K. A. VILNIN, post-graduate student of the Diplomatic Academy of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation

Sri Lanka Keywords:, India, Sinhalese, Tamils, interethnic conflict-intervention, security

Due to its geographical location, large territory, human resources, and strong economic and military potential, India naturally plays the role of a "region-forming center" in South Asia. Political realities are such that none of the global or local processes in the South Asian region that affect India's security can take place without its active participation. This often causes rejection of neighboring countries. However, none of them can ignore Delhi and its interests, whatever the nature of bilateral relations.

A classic example in this regard is India's relations with its southern neighbor Sri Lanka, in particular, in the settlement of the Sinhalo-Tamil conflict. The conflict, which was latent in the first years of independence (Ceylon gained independence in 1948 and was renamed Sri Lanka in 1972), later developed into an armed confrontation between the government and Tamil separatist groups (from 1983 to 2009), which, according to various sources, claimed the lives of 80 to 100 thousand people. ¹ person and ended with the defeat of the extremists. Despite the fact that during the second half of the XX - beginning of the XXI centuries, the vectors of Indian policy towards the conflict have repeatedly changed : respect for neutrality during the growing ethnic tension; secret training of Tamil separatists; mediation efforts for the peaceful settlement of armed confrontation; peacekeeping functions; military participation in armed conflict; policy of isolation and prohibition of the Tamil separatist movement Sri Lanka on its territory; non-intervention in the armed confrontation; limited support of the Sri Lankan government in suppressing the separatists and, finally, efforts to strengthen the base of Sinhalo-Tamil reconciliation and post-conflict development - it has always been and remains an irritating factor in relations between the two countries.

INDIA-SRI LANKA RELATIONS BEFORE THE 1980s

Since Ceylon's independence, Sinhalese leaders have pursued discriminatory policies against Tamils*, restricting their rights in the political, economic, social and linguistic spheres, which was periodically accompanied by bloody anti-Tamil pogroms. However, until the 1980s, Delhi tried not to focus on this issue in its relations with Colombo, despite the fact that Ceylon Tamils had close religious, cultural and linguistic ties with the neighboring Indian state of Tamil Nadu.

On the one hand, this was the result of Jawaharlal Nehru's proclamation of "nonviolence" as the main "principle of international relations"by the founder of the independent Indian state². Nehru tried to avoid interference in the internal affairs of other States in the region, and similar cases that occurred during his rule (1947 - 1964), for example, in relation to Nepal in 1950 - 1951, were rather an exception.

On the other hand, India itself faced an ethnic problem in the state of Madras (since 1969 - Tamil Nadu) with a multi-million-strong Tamil population. In the 1960s, the situation there worsened due to the fact that the Hindi language was given the status of the state language. This caused a sharp protest of Tamils, and there was a risk of a revival of separatist sentiments. Under these circumstances, providing support to the Tamils of Ceylon, where a similar State Language (Sinhala) law came into force in 1961, could only worsen the situation in the south of India itself.

Finally, the existence of democratic regimes in the two countries, good personal ties and similar political views of the leaders of India and Ceylon/Sri Lanka (with the exception of the period 1953-

* Sinhalese are the ethnic majority of the country, Tamils are the main ethnic minority. The ancestors of the Sinhalese and Tamils began to arrive on the island of Sita BC from the territory of modern India.

1956) determined the friendly nature of Indian-Sri Lankan relations. This was reflected in concrete political steps: the closure of British military bases on the island in 1957 at the initiative of the Ceylonese authorities, which was positively received in Delhi; the first successful attempts to resolve the issue of the civil status of Indian Tamils in Ceylon* within the framework of bilateral agreements of 1964 and 1974; Delhi's assistance in suppressing the coup attempt in 1971, the Sinhalese left-wing nationalist extremist organization Janata Vimukti Peramuna (JVP, now a legal political party); the demarcation of the maritime borders of the two states in 1974 and 1976, etc. ³

MEDIATION IN THE SINHALO-TAMIL SETTLEMENT

India's policy towards its southern neighbor changed dramatically with the return to power of Indira Gandhi in 1980 (her first term as Prime Minister was 1966-1977), and the ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka began to significantly affect the dynamics of bilateral relations. There are several reasons for this.

First, Delhi's concerns about the eventual threat of turning the Indian Ocean into a zone of struggle between the strategic interests of major regional (Pakistan) and non-regional (China, the United States) actors played a role. J. R. R. Tolkien, who came to power in Sri Lanka.Jayawardane (Prime Minister in 1977-1978, president in 1978-1989) changed the vector in the economy and foreign policy towards the West and began to look for ways of rapprochement with China and Pakistan - India's main geopolitical rivals. The involvement of other international players in the ethnic conflict, from India's point of view, could lead to the undermining of its security and leadership position in the region.

Delhi has always considered South Asia as a zone of its exclusive influence. This position is formulated in the so-called Indian Regional Security Doctrine of 1983, according to which "India opposes any external interference in the internal affairs of South Asian countries", and "if any South Asian state needs international support" in resolving an internal conflict, "it should seek assistance in the following areas: first of all, in India"; "ignoring it in these matters will be considered as a step in the anti-Indian direction" ⁴.

Secondly, it is the mood in the state of Tamil Nadu. Since the late 1960s, the Tamil Nadu political parties, the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK) and its offshoot, the All India Anna Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (AIADMK), have supported Indian intervention in the conflict on the side of the Sri Lankan Tamils and have supported separatist sentiments in Sri Lanka.⁵ The position of the political elite and the general population of Tamil Nadu remained one of the main factors influencing both the" Sri Lankan " policy of India and the course of the conflict.

By the early 1980s, there were already several extremist groups in Sri Lanka that openly called for armed struggle for the establishment of an independent State of Tamil Eelam in the north and east of the island. The most organized force among them was the Tamil Shlama Liberation Tigers (LTTE).

Third, the victims of the anti-Tamil pogroms that followed the killing of 13 Sinhalese soldiers by LTTE militants in 1983 (the beginning of the armed conflict)were not only Sri Lankan, but also descendants of Indian Tamils, as well as Indian citizens, including diplomats^{. 6}

Fourth, there is an uncontrolled flow of refugees to the south of India, which has negatively affected the economic situation and worsened the crime situation in Tamil Nadu. In addition to the increase in crime, drug trafficking and illegal arms trafficking increased in the state, and Sri Lankan paramilitary groups clashed with each other, as well as terrorist attacks (for example, a powerful explosion at Madras International Airport, now Chennai, in 1984.7).

Thus, the Indian Government could no longer remain a bystander. The situation was complicated by the dilemma that India faced - it could not allow both the defeat of Tamil separatists by the Sri Lankan army and the creation of an independent Tamil state in the north and east of Sri Lanka. Interference in the conflict on any side was excluded.

Support for the Sri Lankan government and the destruction of the Tamil separatist movement would lead to an explosion of discontent among residents and political circles of Tamil Nadu; to a possible "migration" of the conflict to the southern state, where the remnants of the Tamil resistance could try to unite with local radical elements to fight for the creation of an independent state in southern India; to a decline in This is due to the failure of its mediation efforts for a peaceful settlement and to the loss of one of the main levers of pressure on Sri Lanka if it continues to expand cooperation with the West, China and Pakistan against Indian interests.

At the same time, Delhi could not take the side of the separatists by recognizing the independence of Tamil Eelam. Such a move would have provoked sharp condemnation from the international community; it would have led to a significant deterioration, if not a complete break in relations with Sri Lanka, and its inevitable tilt towards the West and anti-Philippines-

* To work on coffee and then tea plantations, the British, since the XIX century, imported Indian Tamils to Ceylon, because neither Sinhalese nor Ceylon Tamils did not want to work on plantations.

Indian forces in the region and beyond; alienate other small South Asian countries from India and increase the wave of separatism in troubled Indian states.

In addition, from the point of view of S. D. Muni, a well-known expert on South Asian problems, "independent" Tamil Eelam could become an object of rivalry between major powers who would seek to use its advantageous strategic position in the Indian Ocean region8.

As a result of the close interweaving of many external and internal political factors, Delhi found itself in difficult conditions. Admittedly, in the Sinhalo-Tamil conflict, India has been following a policy of double standards for several years, both towards the Sri Lankan Government and towards Tamil paramilitary groups.

On the one hand, New Delhi insisted on a peaceful settlement of the conflict, demanded the development of a political solution to the problem within a single state, and was the author of many concrete peace initiatives to prevent the escalation of confrontation. Among them-support for the convening of the Sri Lanka All-Party Conference in 1984; organization of peace talks in 1985 between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil moderate and separatist organizations in the capital of Bhutan-Thimphu; negotiations at the summit of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) in Bangalore (India) between Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi (1984 - 1989) and Sri Lankan President Jayawardane in November 1986; the joint Indo-Sri Lankan development of the so-called "December 19 Project" on the establishment of provincial councils in late 1986; ⁹ finally, the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement on Peace and Normalization in Sri Lanka in July 1987 (which is referred to in the document). see below).

However, as practice has shown, all attempts at a peaceful settlement and its positive interim results were ultimately doomed to failure due to the mutual fault of the conflicting parties. The central authorities, under pressure from Sinhalese nationalists and Buddhist radicals, were inclined to destroy the separatists, and the LTTE refused to accept anything less than the independence of Tamil Eelam. It should be noted that outbreaks of violence between Sinhalese and Tamils did not stop even during the peace talks, and the peace process itself was used by both sides to rearm and regroup forces.

On the other hand, the Research and Analysis Department(Indian Foreign Intelligence) actively trained Tamil militants in Tamil Nadu, provided them with material assistance and supplied them with weapons. According to some sources, between 1983 and 1986, the number of separatist fighters trained in India was 15,000.¹⁰

All this had several goals, including: to persuade the Sri Lankan government to settle the Sinhalese-Tamil armed confrontation peacefully, to put pressure on Colombo, which redirected the vector of its foreign policy to cooperation with the West, Pakistan and China, and to receive intelligence information about the situation in the strategic port of Trincomalee (in the east of Sri Lanka), which, according to the fears of the Indians, could become the second (after Diego Garcia) US naval base in the Indian Ocean. Finally, India sought to increase its influence over the separatists and eventually persuade them to abandon the idea of creating an independent state and accept a political solution to the ethnic problem within the framework of a single state.¹¹

After a series of failures in the peace dialogue and a new escalation of the armed confrontation between the Sri Lankan security forces and the separatists, accompanied by heavy casualties among Sinhalese and Tamil civilians, Delhi abandoned its mediation services. With the beginning of a large-scale operation of the Sri Lankan government forces to completely destroy the Tamil separatists in May 1987, India has made it clear that it will not allow the Sri Lankan army to take full control of the Jaffna Peninsula and resolve the conflict by military means.

Shortly before the operation, the Tamil Nadu authorities provided $3.2 million in financial assistance to the tigers and their allies, ¹² and after it began, the Indian government organized the delivery of humanitarian aid to the population of Jaffna without the approval of Colombo. The Sri Lankan authorities tried to counteract this, but were forced to accept it, since further attempts to stop the supply would have entailed an immediate reaction from Delhi. According to some reports, India's military intelligence has already developed a plan to capture the country's leaders and strategic targets in and around Colombo.¹³

INDIA-LANKA AGREEMENT OF 1987

In the face of the threat of possible direct intervention by India and the lack of broad international support, the Sri Lankan military had to stop its successful military operation. And already on July 29, 1987, between R. Gandhi and J. R. R. Tolkien.An agreement was signed in Jayawardana to establish peace and normalize the situation in Sri Lanka. Its main provisions were as follows:

- cessation of hostilities, surrender of weapons by Tamil paramilitary groups, return of military personnel to barracks;

- Conduct of provincial council elections in Sri Lanka (in the north and east under the supervision of Indian representatives);

- amnesty for jailed Tamil activists and militants;

- preventing the use of Indian territory for dey-

a threat to the unity, territorial integrity and security of Sri Lanka;

- India's provision of military assistance should the Sri Lankan Government request such assistance;

- recognition of Tamil as an official language along with Sinhala ¹⁴.

In letters exchanged between Gandhi and Jayawardane at the conclusion of the treaty, Sri Lanka, among other things, agreed not to involve foreign military advisers and intelligence officers and to refuse to provide seaports to other States for military purposes if this would harm Indian-Sri Lankan relations. Delhi, in turn, agreed to extradite Sri Lankan citizens who were engaged in terrorist activities and propagandized separatism; provide military-technical assistance and assist in training personnel for the Sri Lankan security forces.¹⁵ The very next day, at the request of the President of Sri Lanka, the Indian Peacekeeping Force (ISPM) began to enter the island.

The signing of this document was a major diplomatic success for India. Delhi was given the opportunity to participate in the internal affairs of the island state. The Agreement also had a positive impact on internal security in India itself, particularly in the state of Tamil Nadu, where protests against the use of Hindi again broke out in 1986 ^.16

Despite its generally positive potential, the agreement did not lead to any serious changes in the settlement of the inter-ethnic conflict. Moreover, it has only increased antagonism within both communities. And here's why.

He was opposed by most of the Sinhalese political establishment. The radical Buddhist clergy and the leadership of the Sri Lankan army took an extremely irreconcilable position. There was no consensus within the ruling United National Party itself (the then Prime Minister and future President of Sri Lanka, R. Premadasa, opposed Indian interference). The main opposition party of the country, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party, was against it, and supporters of the JVP in protest mutinied in the south of the country and conducted a real "hunt" for politicians who supported the treaty ¹⁷.

A split has also occurred among Tamil extremist organizations. While the majority of groups supported the agreement, the Tigers, the most powerful separatist group, opposed it from the very beginning, only paying lip service to its signing. This has further escalated the conflict between the LTTE and its allies with other Sri Lankan Tamil paramilitary organizations.

The reluctance of the LTTE and their leader, V. Prabhakaran, to make concessions and cooperate with the ISPM led to the resumption of hostilities on the island. In addition to clashes with Sri Lankan security forces, the tigers also began to attack Indian units. India, in accordance with the Gandhi-Jayawardane Treaty, was forced to launch military operations against the LTTE in order to forcibly disarm it and restore order in the zone of armed conflict.

Thus, India became a direct participant in the Sinhalo-Tamil armed confrontation. Although the ISPM managed to conduct several successful operations, during which they captured key LTTE towns and main bases and forced the Tigers to retreat into the jungle, the Indian units failed to completely break the separatist resistance.

R. Premadasa, who succeeded Jayawardane as President of Sri Lanka in early 1989, was extremely negative about the presence of Indian troops on the island and demanded their immediate withdrawal. It came to the point that, having entered into negotiations with the tigers, he authorized the supply of weapons to this group to fight the Indian units.¹⁸

The position of the new Sri Lankan leadership, the negative attitude towards the Indian presence on the part of broad segments of the Sri Lankan population, both Sinhalese and Tamil, as well as criticism of the activities of the ISPM by opposition forces in India itself (the ISPM's stay in Sri Lanka put a heavy burden on the Indian economy: according to some sources, the costs amounted to up to $1.25 billion). In the course of the operations, 1,555 soldiers and officers were killed. [¹⁹] By the end of March 1990, Delhi had completely withdrawn its troops from the island.

It remains to add that if in 1987 the intervention of India prevented the likely defeat of the separatists by the Sri Lankan army, then the policy of the new Sri Lankan authorities in 1989 was one of the key factors that prevented the possible success of the ISPM in the operation to suppress the LTTE.

The assassination of Rajiv Gandhi by LTTE militants in 1991 and the subsequent ban on the organization's activities in India drew a line under Delhi's involvement in attempts to resolve the armed conflict in Sri Lanka.

THE"NON-INTERVENTION" PERIOD

Subsequently, any attempts by the Sri Lankan Government and LTTE to involve India in solving the Sinhalo-Tamil problem came to nothing. Until the final stage of the armed confrontation on the island, New Delhi officially remained neutral and did not participate in the peace process (mediated by Norway and actively supported by the United States, Japan and the EU) to resolve the armed conflict in Sri Lanka. As the then Prime Minister of India, A. B. Vajpayee, stated in 2002:"We will not participate or interfere in any negotiations between the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE." ²⁰

It is clear that Delhi's reluctance to be drawn back into Sri Lanka was due to serious miscalculations and failures of its" Sri Lankan " policy in the 1980s. Some researchers have argued that this position was also explained by the need to fight anti-government elements in a number of states on their own territory, whose activities sharply intensified in ^{the 1990s21}

At the same time, as noted by a well-known expert on the Sinhalo-Tamil conflict M. Swami, it was at the initiative of the Indians that Norway was secretly involved in organizing the peace process in Sri Lanka in 2002-2006 (since LTTE is banned in India) ^.22 According to the former Norwegian Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs, V. Sven. Helgesen, Norway "could not have achieved any success without the active participation of India at all stages of the negotiations (between the Government of Sri Lanka and LTTE. - K. V.)"²³.

At the last stage of the armed conflict in 2006 - 2009, when India's national interests and security could be directly affected by the policies of China and Pakistan, which openly supported Sri Lankan President M. Rajapaksa (from 2005 to the present) and provided military and financial assistance in the fight against the separatists, Delhi began to provide limited military support to the Sri Lankan military forces. Sun. However, as before, many aspects of such cooperation were carefully concealed.

The Indian Navy provided intelligence and conducted joint operations with the Sri Lankan Navy to destroy LTTE munitions. The coast of Tamil Nadu was patrolled by the Indian Coast Guard; in Tamil Nadu, security forces identified tiger weapons depots; and Sri Lankan Army soldiers were trained by Indian instructors. Military equipment was supplied to Sri Lanka, but only of a defensive nature. Nevertheless, according to some sources, military equipment used in offensive operations, in particular, Mi-17 ²⁴. A telegram from the US Embassy in New Delhi, published by Wikileaks, shows that India also supported the initiative of the United States to create international contact groups on the financing and acquisition of weapons by LTTE activists.²⁵

The cautious stance of the ruling Indian National Congress, which is part of the United Progressive Alliance (ON), was prompted by the desire not to stir up public opinion in Tamil Nadu (since the Sri Lankan army's offensives were accompanied by the death of Tamil civilians) and not to provoke one of the main coalition partners, the DMK, before the parliamentary elections.

In May 2009, the Sri Lankan army finally defeated the remnants of LTTE militant groups. The leaders of the organization, including Prabhakaran, were killed. The entire territory of the country came under the control of the government. The Tigers ' activities inside Sri Lanka have practically come to naught. ²⁶

DELHI'S "SRI LANKAN" POST-CONFLICT POLICY

After the end of the armed conflict, ²⁷ Delhi's policy on resolving the Sinhalo-Tamil problem can be divided into five areas.

The first is to participate in financial and humanitarian projects for the rehabilitation of the Tamil population, reconstruction and development of areas of Sri Lanka affected by the fighting (primarily in the Northern Province). In June 2009, Prime Minister of India M. Singh announced the allocation of $ 5 billion for this purpose. Indian rupees (approximately $ 110 million at the exchange rate at that time). India has been providing assistance in mine clearance, agriculture, health, education, transport and housing infrastructure, etc. since 2010. Delhi has provided a loan of about $800 million for the rehabilitation and modernization of railways in northern Sri Lanka. In addition, India is financing a program to build 50,000 homes for internally displaced Tamils (as of October 2012, about $270 million has already been allocated for this purpose). A joint project to build a coal-fired power plant at Sampur, near Trincomalee ²⁸, continues. According to the Times of India, India's 2013/14 budget increased its annual aid to Sri Lanka to $ 5 billion. Rs (exchange rate as of April 15, 2013: $1 = Rs 54.63), which will be used for rehabilitation of internally displaced persons ²⁹.

The second direction focuses on the idea of political reconciliation between the two ethnic groups by granting Tamils greater autonomy based on the 13th Amendment to the Constitution of Sri Lanka. Although India's position is not new, with the end of the armed conflict, Delhi has stepped up efforts to reach an agreement with Colombo on this issue. The Sri Lankan government has so far sent conflicting signals: despite repeated declarations of commitment to the 13th Amendment, the authorities have disavowed it.³⁰ At the end of 2012, several government ministers (including two of the President's brothers)began calling for the amendment to be repealed or replaced. ³¹

The 13th Amendment remains a serious "irritant" for Sinhalese nationalists and others.-

* The 13th Amendment was adopted on 14 November 1987 to consolidate the main provisions of the Indo-Sri Lankan Agreement of 29 July 1987, namely the creation of provincial sonnets with the transfer of part of the power from the center and the recognition of Tamil as the official language. Not so long ago, there was such a thing as the "13th Amendment plus", where "plus" implies the restoration of the upper house of parliament (the Senate in Ceylon was abolished in 1971).

the majority of the Buddhist clergy who advocate its abolition. In the eyes of the Sinhalese, it will always serve as a reminder of Delhi's open interference in Sri Lanka's internal affairs. The Indians, not without reason considering the adoption of the amendment one of the successful episodes of their mediation efforts in the 1980s, and in the current conditions consider it as the main tool for resolving the Sinhalo-Tamil contradictions.

The third direction is to establish a structured political dialogue between the Government of Sri Lanka and the Tamil National Alliance (TNA - the main representative of the interests of Tamils after the defeat of the "tigers"), aimed at inter-ethnic settlement and national reconciliation. Negotiations between the Government of Sri Lanka and the TNA continued throughout 2011, but were inconclusive, and in early 2012 were completely interrupted due to disagreements about the format of further work to find a political solution to the ethnic problem.* The termination of the dialogue caused dissatisfaction in Delhi.

The TNA holds regular consultations with the Indians and seeks support to resolve disputes between the two communities on island ³². India, in turn, still considers the alliance the main political force representing Tamils, and insists on resuming negotiations. Thus, Prime Minister M. Singh, during his speech in the Rajya Sabha (the upper house of the Indian Parliament), called on the Sri Lankan authorities to initiate a dialogue with the Tamil leadership (read - TNA)^.33

The fourth is Delhi's position on the need for an "independent" and "impartial" investigation of possible war crimes committed by Sri Lankan military personnel during offensive operations and respect for human rights in the country. The Sri Lankan Government and army are heavily criticized by Western countries (primarily the United States) and human rights organizations for violations of humanitarian law and the high number of casualties among Tamil civilians at the hands of military personnel. 34 A UN panel of experts estimates that about 40,000 people have died in recent months of fighting in the country35.

Initially, India was among the countries that tried to prevent serious international pressure on Sri Lanka.³⁶ But over time, India's approach began to change, and it was among the countries that voted in favor of the United States-initiated UN Human Rights Council resolutions calling for an independent investigation of possible violations of human rights and international humanitarian law in Sri Lanka (adopted on March 22, 2012 and March 21, 2013). according to Indian sources, in the first case, India made amendments softening the tone of document ³⁷, while in the second, according to the country's Foreign Minister S. Khurshid, Delhi even wanted to give the resolution a tougher sound (the proposal to discuss Indian amendments was not made at the request of the United States due to fears of losing votes)³⁸.

The reason for this behavior may lie in the changing geopolitical realities, namely, India's rapprochement with the United States and Sri Lanka's closer ties with China and Pakistan. It is obvious that in these circumstances, India wants to maintain the mechanism of pressure on Colombo. In addition, Delhi is unhappy with the Sri Lankan Government's unwillingness to make real political concessions to the Tamils, resume negotiations with the TNA and conduct a proper investigation of war crimes and human rights violations. Last but not least, the pressure exerted by the leading Tamil Nadu parties, the DMK and the AIADMC, on the centre has played a significant role in this. With the internal political situation in the country as a whole and in Tamil Nadu in particular not quite stable, the central government has to take into account the opinion of parties representing one of the largest states of the country in the run-up to the upcoming general elections in 2014.

It should be particularly noted that DMK and AIADMC are very active on the Tamil issue in Sri Lanka, exploiting this topic whenever possible. The inter-party struggle between the DMK and AIADMC for the electorate sometimes reaches quite serious proportions. Each group positions itself as the main "defender" of the Tamil civilian population of Sri Lanka. The Tamil issue does cause a great emotional response in the state, but often both parties only use the Sri Lankan "card" in their political games.

Recently, anti-Lankan sentiment in Tamil Nadu has noticeably increased. On 19 March 2013, the DMK faction in the Indian Parliament withdrew from the ruling OPA coalition, and all five central government ministers from the party resigned in opposition to India's" insufficiently active " position on Tamil rights violations in Sri Lanka.³⁹ In turn, on March 27, the Tamil Nadu Legislative Assembly (headed by the AIADMC) called on the central government to impose economic sanctions against Sri Lanka and submit to the UN Security Council a resolution on a referendum on the creation of an independent Tamil Eelam40.

Finally, the fifth area is addressing the problem of Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka, for which India, according to 2012 data, spends approximately $ 130 million annually. ⁴¹. During the armed conflict, there were four waves of mass migration to the Indian territory.-

* The Government insists on a multilateral format within the framework of a special parliamentary committee. TNA will agree to participate in its work only after .conclusion of a strong bilateral agreement.

ria (1983 - 1987, 1990 - 1992, 1995 - 2002 and 2006-2009)⁴², mainly during the period of escalation of hostilities.

Today, there are more than 100,000 Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu, most of whom do not want to return to Sri Lanka due to socio-economic difficulties and concerns about the ⁴³ human rights violations they believe they may face. Perhaps, over time, many Sri Lankan Tamils will come to accept Tamil Nadu as their homeland, and they will be granted Indian citizenship or permanent resident status, which is especially relevant for the younger generation, whose parents moved to the south of India in the 1980s.

A review of India's foreign policy towards its southern neighbor over the past four years suggests that, despite its apparent activity, Delhi does not have a clear plan for further Sinhalo-Tamil settlement.

Providing financial and humanitarian assistance to Tamils in Sri Lanka, Tamil refugees in Tamil Nadu, seeking concessions from the Sri Lankan Government to expand Tamil autonomy, and encouraging the Colombo negotiation process with the TNA are practically nothing new.

Only the blatant anti-Lankan orientation of the Indian position in the PLO Human Rights Council can be considered a new moment.

^{Volkhonskiy B. M.} 1 Mezhetnicheskiy konflikt v Sri-Lank [Interethnic conflict in Sri Lanka] / / Etnichnost ' i religiya i sovremennykh konfliktsii [Ethnicity and Religion and modern conflicts] [ed. by V. A. Tishkov, V. L. Shnirelman], Moscow, Pauka, 2012, p. 573.

^{Volodin L. G., Shastitko I. M.} 2 "Let not hope deceive!.." / / Life and Struggle of Jawaharlal Nehru, Moscow, 1990, p. 292.

^{Kodikara S.U.} 3 Keynote address: Gcostrategic perspectives of Indo-Sri Lanka relations // Dilemmas of Indo-Sri Lankan relations. Colombo, 1991, p. 21 - 25; Muni S.I). Pangs of proximity: India and Sri Umka's ethnic crisis. New Delhi, 1993, p. 38.

^{Hagerty D.T.} 4 India's regional security doctrine // Asian Survey. 1991. Vol. 31, N 4, p. 351 - 352.

^{Dos Santos A.N.} 5 Military intervention and secession in South Asia: The cases of Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and Punjab. Westporl, CT. 2007, p. 54.

^{Muni S.D.} 6 Op. cit., p. 50 - 51.

^{Hussain I} 7 The role of Tamil Nadu in Indo-Sri Lankan relations// Dilemmas of Indo-Sri Lankan relations.., p. 135 - 137.

^{Muni S.D.} 8 Indo-Sri Lankan relations and Sri Lanka's ethnic conflict // Internationalization of ethnic conflict. L, 1991, p. 119 - 120.

^{Dissanayaka T.D.S.A.} 9 War or peace in Sri Lanka. Mumbai, 2004, p. 90 - 103.

¹⁰ Weiss G. The Cage: The tight for Sri Lanka and the last days of the Tamil Tigers. L, 2011, p. 71 - 72.

^{Meyer E} 11. Sri Lanka: Biography of an Island. Between local & global. Negombo, 2003, p. 178; Muni S.D.). Indo-Sri Lankan relations.., p. 119.

^{Tilakaratna B.} 12 The Sri l^anka Government and peace efforts up to the Indo-Sri Lanka accord: Lessons and experiences//Negotiating peace in Sri l.anka: Efforts, failures and lessons. Colombo. 2006. Vol. 1, p. 55.

^{Smamy M.R.N.} 13 Tigers of Lanka: From hoys to guerrillas. Colombo. 2006, p. 237 - 238.

¹⁴ Indo-Sri Lanka agreement to establish peace and normalcy in Sri Lanka // South Asia Terrorism Portal. Colombo. 29 July, 1987 -http://www.satp.org

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ Hussain I. Op. cit., p. 128.

^{Bandarage A.} 17 The separatist conflict in Sri Ijnka. Terrorism, ethnicity, political economy. Bloomington, IN. 2009, p. 138 - 144.

^{Suryanarayan V.} 18 Prospects for reconciliation // Sri I.anka: Peace without process. Colombo. 2006, p. 103.

^{Bandarage A.} 19 Op. cit., p. 153.

^{Mukarji A.} 20 Sri Lanka: A dangerous interlude. Colombo, 2005, p. KM.

^{DeVotta N.} 21 Is India over-extended? When domestic disorder precludes regional intervention // Contemporary South Asia. 2003. Vol. 12, N 3, p. 372 - 378.

^{Swamy M.R.N.} 22 The Tiger vanquished: LTTL's story. New Delhi, 2010, p. 121 - 124.

²³ Ibid., p. 124.

^{Destradi S.} 24 India and Sri Lanka's civil war: The failure of regional conflict management in South Asia// Asian Survey. 2012. Vol. 52, N 3, p. 605 - 607.

²⁵ MLA positive on anti-LTTL contact groups. Cable 06NI-:WDI-:LIIM100, 12.06.2006//Wiki Leaks- http://wikileaks.org/

²⁶ See: Listopadov N. A. Rout of terrorists in Sri Lanka / / Asia and Africa Today. 2009, N 11; Lunev S. I. The end of the civil war in Sri Lanka and its lessons // North-South-Russia 2009. Ezhegodnik, Moscow, IMEMO RAS Publ., 2010.

²⁷ See: Listopadov P. A. Edict op.

²⁸ См.: Annual reports: 2009 - 2010, 2010 - 2011,2011 - 2012, 2012 - 2013 // Ministry of Lxternal Affairs, Government of India http://mea.gov. in/annual-reports.htm?57/Annual_Reports

^{Karthick S.} 29 India hikes assistance to Sri Lanka by Rs 210cr // The Times of India. Chennai, 02.03.2013.

³⁰ Behuria A. K.,Sultana G. Mahinda Rajapaksa's India policy: Lngage and countervail // Strategic Analysis. 2013. Vol. 37, N 1, p. 93 - 94.

³¹ Gotabhaya wants 13th amendment repealed without delay // Sri Lanka Mirror, 15.10.2012 - http://www.inirror.lk/news/2480-gotabhaya-wants-13th-amendment-repealed-without-delay; 19th Amendment for new devolution package // The Sunday Times. Sri Lanka, 11.11.2012.

³² Sri Lanka's TNA leaders in Delhi for talks // Zee News, 11.10.2012 - http://zeenews.india.com/news/nation/sri-lanka-s-tna-leaders-in-delhi-for-talks_804926.html

³³ PM's reply in the Rajya Sabha debate on the President's address // New Delhi. 8 March, 2013 - http://pmindia.gov.in

³⁴ Sri Lanka 'war crimes': Main allegations // BBC News, 17.06.2011 - httpy/www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-13158916

^{Goodhand J.} 35 Sri Lanka in 2011: Consolidation and militarization of the post-war regime // Asian Survey. 2012. Vol. 52, N 1, p. 136.

^{Destradi S.} 36 Op. cit., p. 609 - 610; DeSilva-Ranasinghe S. Sri Lanka's stability critical to New Delhi's Indian Ocean ambitions // Lulure Directions International, 22.06.2011 - htlp://www.futurcdi-rections.org.au/publications/indian-ocean/29-indian-occan-swa/117-sri-la nkas-slability-critical-to-new-delhis-indian-ocean-ambitions.html

³⁷ India votes against Lanka, but gets resolution diluted // Hindustan Times, 22.03.2012 - http://www.hindnstantimes.com/world-news/F.u rope/I ndia-votes-against- Lanka-but-gets-resolution-diluted/ Article1 - 829280.aspx

³⁸ UNI IRC resolution: No consensus on India's amendments, says Khurshid // First Post. India, 21.03.2013 - http://www.firstpost.com/ world/unhrc-resolution-no-conscnsus-on-indias-amendinents-says-khurshid-670751.html

³⁹ India DMK Parly Ministers leave government // BBC News, 20.03.2013- http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-india-21854933

⁴⁰ Indian Government rejects Tamil Nadu resolution on Sri Lanka // Sri Lanka News, Department of Government Information, 31.03.2013 -http://www.news.lk/news/sri-lanka/4679-indian-govt-rejecls-tamil-nadu-resolution-on-sri-lan ka

^{Mayilvaganan M.} 41 Engaging post-LTTL Sri Lanka: India's policy options // India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs. 2012. Vol. 68, N 1,p. 20.

^{Suryanarayan V.} 42 Focus on the Sri Lankan Tamil refugees // Sri Lanka Guardian. 13.11.2009 - http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/ 11/focus-on-sri-lankan-tamil-refugees.htm I

⁴³ Sri Lanka: Refugees in India reluctant to return // Integrated Regional Information Networks, 04.09.2012 - hltp://www.irinnews. org/report/96233/SRI-LANKA-Refugces-in-India-reluctant-lo-return

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