Buddhist philosophical anthropology up to the present time has been known outside the circle of specialists only fragmentary and in an extremely simplified form. This is primarily due to the relatively late development of the historical and philosophical direction in orientalism, and in particular in Buddhology. Suffice it to mention that the first translation of the Buddhist philosophical treatise, which is included in the collection of canonical texts in the Pali language (Pali Canon), was made only in 1900 (Rhgs, 1900). At that time, acquaintance with Buddhism from primary sources was mainly based on texts that were more accessible in terms of presentation - the Pali canonical literature of sermons (sutras) and religious and disciplinary instructions (vinaya). However, in these texts, Buddhist ideas were presented in a non-systematic form, but only in the form of conversations of the founder of the faith (Shakyamuni Buddha) with your students and converts. The merit of F. I. Shcherbatsky was that he was the first to apply to the analysis of Buddhist philosophical texts a concept that claimed to differentiate different levels in the worldview systems-axiological, epistemological and psychological, etc. E. the concept of Russian academic neo-Kantianism.

Specific Buddhist terminology functioned in the sutra and Vinaya texts without strict definitions of the scope and content of concepts, and therefore the interpretation of its semantics was a difficult task for researchers. Moreover, it was often not even possible to determine whether a word in this context is a "technical term" (as it was customary in philology to call units of a special lexicon) or is used in a common language (dictionary) meaning.

The philosophical canonical literature found itself in such a situation almost beyond adequate translation. Types of definitions of concepts and specific Indian syllogistics, which were not identical with Aristotelian logic, prevented penetration into the content of treatises, and the system of views expounded in them remained inaccessible to European researchers.

Another serious problem was that the living Buddhism of the Far East (China, Japan) and Central Asia (Tibet and Mongolia) had their own regional sets of canonical texts - the so-called Chinese Tripitaka and the Tibeto-Buddhist canon. These collections were based not on the texts of the Pali Canon, which represented the local (Ceylon) tradition of Indian Buddhism, but on the main Sanskrit version of the canonical corpus - the Sanskrit Tripitaka (lit. "Three meetings"). In contrast to the Pali Canon that has been preserved

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However, the original version was considered lost, 1 and researchers had only Chinese and Tibetan translations. In addition, particularly significant Indian post-canonical treatises, such as Vasubandhu's Abhidharma Encyclopedia, were included in the regional canonical codes.

For understanding the development of Buddhist philosophical thought in India, it was the Sanskrit sources - treatises of the post-canonical tradition that were preserved in an extensive volume-that were of paramount importance. They were polemics with orthodox Brahminist schools that defended the sacred ideological heritage of the Vedas on a logical-discursive level, and they also presented concepts that systematically explained the theses of Buddhist canonical philosophy.

However, studies of the Pali Canon have been of little help in uncovering these concepts. Structurally, the Pali version of the canon (Tipitaka) and the Sanskrit version (Tripitaka) coincided, which was revealed when comparing the names of the three sections of the Pali original and the regional (Chinese and Tibetan) canonical codes. Both versions contained collections of sutras (Pal. Sutta-pitaka, skt. Sutra-pitaka), instructions (Pal. - Skt. Vinaya-pitaka) and treatises (Pal. Abhidhamma-pitaka, skt. Abhidharma-pitaka). However, the nomenclature of the treatises, as well as their content, differed.

By the beginning of the 20th century, Oriental studies had not yet developed a complete and coherent picture of the Buddhist worldview. The researchers were not sure that classical (Indian) Buddhism could be qualified as a religion, since it rejected the ideas of God and the substantial soul and did not show interest in the metaphysical problem of true being. Based on the study of Pali sources-the Sutta-Pitaka and Vinaya-Pitaka-the Buddhist worldview was regarded in the works of Orientalists of that time, in particular the Rees-Davids spouses (who were leaders in the study of the Pali tradition), as a kind of moral and ethical philosophy that regulates the life of their followers.

At the same time, this teaching included the idea of the cycle of births (samsara), which is inherent in Indian religious beliefs, as well as the concept that explains the connection between the past, present and future lives of each individual - the "law of dependent origination" (Skt. pratyakamutpada). In addition, the highest goal of spiritual life was indicated - the achievement of Nirvana, the cessation of the cycle of births and thereby the liberation of the individual from the suffering inevitably associated with both the process of existence and death. To achieve this goal, followers of Buddhism were required not only to make "moral and ethical efforts", but also to perform a specific psychotechnical practice - Buddhist yoga, aimed at completely calming the mind and gaining pure gnosis - "seeing reality as it really is."

The process of collecting and studying Sanskrit manuscripts, which was actively carried out in the second half of the XIX - beginning of the XX century in research centers of Western Europe and the Russian Academy of Sciences, allowed us to identify a significant body of Buddhist post-canonical texts devoted to the problems of logic and the theory of knowledge and mostly not related to religious issues. And this circumstance led researchers to believe that the subject of Buddhist philosophy cannot be reduced to moral and ethical issues. The fact that the Buddhist philosophical text was genetically related to the general Indian thought tradition was not in doubt, but the main idea of the text remained a mystery.

The reason for the unresolved problem was the inefficiency of the methods used in working with Buddhist texts. And the first to post-

1 Fragments of the Sanskrit Tripitaka - texts related to the Sutra and Vinaya literature - were discovered only in the mid-twentieth century.

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A major Russian Buddhist scholar, a student of the famous indologist I. P. Minaev (1840-1890)2 F. I. Shcherbatskaya, who later became the founder of the St. Petersburg School of Buddhology, was asked to develop a new theoretical approach based on historical and philosophical methodology.

F. I. Shcherbatskoy (1866-1942) entered the history of Russian science as a general orientalist - Sanskrit scholar, Palist, Tibetologist, and historian of Indian classical poetics. However, his works on Buddhist philosophy received international scientific recognition in the first place. F. I. Shcherbatsky's monograph" Buddhist Logic", published in English in 1930, is still a model of orientalist historical and philosophical research in this area [Stcherbatsky, 1930-1932].

The greatest interest is the contribution of F. I. Shcherbatsky to the development of the methodology of historical and philosophical Oriental studies, which made it possible for the first time to come very close to the study of Buddhist philosophical anthropology based on the material of the Abhidharma Encyclopedia. The fact that identifying the subject of Buddhist philosophy was not an easy task was also due to the Eurocentric interpretation of philosophy as a form of mental activity. Philosophy at that time was identified only on the basis of the European tradition, which goes back to the definition of Aristotle. Accordingly, theoretical constructions that are genetically related to religion could not be fully summed up under this definition. Since the Buddhist written heritage did not provide direct and complete analogies to what was commonly understood in Europe as a philosophical treatise, the problem of identifying philosophical texts in the array of Buddhist written heritage required a special theoretical and methodological understanding.

The Buddhist thought tradition developed as a commentary tradition, appealing either directly to canonical works or to the basic treatises of specific Buddhist schools. Therefore, Buddhist philosophical systems (darshanas) were not of author's origin, but were developed in certain schools. In turn, this meant that the unit of historical and philosophical understanding could be precisely such views, and not the author's 3. Thus, Buddhist logical-discursive texts could only be typologically compared with the ancient heritage, in which philosophical works had the character of individual creativity, free from the direct influence of religious values. However, at that time, the idea of the comparability and equivalence of different cultures had not yet become a generally accepted theoretical postulate, and researchers focused on finding direct analogies, rather than on typological comparison.

At the same time, significant progress has been made in the field of studying Indian Brahmin philosophy, which was initiated by Max Muller's monograph "Six Systems of Indian Philosophy" (Muller, 1995). This was explained by the obvious connection of Brahminist philosophical texts with religious discourse, as well as the fact that they more closely corresponded to the ideas of European researchers about the form of presentation of metaphysics and the theory of knowledge. However, inattention to the religious and ideological orientation of Brahminist philosophy led to a shift in semantic accents and attempts to "recode" the content of treatises in accordance with the rubrication developed by the German historical and philosophical tradition: ontology, theory of knowledge, the doctrine of the soul, ethics, etc. Such a rubrication, abstracted both from the fact of the influence of religious ideology on philosophy, and from the prag-

2 For Minaev's work as an indologist and Buddhist scholar, see [Ermakova, 1998].

3 For the first time, this most important methodological circumstance was thoroughly understood by the Indian scholar S. Dasgupta, author of the six-volume History of Indian Philosophy [Dasgupta, 1961].

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However, the study of the mathematical task of Brahmaist philosophizing - the justification of the highest goal of religious life - did not contribute to the disclosure of the real content of Indian classical religious and philosophical systems.

In the 1900s, the intellectual situation turned out to be contradictory in Buddhist historical and philosophical studies. On the one hand, researchers could not help but see that it was the religious doctrine that served in Buddhism as the direct material for historically primary philosophical reflection, which was embodied in the third section of the canon. On the other hand, scholars tended to view the texts of all three sections of the text either as something syncretic or simply as a step-by-step sequence of presentation of the teaching. With this approach, the content specifics of each section could not be taken into account or were distorted. In particular, the Pali Buddhist scholar Caroline Rees-Davids initially qualified the Abhidharma pitaka only as a further explanation of the religious and ethical teachings of the Sutta Pitaka. In addition, the personal worldview of researchers who interpreted Buddhism by analogy with Protestantism or sought to see it as a harbinger of certain scientific ideas - up to the theory of relativity-also had an additional impact when working on texts.

The method of interpreting the text was entirely borrowed from classical (Greco-Roman) philology. Its theoretical foundations were reduced, in fact, to the idea of interpreting the text under study, based solely on its linguistic and stylistic features. Extralinguistic factors were fundamentally ignored in order to avoid the danger of unjustified expansion of the semantic field. This approach to the interpretation of the text was formulated in the second half of the 19th century by German researchers of written monuments of Mediterranean antiquity. Schleiermacher, A. Beck, F. Astom, F. Wolf, G. Steynal 4. The main meaning of philological interpretation was seen by them to achieve an understanding of the author's thought by identifying and then interpreting the specific features of its linguistic design - lexicon, syntax, stylistics. At the same time, the genre of a written monument was taken into account only to the extent that it could affect the functional style of the language.

Interpretation aimed at revealing the content, i.e. aimed at obtaining information, was called technical and was not considered strictly scientific in the philological aspect, since it could not be limited only to the analysis of the language.

The same philological approach prevailed in Buddhology. Most of the major representatives of Western European Buddhology in the 19th and early 20th centuries-E. Burnouf, G. Oldenberg, R. Pichel, H. Kern, Max Muller, and the Rees-Davids couple-were excellent experts in Indian languages (Sanskrit and Pali). It was these scholars who made fruitful efforts aimed at accumulating historical and cultural material concerning Buddhism; at textual processing and publication of Buddhist texts; and at translating canonical works. However, the philological approach based on the analysis of grammatical structures, etymology, and the selection of" appropriate "dictionary meanings from the position of" common sense " did not bring fruitful results, since it was not methodologically focused on revealing the strict philosophical semantics of the conceptual and terminological apparatus of Buddhist thought. This negative influence of "philology" was also found in general essays on the history of Buddhism. Professional historians of philosophy were disappointed when they got acquainted with them, because they did not see a clear philosophical content in Buddhism as an ideological system.

4 For more information on the philological approach to the interpretation of texts in ancient studies and biblical studies, see [Gorsky, 1981, pp. 13-41].

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The results of applying the philological approach to the Buddhist philosophical heritage were obviously counterproductive : the transfer of the conceptual and terminological apparatus by means of common language dictionary meanings led to the appearance of dark and incoherent translations that were inaccessible to rational reading. Such translations gave the European reader a biased idea of the level of development of Buddhist theoretical thought and only strengthened the Eurocentric view of it. Indeed, in comparison with the translations of Plato, Aristotle, and other Greek authors, the Buddhist thought tradition, interpreted in accordance with the philological approach, looked extremely vague and intellectually poor.

Among the Western European and Japanese scientists who clearly realized the unsatisfactoriness of this situation, we should mention first of all K. Ries-Davids, L. de la Balle Poussin, M. Walliser and D. T. Suzuki. They attempted to analyze the description of categories of the Buddhist worldview (Rhys Davids, 1900; Vallie, 1909; Wlleser, 1904; Suzuki, 1907). However, due to the lack of development of the historical and philosophical approach and the lack of study of the classical works of the Buddhist post-canonical tradition - Sanskrit early Medieval treatises - these attempts could not be successful. In scientific retrospect, they reveal a common serious flaw-distortion of the content of the basic concepts of Buddhist philosophy and arbitrariness in the reconstruction of its categorical system.

This raises a very interesting question in the context of the dialogue of cultures: if "philology" was an obstacle to the progress of Western European Buddhology, what prevented Japanese scholars who were personally involved in Buddhism from reasonably identifying and analyzing the categorical structure of Buddhist philosophy? To answer this question, it is necessary to refer to the description of the state of the study of Buddhism in Japan, which was given by O. O. Rosenberg in the monograph "Problems of Buddhist Philosophy", published in 1918 [see: Rosenberg, 1991, pp. 63-71], when the St. Petersburg Buddhist School already received thanks to the works of F. I. Shcherbatsky O. O. Rosenberg noted that the entire body of Japanese literature on Buddhism can be divided into two groups: works devoted to the history of the Japanese Buddhist tradition, i.e. schools and sects, and works aimed at the study of ancient, Indian Buddhism. He cautioned against being "too trusting" about the latter, since traditional Japanese scholars studied Indian Buddhism from Chinese translations, and the process of mastering Sanskrit in Buddhist theological schools in Japan was slow.

In addition, Japanese Buddhists were dominated by two schools of thought - the old and new schools, which were at odds over the study of Indian heritage. The new school was formed under the influence of Western European Indology, from which it adopted a philological approach. O. O. Rosenberg calls university Professor B. Nanze5 the founder of this direction. The scientists who belonged to the new school had a European education, and there were not many of them.

Representatives of the old school reproached the "innovators" for adhering to a foreign culture and neglecting the Buddhist tradition of Japan. At the same time, they asked the rhetorical question: what is the use of studying only fragmentary preserved Sanskrit heritage, while the Chinese Tripitaka is predominant for living Japanese Buddhism?

As O. O. Rosenberg noted, the compromise between the old and new schools was achieved due to a gradual understanding of this circumstance,

5 B. Nanze together with Kh. Kern published the original Sanskrit version of the Lotus Sutra [see Saddharmapundarika, 1912].

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that the texts of the Chinese Tripitaka contain many concepts and concepts that cannot be interpreted without knowledge of philosophy and Sanskrit. Such a compromise was welcomed by European colleagues, who sought to unite the efforts of scientists and experts in the tradition. This is stated in particular in the preface of M. Winternitz to the second volume of the History of Indian Literature, devoted to the Buddhist heritage (Winternitz, 1913).

O. O. Rosenberg also stressed the importance of such an alliance, but with the caveat that one should not hope for any cognitive advantage of Japanese traditional scholars, because the standard for translating Buddhist philosophical terminology does not exist not only in European languages, but also in Japanese. D. T. Suzuki's work "Outlines of Mahayana", published in Chicago in 1900, was described by him as reflecting the position of educated Japanese people interested in Buddhism. At the same time, O. O. Rosenberg calls Suzuki himself "an English teacher related to the Japanese sect of mystical contemplation of Zen", which did not attach much importance to the literary tradition and was criticized by other Buddhist schools for being "unsystematic and unscientific" (Rosenberg, 1991, p.68).

It was against the background of the situation described above that F. I. Shcherbatskoy made a breakthrough in the study of Buddhist philosophy, which allowed further scientific comparison of the forms of philosophizing with the living cultural tradition of Buddhism in Central Asia and the Far East with the classical Sanskrit heritage.

Already at an early stage of his scientific activity, F. I. Shcherbatskaya considered Buddhist philosophy not in isolation, but in the process of its ideological confrontation with Brahmanism, a religious and philosophical trend that developed in ancient and early medieval India simultaneously with Buddhism. This formulation of the problem helped to reveal the main range of issues focused in this confrontation, which presumably began in the middle of the 1st millennium BC and ended by the X century AD, when Buddhism was finally pushed out of India. Brahmanism as a religious ideology proclaimed its strict adherence to the Sacred Vedic Canon [see: Erman, 1998] and was interesting to F. I. Shcherbatsky in the aspect of those ideologemes that were subject to refutation or reinterpretation in Buddhism. These are the teachings about Atman (the eternal soul, the substantial Self), about samsara (the cycle of births in which the Self discards some properties - dharmas-and acquires others depending on the righteousness or unrighteousness of life's activities), about karma (the human activity that causes a new birth and determines its characteristics and quality), about nirvana as liberation from the cycle of birth associated with the experience of suffering.

Only in the light of the interpretation of these ideological concepts recorded in the Upanishads-the philosophical section of the Sacred Vedic Canon-could one come to understand the typological specifics of the Buddhist worldview, which denied the truth and authority of the Vedic heritage and rejected the Brahminist picture of the world by denying the reality of the Atman and rejecting the idea of a creative divine principle. It was also obvious that an important trend in the development of philosophical discourse in Buddhism was the defense of religious doctrine in the dispute with Brahmanism.

The next methodological moment for F. I. Shcherbatsky was the choice of a historical and philosophical position. The scientist approached this problem with the search for an explanatory theoretical language that would be understandable to European thinkers and at the same time correspond in a comparative sense to the ideas developed in the Buddhist philosophical heritage. In the initial choice of F. I. Shcherbatskaya, I chose neo-Kantianism. This was facilitated by the extraordinary distribution of-

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The development of neo-Kantian views in the field of the history of philosophy, in particular, the concept of the head of the Baden school, V. V., became particularly popular. Windelband.

At St. Petersburg University, where F. I. Shcherbatskoy taught, the position of neo-Kantianism was also very strong. It was dominated by the school of A. I. Vvedensky (1856-1925), which later became known in the history of Russian philosophy as Russian academic neo-Kantianism. This trend appeared relatively independent in the Neo-Kantian tradition and differed in theoretical content from its Baden and Marburg branches.

F. I. Shcherbatsky's close attention to neo-Kantianism, and in particular to the Russian Neo-Kantian school, is evidenced by his first major historical and philosophical work "Theory of Knowledge and Logic according to the teachings of later Buddhists" [Shcherbatskoy, part 1, 1903; Part 2, 1909]. In the introduction to the book, the author drew a parallel between the subject under study and neo-Kantianism. He wrote: "Buddhism has developed a special theory of knowledge in connection with logic to defend its foundations. The main features of this theory give it the right to be called critical: it explains all metaphysical knowledge as impossible, restricts the domain of what is known exclusively to the sphere of possible experience, and sets the task of philosophy not in the study of the essence and beginning of all things, but in the study of the reliability of our knowledge" [Shcherbatskoy, 1903, p.VII]. At the same time, explaining the qualification of the Buddhist theory of knowledge as "critical", F. I. Shcherbatskoy refers to the program article by A. I. Vvedensky "On Kant real and imaginary [Vvedensky, 1894, book 25] .6
In the quoted formulation and in the reference to A. I. Vvedensky, a clear methodological idea of identifying the subject of Buddhist philosophy with neo-Kantianism was already traced on the basis of the approach formulated by the leader of Russian academic neo-Kantianism. And this identification implied a comparative parallel in understanding the orientation of Buddhist and neo-Kantian philosophical discourses. Let's try to reconstruct this parallel.

The goal that the Russian neo-Kantians set for themselves was to build objective general methodological foundations of scientific knowledge, free from heterogeneous extra-scientific layers. Analyzing the scientific worldview, A. I. Vvedensky identified two layers within it: meaning itself and faith as a system of" morally grounded " dogmatic assumptions. Accordingly, in the field of philosophical problems, he did similar work aimed at identifying the process of cognition of objective phenomena of nature and the process of forming "beliefs". The neo-Kantian conceptualization of" beliefs " included a set of very different hypothetical judgments: opinions; hypotheses generated by the creative ability of the human mind; assumptions that go beyond the scope of scientific interests; theses accepted on faith; and those scientific propositions that were not available for individual verification.

On the basis of this analytical dichotomy, the definition of the subject of "critical philosophy" was developed, in which epistemology had the decisive word. Critical philosophy, according to Russian neo-Kantians, includes both the results and conclusions of the sciences, and all kinds of beliefs, including religious ones. Epistemology is designed to differentiate scientific facts and beliefs, so that then the prospect of a holistic assessment of the worldview system opens up.

6 In this article, A. I. Vvedensky differentiates "critical" and "dogmatic" philosophy as follows: "The established meaning of these terms that has emerged since Kant's time and has been established over the course of a century is: 'critical' - Kantian, i.e., consistent with the principles of the 'Critique of Pure Reason', and therefore 'dogmatic' - inconsistent with these principles (be it empiricism, rationalism, positivism, etc.) " [Vvedensky, 1894,p. 4]. pp. 38-39].

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Russian academic neo-Kantianism expressed indifference to metaphysical problems. The fact of the existence of the external world was not rejected, but it also did not become an object of special theoretical reflection. As a result, Kant's" thing-in-itself " became an agnostic residuus of knowledge.

Such, in short, was the content of the concept of "critical philosophy" in A. I. Vvedensky. It is precisely under this concept that F. I. Shcherbatsky summed up the theory of knowledge and logic of the Buddhist school of yogachara7 (another name is vijnanavada) - one of the four schools of the post - canonical tradition, presented in his study of the treatise Dignagi (V - VI centuries) and the commentary to it by Dharmakirti (VIII century). Thus, the scientist tried to apply the methodological framework of the theory of knowledge and logic of the Buddhist school of Yogachara 7 (another name is Vijnanavada). a dichotomy of Russian academic neo-Kantianism to the analysis of Buddhism in order to identify in the structure of the classical written heritage those works that were devoted to the problems of epistemology. He proceeded from the hypothesis that the theory of knowledge that emerged in Buddhism was aimed at criticizing "beliefs" and completely eliminating metaphysical problems from the field of the philosophical text.

"Indian religions," wrote F. I. Shcherbatskoy, " allowed freedom of thought and freedom of belief to a much greater extent than we are used to seeing in other religions... In the field of philosophy, the most fundamental difference between Buddhism and Brahmanism was that Brahmanism was concerned with finding the true being, whereas Buddhism declared the true being unknowable... The Buddha denied the existence of God, the existence of the soul, the existence of true happiness. But its negation is only the negation of the corresponding statements of the brahmans... In view of the fact that many researchers consider the philosophical teachings of later Buddhism completely inconsistent with the spirit of the teachings of the Buddha himself, we will point out that if the former are understood in the sense of a critical theory of knowledge, then this contradiction disappears" [Shcherbatskoy, 1903, p.XI - XII]. From this methodological statement, it becomes obvious that Buddhist philosophy, which was revised from a neo-Kantian point of view, was presented to F. I. Shcherbatsky as a kind of analog of "critical philosophy", but which arose in a different cultural area and in a different historical era. The scientist explains the possibility of its appearance in India during the early Middle Ages by the typological peculiarity of South Asian religions - their tolerance for free-thinking. It was precisely in this typological difference that F. I. Shcherbatskoy saw the answer to the question posed by him, which is very serious in the aspect of philosophical comparative studies: "How could a critical theory of knowledge be developed among Buddhists who sought primarily to protect their religion from opponents?" [Shcherbatskoy, 1903, p. XII].

Of course, from the standpoint of modern knowledge about the history of philosophy and culture of ancient and early medieval India, and in particular about the history of Buddhist philosophy, this answer looks naive. But what is important here is that F. I. Shcherbatsky's point of view was entirely neo-Kantian in this period. Moreover, in his monograph on Dignaga and Dharmakirti, he sought to draw a neo-Kantian line to the earliest origins of Buddhist philosophy, seeing in the views of the original Buddhist schools "an unsystematic attempt at a critical view of the world and knowledge" (Shcherbatskoy, 1903, p. XVIII). To back up your posy-

Yogacara (vijnanavada) 7 went down in the history of Indian philosophy as an influential school of Mahayana Buddhism, which traced its teachings back to Bodhisattva Maitreya, a legendary figure in the Buddhist pantheon. The basic concept of yogacara is the doctrine of consciousness (vijnana-vada), in which only the momentary act of awareness (vijnapti-matra) of perception data was recognized as real, and all other quanta of the psyche (dharma) related to past and future moments of mental processes were considered only as elements of a theoretical description, i.e. cognitive constructs. For more information about yogachara, see Kanaeva, 2000; Zabolotnykh, 2002; Lenkov, 2006.

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In this article, the author appealed to the historical and philosophical qualification of Buddhism. Schreider is a Windelband researcher.

Thus, in his first major work, F. I. Shcherbatskoy defined the main direction of the study of philosophical thought as a reconstruction of the history of the formation of critical philosophy in India:"...if Dingaga and Dharmakirti developed a critical theory of knowledge based on the teachings of the Buddha himself, then our information about the original Buddhism also has many reference points"(Shcherbatskoy, 1903, p. XVIII).

In this direction, the scientist planned a promising selection of Buddhist philosophical treatises for translation and study. So, after the publication of the second part of the Theory of Knowledge..., F. I. Shcherbatskaya turns to the Tibetan version of a small treatise of Dharmakirti, Santanantara-siddhi, and Vinitadeva's commentary on it. The literal title of this treatise - "Proof (of the existence) of the other" - he interpreted as "Justification of someone else's animateness" (Shcherbatskoy, 1922). And this interpretation clearly captures the appeal to the ideas of another prominent Russian neo - Kantian, I. I. Lapshin. In the preface to the publication of the translation of the treatise Dharmakirti, published much later, F. I. Shcherbatskoy explained his interest in the problems of the treatise: "The question of what is the basis of our belief in the existence of conscious beings other than ourselves is one of the most difficult in philosophy, although our ordinary thinking refuses to see it as any question at all. We are indebted to Professor I. I. Lapshin for an excellent sketch of the history of this question and the answers given to it at various times. From this review, it is clear that the question is important not so much in itself as as a touchstone for philosophical constructions, in which the answer to it fits more or less successfully" (Shcherbatskoy, 1922, p.VII).

I. I. Lapshin's monograph " The Problem of the Alien Ego in Modern Philosophy "(Lapshin, 1910) continued the discussion of the issues raised by A. I. Vvedensky in his work "On the Limits and Signs of Animation" (Vvedensky, 1892). The analysis of the problem of the " I "for the Russian neo-Kantians was a significant point of philosophizing precisely because the" I", identified with consciousness, acted for them as the only unquestionable basis for knowledge.

The vulnerability of such a position lay in the hidden danger of solipsism, since the only direct cognitive contact with the world of phenomena was limited in the views of neo-Kantianism to the moment of their sensory apprehension, direct sensation. Beyond this contact lay the realm of fundamentally unconscious " things-in-themselves." This danger of going into solipsism was fixed in Russian academic neo-Kantianism through the concept of "the external world", which follows from the requirements of knowledge, it acted as a simultaneous theoretical support of agnosticism. The " external world "for the knowing" I " remains an integral part of knowledge, but it is a purely specific knowledge-indicating the fundamental limitation of epistemological possibilities. Without such knowledge, the Self would be trapped in a belief - as it has come to know the world, so it is in reality. Introducing the idea of the reality of someone else's "I", Russian academic neo-Kantianism formulated the paradox of simultaneous irrefutability and inconsistency of Solipsism.

The problem of the existence of someone else's " I "was considered by A. I. Vvedensky and especially I. I. Lapshin as a kind of historical and philosophical touchstone for testing any system of thought for the presence of this paradox in it. I. I. Lapshin attempted to consider the types of solutions to the problem of someone else's" I " in the historical and philosophical process. "The problem of the 'alien self'," he wrote, "was solved implicitly, so to speak, in an 'unidentified' form in very different ways in ancient philosophy. There is no doubt that its solution was "implied", albeit in a vague form, in the nihilistic view of the world of the sophists, and in the materialistic view of the world of Democritus, and in the teachings of Plato

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on the relation of individual consciousnesses to the universal soul, but the first impetus to the conscious formulation of this question was undoubtedly given by Descartes "[Lapshin, 1910, p. 10].

Such a turn of historical and philosophical problems greatly appealed to F. I. Shcherbatsky, who, referring to the treatise of Dharmakirti "Justification of alien animation", sought to apply the problem of" alien Self " to the analysis of Buddhist philosophy. In the preface to the translation of the treatise by F. I. Shcherbatskaya, he noted:: "In India, this question arose naturally in connection with the establishment in later Buddhist philosophy of spiritualistic monism, or, as it is usually called, idealism. Once an idealistic view of the world was established in philosophy, according to which there are no external objects outside of our ideas, then the idea naturally arose that there are no living beings outside of us, that they are also just our ideas, i.e., a point of view that directly leads to solipsism. But since humanity, for many reasons, is not inclined to put up with such a result, realism, seemingly defeated, proudly raises its head and raises the question of external animation, not so much to justify it as to refute idealism, to indicate that it leads to the absurd " [Shcherbatskoy, 1903, p. VI - VII].

Philosophical qualifications mentioned in the same context by F. I. Shcherbatsky become meaningfully understandable only when referring to the historical and philosophical essay by I. I. Lapshin. I. I. Lapshin identified six headings, under which he summed up the positions of thinkers in the historical and philosophical process: naive realism, materialism, hylozoism, monistic idealism, monadology and two types solipsism - dogmatic and skeptical. It was within these qualifications, which were based on the types of solving the problem of someone else's "I", that F. I. Shcherbatskoy analyzed the dialogue between the "idealist" and the" realist " in the treatise Dharmakirti.

As for the issues of translation of Buddhist philosophical texts and interpretation of terminology, the scientist expressed this quite explicitly: "Ambiguities in the translations of Indian scientific treatises are largely due to the philological attitude to the texts, an attitude that was passed down to us by tradition from our teachers-classical philologists" [Shcherbatskoy, 1903, p. VI]. F. I. Shcherbatskoy suggests a compromise as a solution: the implementation of two translations - "literal", taking into account the interests of philological hermeneutics; and interpretive, i.e. historical and philosophical.

To understand the meaning of this compromise, it is necessary to keep in mind that philosophical hermeneutics as a textual subdiscipline claimed to be a strict execution procedure, excluding any attempts to interpret the text content in isolation from their linguistic formation8. Extralinguistic interpretation was defined as "transcendental interpretation" and was considered potentially fraught with errors, since philology did not have the appropriate methods that could confirm the truth of such an interpretation.

By offering to carry out a "literal" translation, F. I. Shcherbatskoy hoped to reveal the limits of applicability of philological hermeneutics and in the subsequent interpretive translation to demonstrate the heuristic possibilities of the historical and philosophical approach.

The invaluable scientific merit of F. I. Shcherbatsky was that he was the first to venture to apply the concept of Russian academic neo-Kantianism to the analysis of Buddhist philosophical texts. The study of "beliefs" and the critique of cognitive experience were supplemented in this concept by raising the question of the need to bring the doctrine of the soul and the essence of the psychic beyond the limits of experimental psychology.-

8 For the methods of philosophical hermeneutics contemporary to F. I. Shcherbatsky, see [Blass, 1891].

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Vvedensky, 1892; Vvedensky, 1914], since the imperative of recognizing someone else's animateness is dictated to a person by a moral sense.

Russian neo-Kantianism was engaged in an in-depth study of psychological problems precisely because consciousness was the center of its philosophical attention. In addition, A. I. Vvedensky developed a theoretical view of mystical perception - a way of comprehending transcendent entities [see: Vvedensky, 1901]. And in this A.V. Shcherbatsky saw a special perspective for applying neo-Kantian methodology to the analysis of Buddhist philosophical texts, since he clearly imagined that Buddhism is a functionally differentiated ideological entity and does not fit into the ideas of religious syncretism. This, in turn, implied the possibility of an analytical distinction between religious doctrine, which marks the axiological specifics of Buddhism, psychotechnical practice as a way of realizing the highest religious values (i.e., Buddhist yoga), and philosophical discourse aimed at the theoretical explanation and defense of the Buddhist worldview. Although neo-Kantianism, which emerged in a different historical, cultural and philosophical context, was hardly able to fulfill the role of such an analytical tool in the study of Buddhism, it nevertheless significantly contributed to the progress of historical and philosophical orientalism, giving impetus to an in-depth consideration of the Buddhist teaching on the psyche.

list of literature

Blass F. Hermeneutics and criticism. Odessa, 1891.

Vvedenskiy A. I. Mysticism and criticism of V. S. Solov'ev / / Philosophical essays. Issue I. St. Petersburg, 1901.

Vvedenskiy A. I. O Kant realnom i mnimom [About Kant real and imaginary]. Voprosy filosofii i psikhologii [Questions of Philosophy and Psychology]. 1894. Book 25.

Vvedenskiy A. I. On the limits and signs of animation. St. Petersburg, 1892.

Vvedenskiy A. I. Psychology without any metaphysics. St. Petersburg, 1914.

Gorskiy V. S. Istoriko-filosofskoe istol'kovanie teksta [Historical and philosophical interpretation of the text]. Kiev, 1981.

Ermakova T. V. The Buddhist world through the eyes of Russian scientists of the XIX-first third of the XX century. St. Petersburg, 1998.

Zabolotnykh E. L. Logico-epistomological views of Dignaga and his successors, Moscow, 2002.
Kanaeva N. A. Problema otvodnogo znaniya v Indii [The problem of derived knowledge in India]. Moscow, 2000.

Lapshin I. I. The problem of someone else's " I " in modern philosophy. St. Petersburg, 1910.

Lenkov P. D. Philosophy of consciousness in China. Phasian Buddhist School (weishi). St. Petersburg, 2006.

Muller M. Six Systems of Indian Philosophy, Moscow, 1995.
Rozenberg O. O. Problems of Buddhist philosophy//Rozenberg O. O. Trudy po bududizmu [Works on Buddhism], Moscow, 1991.

Shcherbatskoy F. I. Preface / / Dharmakirti. Substantiation of alien animation / Translated from the Tibetan by F. I. Shcherbatsky. Pg., 1922.

Scherbatskoi F. I. Teoriya znaniya i logika po ucheniyu pozdneyshikh buddhistov [Theory of Knowledge and logic according to the teachings of later Buddhists]. Part 1. Spb., 1903; Part 2. SPb., 1909.

Erman V. G. The Tree of Hinduism, Moscow, 1998.
Dasgupta S. A History of Indian Philosophy. Vol. 2. Cambridge, 1961.

Rhys Davids C. A. F. A Buddhist Manual of Psychological Ethics of the Fourth Century B. C. Being a Translation Now Made for the First Time from the Original Pali of the First Book in the Abhidhamma Pitaca Entitled Dhamma-Sandani (Compendium of States). L., 1900.

Saddharmapundarika / Ed. by H. Kernad B. Nanjio (Biblioteca Buddhica. X). S-Pb., 1912.

Stcherbatskoy F. Buddhist Logic. Leningrad. 1930 - 1932. Vol. 1 - 2.

Suzuki D. Asvaghosa 's Discourse on the Awakening of Faith in the Mahayana (Daijokishinron). Chicago, 1900.

Suzuki D. Outlines of Mahajana Buddhism. L., 1907.

de la Vallie Poussin L. Buddhisme. Opinions sur I'histoire dogmatique. P., 1909.

Winternitz M. Geschichete der indischen Literatur. Bd. II. (Die Buddhiistische Literatur). Lpz., 1913.

Wlleser M. Die philosophische Grundlage des älteren Buddhismus. Heidelberg, 1904.

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