The 1942 Stafford Cripps Mission is one of the pages in the history of British colonial policy in India during the Second World War. After Japan's entry into the war, against the backdrop of its initial victories in the Pacific and Southeast Asia, there was a real threat of the conquest of British India and the separation of this richest English colony from the empire's possessions. The situation was aggravated by the growth of anti-British sentiment in India and the active struggle of the country's leading political forces for independence. Formally, the Cripps mission was sent by London to reach mutually acceptable agreements with Indian political leaders and organize an effective response to the enemy. What were the true goals of the mission? What are the features, content and essence of the negotiations conducted by her? How did the great allied powers of Great Britain react to it? What is its outcome? This article is devoted to these issues.

During the Second World War, the liberation movement of the Indian people against the British colonial regime entered a decisive phase. The war Cabinet headed by W. Churchill and the Viceroy of India, Lord Linlithgow, resorted to the tactic of making broad promises and small concessions in the management system, while pursuing the main goal - to achieve full support and participation of this colony in the war and keep it part of the British Empire. In the late summer of 1940, the Minister for India and Burma, L. S. Emery, issued a statement known in the history of Anglo-Indian relations as the "August Proposal". For their cooperation in the war effort, the Indians were promised dominion status within the Empire's borders, effective after the final defeat of fascism. In addition, it was planned to expand the composition of the Executive Council - an advisory body under the Viceroy-at the expense of representatives of various sectors of society in India. The most influential political organization of the country, the Indian National Congress (INC), which defended the idea of a united, independent, secular India, considered that the metropolis was maneuvering, continuing to adhere to the imperial course, and resolutely rejected the "August proposal". The Muslim League (ML), which had been committed to dividing India along religious lines and creating Pakistan since 1940, asked for 50% of the Council seats, but faced with the refusal of the Viceroy, followed the example of the congressists and rejected the "offer". The opinion of other political parties did not play a significant role after the Congress and the League did not accept the English terms.

On December 7, 1941, the strategic position of the British Empire was weighed down by a new factor - the entry of Japan into the war. Like its European ally, Germany, Japan began with victories: destroying the American fleet in Pearl Harbor, Hawaii, and attacking American, British, and Dutch possessions in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. This shocked the Indian public. For the first time in the history of the British Empire, its South Asian possessions were threatened by an Asian power. Japanese naval and air forces attacked the American Philippines, Guam, Wake and Midway, Japanese troops captured Malaya, Hong Kong, Singapore, North Kalimantan, and began fighting for Burma and the Dutch East Indies. The Japanese fleet entered the Bay of Bengal almost unhindered. Among the Indian people, dissatisfaction with the complete helplessness of the authorities in organizing the defense of dependent territories was growing.

At this critical moment, Great Britain could no longer do without the support and voluntary participation of the broad masses of the Indian people in the war. During pairs-

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During the first parliamentary debate in February 1942, many Labour MPs pointed out to the war Cabinet the need to make concessions to the Indian liberation movement, "establish a national government in Delhi and thereby ensure the effective mobilization of the material and human resources of Hindustan to fight the external enemy" [Great Britain ..., 1942, p. 87-88]. In addition, London was forced to take into account that the development of events in India is being watched by its allies in the fight against Japan-the United States and China. By the spring of 1942, it was the only country in the region that had not yet been captured by the enemy, and the outcome of the 1942 military campaign largely depended on whether it could survive and stop the further spread of aggression into the interior of the continent.The Allies counted on the unconditional support of their goals by all segments of the Indian population.

Churchill, for all his disdain for compromise with the colonies, felt that it was necessary to "make a gesture" - given the pressure from both the INC and allied powers-to take steps to resolve the constitutional problem in India. At the end of February 1942, he ordered the creation of a sub-committee of the war Cabinet headed by K. Attlee, whose function was to make recommendations on Indian cases. The Sub-committee developed a "Draft Declaration" on the basis of which it was to hold talks with Indian political leaders.

The document consisted of two parts:

1. "Post-war proposals":

- immediately after the end of the war, a constitutional drafting body will be established, in other words, a Constituent Assembly;

- a part of its members will be elected by the provincial legislative assemblies formed after the war; a part will be appointed by the princes in proportion to the population of their states;

- those provinces of India that are "not ready to adopt a new constitution" are given the right "to remain outside the union and continue to exist on the same basis or to develop their own constitution as for a separate dominion..."

2. "Immediate offers in time of war":

- during the current critical period for India, the British government will have "full responsibility for its defense";

- the leaders of the leading groups of the Indian people are invited to "consult" with the empire that retained full power [Constitutional Relations ..., 1970, p. 357-358].

Meanwhile, the situation at the front has worsened. On March 8, 1942, the Japanese took Rangoon. The road to British India was opened. In the provinces located near the Indo-Burmese border, panic began. On March 11, Churchill announced in the House of Commons that a war cabinet mission was being sent to Delhi to consult with a wide range of leaders of the colony's political parties and groups on the basis of a "Draft Declaration". Prior to the start of negotiations, the document was not subject to public disclosure. Concluding his speech, the Prime Minister introduced the head of the mission to the audience: "Lord Privy Seal, Speaker of the House of Commons... expressed a desire to complete the task. He has the full confidence of His Majesty's Government and, in the highest name, will make every effort to obtain the consent of not only the Hindu majority, but also the minorities, among whom the Muslims are the most numerous" [Great Britain ..., 1942, p. 1069-1070]. It was about Richard Stafford Cripps. Henceforth, the enterprise conceived in London, its possible success or failure-everything was connected with the name of this man.

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The purpose of Cripps ' mission has been a subject of debate among historians. A significant number of Indian researchers-S. Gopal, A. Guha, V. Menon, V. Patil, M. Venkataraman, and B. Srivastava [Gopal, 1975; Guha, 1982; Menon, 1957; Patil, 1984; Venkataraman and Shrivastava, 1983] and others - are convinced that the war cabinet was interested solely in obtaining the necessary information. comprehensive assistance to the population of the colony and the mother country. In fact, the London government was not interested in the fate of the Indians and their independence. Moreover, by making partial concessions, the British hoped to regain their lost positions after the war and retain full control over their largest colony.

There is an opinion among English historians, first expressed by R. Coupland, that Great Britain did not need to involve the Indian people in cooperation with the authorities in the military issue. India was already fighting on the side of the empire, its material resources were being used for the needs of the front, and the army recruits were replenishing its ranks by 50,000 people every month. According to Coupland, the goal of Great Britain was to consistently lead India to self-government, to promote the formation of its statehood, which "fully corresponded to the government's commitment to the ideals of democracy" [Coupland, 1942, p. 5]. K. Cook and R. Moore disagree with Coupland and note that the goal of the mission was clearly to solve the problem of defense capability [Cooke, 1942; Moore, 1979].

Russian historians (A.V. Gorev, V. K. Poddubny, L. V. Pozdeyeva) consider the" plan " with the Cripps mission as a political maneuver of the British, designed to gain the support of the INC, and also as a convenient reason for its possible discrediting and defamation [Gorev, 1989; Poddubny, 1991; Pozdeyeva, 1964].

Churchill himself, in a draft of an unsent letter to US President F. D. Roosevelt, defined the mission's goals as follows:: 1) "strengthen the defense of India against the approaching invasion"; 2)" satisfy the United States, China and influential circles in England " [Churchill and Roosevelt..., 1984, p. 373].

In our opinion, the Cripps mission undertaken by Great Britain in the middle year of the war, when the final outcome of the drama was not yet obvious, pursued a whole range of goals:

"when the Empire was at war with the Axis powers, it was determined to maintain its dominance in India at all costs. By the spring of 1942, after Japan entered the war, the efforts of the administration and the military command alone were not enough. The war for the Indians was to take on a popular character, and Cripps ' mission was to raise the enthusiasm of a nation of millions, to awaken its will to resist under the auspices of the British;

- India was considered as one of the most important areas of defense in the United Nations coalition strategy. Subordinated to the needs of combat operations in Europe and the Asia-African region, Great Britain was obliged to strengthen this area as much as possible to contain the offensive rush of the Japanese armies.;

- in London, they hoped to smooth out the Anglo-Indian contradictions on the constitutional issue that undermined the stability of the colonial regime, since they believed that the outbreak of war in the Pacific and Southeast Asia made the leaders of the liberation movement more "prudent". The "draft declaration" was supposed to be a mutually acceptable basis for a compromise between the metropolis and the political parties of the colony;

- the British side intended to demonstrate its "good will" to the allies and the world community and cause a positive international response-

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high resonance. In this regard, she was satisfied with any, even the unfortunate outcome of the Cripps mission.;

- the conservative wing of the war cabinet hoped to appease Labor, trade unions, and the left-wing press, who were pushing for concessions to India.

The last few days remaining before the government delegation was sent to Delhi exposed the differences that existed between the war cabinet and the colonial authorities of India. The Viceroy was very pessimistic about the upcoming negotiations. There were two points in the draft that Lord Linlithgow could not agree to: 1) on the right of the future dominion to withdraw from the Commonwealth; 2) on the right of any province not to join the dominion, to exist in the same status or to form a separate dominion. He believed that the reaction of Hindus and Muslims to these proposals would be unpredictable, did not rule out the possibility of inter - communal clashes, and feared that the thoughts of Indians would be distracted from the most important task of the day-the fight against the Japanese.

On March 9, 1942, Linlithgow telegraphed Emery that he would "resign on the very day Churchill makes public the 'Draft Declaration '" (Glendevon, 1971, p.224). The next day, he received a reply from the Prime Minister himself, containing a literal order to "forget about resigning", as this would disorganize the colony's defense. Churchill also made it clear to the Viceroy that his concerns were premature, as there was "no complete guarantee of the desired success of the constitutional proposals "(Glendevon, 1971, p. 224). Linlithgow obeyed.

In predicting the outcome of the Delhi meetings, the Cabinet focused not on the substance of the document it had drawn up, but on the art of negotiation, which greatly increased the level of responsibility assigned to the head of mission. Cripps ' candidacy was not approved by chance. A brilliant lawyer, a shrewd politician, and a connoisseur of the Orient, he was also personally acquainted with many INC leaders, and maintained friendly relations with Jawaharlal Nehru. As a Labor member, he established himself as a supporter of the idea of self-government in India, which appealed to the figures of the liberation movement. Until January 1942, Cripps was the British Ambassador to the USSR, and he fulfilled his duties with honor by signing the Soviet-British Agreement on Joint Actions in the war against Germany. His authority among both the British and the Indians was unusually high. The government found it particularly revealing that proposals reflecting conservative policies would be presented to the Indians by one of the left-wing leaders in the cabinet.

News of the mission's impending arrival quickly reached India. The public was ambivalent. No one knew what exactly Cripps was driving, but most Indians hoped for significant changes in the country's political life. As follows from the reports of the provincial governors to the Viceroy, "the expectation has reached a climax, the first reaction is generally favorable" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 471].

The Indian National Congress expected that the British would make fundamental concessions, needing military support and not wanting to lose India. Aware of the mood in the party, the Viceroy remarked:: "Congress and Hindus are cheering today. They think they have beaten the British government and Cripps is their man" [Glendevon, 1971, p. 225]. Cripps 'name certainly meant a lot to the Congressists, but the Working Committee understood that it was not Cripps' friendship with Nehru that would play the decisive role in the negotiations, because the fate of India is not an issue that is decided at the level of personal relations.

There was an air of wariness and prejudice in the Muslim League against the British mission. Its leadership feared that new proposals for the future of India would not reflect the League's urgent demand for the creation of Pakistan. Lee-

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League leader M. A. Jinnah was concerned about such a prospect and believed that it would "lead to a catastrophe and create an overwhelming distrust of the supporters of Islam" to the state authorities. He called the selection of Cripps to lead the delegation "unfortunate and disrespectful to the League" [cit. by: Saiyid, 1945, p. 756]. Jinnah was convinced that the diplomat would act solely in the interests of the Congress and this would negatively affect the course of negotiations.

Other parties in India expected that negotiations with the Cripps mission would open up opportunities for them to implement their own policies. Hindu Mahasabha intended to defend the idea of unity and indivisibility of the Indian state. The Federation of Liberals supported the INC in demanding the creation of a national government. Sikhs and the Untouchables argued for an end to English rule and demanded guarantees for the rights of minorities.

The colonial administration was also preparing for the arrival of a government mission. The Viceroy had no doubt that Cripps would fail, but he intended to welcome him with appropriate hospitality, so as to avoid "even the shadow of suspicion that stands in his way." "Cripps believes," Lord Linlithgow reasoned, " that India will accept offers from him that it would not accept from anyone else... He would leave very soon, as soon as he lost that confidence. It would be fatal for his reputation to remain here" (Glendevon, 1971, p. 225).

With all the variety of forecasts and opinions, the expectation of change was common. For a time, the Indians became more interested in political life and became confident that in the future they would face a different fate from the fate of Singapore and Burma, occupied by the Japanese army.

* * *

On March 23, 1942, the Cripps mission arrived in Delhi. According to the protocol, it was assumed that for two days its head would be a guest of the Viceroy, and then move to his own residence and start consultations with representatives of Indian political parties. On the first day of his stay in the capital, Cripps made a statement to the press, in which he outlined the objectives of his mission. "I have come," he said, " because I have always been a great admirer and friend of India, and as a member of the war Cabinet, I want to contribute to the final settlement of the political problems that have long clouded our relations. I hope that the urgent issues will be resolved quickly and that the Indian people will willingly unite not only with Great Britain, but also with our great allies in the struggle for the freedom of all mankind" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 463].

On March 25, 1942, meetings with Indian political leaders began. The Congressional Working Committee decided that President Abul Kalam Azad and J. R. R. Tolkien would conduct the negotiations on its behalf. Nehru. Azad instructed his colleagues not to meet Cripps privately or visit his residence without prior invitation before the mission left. These precautions were taken in order to avoid incorrect estimates and speculation.

Gandhi refused to participate in official meetings. Cripps, however, immediately sent him a telegram with an invitation and soon received a reply. "The Committee has decided," Mahatma wrote, " that only its president and Pandit Nehru should communicate with you. You know my anti-war views. If, in spite of this, you want to see me, I will be glad" [Gandhi, 1979, p.518]. The British side was forced to take into account Gandhi's role and influence in Congress and society. He continued to be the de facto leader of the party, and enjoyed unquestionable authority among many millions of people.-

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the majority of the Indian population, and his opinion on the "Draft Declaration" could not but affect the course of negotiations.

Cripps did not have the authority to correct the text of the government document, but he hoped for success. He counted on his ability to persuade. However, the first meeting with representatives of INC. was a "cold shower" for him. Nehru, who was more determined than other congressmen to resist the Japanese, was extremely concerned when he read the contents of the"Draft Declaration". He had expected much more substantial proposals. The very idea of dominion made him "seasick" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 441]. In addition, he was opposed to the creation of Pakistan. On the issue of defense, Azad stated: "Congress considers it necessary to transfer to the Indians full control over the organization of the defense of their country" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 479].

Cripps responded by pointing out that" India is a strategically important part of a huge theater of operations, and decisions about the best use of a particular type of troops can only be made by the military cabinet in London " [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 479], but his interlocutors were not convinced. They made it clear that the Congress is ready to violate the Gandhian principles of nonviolence and non-participation in any wars, as it cannot ignore the reality where all countries and peoples live under different laws. The Congress was determined to organize a popular resistance to the conquerors and demanded powers. Azad pointed out to Cripps that the" Draft " should include a provision for appointing an Indian to the post of Minister of Defense [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 479]. The negotiations of the British mission from the very beginning resulted in heated discussions around the essence of the constitutional proposals.

On March 27, the head of the mission met with Gandhi, who again stressed that he did not represent the INC and expressed a purely personal point of view. His first reaction to the "Draft Declaration" was the soon - to-be widely known phrase "overdue check." Gandhi expressed confidence that the Congress will not agree to the terms of the document, because among them there are at least two absolutely unacceptable ones: the first - on the Indian principalities, the second - on the right of provinces not to join the new union. He explained that the INC would not tolerate the continued existence of " authoritarian states under the auspices of the British Empire with their right to use its armed forces to strengthen the power of princes." As for the right of provinces to determine their future status, according to Gandhi, it could serve as an "invitation to the creation of Pakistan" for Muslims [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 498-500].

Cripps tried to argue that the government's project was based on the idea of a" united India "and that the issue of non-alignment could only be raised if the Congress and the League"failed to reach agreement in the Constituent Assembly." In response to a request for advice on the best method of negotiating, Gandhi frankly told the head of mission that it would be better if he did not come to India at all "with such a banal scheme" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 500]. Thus, the most authoritative leader of the liberation movement resolutely rejected the" Draft Declaration " of the war Cabinet. He was dissatisfied with the fact that dominion status was being proposed instead of full independence, and also-after the war - that the principalities would be represented in the "constitution-making body" not by the elected representatives of the peoples, but by their rulers, and most of all by the proposed dismemberment of India.

In the leadership of the INC, the only supporter of accepting the terms of the Cripps mission was Ch. Rajagopalacharya. He was not authorized to represent the party in the negotiations, but Cripps met with him as a dissenting voice. Rajagopalacharya did not share the critical attitude of his colleagues regarding the clause on the right of non-alignment of provinces to the future dominion, as he believed that in order to eliminate Indo-mu-

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It is necessary to agree to the League's demand for the creation of an Islamic state. At the same time, he supported the majority of the Working Committee on the issue of transferring all responsibility for the defense of India to the representatives of its people. He told Cripps that he agreed to the terms of the document, but "the main difficulty is for Nehru to reach the same conclusion" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 511].

Thus, the first round of negotiations between the mission and Congress brought Cripps to the realization that, first, to a certain extent, the "nationalism" of the Congress had given way to internationalism: being obviously dissatisfied with the part of the "Draft Declaration" that dealt with post-war proposals and guaranteed India dominion status as a maximum, he still he considered the main task of the day to organize a repulse to the Japanese invasion. Secondly, in order to reach an agreement, it became necessary to adjust the text of the "Draft" to take into account the principled position of the congressists on the military issue. Third, the outcome will depend on whether the war cabinet presents its emissary with a field of maneuver.

* * *

The arrival of the British mission coincided with the Muslim League's "Pakistan Day". During the demonstrations, Jinnah openly expressed his concerns about Cripps ' pro-Congress sympathies and warned the government not to try to put pressure on the League and create discord in its ranks. However, when he met Cripps, he was quite surprised that the terms of the" Project " formally allowed for the possibility of a partition of India. Jinnah immediately became interested in the actual technique of separation, the fate of Bengal and Punjab, and the procedure for their secession from the Indian provinces. Their second meeting, on March 28, convinced Cripps that "the League Committee has already adopted, in principle, the 'Draft Declaration' "[Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 512]. He told Jinnah that if not only the League but also the INC agreed to the scheme, he would "ask the Viceroy to involve them in the formation of a new Executive Council" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 512].

Talks with Hindu Mahasabha leaders V. D. Savarkar and B. S. Munji, liberals T. B. Sapru and M. R. Jayakar were held in heated discussions about preserving the unity of India and the danger of its dismemberment. But Cripps remained confident that they would not go so far as to reject the "scheme"on this basis. The House of Princes insisted that the principalities retain their special status and their previous relationship with the London Government. The head of mission explained to them that with the emergence of the new Indian Union, "the relations of the principalities will be established not with the British cabinet, but with the executive power of the dominion" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 510]. Sikh leader Tara Singh and B. R. Ambedkar, who represented the Untouchables, strongly rejected the document. In their opinion, he "created conditions for the division of India even before independence... and he demonstrated that the British see only two parties involved in the transfer of power-the Congress and the Muslim League " [India..., 1942, p. 22-23].

So Cripps got acquainted with the views of political parties and organizations in India. Despite the tensions that had arisen on various issues, he did not lose hope of bringing the negotiations to a successful conclusion. On March 27, 1942, Cripps received instructions from the Secretary of State for India and Burma, Emery, to proceed with the publication of the Government's constitutional proposals. "You should make a statement," Emery wrote, " to explain to the Indian public the nature and significance of the declaration. This will help to avoid gross fraud. It is necessary to clearly emphasize the idea that the proposed status of the dominion is essentially equivalent to the status of the Earth.-

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the neck of your own country... and it does not detract from the role of India among the free nations of the world " [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 508].

On March 30, 1942, the" Draft Declaration " of the War Cabinet was published in India, Great Britain, and the United States. On the same day, Cripps made a radio appearance outlining the contents of the document and held a press conference. During his speech, he noted that London wants to see India similar to other dominions of the British Commonwealth. Referring to the military issue, Cripps stressed that keeping the Cabinet of Ministers responsible for organizing the defense of India does not exclude "the consultative participation of the Executive Council under the Viceroy in solving related tasks." The head of the mission meant that if an agreement is reached in the negotiations, political parties will get a certain number of seats in the Council and will be able to control the work of the military department to a certain extent. At a press conference, he allowed himself, addressing the Indians, to say: "You can turn the Executive Council into a cabinet" [India's Struggle ..., 1962, p. 594, 596]. Cripps had clearly overstepped his authority, which meant that he had already agreed to the creation of a national government during the war.

The Viceroy and Commander-in-Chief of the Anglo-Indian colonial Army, A. Wavell, were the first to react to Cripps ' words. Lord Linlithgow considered the formation and dissolution of the Executive Council solely his prerogative. Wavell, on the other hand, did not allow the idea of appointing an Indian to the post of Defense minister. The only thing he could agree to was the admission of Indians to consultative participation in the control of secondary issues. They contacted Churchill and testified to their fundamental differences with Cripps in their approach to the Indian problem. The striking discrepancy between the head of mission's promises and the specific conditions of the document he brought raised doubts among Indian political parties: did Cripps deliberately keep silent about the most important points of the proposals from the very beginning of the negotiations, or, sensing the possibility of failure, makes promises that he was not authorized to make?

Cripps made every effort to ensure that an agreement was reached between the parties. What really motivated him? Perhaps he intended to add another victory to his brilliant track record (which, in particular, included his success in the diplomatic field in the USSR, his "mantle of Moscow" [Great Britain..., 1942, p. 872]). He knew that he was considered the second Prime Minister in his homeland, and that if he succeeded in his Indian mission, he would have even broader and more attractive prospects. Nor can we exclude the possibility that, as a Labour leader, he set himself the goal of finding "more humane methods of managing the colonies" and, in the case of India's self-government, gave wishful thinking, believing that arch-conservatives like Churchill, Emery, Linlithgow shared his zeal. As a result, he became a hostage to their policies, because, unlike him, the right in the military cabinet was satisfied with any, even negative, result of Delhi meetings.

On April 1, 1942, Cripps applied to the Prime Minister for permission to allow the national leaders of India to control the war department. He explained the move by saying that it was "an urgent need", since "anti-British sentiment is spreading with alarming speed", and without fulfilling this condition, "Congress will not respond to the proposals" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 600]. On the same day, Churchill informed him that he could not make such a decision without consulting the government, and the INC Working Committee rejected the "Draft Declaration" and only at Cripps ' urgent request refrained from publishing the relevant resolution.

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In order to find a way out of the impasse in the Anglo-Indian negotiations, Azad and Nehru held consultations with A. Wavell on April 4-7 at the initiative of the head of the mission. In this connection, Churchill telegraphed Cripps: "The Cabinet approved your idea of inviting the congressists to the commander to discuss the issue of defense and invite them to formulate their views. But we need to know exactly what the Congressists want now before you decide to accept their terms" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 613].

During the consultations, Azad and Nehru expressed the idea that an Indian should become a member of the Executive Council responsible for defense, and the commander-in-chief should be an "executive adviser". Wavell flatly rejected this suggestion, Linlithgow and Emery immediately agreed with the commander: "I would not like to put a spoke in the wheels... but India is now the key to imperial defense, and the transfer of this key to the inept hands of the Indians can lead to fatal consequences" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 642]. Thus, the mission's second attempt to reach an agreement with Congress failed.

* * *

The Allied Powers closely followed the progress of the British government delegation. A March 31, 1942 American public opinion poll showed that 78% of respondents are familiar with the content of the Cripps Formula and 41% are in favor of granting India dominion status already during the war [Hess, 1971, p.45]. US President F. D. Roosevelt appointed the head of the US technical mission, Colonel L. Johnson, as his personal representative in Delhi. Johnson asked the State Department if he could cooperate with the liberation movement, and was told that "he could, but with the greatest caution" [cit. by Jauhri, 1970, p. 59]. The Colonel knew Cripps, and at his suggestion they worked together to try to save the negotiations from failure for the third time. Johnson asked Roosevelt to turn to Churchill, but was refused. The president, who has repeatedly tried to influence the implacable Tory, chose to remain a neutral observer. He was constrained by the rigid framework of a military alliance with Great Britain and did not want to aggravate relations with his partner. It was then that Johnson suggested that Churchill apparently wished for Cripps ' mission to fail.

The result of the joint efforts of Stafford Cripps and Lewis Johnson was a new document-a draft guide to the defense of India, which went down in history as the "Cripps-Johnson formula". Its authors took into account the requirements of the INC and Wavell's opinion and distributed the powers of the military department between an Indian member of the Executive Council and the commander - in - Chief, for which two separate departments were created-defense and military. Congressists joined in the discussion of the "formula". Nehru subsequently wrote: "By April 9, there were excellent chances to reach an agreement - about 75% "[cit. by Brecher, 1959, p. 279]. In developing their project, Cripps and Johnson consulted with some of the Viceroy's entourage, but not with the Viceroy himself, which again provoked Linlithgow's displeasure. The Viceroy wondered why the head of mission continued to use the term "national Government" when the original "Draft Declaration" did not use it. He didn't trust Cripps, and now he wasn't even trying to hide it.

At the crucial moment of the third round of negotiations, Cripps received instructions from London not to go beyond his authority and strictly adhere to the letter of the government project. In addition, the war cabinet demanded an explanation of what is meant by "a national government that will consist entirely of Indians" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 567]. Cripps didn't say anything.

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I expected such a display of distrust, especially at a time when the last hope of reaching an agreement with Congressional leaders was slipping away. In desperation, he wrote a personal letter to Nehru asking for help: "Let me address you as someone who has the burden of making a final decision... We must and can lead our peoples to friendship and cooperation. The chance given to us now will not be repeated... The right to lead the party, which you have, can only ensure success... I know what your qualities and abilities are, and I ask you to put them into practice" [Nehru, 1960, p.478]. But this time Nehru remained uncompromising. Congress did not agree to an agreement, because the terms of the "Draft Declaration" regarding immediate proposals during the war remained unchanged.

Cripps wasn't the only one who caused the war cabinet's dissatisfaction. In London, Johnson's activity was being watched with annoyance. The American ambassador to Great Britain, H. Hopkins, had to explain that the colonel was acting "as a private individual, and not as a personal representative of the president... and it is to Cripps 'advantage to use the name of F. D. Roosevelt to give more weight to his plan" (Sherwood, 1948, p.524). The US government chose to disavow Johnson.

So Stafford Cripps came close to the ultimate failure of his mission. Having found a successful compromise with political parties, including the Congress, he failed to implement his plan. "Programmed" by the Churchill government to defeat, with no diplomatic maneuvering, Cripps found himself in the role of a delegate without the right to vote. As Gandhi noted when predicting the outcome of the negotiations, " ... Sir Stafford is a very good man, but he serves a vicious system - British imperialism. He hopes to improve it, but in the end, it is the system that will remake him" (Gandhi, 1979, p. 440).

* * *

On April 11, 1942, the INC Working Committee issued a resolution refusing to accept the terms of the War Cabinet mission. The Committee stated that this action was a "forced measure of the British", concerned not with the granting of independence to India, but with the "most severe military crisis". He pointed out the limited nature of the "long-term" proposals, which do not take into account the demands of the Indians for the creation of a national government. The resolution specifically stated the INC's negative attitude to presenting the provinces with the right of non-alignment with the future Indian Union ,which "threatens the unity of India". In addition, the Committee could not agree that "the defense of the country in any case remained under British control" [Constitutional Relations..., 1970, p. 747].

After waiting for a decision of the Congress, the Muslim League also rejected the "Draft Declaration", justifying its not entirely logical step by saying that"in the interests of the peace and happiness of Hindus and Muslims, it is unfair to force them to create an Indian Union consisting of two nations, and this is the essence of the government's proposals." Constitutional proposals were also rejected by the Hindu Mahasabha, liberals, Sikhs, and "untouchables" [India ..., 1942, p. 18 - 19,20 - 23].

As soon as it became known about the failure of the negotiations, Churchill sent Cripps a telegram in which he summarized:: "You have done everything that is humanly possible, and your will, perseverance and resourcefulness have proved to the whole world how great is the desire of the British side to reach an agreement" [Churchill, 1978, p.217]. The Cripps mission had no choice but to return home ingloriously.

The failure of the Anglo-Indian talks caused deep disappointment in China and the United States. Chiang Kai-shek saw what happened in Delhi as a personal setback. Even Roosevelt took the liberty of insisting that Churchill postpone Cripps ' departure and "pre-empt-

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made a last effort" [Churchill and Roosevelt..., 1984, p. 373]. On April 12, 1942, he wrote to the Prime Minister: "In the United States, there is an opinion that the crisis in the negotiations arose from the unwillingness of the British government to recognize the right of the Indian people to self-government, despite the willingness of the Indians to entrust the competent British leadership with technical and military control over the defense of their country. I remain convinced that if all groups that make up Indian society are given the opportunity to create a national government similar to our own... a solution will be found. If you take this step, even after Cripps fails, it will become clear that the British government really did everything in its power, and the responsibility for the failure of the negotiations lies only with the Indians themselves "[Churchill, 1978, p. 218-219]. In his memoirs, Churchill described Roosevelt's proposal as follows:: "I am grateful that this act of madness was not possible" (Churchill, 1978, p. 219).

What are the reasons for the failure and consequences of the British mission to India? The first attempt to analyze them was made by Stafford Cripps himself. On his return to London, he presented a progress report to the House of Commons. In his opinion, the main result of the visit was a demonstration of the good will of the cabinet, "which took the trouble to develop a declaration and sent one of its ministers to negotiate with representatives of the Indian people." The reasons that prevented the mission from reaching an agreement, in his opinion, were:

1) "threat of Japanese invasion" as an unfavorable background;

2) "anti-British sentiments" as a result of the defeat of the British in Southeast Asia and the disorienting propaganda of the enemy;

3) inter-communal contradictions in the approach to the question of the status of the dominion and the existence of the idea of "two nations - two Indies" [Great Britain..., 1942, p. 826-832].

Thus, the main actor of the failed mission blamed the fateful circumstances associated with the war, as well as religious divisions and Indo-Muslim political contradictions.

To. Attlee, under whose direct supervision the constitutional proposals were developed, also referred to inter-communal differences, calling them a "stumbling block" (Attlee, 1954, p. 181). The British Prime Minister was even more categorical. Blaming INC for the failed agreement, he frankly stated:: "I am absolutely satisfied - we have done everything in our power" [Churchill, 1978, p. 632-633].

Foreign and domestic historians, analyzing the failure of the Cripps mission, pay attention to various factors.

If we talk about English historians, then, for example, K. Cooke [Cooke, 1957] and R. Coupland [Coupland, 1942] believe that Gandhi, who rejected the "Draft Declaration", was responsible for the failure of negotiations. Cook writes: "Cripps was too close to success for Gandhi to like it... and he powerfully destroyed everything" (Cooke, 1957, p. 294). R. Moore takes a much broader view of the problem. He believes that "Cripps' mission was crushed by the millstones of Churchill's conservatism and Congressional nationalism." Moore emphasizes that the prime minister did not provide adequate support to his emissary and thus doomed him to defeat. The leaders of the INC, and especially Nehru, whom Cripps considered "allies", betrayed their "common cause" [Moore, 1979, p. 122, 126]. G. Hodson, on the contrary, argues that Churchill is not responsible for the outcome of the negotiations. "The fault lies with Cripps. He had not established a proper understanding with the Viceroy, and he had also made his difficult task more difficult by the very way he negotiated. At the initial stage, he reached the limit of promises, and in the end, when discussing the details, it turned out that he had nothing more to offer" [Hodson, 1985, p.19].

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What is common in the approaches of English historians, both conservative and objectivist-critical, despite the well-known polarity of their judgments, is the desire to identify a certain figure of a politician who is endowed (or not endowed) with certain qualities and therefore fatally influenced the results of Cripps ' mission.

The Indian side blames "British imperialism", which did not want to part with political power in the colony. Historians of the liberation movement are convinced that all parties in India, especially the INC, "went far enough" in cooperation with the authorities in organizing defense. A. Guha emphasizes that the Congress, in order not to interfere with the organization of repelling Japanese aggression, since December 1941, "practically ignored Gandhi", And it is not the fault of the Congress that "Cripps left with nothing" [Guha, 1982, p. 497]. J. Nehru [Nehru, 1988] and G. Mukherjee [Mookerjee, 1974] reject the British thesis about Gandhi's "alleged" pressure on the INC Working Committee at the time of the decision. "The real reason, "Mukherjee points out," is the question of transferring power to the national government "[Mookerjee, 1974, p. 189]. A. Prasad believes that "the responsibility for the failure lies entirely with the Churchill cabinet, as well as with the Viceroy" [Prasad, 1958, p. 23].

Russian historians agree that the diplomatic action of Churchill's war cabinet owes its unfortunate ending to the fact that the INC's demand to transfer responsibility for organizing the country's defense to the Indian people was not met.: "The final break occurred due to the refusal of the British side to recognize the partial control of Indian political parties over the military affairs of India" [Poddubny, 1991, p.27].

In our view, the Cripps mission failed for a number of reasons:

1.Objective circumstances did not contribute to its success. The prerequisites for the collapse of colonial empires and the creation of new, sovereign national states were maturing. The Indian Liberation Movement has reached the level of organization where the fundamental condition for further cooperation with Great Britain - the immediate granting of full independence and the formation of a national cabinet of ministers-has become on the agenda. For such a turn of events, for a compromise adequate to the challenges of the time, Churchill's war cabinet (whose hard-ness became proverbial) was not ready.

2. The Second World War, directly or indirectly, presented all organizations and parties with the problem of the need to correlate universal, humanistic goals for the defeat of fascism with narrow national tasks, no matter how large-scale they may seem within a single country, colony or semi-colony. Indian leaders, especially congressists, were not able to rise to the level of global thinking in politics, but to consistently show flexibility and practical striving for consensus in negotiations to the logical end.

3. The individual-oriented liberation movement of India was once again influenced by Gandhi, who rejected the "Draft Declaration".

4. The Labour faction of the British Parliament and Labour ministers did not show any support for Cripps, preferring to maintain relative agreement in the coalition war cabinet rather than split it over the Indian issue.

5. Non-aggressive political organizations in India, including the Muslim League, did not take a clear position on the "Project" and focused on community or local priorities. They did not represent an independent force in the negotiations - for a possible solution of the issue without the INC.

The consequences of the Cripps mission's failure were significant. It seems that then a real chance was lost to preserve the unity of India in the post-war constitutional reorganization. The right to missile defense declared in the "Draft Declaration" -

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The right to self-determination assumed the possibility of non-entry into the dominion of some provinces and the formation of Pakistan, but in 1942, in those specific historical conditions, with the degree of influence of the Congress (and the weakness of the League) in Indian society, it was practically impossible. The Congress will never receive broader promises from London in the future, and the League's social base and the severity of Indo-Muslim contradictions will increase many times over.

The outcome of the negotiations led to an aggravation of Anglo-Indian relations. Public opinion in India was inclined to believe that the war cabinet had sent Cripps to Delhi on an obviously impossible mission, in order to give the world the impression that the Indians were incapable of governing the country. Anti-British sentiment increased markedly, which was especially dangerous against the backdrop of Japan's military successes. INC President Abul Kalam Azad noted with concern that " most people are convinced of the impending defeat of the British, moreover, they want their defeat, without thinking about the consequences of the conquest of the country by a new aggressor "[Azad, 1961, p. 123]. The enemy was at the gate, and the prospects of finding a basis for Indo-British military cooperation were no longer there it existed. India was heading for the "August Revolution"...

list of literature

Azad A. K. India seeks Freedom, Moscow, 1961.

Gorev A.V. Mahatma Gandhi, Moscow, 1989.

Poddubny V. K. Questions of Foreign Policy and international relations in the ideology and activities of the Indian National Congress in 1917-1947. Dissertation for the degree of Doctor of Historical Sciences. Moscow, 1991.

Pozdeyeva L. V. Anglo-American relations during the Second World War. 1939-1945. M, 1964.

Attlee С. As It Happened. L., 1954.

Brecher M. Nehru: A Political Biography. L., 1959.

Churchill W. S. The Second World War. Vol. 4. Boston, 1978.

Churchill and Roosevelt. The Complete Correspondence / Ed. by W. F. Kimball. Vol. 1. Princeton, 1984.

Constitutional Relations between Britain and India. The Transfer of Power (1942 - 7) / Ed. by N. Mansergh and P. Moon. Vol. I. L., 1970.

Cooke With. The Life of Richard Stafford Cripps. L., 1957.

Coupland R. The Cripps Mission. L., 1942.

Gandhi M. K. The Collected Works of Mahatma Gandhi. Vol. 75. New Delhi, 1979.

Glendevon J. The Viceroy at Bay. Lord Linlithgow in India. 1936 - 1943. L., 1971.

Great Britain. Parliamentary Debates. House of Commons. Official Report. Vols. 378, 379. L., 1942.

Gopal S. Jawaharlal Nehru. A Biography. L., 1975.

Guha A. India's Struggle Quarter of a Century. 1921 - 1946. Pt 2. New Delhi, 1982.

Hess J. America Encounters India. 1941 - 1947. L., 1971.

Hodson H. V. The Great Divide: Britain - India - Pakistan. Karachi, 1985.

India. (Lord Privy Seal's Mission). Statement and Draft Declaration. L., 1942.

India's Struggle for Freedom. Select Documents and Sources / Ed. by J. S. Sharma. Vol. 1. Delhi, 1962.

Jauhri R. C. American Diplomacy and Independence for India. Bombay, 1970.

Menon V. P. The Transfer of Power in India. Bombay, 1957.

Mookerjee G. K. History of Indian National Congress (1832 - 1947). Delhi, 1974.

Moore R. J. Churchill, Cripps and India, 1939 - 1945. Oxford, 1979.

Nehru J. A Bunch of Old Letters. N. Y., 1960.

Nehru J. Discovery of India. New Delhi, 1988.

Patil V. T. Jawaharlal Nehru and the Cripps Mission. Delhi, 1984.

Prasad A. Indian Revolt of 1942. Delhi, 1958.

Saiyid M. H. Mohammad Ali Jinnah. A Political Study. Lahore, 1945.

Sherwood R. Roosevelt and Churchil. N. Y., 1948.

Tara Chand. History of Freedom Movement in India. Vol. 4. Bombay, 1972.

Venkataraman M. S., Shrivastava B. K. Roosevelt. Gandhi. Churchill: America and the Last Phase of India's Freedom Struggle. Delhi, 1983.

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