to the help of the bank, the interest on the loan to his classmate was taken into account his own profit, i.e. higher than that of the bank. Only Adathas could count on a personal loan from an English bank. The other Nagarattaras were forced to act through them.

Intra-caste lending to nagarattars as a way of distributing capital was a more progressive (from the capitalist point of view) method than the one described by Marwari in the 70s-90s of the XIX century. It was aimed not so much at involving additional participants in the business, but at increasing working capital. Not only Indian commercial capital was put into circulation, but also English capital. A potentially inefficient Nagarattar businessman might not receive an intra-caste loan, since the latter was granted at a fixed interest rate (a kind of "pass-through barrier" for newcomers) set by the caste.

It should be noted that the Marwari community also changed its approach to lending by the 1920s. A source reports that in the Central Provinces, Marwari bankers had almost no passive, unused capital [ Central..., 1930, p. 20, 150].

The native banker's creditworthiness, which was largely determined by the amount of working capital, allowed him to interact with English banks. By the 1920s, small and medium-sized moneylenders could not count on loans from British banks, while large Marwari businessmen had constant contacts with English banks [ Central..., 1930, p. 469], regularly took loans from them and re-registered bills of exchange [ Central..., 1930, p. 503], which gave them additional opportunities to pay for their loans. opportunities to increase working capital.

In Ceylon, English banks hired Shroffs (usually belonging to the Chettiar caste, but not from the Nagarattar community) to recommend the locals

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clients and guaranteed their integrity. Their business depended on knowing the creditworthiness of potential borrowers [Weersooria, 1973, p. 25].

The Nagarattars provided not only short-term loans from their own short-term loans, but also risky short-term loans and even long-term loans (Rudner, 1994, p. 78). If the client was unable to repay the loan, or their own loans were due before the client had to pay back the money, Nagarattar could simply pay the Bank of England (using the scheme described above) out of funds borrowed from a Nagarattar classmate. The latter, in turn, could borrow money from the same English bank.

By the 1920s, long-term loans were also extended to Marwari [ Central..., 1930, p 49].

It should be noted that the Marwari community, having almost no unused, passive capital, still left a certain caste reserve, which allowed a businessman or firm to exist for almost a year in the event of a collapse. This reserve was allocated to the bankrupt by the decision of the caste council [ Central..., 1930, p. 80]. In other words, the Marwari continued to use their savings as a guarantee of the firm's recovery after the crash. On the contrary, sources do not provide information about such practices among Nagarattars. It is logical to assume that in their environment, such a reserve to some extent replaced borrowed capital (including from English banks).

By the late 1920s, the capital of major Indian bankers was closely linked to that of colonial banks. In Bengal, urban bankers were able to re-register bills of exchange with the Imperial Bank, Indian joint-stock banks (and sometimes with foreign banks). In Bombay, during the business season, moneylenders supplemented their resources by lending money to each other, and in large cities by borrowing from the Imperial Bank of India and joint-stock banks (on bills signed by two trusted moneylenders or by re-recording the bills they guaranteed). In Burma, the Nagarattaras received loans from the Imperial Bank and joint-stock banks. During the business season, the amount of such loans reached 30 million rupees. In Delhi, city bankers re-registered bills of exchange in Indian joint-stock banks and in the Imperial Bank. In the United Provinces, some moneylenders obtained loans from the Imperial Bank and re-registered bills of exchange with it. In Madras, the Nagarattaras received loans from Indian banks, the Imperial Bank, and from foreign banks [Indian..., 1931, p. 102-103].

The Nagarattaras used three organizational forms: a family firm, an agency, and a local caste association.

Family businesses were coordinated through caste councils (panchayats). Nagarattar panchayats served as forums for exchanging information, resolving disputes, setting general interest rates, and representing Nagarattar interests in government. By the 1920s, they were replaced in some places by Nagarattar caste associations (Mahadevan, 1976, p. 187; Thurston, 1909, vol. V, p. 263].

By the 1920s, it became profitable to invest in industry. As a rule, the capital of a separate (nuclear) Nagarattar family was insufficient for such large investments. Under these circumstances, the Nagarattars preferred to stick together and invest on behalf of a large family (Rudner, 1994, p. 108). It should be noted that such" non-independence " of individual firms took place almost throughout the entire colonial period, and the commercial role of the large Nagarattar family was almost always significant.

Family firms and agencies functioned as commercial banks with branches, large firms (adatha colleges, similar to Marwari's mahajan guilds) functioned as reserve banks, and caste councils (vituti and panchayas-

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Thurston, 1909, vol. V, p. 263; Weersooria, 1973, p. 76 - 125, 110 - 116].

* * *

Indian moneylenders made large profits largely due to their membership in the merchant-usurer castes. The moneylender's caste was a prerequisite for his commercial success. The cash needed to start your own business could be obtained on acceptable terms only through a preferential caste line. Moreover, further commercial activity was largely insured against the risk of bankruptcy and ruin by the caste "code of honor" and mutual assistance. The moneylender was faced with a dilemma: either together with the caste against everyone else, or alone against his own caste. The loner inevitably lost out to caste corporatism.

Caste mutual aid of moneylenders had a pronounced commercial meaning. Moneylenders had practically no other protection for their activities than caste corporatism. The violator was punished not so much because he violated a caste tradition or an age-old custom, but because he caused commercial damage to the caste and created a danger of destroying the corporation. This is probably why cases of exclusion from the caste due to unfair commercial behavior were rare. More often, the methods of economic coercion were used (according to very complex and hardly reconstructed schemes).

Caste connections, one of the keys to the commercial success of Indian moneylenders, continued to play a significant role in Indian banking. They allowed Indian bankers to significantly increase their turnover, which gave them the opportunity to provide long-term loans and short-term risky loans.

Caste corporatism served as a reliable security for native bills of exchange-hundi, which were not protected by colonial legislation.

While maintaining considerable influence in the sphere of not only usurious but also bank credit, caste ties were an important condition not only for the formation but also for the functioning of capitalist credit. This was also largely due to the fact that there was no alternative to caste during the study period. The internal market was very narrow, the free circulation of goods and services throughout India did not know, the merchant did not have protection and guarantees of its activities. Under these conditions, the caste as an organizing force was in fact the sole refuge of the merchant. The caste continued to maintain its influence with the further development of commodity-money relations, demonstrating flexibility and the ability to adapt to new conditions.

At the same time, the very foundations of caste were affected by changes. Caste mutual aid has become more often motivated by commercial interests. In banking, an intra-caste loan was applied only to creditworthy peers. The financial guarantee for the existence of the banking caste was a minimum percentage (prime rate), which was protected no less than the honor of the caste. Intra-caste lending is being reoriented to increase working capital. Caste financial reserves are replenished not so much at the expense of liabilities (savings), but at the expense of borrowed capital, and depend on the size of turnover (the larger it is, the larger the size of the potential loan).

It cannot be argued that capitalist credit destroyed caste-based commercial corporatism. The caste was able to adapt to new requirements and maintain its influence. Caste foundations in credit could only be destroyed-

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This is provided that the capitalist system develops organizational institutions that are adequate to them in terms of efficiency, which did not exist in India during the period under study.

While maintaining considerable influence in the field of credit, the caste contributed to the formation and development of capitalism in colonial India.

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Timberg T.A. The Marwaris: from Traders to Industrialists. New Delhi, 1978.

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