Libmonster ID: IN-1266
Author(s) of the publication: O. A. BOYARKINA

PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS OF SETTLEMENT

O. A. BOYARKINA

Candidate of Political Sciences

Federal Agency for Scientific Organizations

Keywords: Indus and Mekong Rivers, water geopolitics, transboundary water resources, national interests, international water conflicts

Fresh water is one of the most scarce natural resources in South and Southeast Asia. Its distribution causes conflicts in these regions, which are characterized by high rates of population growth and rapid economic development. As a result, the increased demand for water contributes to the escalation of political tensions, as well as endangers regional political security.

This is the case, for example, in the Indus and Mekong River basins. The main tributary of the Indus, one of the largest rivers in the world with an area of approximately 1.7 million square kilometers, is the Sutlej River, which takes in the waters of the Bias, Ravi, Jhelum and Chinab rivers. About 300 million people live in the Indus basin. The river originates in China, in the Himalayan Mountains, and flows through India and Pakistan (see map 1).

HYDRO POLICY IN THE INDUS BASIN

The history of the international water conflict in the Indus River region began with the independence of India and Pakistan in 1947. During the armed conflict between the two countries, 2/3 of the Kashmir principality went to India, and the north-western part - to Pakistan.

Map 1. Indus River.

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Almost immediately, a period of sharp territorial disputes began between the two new sovereign states, mainly over the division of Kashmir. At the same time, the "water factor"played an important role in the disagreements that arose.

Here it should be borne in mind that Kashmir is of strategic importance for both states. For India, it is important from a geopolitical point of view, since its possession makes it possible to control Chinese Tibet and the so-called "Bacchalus corridor", which opens the way through Afghanistan to Russia.1 Pakistan, being an agricultural country, is completely dependent on the water resources of the Indus River flowing in this region. It is through Kashmir that the bulk of water for irrigation purposes enters Pakistan.

With the collapse of British India, the unified water management system was destroyed, and inland rivers became trans-border. At the same time, on the territory of India, which has become the "state of the upper reaches", there are a number of hydroelectric power stations that supply the irrigation channels of the underlying Pakistan with water resources. Thus, Pakistan has become dependent on India's water policy.

The problem is compounded by the fact that 92% of Pakistan's territory needs water in arid climates and that more than half of the country's population is engaged in agriculture, which is the mainstay of the state's economy. The 1947 canal water Supply Agreement ended with the outbreak of the first Indo-Pakistani War. In April 1949. India blocked the Indus altogether, changing the riverbed, and Pakistan had to pay for the water. In addition, Pakistan was also denied access to the Ravi and Sutlej rivers. The dispute over the water rights of international rivers was resolved only in 1960, when the conflicting parties concluded the Indus Waters Treaty.2

An important role was played by the World Bank (WB), which mediated the settlement of the conflict. The bank's proposals were based on the recognition of the sufficient volume of water in the basin for the normal social and economic development of both countries, as well as on the need to consider and resolve the water conflict separately from the political, mainly territorial dispute.

Under the 1960 Treaty, the Indus Basin was divided into western and eastern rivers. India was granted rights to the Sutlej, Biasa and Ravi Rivers (eastern rivers), and Pakistan was granted rights to the Chinab, Jhelum and Indus Rivers (western rivers, whose total flow was approximately 80% of the total). India also received the right to use the water of western rivers, but it could not change their channels and build reservoirs without prior approval from Pakistan.3

During the 1960s and 1970s, a number of hydraulic structures on cross-border rivers were built jointly by the two States. The largest of them are Mangla Dam on the Jhelum River and Tarbela Dam on the Indus River.

However, contrary to the provisions of this treaty, India has repeatedly continued to take unilateral actions in the Indus basin. In 1970, Indian plans to build a reservoir in Salalah (near the source of the Chinab River) provoked another outbreak of water conflict, which was resolved only in 1978.A new reason for the conflict was the construction of the Tulbul dam by India in 2005.

Its construction was perceived by Pakistan as a threat to its national security: the country, after completion of the work, could, according to various estimates, not receive about 0.37 cubic km of water per year4 (given that the total runoff per capita in the Islamic Republic of Pakistan in 2005 was close to the critical level of 1.1 thousand cubic meters). 5 cubic km).

The growing tension between the two countries over the water issue was caused by the fact that India often did not provide the necessary technical information to the Pakistani side and rarely coordinated its hydraulic engineering projects with it. It has repeatedly built dams and reservoirs in violation of the terms of the 1960 Treaty. The "water policy" of a neighboring country has often forced Pakistan to apply to international institutions for arbitration and international expertise, 6 but only some Indian projects have passed it.

Problems with the use of the waters of cross-border rivers could often lead to an armed regional conflict. The situation was saved by the fact that the Indu treaty mentioned above was signed not by two border countries, but by three parties, including the World Bank. Thus, the Permanent Commission on

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Map 2. The Mekong River.

The Indus River, established in 1960 under Chapter VIII of the Treaty as a negotiating platform and to facilitate bilateral dialogue on the use of trans-boundary river resources, functioned even during the two Indo-Pakistani wars (1965 and 1971), which were triggered by regular territorial disputes.

India's unilateral actions on cross-border rivers and its territorial claims do not contribute to the further development of water cooperation between the two countries. Today, the Indian leadership is increasingly raising the issue of denouncing the "water treaty" with Pakistan.

Rapid population growth along with high economic growth rates pose an acute challenge for India to overcome water hunger (from 1947 to the present, the water supply per capita in the country has decreased by more than 3 times - from 5 to 1.5 thousand cubic meters 7). Being a regional power center, on the one hand, and a country with an energy - deficient economy, on the other, India is actively developing hydro projects on transboundary rivers, often without taking into account the interests of the neighboring state.

So, in 2012 Pakistan and India are once again on the verge of a military conflict, caused by India's construction of the largest hydroelectric power station in the region, Nimu Bazgo. The commissioning of this hydroelectric facility has significantly reduced the amount of water flowing into the lower Pakistan, which regularly suffers from drought. According to experts, the construction of the Nimu-Bazgo hydroelectric complex caused significant damage to the economy of Pakistan8. Over the years of independence, the water supply per capita in the republic has decreased 4.5 times - from 5.6 to 1.2 cubic meters.9

Accusing India of "water terrorism", the Pakistani leadership even announced the possibility of a nuclear strike on India in the event of its withdrawal from the 10 treaty. Taking into account the fact that the population of both countries has increased almost 3.5 times since its conclusion, and both countries are already experiencing an acute water shortage, it becomes obvious that the treaty is really under threat, and in the near future we can predict a new aggravation of the "water relations" between India and Pakistan.

WATER GEOPOLITICS IN THE MEKONG BASIN

The international political situation in the Mekong River basin is no less tense. Cooperation in the use of transboundary water resources (TWR) in this region is complicated not only by the large number of stakeholders, but also by the non-participation of "upstream countries" in the project.

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the negotiation process on the joint development of TVR.

The Mekong is one of the largest rivers in Asia: its basin area is approximately 800 thousand square kilometers, the river occupies the 12th place in the world in terms of flow.

The Mekong is formed in the Tibetan Plateau, then flows through China (Yunnan Province), Myanmar, Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and in Vietnam flows into the South China Sea. Thus, the river inextricably connects 6 states (see map 2).

Its pool can be divided into Upper and Lower. The lower one makes up about 76% of the entire river basin and includes Laos, which occupies 25% of its territory, Thailand -23%, Cambodia-20% and Vietnam-8%. The Mekong basin is home to more than 300 million people11.

Water cooperation in the region began in the second half of the 1950s. Even then, the international community was aware that a transboundary river has a potential for conflict, and understood the need for joint management of TVR. In this context, in 1957, under the auspices of the United Nations Economic Council for Asia and the Far East, the Committee for Coordination of Integrated Development of the Lower River Basin was established. At the same time, two upstream countries - China and Myanmar - refused to participate in the negotiations on its creation.

The committee's functions were to develop plans for the joint development of the river basin, develop conditions for each of the four countries ' participation in the implementation of possible projects, and coordinate work on their implementation. Political instability, armed conflicts accompanied by border changes, and a number of other factors led to the fact that by the 1990s, only one project was completed with the participation of the committee-the construction of the Nam Nguyen dam in Laos.12

The committee's role was effectively limited to providing hydrological data, as well as providing environmental and technical assistance to Thailand and Laos in carrying out work on the Mekong tributaries.

The end of military operations in South-East Asia in the late 1980s, the resolution of the conflict in Cambodia (1991), and the creation of a favorable political environment in the region did not, however, contribute to improving the effectiveness of regional cooperation. On the contrary, in the first half of the 1990s, a new hotbed of tension was likely to appear due to the increasing demand of Southeast Asian countries for Mekong resources. First, Thailand, then Laos and Vietnam seek to implement large-scale water projects that promise significant economic benefits for each of the three countries, and, as a result, can lead to an aggravation of interstate relations.

Thailand was the first to implement its ambitious hydraulic engineering projects on the Mekong, which caused complaints from the countries of Southeast Asia, since the economic plans of this country for the development of the river's hydraulic resources did not take into account the interests of other states. Thus, in 1991, the so-called Kong Mun Chi project caused particular concern and criticism of the Vietnamese leadership, since its implementation could lead to a sharp reduction in runoff.13

For Vietnam, the world's second-largest rice exporter after India, which consumes about a quarter of the Mekong's water resources, the loss of fertile land in the river delta could result in serious economic damage and become water dependent on Thailand.

It should be noted that in the post-war period (early 1990s), it was difficult for the States of Southeast Asia to come to mutually acceptable solutions on water projects. In fact, the clash of interests of the lower-level countries was inevitable, since then they were faced with the acute task of accelerating economic development.

Depleted by long-term political instability, the lower reaches are striving for economic modernization, which is based on the development of the Mekong's hydropower potential and the creation of modern irrigation systems. This would help to solve both food problems and the problem of energy supply in cities.

In 1995, the downstream countries (Laos, Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam) concluded an agreement on cooperation in the Mekong River basin.14 In accordance with it, the Mekong Commission was established. 15 The functions of this intergovernmental organization were to maintain and coordinate actions for the development and use of the river's water resources, taking into account the interests of the State.-

page 44

of each country participating in the agreement. The Commission is supported by national Mekong committees established in all four States. This created a framework for implementing a unified water policy in the region, which is enshrined in the Mekong River Agreement at the legislative level.

In fact, however, the commission was unable to agree on the conflicting national interests of the parties, each of which pursued exclusively its own economic goals. Southeast Asian countries prefer to implement national river basin development plans. In fact, the creation of the commission was a purely political step, creating a basis for further cooperation, but by no means solving practical problems of joint development of the Mekong resources. Unfortunately, national interests in the water sector still prevail over regional ones.

With the construction of large dams in the upper reaches of the river by China in 1995, the question of a serious environmental threat to the Mekong arose.16

The problem is that China, the largest consumer of the Mekong's transboundary water resources, which accounts for about 20% of the river's flow, is not a party to the 1995 agreement and is not a member of the Mekong Commission, which significantly limits the latter's ability to influence the water policy pursued by the Chinese leadership.

China's plans to build 14 more dams on the Mekong River in the next decade are designed to solve a number of internal socio-economic problems of the country, primarily meeting the energy needs of the population. 17 However, their implications are far from clear. South-East Asian countries are concerned that the implementation of these projects will negatively affect the high water of the river in its lower course.

In 2004, there was already a decrease in the water level in the river to a critical level, which caused discontent among the population of the lower countries. As a result of changing ecosystems, the irrigated agriculture of Thailand and Vietnam, as well as the food security of Cambodia, may be at risk. However, open opposition to the regional pole of power - the PRC - runs counter to the economic interests of the lower-level states, which are interested in attracting its investments.

China, in turn, is guided by pragmatic interests in solving domestic social problems, not always taking into account the interests of its neighbors, whose economic and environmental security depends on its water policy.

In 2002, under pressure from the Mekong River Commission, the PRC made some concessions, in particular, agreed to regularly provide hydrological data to coastal States. However, it has not abandoned its ambitious water management plans.

As a dialogue partner since 1996, but not a member of the Mekong Commission and therefore not bound by any legal obligations, China emphasizes its intention not to follow the rules of the agreement on the sustainable use of Mekong River waters. In fact, the fate of 80% of farmers living in the lower Mekong basin today depends on the water policy pursued by the Chinese leadership. In this regard, the question arises today about the need to include the PRC in the commission as a full member.

In 2011, the commission, based on the results of the environmental impact assessment of dam construction, decided for the first time in its history, in agreement with all its participants, to postpone the implementation of any hydraulic engineering projects on the Mekong River for 10 years. However, despite this, Laos continues to conduct an active economic activity here, which, of course, causes concern for its neighbors.

In 2013, the Lao leadership announced the imminent start of construction of the Don Sahong dam on the Mekong River. The goal of the hydro project is to stimulate economic development and achieve 90% of the country's electrification by 2020. After implementation, it is planned to export electricity to Cambodia, Thailand, and China. Prior to the implementation of this project, official Laos agreed to hold consultations with neighboring countries on the project, which began on July 25, 2014, within the framework of the Mekong Commission18.

The problem is compounded by the fact that the Mekong River Commission is only an intergovernmental advisory body; the agreement

page 45

1995 does not give it the right to force member countries to abandon the implementation of hydroprojects. 19 The advisory nature of the Commission's decisions explains Laos ' open opposition to act in accordance with them. In fact, it turns out that the downstream States retain the right to build dams without the consent of the other states of the river basin.

* * *

The existence of an institutional framework for water cooperation in the region, and this is the Mekong Commission, is undoubtedly a significant step towards strengthening the partnership between the countries of Southeast Asia for the joint development and use of the waters of the great international river. The Commission meets annually. In January 2015, the 21st regular session was held, during which the results achieved in the sustainable management and development of the Mekong River, financial aspects, as well as the impact of major hydro projects on the state of the environment were discussed.20

The expected increase in population in the lower Mekong basin will lead to a significant increase in demand for water and energy resources of the river and will sharply challenge the states of Southeast Asia to find new mutually beneficial solutions for the economic development and use of Mekong waters. In this context, the existing legal framework for regional water cooperation can significantly facilitate the solution of these tasks.

Examples of water cooperation in the Indus and Mekong basins show that international water conflicts are still manageable. This requires sufficient political will on the part of the national leadership, a well-developed regulatory framework, and an effective institutional mechanism for developing regional water partnership, taking into account the economic interests of all countries covered by the international river basin.


Blinkenberg L. 1 India-Pakistan: The History of Unsolved Conflicts. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, Dansk Udenrigspolitik Institute Skrifter, 4. 1972, p. 52.

2 The Indus Waters Treaty - http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTSOUTHASIA/Resources/223497 - 1105737253588/IndusWatersTreatyl960.pdf

Biswas A.K. 3 Indus Water Treaty: the Negotiating Process // Water International, 17 (4), 1992, p. 202.

Mustafa K. 4 IWT does not allow Wullar Barrage, Pakistan tells India // The International News, 13 May 2011 - http://www.thenews.com.pk/Todays-News-13 - 5960 - 1WT-does-not-allow-Wullar-Barrage-Pakistan-tells-India

Belokrenitsky V. 5 Pakistan - India: confrontational stability? / Mezhdunarodnye protsessy [International Processes], vol. 4, No. 2 (11). May-August 2006. (Belokrenitsky V. 2006. Pakistan - India:... // Mezhdunarodnye protsessy. Vol. 4, N 2(11) (in Russian)

6 Permanent Court of Arbitration, Indus Waters Kishenganga Arbitration (Pakistan v. India), 2010 - 2013 -http://www.pca-cpa.org/showpage.asp?pag_id=1392

7 The problem of fresh water. Global Context of Russian Politics, Moscow, MGIMO-University. 2011, p. 48.

8 Eastern countries in the struggle for water resources -http://www.uefima.ru/v-mire/vostok-v-borbe-za-vodu.html

9 The problem of fresh water...

10 Indus River basin (Afghanistan, China, India, Nepal, Pakistan). Cross-border cooperation on international rivers: problems, experience, lessons learned, expert forecasts - http://www.cawater-info.net/bk/water_law/2_1.htm

11 Asian Development Bank, Greater Mekong Subregion, II WWF - http://www.adb.org/countries/gms/main

MacQuarrie P.R., Viriyasakultom V., Wolf A.T. 12 Promoting Cooperation in the Mekong Region through Water Conflict Management, Regional Collaboration, and Capacity Building // GMSARN International Journal 2 (2008), p. 178.

Rogozhina N. G. 13 Ekologicheskaya strategiya stran Yugo-Vostochnoi Azii. M. Ecological Strategy of the countries of South-East Asia (socio-political aspect), IMEMO RAS, 2010, p. 100. (Rogozhina N. G. 2010. Ekologicheskaya strategiya stran Yugo-Vostochnoi Azii. M.) (in Russian)

14 Agreement on the cooperation for the sustainable development of the Mekong River basin, 5 April, 1995 -http://www.mrcmekong.Org/assets/Publications/policies/agreement-Apr95.pdf

Diokno M.S.I. and Chinh N.V., 15 eds. 2006. The Mekong Arranged & Rearranged. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Mekong Press.

Rogozhina N. G. 16 China's hydropower policy // Online magazine "New Eastern Outlook", 28.07.2014 - http://ru.journal-neo.org/2014/07/28/gidroenergeticheskaya-politika-kitaya/

Sheridan М. 17 Chinese dams draining the life from Mekong River // The Times, February 24, 2015.

18 Mekong River Commission - http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/consul tations/don-sahong-hydropo-wer-project/

19 Australian Mekong Resource Centre. The governance role of the MRC vis-a-vis Mekong mainstream dams, 2008.

20 Twenty-first Meeting of the MRC Council -http://www.mrcmekong.org/news-and-events/news/media-advisory-twenty-first-meeting-of-t he-mrc-council/


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