Since independence, India has chosen and managed to maintain its commitment to a democratic path of development, while in many post-colonial countries, political regimes have transformed into various variants of authoritarianism. One of the reasons for the stability and viability of the Indian version of democracy is related to the colonial period of the country's history, during which the formation and establishment of the parliamentary system and the corresponding political culture on Indian soil was influenced by external impulses [Volodin, 1989, Democracy..., 2001, p. 56]. The British colonial administration played a guiding role in the political process in India, setting its vector and framework. In turn, in colonial India, there were two main ways to learn and practice the use of democratic norms and procedures: participation in the work of legislative bodies and participation in the work of the Indian National Congress (INC) and other parties whose activities were modeled on Western political associations [Divided by..., 2005, p. 19]. The Congress not only defined the nature and pace of the national liberation movement, but was also an important mechanism for the political socialization of Indians, along with the existing legislative councils, municipal bodies and public organizations.

Keywords: Indian National Congress, Swaraj Party, nonviolent non-cooperation, legislatures.

The period of the early 1920s, when after the end of the first campaign of civil disobedience, the Indian National Congress was faced with the need to develop a further program of action taking into account the new political realities, which led to increased intra-party struggle and the formation of a Swarajist wing within the INC, which initiated large-scale participation of congressists in the political process. the work of the Legislative Councils of India.

For a long time in Indian and domestic historiography, the main role in the process of India's progress towards independence was assigned to M. K. Gandhi and the doctrine of nonviolent non-cooperation proposed by him, while the participation of Indian parties in the work of legislatures was underestimated and, as a result, remained less studied. Thus, the Swaraj tactical initiatives were considered as a "rebellion" against Gandhi's methods, and their actions were generally assessed as ineffective [Sitaramayya, 1946; Majumdar, 1963; Aggarwala, 1971; Recent History..., 1959]. Over time, the significance and place of constitutional and parliamentary forms of activity in the liberation movement began to be highlighted in a new way for the subsequent development of the national movement.-

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independent India. There was a growing interest in the constitutional development of India during the colonial period. It is no coincidence that since the 1980s, Indology has been developing an idea of Swaraj activists as a natural phenomenon in the history of the liberation struggle, and the importance of their experience in legislative activity has been emphasized [Bakshi, 1985; Sarkar, 1989; Nanda, 1998]. In this light, the study of internal party discussions in the INC on the future status of the country, on the methods of national struggle allows us to more carefully approach the question of the role and correlation of mass, nonviolent and parliamentary forms of struggle in the INC strategy, the significance of the "constitutional vector" of the liberation movement in the development of democratic political culture and the formation of national statehood.

The period of the first half of the 1920s was difficult and in many ways a turning point in the history of the Indian national liberation movement. In September 1920, the Congress joined Gandhi's massive campaign of civil disobedience, which resulted in the introduction of the repressive Rowlett Act. The non-cooperation campaign was accompanied by an unprecedented surge of enthusiasm and self-sacrifice among Indians. The campaigners believed in the power of the Gandhian method and believed that achieving the national goal of Swaraj was close at hand. However, despite the fact that the movement of nonviolent disobedience to the authorities made a strong impression on the colonial authorities, they failed to make fundamental concessions to the Indians. Moreover, the authorities responded to the satyagraha with massive repression; by the beginning of 1922, about twenty thousand participants were arrested [Sitaramayya, 1946, p. 223]. Of the INC leaders, only Gandhi remained at large.

By this time, the campaign had gone beyond nonviolence during the Bombay and Madras demonstrations, but since the movement was at its peak, Gandhi continued the campaign, denouncing the violence. When another clash between farmers and police occurred in the village of Chauri Chaura, resulting in the death of twenty-two policemen, Gandhi came to the conclusion that it was necessary to stop the non-cooperation movement. He explained his decision by saying that India is not yet ready to conduct long nonviolent campaigns of civil disobedience, which require discipline on the part of their participants. On his initiative, at a meeting of the INC Working Committee in Bardoli in February 1922, a resolution was adopted to end the mass disobedience movement.

This decision caused a wave of disappointment and misunderstanding both among the leaders of the Congress and among ordinary participants of the movement, who were in favor of continuing the fight against the colonial authorities. According to one of the organizers of the satyagraha campaign in Bengal, Subhas Chandra Bose, "the general indignation was increased even more because the Mahatma did not consider it necessary to consult with representatives of various provinces, and because the situation in the country as a whole was extremely favorable for the success of the civil disobedience campaign" (Bose, 1964, p. 108]. However, it should be noted that Gandhi quite correctly assessed the political situation in the country and, obviously, the campaign had already passed its peak and its continuation threatened to lose control of the movement by the Congress and go beyond nonviolence. After the end of the civil disobedience campaign, the INC found itself in a state of deep crisis, and the party's size declined sharply. The situation was further complicated by the fact that the government arrested Gandhi, depriving the party of its ideological leader.

Shortly before his arrest, Gandhi called on the National Congress to move forward with a so-called constructive agenda. Its main provisions included actions to attract new members to the Congress, the spread of hand-spinning and weaving (khaddar and charka), the organization of national schools, arbitration courts, the fight against untouchability and the strengthening of Hindu-Muslim unity. In addition, the party had to continue to pursue a policy of five

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boycotts (of legislatures, courts, educational institutions, posts, and British goods) [The Indian National..., 1924, p. 7], however, some mitigation of the boycott of educational institutions and courts was envisaged. According to Gandhi, the Congress should have stopped promoting boycotts of these institutions, and put the main emphasis on organizing national schools and arbitration courts. The logic of the program was that the ongoing boycott of government institutions required the creation of alternative national institutions, which INC was invited to organize.

In general, the constructive program was designed for the period of retreat of the national forces and aimed at strengthening the Congress ' ties with the masses, consolidating the national movement and promoting the ideas of non-cooperation. However, it could not satisfy all its members, especially those members of the new generation of Indian nationalists who wanted to continue their active struggle against British colonial rule, as well as many moderate congressists who wanted to return to the already tested parliamentary forms of activity and were skeptical of Gandhi's calls for continued non-cooperation with the authorities.

Conferences of the provincial branches of the INC, held in April and June 1922, demonstrated the dissatisfaction of many congressists with a constructive program. The mood in favor of changing the political course of the Congress was particularly strong in the provincial committees of Bengal, Maharashtra and the Central provinces. Representatives of Bengal and Maharashtra, until Gandhi came to the leadership of the INC, played a dominant role in it, determined its ideological and political orientation as a secular liberal party. Ideas about the expediency of Indian participation in the representative and administrative structures of British India had many supporters here. It is no accident that representatives of these provinces formed the core of opposition to the Gandhian non-cooperation program during its discussion at the INC sessions in Calcutta and Nagpur in 1920.

Chitta Ranjan Das, the head of the Bengal Congress Committee, was one of the first to take the initiative to change the party's agenda. While in prison at the time of the Bardoli resolution, he was able to deliver a message to the Bengal Provincial Conference Inc. In his address, Das called for a significant correction of the Gandhian program, outlining the contours of a new tactical line. The Bengali leader stated: "If necessary, we must master the provincial councils and act in them according to the principles of non-cooperation. Perhaps, until we get our rights, our job in the Soviets will be to obstruct and hinder any activity, good or bad" [Das, 1922, p. 17].

The resolutions of the provincial branches of the Congress and the Committee on Civil Disobedience 1 demonstrated that the Gandhian doctrine of non-cooperation had a strong influence on the worldview and political position of INC members, but at the same time, there was also a very serious opposition in the party to the tactics of non-cooperation in its comprehensive version. Against the background of the recognition of India's unwillingness to conduct a new mass satyagraha campaign, the question of attitude towards the reformed legislative bodies, whose powers were significantly expanded in accordance with the Indian Government Act of 1919, became increasingly acute. It was around the question of joining the Soviets that the main disputes broke out, as a result of which the party was divided into two camps: "supporters of change", who advocated tactical innovations.,

1 In July 1922, by decision of the All India Congress Committee, a six-member Civil Disobedience Committee was established: H. A. Khan (Chairman), M. Nehru, V. D. Patel, M. A. Ansari, C. Rajagopalachari and S. Iyengar. After interviewing about eight hundred party members, the Committee concluded that the country is not ready for a new mass campaign of civil disobedience.

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and" opponents of change", followers of Gandhi. According to the Congress charter, the final decision on the party's future program was to be made at the Congress.

The venue of the next congress of the INC in December 1922 was the city of Gaya (prov. Bihar). Both opposing groups in the Congress attached great importance to the congress, so both Gandhi's supporters and their opponents tried to get as many of their representatives to the congress as possible. C. R. Das was elected Chairman of the congress.

In the Chairman's speech, C. V. Das presented his vision of the main problems of the national movement and put forward an alternative to the Gandhian constructive program of political action. He called on Congress to take part in the upcoming legislative elections and, after entering the legislative councils, present a number of demands to the government, and if the latter refused, use tactics to obstruct the work of the councils. In his speech to the delegates, he explained his position as follows:: "So far, we have boycotted the legislative bodies from the outside. We have achieved a lot - the prestige of these bodies has fallen, and the country now knows that the people who sit in them are not true representatives of the people. But legislatures continue to exist, and it is the duty of Congress to boycott them more effectively from within.".., 1934, p. 589]. Indeed, in 1920, legislative elections were held, despite a boycott by Congress, and seats were taken by other parties and associations (mainly liberals) loyal to the colonial government. Therefore, in the current circumstances, the National Congress, according to Das, it made sense to take part in the elections in order to prevent the use of legislative bodies in the interests of the British authorities. In addition, he believed that Congressional participation in the elections and subsequent work in legislative councils would serve as an incentive to activate the national movement, which was in a state of decline after the end of the campaign of civil disobedience.

There is no doubt that Das used the experience of the Irish Sinfainers to formulate his program2 [Nanda, 2008, p. 248]. J. Nehru recalled that many people in India at that time were fascinated by the tactics of the Sinfainers, and even before the start of the disobedience campaign, he himself suggested that M. K. Gandhi adopt this tactic in relation to legislative councils. However, Gandhi rejected it for the reason that such tactics would not be understood by the population, which would be more willing to accept the call to refuse to vote [Nehru, 1955, p.114].

The report of the Committee on Civil Disobedience showed that the majority of INC members did not support the idea of joining legislative councils, so in order to make adjustments to the party's tactical line, it was necessary to prove that Congress ' participation in the work of legislatures did not contradict the non-cooperation program. It is no coincidence that in his speech, C. R. Das paid much attention to the justification of this thesis. "It was stated that participation in the work of legislatures contradicts the idea of non - cooperation," Das said. " The argument is that the idea of joining the councils will always be associated with cooperation. But this is a logically incorrect judgment. Joining the soviets in order to cooperate with the government and joining the soviets in order not to cooperate with the government are two different positions. The former does not correspond to the idea of non-cooperation, and the latter fully corresponds to it" [Congress..., 1934, p. 593]. To substantiate his position, he turned to the analysis of a constructive program, noting that by implementing a boycott of British educational institutions, ships and goods, the Congress sets itself the task of:

2 Sinn Fein is an Irish political organization. In the 1918 elections to the British Parliament, the Sinfainers won the majority of seats allocated to the Irish. The deputies elected from Ireland, refusing to take their seats in the House of Commons, then met in Dublin and proclaimed themselves the first Irish Parliament.

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creating alternative national institutions and developing national production. In his opinion, the only successful form of boycotting legislatures is "to enter the soviets and try to turn them into institutions that meet the interests of Indian society, or to do away with them completely" [Congress..., 1934, p. 590].

As expected, the main disputes between the congress delegates revolved around the issue of the entry of congressists into the legislative bodies. Skepticism about the reformed legislative councils prevailed in the party, and many pointed out that the government did not actually take them into account. The leader of the "opponents of change" C. Rajagopolachari noted that the soviets do not represent the Indian people, they are only a mask issued for representative government [Rajagopolachari's Speech..., 1991, p. 69].

At the same time, attempts were already made at the congress to work out a compromise solution on the controversial issue. Thus, the Madras politician S. Iyengar, referring to the fact that the deputies elected during the first elections in 1920 collaborated with the government, suggested that the Congress take part in the next elections in order to win as many seats as possible, and then refuse to take them. Srinivasa. Iyendar's..., 1991, p. 71 - 74]. However, the "opponents of change" were adamant, especially since their firmness was reinforced by Gandhi's personal authority. According to the "opponents of change", joining the Soviets with the intention of paralyzing their activities will give colonial officials the opportunity to present themselves in the eyes of the world community as martyrs who suffer for the sake of introducing progressive institutions to Indian soil [C. Vijayaraghavachariar's Speech..., 1991, p. 77]. The debate over the participation of the INC in legislative bodies has become heated. The disputes were so prolonged that the congress had to be extended for two days. As a result, Das ' resolution on joining the legislative councils was rejected by a majority of 1740 to 890. The Congress decided that the boycott of legislative bodies, educational institutions, and courts should continue, and decided that each province should take steps to establish national educational institutions on a solid financial basis, as well as self - governing bodies in the village - panchayats [Resolutions of the Gaya..., 1991, p. 81-82].

The contradictions that arose in the Congress regarding the future political course were so deep that C. R. Das and his supporters did not obey the decisions of the congress. On December 31, 1922, the creation of a Swaraj party within the INC was announced, which along with Das included such prominent figures of the national movement as M. Nehru 3, V. D. Patel 4, N. C. Kelkar 5, M. R. Jayakar 6 and others. C. R. Das was elected Chairman of the party and M. Nehru was elected Secretary. The next day, Das submitted his resignation as chairman of the INC., in which he stated that he should work with those who share his point of view, emphasizing that he sees the difference in approaches that has arisen in Congress as a manifestation of its viability; although the activities of the two camps will develop in different directions, in his opinion, there is no reason why everyone should not remain a member of the INC [The Indian Annual..., 1923, p. 872]. However, Das ' resignation was not accepted by the All India Congress Committee, and he continued nominally as Chairman.

3 Motilal Nehru (1861-1931) - lawyer, moderate representative in the INC., supported the civil non-cooperation program of M. K. Gandhi in 1920, leader of the Swaraj faction in the Central Legislative Assembly in 1924-1929.

4 Vitalabhai Patel (1873-1933) was a lawyer, member of the Bombay Legislative Council, and the first elected President of the Central Legislative Assembly of India from 1925-1930.

5 Narasimha Chintaman Kelkar (1872-1947) - follower of B. G. Tilak, editor of the Kesari and Mahratta newspapers.

6 Mukund Ramrao Jayakar (1973-1959) - lawyer, leader of the Swaraj Party in Bombay, one of the founders of the Responsivist Party in 1926, which advocated cooperation with the government in legislatures.

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In February 1923, at the founding congress of the Swaraj party in Allahabad, its program was approved, the preamble of which confirmed loyalty to the credo of the Congress - achieving Swaraj by all constitutional and peaceful means - and the principle of nonviolent non-cooperation, but it was supposed to "use it rationally, and not turn it into a lifeless dogma" [The Program..., 1991, p. 153].

Swaraj as a national ideal of freedom was a rather capacious concept and could be interpreted in different ways-from the status of a dominion to complete independence. There was no consensus in Congress on this issue, so attempts to define Swaraj in constitutional terms led to contradictions in his ranks. Das refrained from identifying Swaraj with any form of government when drafting the Swaraj Party's program. At the same time, at the founding congress, the party's immediate goal was declared to be dominion status. However, the use of the term "dominion status", which in British political practice meant a special form of government established in certain parts of the British Empire, was dictated by the desire to convey national requirements to the colonial administration in a form that they understood. For the Swaraj people, the promotion of self-government was embodied in the right of Indians to draw up their own constitution and determine the nature of the state system, taking into account national characteristics.

Even before the creation of the Swaraj party, there was a wide range of views among the "supporters of change" on the issue of tactics in legislative councils: from total obstruction to selective cooperation with the colonial government, depending on its readiness to take into account national interests. In the end, the program of action was determined in accordance with the position of Das, and he himself became a consolidating figure for the Swarajists. The Swaraj party's tactic in legislatures was that the party's elected deputies would present national demands to the Government and ask for their implementation within a reasonable time; if the demands were not met, the Swaraj Party deputies would adopt a policy of "constant, consistent obstruction" of the legislative councils ' activities in order to make governing through the councils impossible. In addition, party members should not accept any official posts or positions [The Program..., 1991, p. 154].

A curious comment on the obstructionist Swaraj program was published in the Manchester Guardian in June 1923: "To enter the Soviets and then do nothing but obstruct is such a frivolous policy that it must inevitably be overturned by reality... No great prophetic ability is needed to predict that Das's new party will soon cooperate with the government in a direction that will lead to a reasonable opposition "(Manchester Guardian, 1923). Those who were experienced in the mechanism of functioning of the parliamentary system could have predicted in advance that, having entered the path of parliamentary struggle, the Swarajists would be pushed to moderation and compromise by the very practice of parliamentary activity.

During the first half of 1923, influential congressional groups in Maharashtra, Bengal, Punjab, and the Central Provinces announced their affiliation to the new party. The Swaraj activists launched an active propaganda campaign, emphasizing that their program does not contradict the idea of non-cooperation.

According to the charter of the Indian National Congress, amended in 1915, any public organization could act on behalf of the Congress and elect delegates to its annual congresses, if it recognized its credo: achieving self-government by peaceful, constitutional means [Devyatkina, 1970, p.40]. Specific methods were not fixed in the charter, which made it possible to act within the framework of the Con-

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It is open to different movements and groups with different views on the methods and forms of achieving swaraj. Thus, the Congress charter allowed for the very existence of a Swaraj structure within its membership. At the same time, the formation of a Swaraj party, whose program did not coincide with the official course of the INC, undermined its unity and was fraught with the danger of a split. This situation made it imperative to reach a consensus. Neither the Swarajists nor their opponents wanted to split the party and made attempts to resolve the contradictions that had arisen.

At the end of February 1923, the first agreement was reached between the competing groups in Congress, according to which the parties agreed that they would not take any action in connection with entering the legislative bodies until April 30; the "supporters of change" would cooperate with the "opponents of change" in those points of the Congress program on which the parties agreed to enter the legislative bodies. there is no disagreement between them [A Centenary..., 1985, p. 117]. However, this interim agreement left the question of attitudes to Swaraj tactics open. As the Mahratta newspaper of India wrote on this occasion ," if we want to reach a real compromise, the Congress platform should be expanded so as to unite all parties seeking to achieve Swaraj. Congress should not be allowed to become the property of "opponents of change" who can pursue violators " [The Mahratta..., 1991, p. 94]. It should be noted that the editors-in-chief of a number of national periodicals were respected congressional leaders, such as C. R. Das (Forward), N. C. Kelkar (Mahratta), M. K. Gandhi (Young India). The political preferences of the leaders found expression in the pages of newspapers, which served the purpose of explaining the political positions of certain figures and largely shaped public opinion at the regional and pan-Indian level.

The" opponents of change " and the Swaraj party are fighting for leadership positions in Congress, fueled by personal ambitions. There was growing concern among the Indian public and ordinary members of Congress about the current situation in the party, and calls were made to find a compromise in order to preserve the unity of the party. One of the Indian newspapers rightly noted: "Serious disagreements among the leaders of the non-cooperation movement create a difficult situation. Instead of working in concert, the leaders of both congressional groups are sowing the seeds of discord in the country. They seem to have forgotten that by using different methods, they are actually working towards one common goal. Both groups ' programs can be useful and effective in their own ways. While satyagraha will help to awaken the broad masses and prepare them for the struggle for Swaraj, the program of joining the soviets will do the same for the educated classes, preparing them for further political struggle " [The Pranvir ..., 1991, p. 107].

Among the congressists, there were many who did not join any of the opposing groups, actively advocating the search for a compromise solution. On their initiative, in May 1923, a meeting of the All-India Congress Committee was held, at which a resolution was adopted to suspend propaganda for a boycott of legislative bodies due to the presence of a broad opinion in Congress in favor of participating in elections [The Indian Annual..., 1923, p. 165]. In response, the leaders of the "opponents of change" C. Rajagopalachari, V. Patel and R. Prasad resigned from the Working Committee of the INC.

The move by Rajagopalachari and his supporters provoked negative reactions in the national press, most of which were in favor of joining the Soviets. Thus, the Karmavir newspaper noted that Rajagopalachari's actions would only increase divisions and apathy in the country; his position at the INC session in Gai caused great losses for the country, and he should be more practical and not make a fetish of lifeless principles [The Karmavir..., 1991, p. 111]. After the resignation of the three leaders, a new Working Committee was formed under the chairmanship of M. A. An-

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sari, which included leaders who did not belong to either of the two movements: J. Nehru, S. Naidu, A. K. Azad and others. However, this composition of the committee did not enjoy serious support in the party, its decisions were not actually implemented and were sabotaged by individual provincial committees. As a result, he was unable to break the political deadlock in Congress and soon resigned.

Due to the inability of the party leadership to work out a compromise solution, it was decided to submit the question of the further program of action to the supreme body - the congress. An extraordinary congress of the INC was scheduled for September 1923 in Delhi. By this time, the Swarajists had won the sympathy of a significant part of the politically active sections of India, and they easily managed to persuade Gandhi's supporters to compromise. It is important that the draft of another compromise solution on joining the Soviets was put forward by an associate of Gandhi and the leader of the caliphate movement, Mohammed Ali. Later in the Indian press there were reports that M. Ali received a personal message from Gandhi, who was in prison, in which the latter urged Ali not to follow strictly his program, but to act as the interests of the country require [Gandhi's "Wireless"..., 1991, p. 119].

The resolution adopted at the congress in Delhi read as follows: "Every congressman, if he has no religious or other objections to joining the councils, can freely nominate his candidacy and vote in the upcoming elections. The Congress suspends all propaganda against joining the Soviets. At the same time, the Congress calls on all its members to redouble their efforts to implement the constructive agenda of our leader Mahatma Gandhi" [Sitaramayya, 1946, p. 267]. Thus, without officially joining the Swaraj initiatives, the Congress actually authorized the participation of party members in the upcoming legislative council elections, but not on their own behalf. This decision temporarily defused the situation in the INC and was a significant success for the Swarajists. They were given the freedom to implement their tactical initiatives, although they were not able to achieve official recognition of their program.

After the conclusion of the INC congress in Delhi, Swaraj activists actively participated in the election campaign. In October 1923, the election manifesto of the Swaraj Party, prepared by M. Nehru, was released. The party confirmed its determination to "follow the policy of nonviolence and non-cooperation with the existing government until it is radically changed in accordance with the will of the people expressed through its elected representatives", and also stressed that it is a component of the Congress [Bakshi, 1985, p. 51]. The constant appeal to the doctrine of non-cooperation was largely a tactical move on the part of the Swarajists. Since Gandhi's authority among a large part of Indians was still high, it was important for the Swarajists to emphasize the continuity of their program with the principles of Gandhism in order to strengthen their positions in Congress and ensure voter support. In their election campaigns, they used the name of Gandhi, positioning themselves in the eyes of voters as his followers. Looking ahead, it should be noted that the Svarajists ' further activities in the legislative councils were in line with the constitutional tradition, and they took little part in the implementation of the constructive program of M. Gandhi.

Despite the opposition of the "opponents of change" and the inability to use the financial resources of the Congress, the Swarajists achieved significant success in the November 1923 elections. In the Central Legislative Assembly, they won 45 of the 105 elected seats. In the provincial legislative Council elections, the Swarajists achieved particularly impressive results in the Central Provinces, where they won an absolute majority of seats: 41 out of 73 [A Centenary..., 1985, p. 157], thus taking a strategically key position. In Bengal, the Swaraj formed the largest group in the council, with significant support from the Government.-

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whether Muslims 7. Thus, out of 39 seats allocated to deputies from the Muslim community of Bengal, 21 seats were won by candidates from the Swaraj Party [Khan, 1987, p. 10]. In the rest of the provinces, the Swaraj's success was less impressive. In Bombay, Madras, Punjab and Bihar, they won an average of about 12% of the total council seats. Despite the fact that the Swaraj party secured an absolute majority of seats only in the Legislative Council of the Central Provinces, the overall result of the election was assessed in India as their decisive victory.

At the same time, the success of the Swaraj party in the elections has increased its prestige in the Congress itself. At the December 1923 session of the INC in Kokonada, its chairman, Mohammad Ali, appealed to those present not to obstruct the Swarajists in carrying out their program, although he stressed that the Congress was not yet ready to accept their program of joining the Soviets. In addition, Swaraj members, he said, will not be able to devote much time to a constructive program, the implementation of which should be seriously engaged in the National Congress [Congress... 1934, p. 721]. Despite the objections of some representatives of the "opponents of change" camp, the decisions of the congress, in fact, reflected the proposals of the chairman. The final resolution confirmed the Congress ' commitment to the principles of non-cooperation, called on the population to implement a constructive program and prepare for a new campaign of civil disobedience, and also confirmed the decision taken at the congress in Delhi [The Final Compromise..., 1991, p. 141]. It is significant that the author of the resolution was none other than the leader of the "opponents of change" Rajagopalachari. In the end, the desire to find a compromise solution for the sake of preserving the unity of the party prevailed, which was an indicator of the establishment of such principles of political culture as pluralism and tolerance in the internal party life, as well as the understanding of the party leadership of the lack of conditions in the country for organizing a new mass satyagraha campaign.

Thus, the need to develop a renewed political course after the end of the campaign of disobedience led to the emergence of a trend in the INC that competed with the Gandhian one, and then to the emergence of a party that put forward its own program of action based on a combination of parliamentary methods of struggle with the tactics of non-cooperation. The intensity of the battle in the INC over tactics indicated that the idea of using legislative institutions in the national interest, which is traditional for Congress, still finds support among a significant part of its members. However, the non-cooperation program so strongly influenced the worldview of the majority of Indian nationalists that the Swaraj initiative to enter the legislative bodies (contrary to Gandhi's position) could only be implemented under the pretext of conquering and breaking the colonial apparatus from within.

Another round of internal party struggle in the Indian National Congress was connected with the release of M. K. Gandhi from prison on February 5, 1924. In justifying the expediency of Gandhi's early release, the Bombay government, aware of the latter's negative attitude towards the Soviet membership program, pointed out the possibility that "he would openly condemn the Swarajists for their departure from the original principles of non-cooperation, which would lead to a decline in their authority and reduce their chances of pursuing obstructionist policies in legislatures" (Chandra, 1988, p. 238]. In part, the expectations of the colonial authorities were justified.

7 Since one - third of the legislative seats in Bengal were reserved for Muslims, the Swaraj party needed to enlist their support in order to implement a policy of boycotting the work of the councils from within. On the eve of the elections, Das entered into an agreement with representatives of the Muslim community, granting them a number of privileges, in particular, Muslims were supposed to secure 60% of seats in municipal bodies in those areas where they formed the majority, and 55% of posts in the provincial administration after India achieved self-government [The Party..., 2003, p. 43].

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Gandhi's release from prison was applauded by the Indian public, including Swaraj activists, who hoped to enlist his support. To this end, C. R. Das and M. Nehru was visited by Gandhi in Juhu, a coastal city near Bombay, where he was recovering from surgery. Despite all the efforts of the Swaraj activists to convince Gandhi that their program does not fundamentally contradict the doctrine of nonviolent non-cooperation, Gandhi remained unconvinced. At the end of the talks, both sides made statements in the press. Gandhi said that he believes in the original non-cooperation program, but at the same time stressed that he is not going to create obstacles to the participation of Swaraj members in the work of the councils, although he will not help them in this. The Swarajists, in turn, expressed their intention to follow their course, noting that they prefer to be guided not by speculative considerations, but by the vital interests of the country [Nanda, 2008, p. 252]. As a result, after negotiations, relations between the opposing currents in the INC only worsened.

Already in June 1924, Gandhi made an attempt to strengthen the position of "opponents of change" in Congress. At a meeting of the INC Working Committee, he proposed to make a number of amendments to the party's charter, in particular, for those wishing to join the party, to replace the 4% cash contribution with a certain amount of yarn produced by their own hands, and to appoint only those who recognized the thesis of the "five boycotts" to responsible posts in the party [The Indian Quarterly..., 1924, p. 606]. The proposal was strongly opposed not only by Swaraj members, but also by other members of the Working Committee. Das, Nehru and their supporters left the meeting in protest. But even in their absence, Gandhi's resolution was passed by a margin of only one vote, after which he decided to remove it from the agenda.

As the author of the non-cooperation doctrine, Gandhi reacted quite sharply to attempts to make any changes to it and, apparently, wanted to clear the governing bodies of the Congress of those who disagreed with him. The unsuccessful attempt to amend the party's charter, as well as the firm determination of the Swaraj members to continue their course, showed him that the situation in the country and the Congress has changed, and the idea of non-cooperation in the form of a constructive program does not find unanimous support among the participants of the national movement. Gandhi realized that educated India may accept him as a freedom fighter, but it does not accept his philosophy of life [Mishra, 2001, p. 84]. Indeed, despite Gandhi's great authority, the Congress as a political organization cannot be completely identified with his doctrine. The Congress adopted, first of all, the method of struggle for independence, while in understanding the nature of the political and economic structure of India, it was guided by the British model.

The wisdom of Gandhi as a politician was shown in the fact that he did not take the path of aggravating the confrontation with the Swarajists, but showed a willingness to compromise in the name of preserving the unity of the party. In August 1924, he issued a statement in which he noted:: "I still do not approve of the Swaraj program and I know that preparations are underway to seize the Congress in the Belgaum session by the group that will secure the majority of seats. However, the majority principle does not always work when disagreements are fundamental. Under the circumstances, I don't want to keep the leadership of Congress in my own hands any longer. If I have not been able to convince the Swaraj people through simple arguments, I should retire from Congress " [The Collected Works..., 1968, p. 140]. In the same statement, he put forward a number of proposals to work out a compromise. In particular, the end of four out of five boycotts by the Congress for one year, with the exception of the boycott of foreign clothing, and the obligation not to hinder, but also not to help, Swaraj and other parties in carrying out their political activities. At the same time, Gandhi sought to suck.-

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It should also implement the main points of its constructive program, such as the distribution of baggage, the fight against untouchability and the achievement of Hindu-Muslim unity.

Following this, a series of consultations were held between Gandhi and the leaders of the Swaraj Party in order to reach a compromise decision on the future political course of the INC. The repressive measures taken by the Bengal Government against the Swarajists in October 1924 prompted Gandhi to speed up the compromise process in order to strengthen the ranks of the Congress. In November 1924, a joint statement was issued by the three congressional leaders, known as the Gandhi-Das-Nehru Pact, the main provisions of which were as follows: The Congress suspends the non-cooperation program, with the exception of the boycott of foreign fabrics and clothing; further activities of the INC will be carried out in separate areas; work in the legislatures should be continued by the Swaraj party from on behalf of the Congress as an integral part of it, but at the expense of its own funds [The Collected Works..., 1968, p. 289]. In the end, the Swaraj party made more concessions than Gandhi had originally intended.

The Gandhi-Das-Nehru Pact was submitted to the regular session of the INC, held in Belgaum in December 1924 under the chairmanship of M. K. Gandhi, and approved without changes. As J. Nehru noted, " becoming the president of the Congress was for him (Gandhi. - I. B.) in a certain sense, a demotion, because for a long time he was its permanent supreme leader" [Nehru, 1955, p. 149]. The words of J. R. R. Tolkien The Nehrus reflect well the current balance of power in Congress. The Belgaum session was a triumph for the Swarajists, and Gandhi accepted their existence and even agreed to give them a majority of seats on the Working Committee. However, the Swarajists, in turn, also made a number of concessions. Hand-spinning was recognized as one of the conditions for admission to the Congress, and Gandhi and his supporters were given the authority to organize an All-India Association of Spinners with their own funds [The Indian National..., 1925, p. 1-2].

Thus, the confrontation between the two movements in the INC was resolved by dividing the spheres of influence and activities. The official recognition by the Congress of the Swaraj program as one of its activities, on the one hand, was an indicator of the authority and influence achieved by the Swarajists among the politically active part of Indian society, and on the other hand, it demonstrated the multi - variant tactical line of the INC, which made it possible to develop the most appropriate political course.

In our opinion, the decisions of the INC congress in Belgaum were one of the factors that contributed to the already begun transition of the Swaraj party to more moderate positions in legislatures. Due to the temporary refusal of the Congress to carry out the non-cooperation program, the tactical attitude of the Swarajists to boycott the legislatures is no longer motivated; formally, they now had no serious obstacles to changing the party program. By putting forward the slogan of destroying the constitutional system created by the 1919 reform, they were actually trying to get the colonial authorities to further develop parliamentary institutions in India, which was their strategic goal. Obstruction was only a tactic, not an end in itself for the Swaraj people. By the beginning of 1925, it became clear that the method of obstruction chosen by them was not capable of undermining the foundations of colonial rule, which led to a decline in popularity and a weakening of the position of Swaraj members in the legislatures. The very practice of working in legislative councils encouraged Swaraj members to make changes to their program. At first, they were allowed to put forward their own constructive bills, then take part in the work of elected parliamentary committees, and then they began to take seats in government committees [Bochkareva and Kurnykin, 2004, pp. 46-49]. In fact, in the legislative bodies of the second and third convocations, the Swarajists played the role of parla-

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In this capacity, they influenced the adoption of a number of important bills for the country (the introduction of protectionist tariffs in the metallurgical industry, the abolition of excise duty on Indian factory fabrics, the establishment of a military college in India, etc.).

However, the limits of both the destructive tactics of the Swarajists, designed to disorganize the work of the legislative bodies to push the mother country to redistribute powers in favor of the Indians, and the constructive opposition within the framework of parliamentary tactics, which made it necessary to resort to mass forms of pressure on the colonial regime in the form of Gandhian satyagraha, were soon revealed. Following the start of a new campaign of civil disobedience, the INC congress in 1929 decided to disband the Swaraj party.

The nature of intra-party discussions in the Indian National Congress indicated that the idea of using existing legislative bodies to defend national interests was supported by a fairly wide range of Indian politicians and the public. The emergence of the Swaraj party within the INC was not accidental and reflected the process of searching for the most effective methods of pressure on the colonial authorities in accordance with the dynamics of political processes in the country. The Congress's activities in the 1920s marked the beginning of the formation of a national movement strategy, which was defined by the Indian historian B. Chandra with the formula "pressure-compromise-pressure" [Chandra, 1989, p. 3], and assumed an alternate combination of mass campaigns of civil disobedience with work in existing legislative institutions. The role of the Swaraj movement in the history of the Indian national movement was that in the period between two campaigns of civil disobedience, they made it possible to realize the potential of opposition to British rule, albeit in forms limited by the framework of the colonial constitution, and helped strengthen the reformist, parliamentary vector of struggle in the strategy of the INC. In the 1930s, the Swaraj wing was no longer required to be organized, as the policy of participation in the legislative bodies was included in the arsenal of tactical methods of the Congress. With the emergence of the Swaraj wing and the subsequent recognition of its program, the Congress, as a national organization, also began to act as a political party, playing the role of a constitutional opposition in legislative councils.

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