The state, for its own self-preservation, is obliged to develop the necessary mechanisms for development and ensuring the basic needs of its population - first of all, national security. Their effectiveness is tested in the success of solving problems related to ensuring the basic national interests: territorial integrity, sovereignty, stability of the internal political regime, and socio-economic development. The mechanism of ensuring national security and one of its constituent subsystems - internal political security-is a system of means and actions used by the authorities to achieve and maintain a certain degree of protection of the state, society and the individual, in which real external and internal threats to the national interests and values of the country are eliminated or seriously limited, and the inertia of stable
India does not have a national security concept formulated in a single document, but certain mechanisms have been developed and are being used quite successfully to maintain not only the viability of a single state, but also the country's progressive development as a stable democracy.
The mechanism of administrative reorganization of states acts as one of the most successful mechanisms for stabilizing political life in the regions when interethnic conflicts escalate. The reasons for the application and scope of the administrative reorganization mechanism are closely related to the evolution of the state's governance system and other constitutional mechanisms (the institution of governorship, presidential rule, state of emergency) used by the State to localize hotbeds of ethnic conflicts that pose a threat to the national security of India. This analysis allows us to trace the system of political means used by the state to counteract the spread and deepening of ethnic conflicts, as well as partially reveal the direction of evolution of the state system itself .1
India's political system emerged as a synthesis of traditional and modern. Therefore, the development of mechanisms for ensuring national security requires close attention to the problems of continuity and traditionalism, which are characteristic of the public administration system, in the context of modernization in the sphere of power and socio-economic relations. On the one hand, the country's internal security is based on the stability of the political regime, which contains mechanisms for internal development through the gradual expansion and deepening of democracy. This makes it possible, without radically changing and breaking the existing political system, to identify, fend off and prevent the emergence of hotbeds of social tension by including various strata of multi-confessional, multi-ethnic Indian society as active subjects of political life and governance. On the other hand, since the first years of independence in
1 Social and caste conflicts, which are often a source of destabilization, are not considered in this paper.
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Clashes between various ethnic and confessional groups persist in the country, and it is this factor that has the most significant impact on ensuring the internal political security of India. In some hotbeds of tension, the situation has been relatively stabilized; in other areas, periodic exacerbations of ethnic and religious contradictions that fuel separatist movements pose the main threat to the internal security of the state and citizens, as well as to the territorial integrity of India.
Interethnic and religious conflicts in modern India are a type of social conflict that is the result of a profound transformation of socio-economic relations and the modernization of traditional society with its stable and little-changed hierarchy. Forms of interethnic and religious conflict have become prevalent in India for the following reasons:
1. Features of the historical development of the Hindustan region (the existence of independent states on the territory of the peninsula for thousands of years, and a single state-the Republic of India - within its modern borders is only 60 years old);
2. Existence of different religions (value systems, lifestyles)within a single civilization;
3. The existence of linguistic (ethnic) differences. Despite the trend towards the formation of a single Indian nation, the process of forming a sub-national identity proceeds faster, and ties within an ethnic group or religious community are stronger. This contributes to political mobilization, the promotion of group-wide demands, and the use of ethnic or religious factors by the elite. Political parties in regions are formed on an ethnic basis, which attracts electorates from all strata of a particular ethnic group, regardless of their socio-economic status;
4. The persistence of acute economic development imbalances in multiethnic and multi-confessional India, which often coincide with religious and ethnic boundaries of communities. Thus, the Muslim community is largely represented by recent Hindus who converted to Islam in order to improve their social status (in the past - Dalits). Inequality persists in the development of large areas of the country;
5. Changes in the ethno-demographic situation in various areas with traditional tribal populations due to migration from other regions of India and neighboring countries. This contributes to the exclusion of traditionally dominant groups of the region from resources (which is especially typical for North-Eastern India);
6. Erosion of the system of traditional distribution of resources and privileges due to the modernization of socio-economic relations, which leads to a decrease in the role of previously dominant religious and ethnic groups.
For these reasons, there is still a high potential for inter-communal conflict in India, which has been undermining the stable development of the state throughout the years of independence and is one of the main threats to national security.
When analyzing the factor of interethnic conflict, we can identify certain indicators (indicators of changes in the situation in the region), the development of which has the greatest impact on the state of internal political security when the threat of interethnic conflicts increases (Table 1). Changes in the status of these indicators imply the use of certain mechanisms on the part of the authorities to maintain the stability and effectiveness of the management system, which is the basis for ensuring internal political security.
Based on the tasks set, the table contains indicators that influence the development of the situation in the direction of deepening interethnic conflict. Each such indicator is associated with a specific mechanism developed by the state authorities and applied when a change in the indicator means a threat. The furs themselves-
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Table 1
Indicators influencing the provision of internal political security in the development of interethnic conflicts
National security subsystem |
Indicators |
Mechanisms |
Effectiveness |
Internal political security-a factor: interethnic conflict |
1. The system of governance of the country (destabilization of the dual system of governance, both federal and unitary according to development trends) |
Constitutional issues : 1. The Governor's Institute 2. Presidential Board Actual data: 4. Redistribution of power, reform of the management system in the direction of greater state autonomy 5. Regionalism 6. Coalition government |
1. Reduced efficiency, reform requirements 2. Reduced efficiency, reform requirements 3. Reduced efficiency, reform requirements 4. Efficiency improvement, further development 5. Efficiency improvement, further development 6. Efficiency improvement, further development |
Laws are conventionally divided into two groups: constitutional ones, which are legally fixed in the Basic Law of the Republic and are a legitimate form of interference by the center in the internal affairs of subjects in the event of a threat of violation of the constitutional order; and actual ones, which have developed in the process of developing the management system through compromise decisions of the federal government while strengthening the role of regional elites in the political and economic structure of the state.
Thus, the following feature can be traced: mechanisms that strengthen the centralization of the management system are legally formed, but their effectiveness in the current form is reduced. On the contrary, the mechanisms that have actually developed in the course of the evolution of the state system, resulting in the strengthening of federality, are more effective in solving the tasks of ensuring national security in the event of a threat of interethnic conflict.
STATE MANAGEMENT SYSTEM AND REGIONALISM
The internal security of such a multi-ethnic and multi-religious state as India is largely based on the effectiveness of the internal management system, based on taking into account and balancing the needs of various communities. If the balance is disturbed or the traditional foundations of the organization of sub-ethnicities and religious communities are not taken into account, aggravated by the disproportions of socio-economic modernization, the reasons for the expansion of the conflict zone and the radicalization of participants are more related to internal causes of governance inefficiency.
The state system and the system of government is elaborated in detail in the Constitution of India, which over the course of 55 years has been amended about a hundred times, correcting and supplementing primarily the system of power sharing between the center and the states. The vector of evolution of the constitutional system for a long time was aimed at further centralization of government.
The contradictions of the Indian state system of governance lie in the overlap of multidirectional processes taking place in Indian society and the political system, leading to the strengthening of regionalism, the cohesion of sub-ethnicities and the strengthening of the powers of the center (through emergency legislation and changes in the Constitution). This becomes one of the reasons for the emergence of confrontations between
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the center and strengthened local elites that make up the core of regional parties.
Even during the colonial period in India, the danger of excessive centralization of government was clearly identified. However, the Indian Federation has been a state with a strong centralized power since its foundation, which gives reason for researchers to define the state structure of India as "pseudo-federal" or "unitary in emergency situations" 2 .
Centralization of power was undoubtedly necessary for the implementation of radical socio-economic transformations throughout the country, in conditions of underdeveloped and uneven development of regions. Historical features also played a role: during the colonial period, territorial division was carried out without taking into account natural cultural and ethnic borders. By the time of the formation of the state, ethnic identity among many ethnic groups was at the stage of formation, and there was no harsh confrontation with larger ethnic groups. Objectively, the reform of the management system should have been gradual and extended over time.
As time passes, regional economic development imbalances continue to deepen, leading to increased tensions not only in the chronically contested areas of Jammu and Kashmir and North-East India (NEI), but also across the country. According to M. V. Pylee, an Indian expert on the problems of federalism, the basis of the "center-states" policy for the union government was the point of view, according to which the interests of ensuring national security are a priority in relation to the need to preserve the federal nature of the state system [Pylee, 1977, p.695-696].
Centralization and suppression of the desire to strengthen autonomy are supported not only by economic necessity, but also by the ideological justification of the need to form a single nation within the peninsula. The idea of a united nation is enshrined in the preamble of the Constitution and is supported by a list of basic duties of citizens. According to the Constitution, joining the Indian Union was voluntary, but once a state is part of the country, it cannot secede.
The unitary bias of the Indian Federation is enshrined in the Basic Law through the institution of a state of emergency (Articles 352-360), but it is important to note that a large tendency towards centralization in governance is also evident in normal times. Although many issues are placed under the jurisdiction of state governments, all strategic areas are under the control of the center. Issues of ensuring "internal law and order" are transferred to the responsibility of the states, but if its state threatens national interests, then the resolution of the conflict situation automatically passes to the union authorities. Therefore, the legitimacy of the center's intervention in conflict zones is guaranteed by the Basic Law of the Republic.
It should be noted that the distribution of power of the center and the states on the issue of administrative reorganization of borders is important. Given the urgency of the territorial issue, especially the coincidence of administrative borders with the lines of ethnic settlement, one of the strategic issues for the survival of the state about the borders of the subjects of the Federation is completely under the jurisdiction of the center. According to Articles 3-4 of the Constitution, states are not inviolable units. The Federal Parliament may carry out a reorganization on the basis of an ordinary law passed by an ordinary majority. The President sets a certain time limit within which the state Legislature can send its own opinion.
2 The unitary nature of the Indian Constitution was emphasized both by one of the founders of the Constitution, B. D. Ambedkar, and by Indian scholars [see, for example, Basu Durga Das, 1986].
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opinion on the reorganization, but the President is not obliged to adjust the decision of the center based on the recommendations of the state (Article 4, paragraph 2).
The Constitution of India provides for three levels of political power. First, the federal system, which includes the following institutions: the Union Parliament, the Prime Minister, state legislatures, and state Chief Ministers. Second, a unitary administrative system: the President of India, state governors, the Indian Administrative Service, district collectors. Third, local self-government is also at three levels: villages-tahsils-districts. First-level government institutions are elective, both at the federal and state levels. At the second level, appointments are made by the central authority. This level of government is a guarantee of the country's unity.
The institution of gubernatorial rule can legitimately be considered as a mechanism of constitutional control of the central government over the state government in order to prevent the penetration of separatist forces into power and quickly localize internal unrest. For these purposes, the Governor, according to the Constitution, is given a fairly wide range of powers. The governor is the third key figure (along with the Prime Minister and the President) in implementing the mechanism of presidential rule in the states. B. D. Ambedkar defined presidential rule as the norm of ensuring security, but only as an extreme measure, when all other mechanisms for normalizing the internal life of the state have already been exhausted. The introduction of direct presidential rule was and remains today one of the most widely used mechanisms for the functioning of the governance system in a multi-ethnic country with a form of parliamentary democracy developed in the Constitution, but it is also one of the most controversial, as it is a form of complete termination of local elected governance institutions.
According to the Constitution, presidential rule means the transfer to the President of the Republic of "all or some functions" of the executive branch of the state: the government, the governor, any institutions or authorities in the state, accompanied by the suspension of the provisions of the Constitution in relation to any institution or authority in the state, except for the judiciary. The powers of the State Legislature are exercised by the Union Parliament (Section 356 (1)). In order to issue a proclamation on the introduction of presidential rule, the President must receive a report from the Governor, but he can also make a decision alone if a situation arises in which the administration cannot be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Constitution (Article 356(1)). Such a proclamation may be repealed or amended by a subsequent proclamation (Article 356 (2)). The introduction of presidential rule requires no other grounds than the president's "conviction" of violating the implementation of the Constitution, which undoubtedly gives the central government the widest possible control over all subjects of the Federation, including the possibility of abuse in the interests of countering opposition-minded forces in the region.
Presidential rule is a temporary form of direct influence imposed by the center for a certain period of time, most often used in areas of separatist movements (Punjab), ethnic clashes (Assam) or to remove political forces that are not pleasing to the center (Kerala). Presidential rule can be imposed for a fixed term, after which elections to the state legislature are called. In the first 17 years of the Constitution of India (1950 - 1966), presidential rule was introduced ten times, and since 1967 to the present - almost 100 times. This method was most often used in the 1970s and 1980s, when the mechanism of inter-party agreements was not developed, and regional parties did not yet play a role in political life
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key roles. Under these conditions, the center could resort to emergency measures and direct interference in the affairs of the subjects almost without damage to itself.
At the same time, since the late 1970s, the development of the country's political life has been closely linked to the process called regionalism in historiography, which is, in fact, the political, economic and social embodiment of the forces of local nationalism. The administrative reform of 1956, when the formation of sub-ethnic groups based on the indigenous ethnic group in the states went faster than the formation of a single Indian identity, became a definite point of reference for turning regionalism into the central process of the country's political life. Moreover, regionalism is a movement of the moderate part of political leaders, based not on the demand for secession, but on taking into account local needs, ethnic and religious history, and local socio-economic problems, expressed, as a rule, in the program of greater autonomy.
In the Russian scientific literature, the analysis of the theory of regionalism is most consistently presented in the works of A. A. Prazauskas. In his opinion, ethnic conflicts in Eastern countries, including India, are largely the result of excessive centralization, authoritarian governance, in which the interests of small ethnic groups are not realized through political institutions. Regionalism was initially a product of the trend of an evolutionary change in the state structure of India towards greater federality, strengthening the autonomy of state subjects, and the inclusion of opposition regional forces in the national political system. On the basis of regionalism, a system of balance of power between the center and the states began to be developed over time.
Thus, regionalism can legitimately be described as an actual (as opposed to legal, constitutional), historically determined mechanism for maintaining stability and effective functioning of a multiethnic and multi-confessional state as a single whole. It allows the moderate wing of political forces within the existing system to implement demands for greater autonomy and forces the center to use emergency powers more cautiously and with restraint. This not only prevents the expansion of separatism, but also contributes to a certain improvement in the governance system through the constant dialogue of regional and national parties, which is necessary for the formation of electoral alliances. The rise to power of moderate regional parties in separatist states means a relative normalization of the internal situation and the rejection of radical demands and terror by the leading regional groups (for example, the moderate faction of the Sikh Akali Dal party came to power in Punjab in the 1985 state legislative elections).
The political development of regionalism lays the foundation for the stability of Indian democracy in the new multi-party environment, as it has become the basis on which the mechanism of inter-party agreements has been formed, making gradual adjustments to the existing system of governance. During the 1970s, the Indian political system experienced a crisis caused by the existence of one-party rule in the center, with a pronounced tendency to strengthen local nationalism and regional parties. In the absence of a mechanism for creating strong inter-party alliances and traditions of coalition government, the central government, represented by the Indian National Congress, preferred to strengthen authoritarian methods of influencing the regions, which ended with the introduction of emergency rule (1975-1977). But the emergency measures of the center led to the opposite result: from the end of the 1970s, the strengthening of regional parties became an irreversible process, and the INC lost its status as the dominant party. To date, India has created a structure of mechanisms based on constitutional norms, which allows you to quickly localize pockets of opposition in the region.-
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nakh. However, due to certain discrediting of these extraordinary measures and due to a change in the paradigm of the "center-states" relations, the effective functioning of the governance system requires a revision of the nature of relations between the federal government and regional forces in the direction of greater federality and autonomy of subjects, which will require a detailed modernization of control mechanisms, primarily the institution of governorship and presidential
With the changing political balance of power (from a de facto one-party regime to a coalition government), the institutions of the governor and the President, as a direct intervention in the political life of the states, are increasingly criticized by the Indian public and especially regional forces.
On the one hand, this is due to the fact that in the 1990s, during the period of coalition rule and alliances with leading regional parties, emergency measures became more complicated. The possibilities of using the institution of presidential rule for political purposes have become more limited. In the conditions of constant "electoral competition" between the Bharatiya Janata parties and the INC, alliances with regional parties play the most significant role, so gross interference in state affairs through the displacement of regional power can lead to a regrouping of alliances and, consequently, a loss of votes and a possible transfer of power to the second party. Centralization and increased emergency measures are somehow destabilizing the Indian political system and hindering the development of a new style of center-state relations. In the political life of India, there is a peculiar law of dependence between the power of pressure of the federal government and the policy of the regional elite in the states in relation to the center, noted by A. A. Prazauskas: "The sword of Damocles of presidential rule... It increases the suspicious attitude of non-congressional governments towards the center, encouraging them to seek greater state autonomy, and exacerbates the problem between the federal government and the states" (Prazauskas, 1990, p.198).
On the other hand, the very practice of introducing presidential rule for purposes closer to political struggle than to security problems, and the frequency of its use, has placed the requirement to reform the institution of presidential rule or its abolition among the main requirements of regional political forces. In general, reform proposals are limited to requiring the appointment of a governor after consultation with the Prime Minister of the state government, or the nomination of a governor by the state itself, i.e. the transfer of appointment rights from the center to the state. This will remove the governor's institution from the chain of a unitary system of government: president-governor-collector and weaken control over the subjects of the Federation. A more radical reform could be the introduction of electivity for the post of governor.
In February 2000, the National Commission for the Review of the Functioning of the Constitution was established, which completed its work in 2002 with the creation of a collection of recommendations for reforming the text of the Basic Law [Report of the National Commission..., 2002]. In general, the recommendations of the Commission were close to the conclusions of the Commission of J. R. R. Tolkien. It was created in 1983, and was largely aimed at strengthening the federal nature of governance. They contain a number of proposals to amend articles related to the application of presidential rule, the meaning of which is as follows [ibid.]:
1. Presidential rule is usually established on the basis of a report by the Governor in accordance with Article 356 (1). The report of the Governor must be a" talking document " containing accurate and clear information about all the facts on the basis of which the President can come to a conclusion about the existence of the situation specified in Article 356 (paragraphs 8.20.3 and 8.20.4);
2. Article 356 should be amended to provide a guarantee against the dissolution of the State Legislature by the Governor or the President.,
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than the proclamation for the introduction of presidential rule issued under Section 356 (1) will be submitted to the State Parliament for consideration (paragraph 8.21.4).
The Constitutional Commission's proposals are in line with the demands of the Indian public, and especially of regional political forces. The most important proposal is to introduce the state legislature into the implementation mechanism of the presidential government, which will undoubtedly introduce some federal basis into the initially narrowly centralized control mechanism of the union government.
It should be emphasized that the legitimacy of the existence of the institution of presidential rule has not been questioned by any constitutional commission, including the Sarkaria Commission. Periodic escalations of tension in border states require the existence of a mechanism for the intervention of allied forces if the situation in a particular state poses a threat to national security. At the same time, there is an objective need to reform the procedure for passing the proclamation on the introduction of presidential rule in order to better take into account the opinion of the state government and expand the range of necessary conditions for the introduction of presidential rule.
MECHANISM FOR ADMINISTRATIVE REORGANIZATION OF STATES
The desire of ethnic groups for compact residence and administrative divisions that coincide with natural ethnic boundaries is partly determined by the current majority electoral system in India, in which the dominant community receives the most favorable conditions for securing a leading position in the political field, and therefore for strengthening its leading role in the socio-economic sphere.
To resolve interethnic conflicts in India, from the very beginning, they used primarily the mechanism of administrative and territorial reorganization. The evolution of state policy on this issue was closely linked to the gradual adjustment of the original plans for the accelerated formation of the Indian nation within the Hindustan peninsula as a "big melting pot". There are several stages that can be distinguished here:
1. 1947-1956 Administrative division without significant attention to the traditional borders of ethnic settlement. The emergence of reorganization movements, which were most active during this period in the south of the country. Movements for the creation of linguistic states of Andhra Pradesh, with a dominant Telugu-speaking population, Kerala, Tamilnadu, Karnataka;
2. 1956-1971 State Reorganization Act of 1956, creation of large linguistic states. The hotbed of separatist movements and the center of demands for administrative reorganization is moving to Northeast India (NEI). The agreement to create a new state for small ethnic groups during this period was a compromise result of the armed struggle of small ethnic groups;
3.1971-present. Law on further Reorganization of the SVI of 1971 Continuation of administrative reorganization based on data from state commissions confirming the economic, political and social feasibility of creating a new federal unit.
After the creation of linguistic states as a result of the 1956 reform, the largest peoples of India were in a better situation to develop their culture and solve socio-economic problems. The positive effect of the reform was the easing of ethnic hatred, and separatist movements in most of the country lost their main base of support. The reorganization of the states proved to be an effective mechanism for normalizing domestic life, especially in the southern regions of India. With the creation of autonomous, linguistic states of Andhra Pradesh, with a dominant
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Telugu-speaking population, Kerala, Tamilnadu, Karnataka, separatist slogans in the south have lost broad public support.
The main significance of the change in the administrative division was that the main peoples were united within a single territorial unit. This stimulated the growth of ethnic identity and its politicization. The politicization of ethnic groups was also reinforced by state competition for access to natural and financial resources under the existing system of central redistribution. Despite the establishment of a single market within the country, development at the regional level is extremely important. Solving narrowly regional problems is not a priority for the federal government, which helps to strengthen local elites, who are more receptive and more aware of local needs, at the center of regional political life.
The 1956 reform was most beneficial for large ethnic groups. After the reforms, the elites of the dominant ethnic groups began to pursue a more radical policy towards national minorities and tribes. National and religious minorities, who make up less than 10% of the population, were usually offered programs of absolute integration under majority conditions, which was considered by minorities as a threat to the preservation of their identity. The development of events in this scenario led to the fact that one of the largest states in India - Assam-was repeatedly subjected to administrative reorganization.
State policy towards small sub-ethnic groups has evolved since 1956, when only large peoples were granted the right to a state, and the demands of small ethnic groups were perceived as manifestations of separatism, which must be combated with extraordinary measures. Small ethnic groups were able to develop more effectively without compromising their cultural identity, but they continued to demand further reorganization, which also provided for such a mechanism as obtaining the status of a union territory (for example, the newly formed states in the SVI).
Initial over-centralization and governance in Assam (full integration of small nations, building a system of governance with the dominant core of the Brahmaputra Valley based on the common Assamese language, prioritizing economic development of the valley) It became the reason for the transformation of Assam state into the center of separatist movements in the North-Eastern region. Assam was divided into the states of Arunachal Pradesh, Manipur, Meghalaya, Mizoram, Nagaland, Tripura 3 due to the small peoples and tribes movement for autonomy. But North-East India is still a conflict zone. Today, the internal situation in the region is aggravated by uncontrolled immigration flows and the confrontation between the Hindu and Muslim communities.
The constant tension in the SVI is largely a consequence of internal contradictions in the region. Religious differences here often coincide with the ethnic boundaries of the tribes. Christianity, which is widespread here for historical reasons, is changing under the influence of the traditions of local cults (due to their small number, but pronounced isolation of culture and language, tribes constantly emphasize their identity, extending it to religious rites), and as a result, the forms of religion differ among representatives of different peoples. The fear of assimilation (or of the alien population) is also manifested in the opposition of one's religious community to another (the borders run along the tribe). Christians-
3 The process continued from 1962, when the Nagaland State Creation Act was passed, which included the Naga Hills-Thunsang district formerly part of Assam, until 1986, when the former Union Territory of Arunachal Pradesh was transformed into a state.
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The largest community in the Northeast does not appear to be monolithic. As noted by researchers, Christians from different ethnic communities rarely pray in the same church (Bhattacharya, 1995, p. 49). Thus, religious radicalism is not the main fault line in the society of the North-East, it is "embedded" in interethnic relations, according to which the life of the region and the alignment of political forces are built.
When the ethnic identity of smaller groups in a multiethnic region is at the final stage or is clearly expressed, it is accompanied by a sharp politicization of the population and especially of elites who advocate aggressive and radical positions for self-determination and a greater share of the autonomy of their subethnos. The use of armed forces in exceptional cases is justified only when the separatist movement is represented by an extremist wing rather than a moderate one, and there are no organized groups among the rebels with whom the Government can start negotiations. Over time, there is an effect of "population fatigue", as violent actions of extremists do not give results (the experience of India shows that the center does not make concessions), and constant levies ("taxes")do not work. on the part of the separatists, they cause an increase in discontent among the population. Their mass support base is being eroded, which leads to a split in the movement and the separation of the moderate wing from its ranks. If the government's negotiations with moderate leaders lead to mutually beneficial compromises, then there is another pillar of union power in the region. Local leaders strengthen the legitimacy of the government and its power-wielding powers, as the leaders of regional parties enjoy greater trust among the population, and their actions against the separatists are not considered by the majority as infringing on their rights and freedoms. For the central government, it is necessary to meet the demands of the moderates for greater autonomy within the framework of negotiations, as this will undoubtedly expand the social support of the moderates and will help to weaken extremist groups and, consequently, stabilize the situation.
The creation of states with a small ethnic core is not a panacea for a region gripped by a crisis of inter-communal contradictions. But the creation of smaller states, as the experience of SWI and the rapid development of Haryana (after the reorganization of Punjab in 1966) has shown, is a measure to counter regional discrimination and unequal access to resources and power. Under the majority system of elections, the majority in a single district gets a majority of seats in the state legislature and - even with a small number on a national scale - makes up a significant political force.
The state resorts to reorganization to solve both political and economic problems, but the question of the effectiveness of "state-building" reforms for areas of political instability causes disputes that have arisen since the foundation of the state and are a continuation of the peculiar struggle in the Indian Republic of two systems, unitary and federal. The creation in 2000 of three new states: Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand and Uttaranchal, separated from the larger states of Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Uttar Pradesh, further revived the debate about the results of administrative reforms and the seriousness of the grounds for such reforms.
The main task of ensuring national security is to preserve the territorial integrity of the country. The creation of more states undoubtedly leads to increased federalism and the growing influence of regional elites. In this regard, the question arises whether this will lead to increased political instability, and possibly the threat of territorial losses, or, on the contrary, will lead to strengthening the integrity of India.
Currently, the formation of new states is based on the following parameters::
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* the state can be formed on the basis of linguistic (ethnic) homogeneity;
* there is a politically established movement for self-determination in this territory.;
* the majority of the local population needs to support the creation of a state;
* economic feasibility: the new state should represent a promising economic unit;
* management efficiency has been reduced in this area.
The success of the state creation movement mainly depends on the interaction and overlap of four factors: the presence of a strong and popular movement for the creation of a new state; the deep (historical) roots of the economic inequality of the region superimposed on a different socio-cultural identity; the increased activity of the regional elite; and the decrease in the effectiveness of managing the administration of a large state. The allocation of a new state in areas where all the factors are present and the regional elite is formed is justified. The main task of administrative reform is to prevent further radicalization of the elite, which can lead the movement for violent reorganization.
In the case of the creation of Uttaranchal, it is obvious that its supporters were the absolute majority of the population (84%):
Table 2
Support for the creation of Uttaranchal by various segments of the population, %
Population categories |
Fully supported |
They support you |
They don't support it |
All |
39 |
45 |
11 |
Young people (25-30 years old) |
34 |
56 |
7 |
Older people (56 years and older) |
43 |
39 |
13 |
Competent people |
44 |
40 |
6 |
Educated people |
41 |
47 |
12 |
The poorest strata |
47 |
40 |
8 |
Wealthy people |
25 |
37 |
24 |
Dalits |
27 |
53 |
14 |
"Adivasi " |
63 |
33 |
2 |
Higher castes |
40 |
45 |
10 |
-----
Source: [Kumar Sanjay, 2002].
The situation is more complicated in Jharkhand, where support was primarily provided by the Adivasis (tribes):
Table 3
Support of various social groups for the creation of Jharkhand
Social groups |
Supporting reorganization (%) |
All |
33 |
Dalits |
32 |
"Adivasi " |
68 |
Other backward castes |
26 |
Higher castes |
38 |
-----
Source: [Kumar Sanjay, 2002].
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There is nothing surprising in the desire to get" their own " state, both among the indigenous group, since this gives more opportunities for economic development of areas inhabited by "Adivasi", and among the higher castes, who get the opportunity to strengthen their political position. The Jharkhand Self-Government Movement, led by Jharkhand Mukti Morcha (JMM), dates back to India's independence. This political party enjoys the greatest confidence of the population: an alliance consisting of the MMM, Inc. and the Rashtriya Janata Dal won the February 2005 elections ." в легислатуру штата [http://www.eci.gov.in/StatisticalReports/KeyHigh-Lights/SE_2005/StatisticalRep orts_JH_2005.pdf]. The State Commission's research notes a significant economic backwardness in the southern regions of Bihar (modern Jharkhand), compared to the rest of the state. This factor was also one of the decisive factors in carrying out administrative reorganization.
It is interesting to compare the results of the elections in the new states and in Bihar, Uttar Pradesh and Madhya Pradesh, which were reorganized. The data show a significant difference in the electoral preferences of the new state and the rest of the territory from which the territory was allocated. For example, in the last elections in Uttar Pradesh, there was a significant shift of Congress from the political center of the state (the party received only 8.9% of the vote), but in Uttaranchal, INC continues to be a popular party (26.9% of the vote). The situation was reversed for the Bahujan Samaj Party (in Uttaranchal, the party received only 10.9% of the vote, and in Uttar Pradesh-23%). Bharatiya Janata Party, however, holds strong positions in both Uttar Pradesh (20.08%) and Uttaranchal (25% of the vote) [http://www.eti.gov.in/StatisticalReports/Keyffigh-Lights/SE_2002/Stat_rep_UP_ 2002. pdf].
Thus, different electoral preferences speak in favor of the new administrative division.
As for Chatisgarh, the main part of its population is made up of "Adivasis", who live here quite compactly (compared to the rest of the state). For a long time, this area, like Uttaranchal, was the most backward region of Madhya Pradesh. But the urgency of the demands for reorganization was absent, as well as the mass character of the movement. The question of reorganization was resolved positively due to the excessively large size of the state of Madhya Pradesh. Here, the reorganization was aimed at improving the efficiency of administrative management. The ethnic characteristics of the regions ' populations were taken into account, and the territory inhabited by "Adivasi" - a dominant area that is ethnically different from the rest of Madhya Pradesh-became the core of the new state. Here, the goals of effective governance and economic development have become more important for the reorganization, taking into account the peculiarities of ethnic borders.
One of the indicators of the legitimacy of separating individual territories from large states can be the surveys that follow the reorganization (Table 4 ).:
Table 4
The ratio of the population of Uttar Pradesh (by district) to the creation of the state of Uttaranchal, %
District |
Satisfied with the creation |
Against |
Don't know about staff creation/no opinion on this issue |
Uttaranchal |
79 |
13 |
8 |
Purvanchal |
18.8 |
39.9 |
40.9 |
Harit Pradesh |
15 |
44.6 |
40.4 |
Bundelkhand |
10.7 |
46.9 |
42.4 |
-----
Source: [Verma, 2002].
page 49
Some dissatisfaction with the "territorial losses" naturally exists, but the peaceful nature of the administrative reform, the lack of awareness about the creation of Uttaranchal and the lack of clashes with the population of other districts confirms the legitimacy of the reorganization of the territory into a state.
The Center recognized that new administrative reforms are needed, and states can also be allocated for small ethnic groups. But for the smallest groups that require a certain degree of autonomy, it is unlikely that a state or union territory should be created, because of the small size and inability to provide a certain amount of economic independence for the state. In addition to administrative divisions such as a State and a Union Territory, there are other forms of autonomy in India. For example, to reduce tensions in multi-ethnic Assam, autonomous districts (Mikir, North Kachar) have been created, governed by councils with executive functions (half of the councils are elected by the population of the district). This can be considered as the embryo of a new administrative division. Tribal areas are included in the lists (the fifth and sixth lists), and according to Article 244, paragraph 2 of the Constitution, their administration is regulated separately. For legislative functions, it provides for the creation of district and district councils (representative bodies), which are delegated the authority to issue laws regulating local relations and collect certain taxes. Assam's laws on related matters do not apply to autonomous districts (the prerogative belongs to laws issued by the Tribal Council), which contradicts the general Indian legal practice, where federal laws on related issues override local ones. Also, the Tribal Councils of the autonomous districts have been given a part of their judicial powers: the right to conduct some civil and criminal cases. Thus, without radical reorganization of the state, tribes and small ethnic groups are given considerable autonomy in management, which allows preserving the uniqueness of cultural traditions of even the smallest ethnic groups. The 2002 Constitutional Commission recommended that the rights assigned to the autonomous regions by the fifth and sixth lists of the Constitution should be more closely monitored.
The mechanism of administrative-territorial reorganization is used by the State mainly to resolve interethnic conflicts. The creation of new states, of course, does not solve all the problems of the region, but it moves the structure of power and administration closer to backward or isolated regions, which contributes to a more complete implementation of regional political and social requirements. The reorganization of the state of Assam and the creation of independent states-Nagaland, Mizoram, Tripura, Manipur-relatively stabilized the situation, and the demands of moderate forces for greater autonomy were met. The main achievement of the administrative reforms in SVI is that the separatist movement has lost its mass base of popular support. It should be borne in mind that the radicalization of the SWI tribal and small ethnic movement was facilitated by the protracted administrative reform, the creation of new states - the result of armed struggle rather than the center's understanding of the feasibility of reorganizing Assam.
The political and administrative system of India is constantly evolving, which is caused by deep processes of socio-economic modernization, strengthening of the subnational and ethnic identity of the multi-ethnic Indian society. This led to a significant departure from the original concepts of building federal subjects - states on the basis of large linguistic communities and accelerated integration of all peoples into a single Indian nation. Gradually in India a system of providing services to large and small and even the smallest nationalities and tribes was created
page 50
autonomy within the Federation for the protection of cultural and linguistic identity and effective self-government. The mechanism of territorial reorganization, taking into account such factors as the natural boundaries of ethnic settlement, the presence of a mass movement for autonomy, a strong regional elite leading the political movement, the economic feasibility of creating a state, etc., proved to be the most effective for stabilizing the internal democratic regime, and most importantly, the territorial integrity of the country.
In general, administrative and territorial reforms also contributed to the decentralization of governance, and through this, to the strengthening of the federal nature of the state structure of India. In certain states created on the basis of an ethnic community, the strengthened elite becomes the main conductor of local interests. In the context of the evolution of the political system towards bipartisanship at the federal level, in which the strength of national parties depends on the conclusion of alliances with regional parties, there will be no movement towards strengthening the center. Apparently, the next stage will be a further evolution towards a more flexible and less centralized system of governance of the Federation based on coalition rule and mutual compromises as a result of inter-party agreements between national and regional political forces.
list of literature
Basu Durga Das. Fundamentals of the Constitutional Law of India, Moscow, 1986.
Prazauskas A. A. Etnos, politika i gosudarstvo v sovremennoi Indii [Ethnos, Politics and the State in modern India].
Bhattacharya N.N. Religious Culture of Northeastern India. New Delhi, 1995.
Bihar Assembly Election Survey 2000, (Post-poll) sample size 2225.
http://www.eci.gov.in/StatisticalReports/KeyHighLights/SE_2002/Stat_rep_UP_2 002.pdf
http://www.eci.gov.in/StatisticalReports/KeyHighLights/SE_2005/StatisticalRepo rts_JH_2005.pdf
Kumar Sanjay. Creation of New States // Economic and Political Weekly. September 7, 2002.
Pylee M. V. Constitutional Government in India. New Delhi, 1977.
Report of the National Commission to Review the Working the Constitution // www.lawmin.nic.in\ncrwc\finalre-port.htp
Uttaranchal Assembly Election Survey 2002, (Post-poll) sample size 733.
Verma A. K. Political prospects in UP (pointed from pre-poll survey) // Economic and Political Weekly. 9 February, 2002.
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